Date: 05-07-2015

Case Style: United States of America v. Shawn Coughlin

Case Number: 14-1836

Judge: Souter

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on appeal from the District of Massachusetts (Suffolk County)

Plaintiff's Attorney: Crystal S. Yang, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.

Defendant's Attorney: Ken Anderson, with whom Byrne & Anderson, L.L.P. was on
the brief, for appellant.

Description: Shawn Coughlin, a sergeant with
the Plymouth, Massachusetts Police Department, was charged under 18
U.S.C. § 242 with willfully assaulting an obstreperous arrestee
handcuffed and detained in a holding cell, thus violating the
arrestee's right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from
excessive force. The indictment read that Coughlin struck the
victim in the head and kneed him in the body, "resulting in bodily
injury," an element that elevated the crime charged to a felony.
The government's evidence at trial consisted of video footage
of the holding cell, showing the incident between Coughlin and the
victim; the testimony of a use-of-force expert, who reviewed the
video record of the bodily movements of Coughlin and the victim and
gave his opinion that Coughlin struck the victim with his palm and
knees and that such blows were unnecessary under the circumstances;
and testimony from other officers on the scene, one of whom
confirmed that Coughlin hit the victim with his palm and knee.
Coughlin took the stand in his own defense, offered his own use-offorce
expert, and presented witnesses testifying that the victim
did not report any injuries in the hours and days after the
incident. The jury convicted Coughlin, and specifically found
that he caused the victim bodily injury.1
Coughlin raises essentially three claims of error, the first
1 Coughlin was also charged and convicted of one count of
falsifying a record in a federal investigation, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1519.
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being denial of his several motions for acquittal under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. Although he claimed insufficient
evidence for any finding of guilt, the thrust of his argument then
and now is that a jury could not conclude that the victim suffered
"bodily injury," except to such a de minimis degree as to be
legally inconsequential under the statute. Coughlin notes that the
victim neither testified at trial nor reported an injury, and he
emphasizes the want of testimony that the victim uttered any
audible expression of pain.
In our review, which is de novo,
we examine the evidence, both direct and circumstantial,
in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. We do
not assess the credibility of a witness, as that is a
role reserved for the jury. Nor need we be convinced
that the government succeeded in eliminating every
possible theory consistent with the defendant's
innocence. Rather, we must decide whether that evidence,
including all plausible inferences drawn therefrom, would
allow a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged
crime.
United States v. Trinidad-Acosta, 773 F.3d 298, 310-11 (1st Cir.
2014) (citations omitted).
A decade ago, this court held that "bodily injury" under the
statute includes "(A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or
disfigurement; (B) physical pain; (C) illness; (D) impairment of
[a/the] function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or
(E) any other injury to the body, no matter how temporary." United
States v. Bailey, 405 F.3d 102, 111 (1st Cir. 2005) (brackets in
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original).2
Under this broad definition of "bodily injury," Coughlin's
challenges are wholly without merit. A rational jury could easily
find that the video evidence showed what the government expert
concluded and direct witness testimony confirmed, that Coughlin hit
the victim with the palm of his hand and knee, and the same jury
could infer that the recipient of such blows suffers at least some
temporary physical pain. This is all the statute requires, against
which Coughlin's arguments would impermissibly require that
inferences and credibility determinations be drawn in his favor,
and against support for the verdict.
Coughlin's next claim is that the district court erroneously
failed to instruct the jury as he requested on the "objective
reasonableness" standard of excessive force. The district court
gave the following instruction:
A law enforcement officer may use only that force which
would appear necessary to a reasonable law enforcement
officer on the scene, not one with the benefit of
hindsight, in order to prevent injury to himself or
others, bring a subject into custody or keep an arrestee
in custody. An objectively reasonable officer may not,
however, use more force than is reasonably necessary to
2 Much of Coughlin's brief on appeal is devoted to arguing, as
mentioned, that there should be a de minimis exception to the
definition of "bodily injury." But any such argument is foreclosed
by Bailey, which accepts "any" "injury" "no matter how temporary."
405 F.3d at 111. Moreover, as counsel conceded at oral argument,
Coughlin waived this argument below. Coughlin similarly failed at
trial to make his current argument that the court's bodily injury
instruction was in error, and, in any event, that instruction fully
comported with this court's holding in Bailey.
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accomplish these purposes, nor may he use force to
punish, retaliate or deter future misconduct. In order
for you to convict the defendant, you must find that the
government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that his
actions were not reasonable based upon a consideration of
all of the facts and circumstances judged from an
objective consideration of the perspective of the officer
at the scene.
Coughlin asked the district court to include portions of the
opinion in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), particularly its
observation that police officers often must make "split-second
judgments" about the use of force, id. at 397.
We review for abuse of discretion when enquiring whether the
district court's instructions adequately explained the law, Baker
v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 771 F.3d 37, 58 (1st Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted), and find no abuse here. The district court's instruction
properly summarized objective reasonableness, specifically warning
the jury against judging with the benefit of hindsight and twice
referring to the required perspective of the police officer at "the
scene." Coughlin may prefer the "split-second" language in Graham,
but he is not entitled to his preferred phrasing as against the
court's adequate charge. See United States v. Baird, 712 F.3d 623,
633 (1st Cir. 2013) ("District courts have the prerogative to craft
the particular verbiage [used in] jury instructions. So long as
that language properly explains the controlling legal standards
. . . it will not be second-guessed on appeal." (citations
omitted)).
There being no specific error, Coughlin's final claim of
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cumulative error is without merit.

Outcome: The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

Comments: