Date: 01-15-2017

Case Style:

Sex Offender

Case Number: 07-15-00065-CR

Judge: Patrick A. Pirtle

Court: In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Curtis W. Brancheau

Defendant's Attorney:

Walton Weaver

Description: On November 15, 2012, an indictment issued in Cause Number 10,930 alleging
Appellant had engaged in the continuous sexual abuse of M.A.,5 a child younger than
seventeen years of age.6 That same day, a second indictment issued in Cause Number
10,931 alleging Appellant had committed ten separate acts of indecency with a child.
The ten-count indictment alleged Appellant intentionally and knowingly contacted the
breast of M.A., a child under the age of seventeen years of age, with the intent to
arouse and gratify his sexual desire on or about November 1, 2008 (Count I), March 2,
2009 (Count III), February 1, 2012 (Count V), September 1, 2010 (Count VII), and
March 1, 2011 (Count IX). The remaining five counts allege Appellant intentionally and

3 Although Appellant was convicted of ten separate offenses, the trial court entered only one judgment. This court has held on several occasions that the better practice is to enter a separate judgment for each conviction.

4 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, sec. 2 (West Supp. 2016) (providing for the admission of evidence of an extraneous offense in the prosecution of certain offenses, “for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters, including the character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity with the character of the defendant”). Hereinafter, we will cite this article simply as “article 38.37, sec. 2” or “art. 38.37, sec. 2.” 5 To protect the privacy of persons who suffered sexual abuse as minors, we refer to them by their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West 2014). 6 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b) (West Supp. 2016) (requiring that the victim be a child younger than fourteen years of age).

3

knowingly contacted the female sexual organ of M.A., a child under the age of
seventeen years of age, with the intent to arouse and gratify his sexual desire on or
about January 7, 2009 (Count II), November 1, 2009 (Count IV), May 1, 2010 (Count
VI), January 1, 2011 (Count VIII), and April 1, 2011 (Count X).
In January 2015, during a pretrial hearing, the trial court consolidated the two
indictments into one case, under Cause Number 10,931. The trial court also granted
the State’s motion to abandon portions of the continuous sexual abuse indictment. At
the conclusion of the trial, Appellant successfully moved for an instructed verdict on the
remainder of the continuous sexual abuse allegations.
TRIAL
M.A. testified at trial that Appellant, her stepfather, inappropriately touched her at
all five of the family residences from 2001 through 2012, when she turned eighteen
years of age. She testified that, on numerous occasions as early as 2001, while the
family was living in Amarillo, Appellant touched her breasts. She recounted another
incident when Appellant pulled off her shorts and underwear and placed her hand on his
private part.
M.A. lived in Borger, from November 2004 to November 2008, when she was
between nine and eleven years of age. She testified that when she was between ten
and eleven years old, Appellant touched her vagina. In 2008 and 2009, M.A.’s family
moved to Venezuela and later San Pedro, California. In both locations, Appellant
touched her breasts multiple times inside and outside her clothes and touched her
vagina multiple times, both inside and outside her clothes. She also recounted
4

instances where Appellant touched her breasts in a swimming pool in Venezuela and
while passing her in a hallway in their California residence.
According to M.A.’s testimony, the family again lived in Borger from 2009 to
2012, when she was between fourteen and seventeen years of age. She testified that,
during the time she lived in Borger, Appellant touched her breasts one hundred to one
hundred fifty times and touched her vagina underneath her underwear approximately
fourteen to sixteen times. Sometimes, he would touch past the outer lips of her vagina.
She also recounted specific instances where Appellant touched her vagina and breasts
in her bedroom after pinning her against her bed in 2009, touched her breast in the
game room in 2010, and touched her vagina while returning from Amarillo after
purchasing tires in 2010. During this time, she was being home-schooled. While she
was studying, Appellant would come up behind her, place his hand over her shoulder,
and touch her breast.
M.A. further testified that when she was seventeen, she was “skyping”7 with
Mitch Poll. Appellant entered the room and she minimized the computer screen to hide
the fact that she was skyping, but otherwise left the program running. With the video
feed still running, Poll could see M.A. even though she had minimized the screen. Poll
testified that he observed Appellant come up behind M.A., slide his arm around her, and
touch her breast. He also testified that M.A. pushed him away, and after a few minutes,
Appellant left the room.

