Date: 12-16-2016

Case Style:

Case Number: 2014-CA-01606-SCT

Judge: Tomie Green

Court: IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

Plaintiff's Attorney:

WILSON DOUGLAS MINOR
HAROLD EDWARD PIZZETTA, III
JASON L. DAVIS
tkJAMES M. NORRIS

Defendant's Attorney:

James W. Craig

Vanessa Judith Carroll

Description: In 1994, a jury convicted Charles Ray Crawford of capital murder, rape, burglary, and
sexual battery, and he received a death sentence in the Circuit Court of Tippah County.
Crawford v. State, 716 So. 2d 1028 (Miss. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021, 119 S. Ct.
550, 142 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1998), reh’g denied, 525 U.S. 1021, 119 S. Ct. 1100, 143 L. Ed. 2d
99 (1999). On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Crawford’s conviction and
death sentence. Id. at 1053.
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¶3. Crawford sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Mississippi, which was denied in 2008. Crawford v. Epps, 2012 WL
3777024, *4 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 29, 2012) (citing Crawford v. Epps, 228 WL 4419347 (N.D.
Miss. Sept. 25, 2008)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated
judgment and remanded the case for further consideration. Crawford, 2012 WL 3777024,
at *4 (citing Crawford v. Epps, 353 Fed. App’x 977, 994 (5th Cir. 2009)). On remand, the
district court dismissed Crawford’s petition for writ of habeas corpus with prejudice.
Crawford, 2012 WL 3777024, at *11. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Crawford v. Epps, 531
Fed. App’x 511, 522 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1281, 188 L. Ed. 2d 313 (2014).
¶4. The State’s February 24, 2014, Motion to Reset Execution Date was denied by the
Mississippi Supreme Court on March 31, 2014, because Crawford’s direct appeal from his
rape conviction remained pending. Crawford v. State, 2014-DP-01016-SCT (Miss. Mar. 31,
2014). This Court affirmed Crawford’s rape conviction. Crawford v. State, 192 So. 3d 905
(Miss. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2527 (Mem.) (2016).
¶5. Crawford sought leave in the Mississippi Supreme Court to file a successive petition
for post-conviction relief on February 25, 2014. This Court denied Crawford leave to proceed
on August 4, 2016. See Crawford v. State, 2016 WL 4141748 (Miss. Aug. 4, 2016).
Crawford’s motion for rehearing was denied by this Court on November 10, 2016.
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¶6. Crawford, along with Michelle Byrom,1 filed the present Complaint for Equitable and
Injunctive Relief in the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County on
March 28, 2014. The complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged “violations and
threatened violations of . . . rights to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and art. 3, sections 14, 24, and 28 of the Mississippi Constitution.”
¶7. The MDOC filed a motion to dismiss under Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).The Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, after
a hearing on June 12, 2014, acknowledged in an order entered on July 21, 2014, that
Crawford had sought equitable and declaratory relief, but ruled that the “Complaint is
actually based upon alleged violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and seeks a
determination of the same.” Accordingly, finding the claims to be “legal in substance,” the
chancery court determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and transferred the case to the
Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County.
¶8. The MDOC renewed its motion to dismiss and the Circuit Court of the First Judicial
District of Hinds County granted the MDOC’s motion to dismiss on October 30, 2014, “as
Plaintiff Charles Crawford currently has the same or similar issues under review before the
Mississippi Supreme Court.” Crawford appealed both the chancery court’s order of transfer
and the circuit court’s order of dismissal on November 12, 2014.
1 Byrom’s claims in this case were dismissed voluntarily following the Mississippi Supreme Court’s vacating her capital murder conviction. See Byrom v. State, 2014-DR00230-SCT (Miss. Mar. 31, 2014) 4
DISCUSSION
1. The circuit court erred in finding that Crawford had the same or similar claims pending before this Court at the time the present Section 1983 lawsuit was filed.
¶9. The circuit court granted the MDOC’s motion to dismiss because “Plaintiff Charles
Crawford currently has the same or similar issues under review before the Mississippi
Supreme Court.” Crawford argues on appeal that no factual basis exists for the ruling
because Crawford’s motion for leave to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief
did not include the method-of-execution claim challenging Mississippi’s lethal injection
protocol, which was advanced in the present Section 1983 civil suit. The MDOC’s brief does
not respond to Crawford’s first assignment of error.