7 An online video chat program used over the Internet.
5

M.A. testified that when she was between fourteen and seventeen, Appellant
would make inappropriate comments while touching her. He once asked her to give
him oral sex. During another incident, he told her he would divorce her mother and
marry her. During a third incident, he told her that when she went to college, she
needed to find a pretty girl for him so he could visit on weekends and have fun. When
she was between fifteen and sixteen years old, he told her he would have liked to have
taken her virginity.
M.A. finally made an outcry to her mother, Delisa Anderson, because she was
tired of keeping the incidents secret and was afraid what her boyfriend would do after
she had told him about the inappropriate touching. She and her mother then went to
the sheriff’s office and told their story to Deputy Durk Downs.
Delisa testified she and M.A. went to the sheriff’s office after M.A.’s outcry. She
told Deputy Downs that Appellant had put his hand down M.A.’s pants, felt her genital
area, and put his finger up her vagina, but not all the way. At a subsequent meeting
with an investigator and crime victims’ coordinator, Delisa told them that she believed
her daughter would not lie, and Appellant was a manipulator. She also testified that
later she came to disbelieve M.A. because her stories were inconsistent. In a letter sent
from jail by Appellant to his mother, with instructions to share the letter with Delisa,
Appellant wrote “I should have been thrown in prison 25 years ago.” Delisa testified she
thought Appellant was referencing guilt over an extra-marital affair.
Delisa further testified she gave the deputies the name of Appellant’s ex-wife and
told them they needed to check with his stepchildren by that earlier marriage because
6

she had discovered their names on his computer. She also testified there was one
occasion when M.A. woke up in her and her husband’s bed wearing no pants or
underwear.
Deputy Downs testified that in August 2012, he met with Delisa and M.A. at the
sheriff’s office to discuss the alleged indecent behavior of Appellant toward M.A. Delisa
did much of the talking and reported that Appellant had touched M.A. underneath her
clothing. Deputy Downs described Delisa as very cooperative and testified that she
suggested that he seek out Appellant’s stepdaughters from a previous marriage. At the
meeting and a subsequent interview with Delisa, he testified she never gave him the
impression that she did not believe her daughter.
Deputy Downs further testified that after the first meeting, Delisa came forward
with several letters she found at the residence that were written by Appellant the night
before he was to accompany a deputy to the sheriff’s office. In the letters, Appellant
wrote the following:
Sorry for you to have to deal with this. Sorry [Delisa] and [M.A.] for anything and everything. I can’t pretend anymore. I’ve been discovered. Tried to hide so many times. None of this is anyone’s fault, but all mine. * * * But it’s my own fault, no one else’s. I just wasn’t strong enough, not as much as I wanted to be. I’m sorry for what you’re about to face and for any pain I’ve caused in the last 15 years. * * * When I left Michigan in 10th grade, Dawn Manson told me her mother dreamed I was being chased by cops in Texas. Maybe I made it a selffulfilling prophecy. * * *
7

Always afraid of being found out. That’s why I have never stayed in one place too long. I should have been thrown in prison 25 years ago. Have to go write another note now for the cops.
When Appellant was in jail, he wrote several letters intended for Delisa and M.A.,
that were delivered through his mother. Appellant wrote “[M.A.] you have always been
such an inspiration. How many times have I wished I was as good a person as you
are.”
Delisa later brought some items she found in Appellant’s car to Deputy Downs,
including his passport and $10,000. Delisa thought her husband was preparing to leave
town. Deputy Downs later contacted three of Appellant’s stepdaughters from a previous
marriage.
During the State’s case-in-chief, the State offered the testimony of two adult
witnesses (C.A. and D.M.) concerning their being sexually molested by Appellant when
they were children. Prior to receiving their testimony, the trial court held a hearing
outside the presence of the jury. See art. 38.37, sec. 2-a.8 The trial court heard the
testimony to be offered by the State from the two witnesses and determined their
testimony met the requirements of article 38.37, sec. 2. The trial court also decided to
offer a limiting instruction to the jury prior to the presentation of their testimony.

8 Among other testimony, article 38.37 permits a trial court to admit evidence that a defendant has committed a separate past crime, wrong, or act related to the sexual abuse of a child that is not the subject of an indictment for which a defendant is currently being tried for sexual abuse of a child for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters, including the character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity with the character of the defendant. See art. 38.37, sec. 2(b). Before the evidence described by art. 38.37, sec. 2(b) may be admitted, however, the trial court must conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the evidence likely to be admitted at trial will be adequate to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the separate offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See art. 38.37, sec. 2-a.
8

Prior to permitting C.A. to testify at trial, the court gave the jury a limiting
instruction.9 C.A. then testified she was Appellant’s stepdaughter from a previous
marriage. She described a number of situations where Appellant inappropriately
touched her breast and thighs. She stated this occurred thirty to fifty times a year and
that, approximately thirty times, he peeked behind the shower curtain when she was
taking a shower. One such incident occurred while her mother was out of town working.
During that incident, C.A. was watching television late at night when Appellant came up
behind her, pulled her shorts down, and laid on top of her. She could feel his sexual
organ against her, and when she rose up, Appellant rolled off. He was naked.
Prior to admitting D.M.’s testimony, the trial court issued a similar limiting
instruction to the jury without objection. D.M. testified she was also Appellant’s
stepdaughter from the same previous marriage described by C.A. She testified that,
when she was eleven or twelve, Appellant would sit close to her, put his hand on her
thigh, and move his hand closer to her vaginal area. He would call for her to come to
him on a pretense, and when she arrived, he would be sitting with his pants undone with
an erection. He would also enter her bedroom naked and ask to get in bed. He also
rubbed her crotch area with his hand atop her clothes and beneath her clothes. During
one such instance, when she was in the sixth grade, she was on the couch with him
when he suddenly forced her to have intercourse.

9 The trial court gave the following limiting instruction without objection:

Now, before we proceed . . . the Court will give you an instruction that, regarding the testimony of this witness, that you may consider that testimony if you do find beyond a reasonable doubt that the testimony is, in fact, true, and that you can consider that for any—any bearing it has in this case on relevant matters, including character of defendant and the acts performed in conformity with the character of that defendant.
9

Paula Griffin, a legal assistant for a local attorney, testified for the defense. She
testified Delisa and M.A. visited her office several times to discuss with her employer
the allegations against Appellant. She described M.A.’s demeanor as unusual, happy,
and “joking around.” On the third visit, she described M.A. as “chipper” while her
mother was “distraught.” She also testified M.A.’s stories would change.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court issued its jury charge without objection.
The jury charge stated as follows:
III.
The State has alleged in its indictment that the offenses occurred ‘on or about’ November 1, 2008, January 1, 2009, March 1, 2009, November 1, 2009, February 1, 2010, May 1, 2010, September 1, 2010, January 1, 2011, March 1, 2011, and April 1, 2011. However, the State is only required to prove the offenses occurred before the date of the indictment was presented and not necessarily precisely on the dates alleged in the indictment.
XV.

You are further instructed that certain evidence was admitted regarding the defendant having allegedly committed offenses of indecency with a child and sexual assault of a child against victims not named in the indictment. You can only consider said evidence if you believe the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Then and only then, can you consider that evidence for its bearing on any relevant matters including the character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity with the character of the defendant.
Thereafter, the jury convicted Appellant of ten counts of indecency with M.A. He
was then sentenced to confinement for twenty years and a fine of $10,000 on each
count. This appeal followed.