¶10. To consider Crawford’s argument, this Court must look outside the record to
Crawford’s Motion for Leave to File Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, filed
in this Court on February 25, 2014. “This Court takes judicial notice of its files.” In re Dunn,
166 So. 3d 488, 492 n.6 (Miss. 2013). In his motion for leave to file a successive petition for
post-conviction relief, Crawford presented no argument relating in any manner to the
method-of-execution issue that is pled in his Section 1983 suit. The circuit court’s order
therefore is factually mistaken. “‘When considering jurisdictional issues the Court sits in the
same position as the trial court, “with all facts as set out in the pleadings or exhibits, and may
reverse regardless of whether the error is manifest.”’” Canadian Nat’l Ry. Co. v. Waltman,
94 So. 3d 1111, 1115 (Miss. 2012) (quoting Knight v. Woodfield, 50 So. 3d 995, 998 (Miss.
2011)).
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¶11. Because the dismissal clearly was erroneous, we reverse. We remand for a
consideration of the legal sufficiency of Crawford’s complaint under Mississippi Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
2. Challenges to the constitutionality of the State’s method of execution may be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court.
¶12. The MDOC argues that the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act
(UPCCRA) provides Crawford’s exclusive remedy: “[t]he purpose [of the UPCCRA] is to
revise, streamline and clarify the rules and statutes pertaining to post-conviction collateral
relief law and procedures, to resolve any conflicts therein and to provide the courts of this
state with an exclusive and uniform procedure for the collateral review of convictions and
sentences.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-3(1) (Rev. 2015) (emphases added).
¶13. The MDOC correctly states that this Court has held that “[a] pleading cognizable
under the UPCCRA will be treated as a motion for post-conviction relief that is subject to
the procedural rules promulgated therein, regardless of how the plaintiff has denominated or
characterized the pleading.” Knox v. State, 75 So. 3d 1030, 1035 (Miss. 2011) (citing
Edmond v. Miss. Dep’t of Corrs., 783 So. 2d 675, 677 (Miss. 2001)). Moreover, MDOC
claims that “[b]y requesting an injunction prohibiting the State from carrying out his
execution, Crawford mounted a collateral attack against the execution of his death sentence.”
¶14. Crawford, however, filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
provides the following:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
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causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Section 1983 suit, Crawford raises various constitutional claims
relating to the specific lethal injection drugs the MDOC intends to employ to carry out his
execution.
¶15. The United States Supreme Court considered a similar case in which the plaintiff
challenged the constitutionality of Florida’s lethal injection protocol pursuant to Section
1983. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 576, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 165 L. Ed. 2d 44 (2006). The
question before the Court was whether the plaintiff’s “claim must be brought by an action
for a writ of habeas corpus under the statute authorizing that writ . . . or whether it may
proceed as an action for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida treated the Section 1983 claim as a petition for writ of
habeas corpus and dismissed it as successive, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Id. at 578.
¶16. The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, noting an important
distinction. Id. at 585. “‘Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars
affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus.’” Id. at 579 (quoting Muhammad
v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750, 124 S. Ct. 1303, 158 L. Ed. 2d 32 (2004) (per curiam)).
Conversely, “[a]n inmate’s challenge to the circumstances of his confinement . . . may be
brought under § 1983.” Id.
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¶17. The Court applied Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 158 L.
Ed. 2d 924 (2004), in which it had held that the plaintiff properly had used Section 1983, as
opposed to filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, to challenge Alabama’s planned use
of a “cut down” procedure during his execution by lethal injection. The Court in Nelson had
observed that “[i]n a State such as Alabama, where the legislature has established lethal
injection as the preferred method of execution . . . a constitutional challenge seeking to
permanently enjoin the use of lethal injection may amount to a challenge to the fact of the
sentence itself.” Id. But the Court continued, “[a] suit seeking to enjoin a particular means
of effectuating a sentence of death does not directly call into question the ‘fact’ or ‘validity’