10

ANALYSIS
Appellant asserts (1) the evidence is insufficient to convict him of all ten counts in
the indictment because M.A.’s testimony coupled with the article 38.37 evidence was
insufficient for a jury to convict him, (2) article 38.37, sec. 2 is unconstitutional because
it denies defendants due process by permitting the introduction of purely inflammatory,
prejudicial character evidence, (3) the trial court unconstitutionally applied article 38.37,
sec. 2 in this case because the extraneous offenses were not in conformity with the acts
alleged in the indictment, and (4) the trial court erred by failing to perform a balancing
test under Texas Rule of Evidence 403 prior to admitting the article 38.37, sec. 2
evidence. Logic dictates that we consider the constitutional challenges first.
ISSUES TWO AND THREE—CONSTITUTIONALITY
Appellant asserts he was denied due process because article 38.37, sec. 2 is
unconstitutional and alternatively, that the trial court unconstitutionally applied article
38.37, sec. 2 in this case because the extraneous offenses were dissimilar to the acts
alleged in the indictment. We disagree.
Both issues were recently addressed by this court in Bezerra v. State, 485
S.W.3d 133 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. ref’d). In Bezerra, this court held that
article 38.37, sec. 2 is constitutional and the admission of this type of extraneous
offense evidence does not violate a defendant’s due process rights. Id. at 140
(adopting the reasoning of the court in Harris v. State, 475 S.W.3d 395, 402-403 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d)). See also Robisheaux v. State, 483
S.W.3d 205, 209-213 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet. ref’d); Belcher v. State, 474 S.W.3d
840, 844-47 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, no pet.).
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Further, although the extraneous offenses admitted in Bezerra were somewhat
factually dissimilar from those in the indictment, there were factual similarities between
the testimony of the victim and that of his adopted daughter by a prior marriage.
Bezerra, 485 S.W.3d at 141. The evidence supporting the multi-count indictment
showed the defendant rubbed the victim’s legs over her clothing near her privates, put
her hands on his private area, and had her massage him. Id. The State’s article 38.37,
sec. 2 evidence showed that the defendant had previously sexually assaulted his
adopted daughter by touching her vagina multiple times, making her touch his private
area, and asking her to masturbate him. Id. This court held that because the evidence
supporting both the indicted offenses and extraneous offenses involved appellant
assaulting children by touching their privates with his hand and making them touch his
privates, the offenses were sufficiently similar to be admissible and probative. Id.
Similarly here, the indicted offenses and extraneous offense evidence involved
Appellant’s stepdaughters in both marriages and his rubbing their private areas atop
and underneath their clothes. The evidence was relevant and probative because it
established Appellant had a history of attempts to groom and then sexually abuse his
stepdaughters in both marriages by touching their breasts and privates.
In addition, any impermissible inference or unfair prejudice can be ameliorated by
the trial court’s limiting instructions. Beam v. State, 447 S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Furthermore, the testimony of the two women did
not consume an inordinate amount of time or repeat evidence that had already been
admitted. See Robisheaux, 483 S.W.3d at 221. There was also a substantial need by
the State for such evidence because there was no physical evidence to support M.A.’s
12

accusations and she was the only eyewitness to the offenses alleged. See Belcher,
474 S.W.3d at 848. Accordingly, the evidence was admissible because it was relevant
and probative, the trial court lessened any prejudice through its instructions, the
evidence required a minimal amount of time to develop, and the State had a substantial
need for that evidence. See Beam, 447 S.W.3d at 404-05. Issues two and three are
overruled.
ISSUE FOUR—RULE 403 BALANCING TEST
By his fourth issue, Appellant asserts the trial court erred by failing to perform a
balancing test under Texas Rule of Evidence 40310 prior to admitting evidence under
article 38.37, sec. 2(b). Again, we disagree.
Extraneous offense evidence admissible under article 38.37, sec. 2 is still subject
to exclusion under Rule 403’s balancing test. Bezerra, 485 S.W.3d at 141. See TEX. R.
EVID. 403. Rule 403 states that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or the needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on
reh’g). When analyzing these competing interests, the trial court should consider the
following factors: (1) the probative value of the evidence, (2) the potential to impress the
jury in some irrational yet indelible way, (3) the time needed to develop the evidence,
and (4) the proponent’s need for the evidence. See State v. Melchler, 153 S.W.3d 435,
440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