of the sentence itself—by simply altering its method of execution, the State can go forward
with the sentence.” Id.
¶18. The Hill Court likewise observed that, “[i]f the relief sought would foreclose
execution, recharacterizing a complaint as an action for habeas corpus might be proper.” Hill,
547 U.S. at 582. The Court found that Hill’s “complaint does not challenge the lethal
injection sentence as a general matter but seeks instead only to enjoin the respondents ‘from
executing [Hill] in the manner they currently intend.’” Id. at 580. Specifically, Hill claimed
that “the anticipated protocol allegedly causes ‘a foreseeable risk of . . . gratuitous and
unnecessary’ pain.” Id. And “[a]lthough the injection of lethal chemicals is an obvious
necessity for the execution, Hill alleges that the challenged procedure presents a risk of pain
the State can avoid while still being able to enforce the sentence ordering a lethal injection.”
Id. at 581. The Court further determined that “Hill’s challenge appears to leave the State free
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to use an alternative lethal injection procedure . . .” and that “[u]nder these circumstances a
grant of injunctive relief could not be seen as barring the execution of Hill’s sentence.” Id.
at 580-81.
¶19. Here, as in Hill, Crawford has alleged that the “MDOC’s decision to use compounded
drugs, specifically a compounded anesthetic that has not been tested or approved by the
United States Food and Drug Administration (‘FDA’), means that Plaintiffs may be
conscious throughout their executions and will experience a torturous death by suffocation
and cardiac arrest.” Crawford is not seeking to preclude Mississippi from carrying out his
execution by lethal injection altogether. He asserts that Mississippi’s planned use of
compounded lethal injection drugs presents an unnecessary risk of inflicting gratuitous pain
during the execution in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and of Article 3, Sections 14 and 28, of the Mississippi Constitution.
¶20. Further, state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction of suits brought pursuant to
Section 1983 with their federal counterparts. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139, 108 S. Ct.
2302, 101 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1988) (citing Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 506
507, 102 S. Ct. 2557, 73 L. Ed. 2d 172 (1982)). “Without a doubt the courts of this State have
the authority to hear and adjudge a claim under § 1983.” City of Jackson v. Powell, 917 So.
2d 59, 74 (Miss. 2005) (citing Barrett v. Miller, 599 So. 2d 559, 564 (Miss. 1992)). “This
authority is present even though the statute is not specifically cited by name in the
complaint.” Powell, 917 So. 2d at 74 (citing Hood v. Miss. Dep’t of Wildlife Conservation,
571 So. 2d 263, 267 (Miss.1990)). “This authority is strengthened by the duty and obligation
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our courts have to enforce federally created rights.” Powell, 917 So. 2d at 74 (citing Burrell
v. Miss. State Tax Comm’n, 536 So. 2d 848, 863 (Miss. 1988)).
¶21. The United States Supreme Court has held that method-of-execution claims may be
brought pursuant to Section 1983. Section 1983 claims are cognizable in state court.
Crawford may proceed with his Section 1983 claim in state court.
3. Whether the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County erred by transferring Crawford’s Section 1983 suit to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County.
¶22. On July 21, 2014, the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County
sua sponte ordered this case to be transferred to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District
of Hinds County after finding the claims to be “legal in substance.” Crawford did not file a
notice of appeal until November 12, 2014, nor was a petition for interlocutory appeal timely
filed pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a). Accordingly, the transfer
order is not before this Court at present and we decline to address the issue.
4. Whether Crawford’s complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted.
¶23. As discussed above, the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County
never ruled on the MDOC’s dismissal sought under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), but instead granted dismissal because “Crawford currently has the same or similar
issues under review before the Mississippi Supreme Court.” Because of the mistaken factual
basis upon which the circuit court granted the MDOC’s motion to dismiss, we remand this
case for a consideration of the sufficiency of Crawford’s complaint under Mississippi Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Outcome:

Because the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County erroneously dismissed Crawford’s Section 1983 lawsuit on the basis of a factual misapprehension, we reverse and remand.

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