10 Hereinafter, we will refer or cite to Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence simply as “Rule 403.”
13

The trial court is not, however, required to articulate the application or results of
its balancing test on the record. Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 250 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998). Rather, unless the record indicates otherwise, the trial court is presumed to
have engaged in the required balancing test once a party objects on the ground of Rule
403 and the judge rules on that objection. Id. (finding no error when trial court listened
to defendant’s Rule 403 objections and then overruled them without explanation);
Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (finding that the trial
court has no discretion as to whether or not to engage in a balancing test once a
sufficient objection invoking Rule 403 has been made).
We review the trial court’s application of a balancing test and the resultant
admission or exclusion of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Jones v.
State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 651 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 378
79. In doing so, we too must take into account the same factors a trial court should
consider when conducting its balancing test. See Melchler, 153 S.W.3d at 405.
Since the record in this case does not indicate otherwise, we must presume the
trial court conducted a balancing test based upon Appellant’s objection and its
subsequent ruling. See Rojas, 986 S.W.2d at 250; Santellan, 939 S.W.2d at 173. As to
the first factor concerning the probative value of the evidence, because Rule 403 favors
the admissibility of relevant evidence, there is a presumption that relevant evidence will
be more probative than prejudicial. Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 154 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996); Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389. Moreover, we have already determined
in the prior section discussing issues three and four that the State’s article 38.37, sec. 2
14

evidence was both relevant and probative. Accordingly, the first factor favors admission
of the contested evidence.
The second factor requires that we evaluate whether the extraneous offense
evidence had the potential to irrationally impress the jury. Here, the extraneous offense
evidence was quite similar to the charged offenses in that both offenses involved the
sexual assault of a stepchild. Furthermore, the offenses were not so dissimilar in
character as to lead the jury into forming some irrational yet indelible impression
regarding Appellant’s character and any impermissible inference was minimized through
the trial court’s limiting instructions. This factor, therefore, tends to support admission of
the extraneous offense evidence.
The third factor evaluates the time required to develop the extraneous offense
evidence. Here, although the prosecution spent a significant amount of time developing
and discussing Appellant’s sexual assault of C.A. and D.M., much of that time was
consumed in the context of the article 38.37, sec. 2-a hearing. While this time-efficiency
factor may weigh in favor of exclusion of the evidence, a thorough evaluation of this
factor dictates that we take into consideration the practical considerations of having to
evaluate the contested evidence outside the presence of the jury before again
presenting it for its consideration.
The fourth factor addresses the proponent’s need for the extraneous offense
evidence. As we discussed above in the context of our constitutionality evaluation, the
prosecution’s need for the evidence was significant because, not only was M.A’s
testimony the only direct evidence presented in support of allegations contained in the
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indictment, it was also critical because Appellant had attacked her credibility by raising
questions concerning the consistency of her version of the events and her mother’s lack
of confidence in her truthfulness.
Balancing these factors together, we find the trial court acted within the zone of
reasonable disagreement when it implicitly determined that the probative value of the
extraneous offense evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted that evidence or
failed to articulate its balancing analysis. Appellant’s fourth issue is overruled.
ISSUE ONE—SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Having determined the evidence properly before the jury, when reviewing the
sufficiency of that evidence, we view all evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict to determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding that Jackson standard is the only standard to use when
determining sufficiency of evidence). We measure sufficiency of the evidence
according to “the elements of the offense as defined by” the hypothetically correct jury
charge for the case. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
Further, jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and the
weight to be given to the testimony. Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008). Consequently, we do not resolve any conflict of fact, weigh any evidence,
or evaluate the credibility of any witnesses, Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999), and any inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the
16

adjudication. Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
The essential elements of the offense of indecency with a child are that (1) a
person (2) engages in sexual contact with (3) a child younger than seventeen years of
age. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1) (West 2011). In the context of this section,
“sexual contact” occurs if, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, a person touches the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a child younger
than seventeen years of age, including touching through the child’s clothing. Id. at §
21.11(c).
Furthermore, a child‘s uncorroborated testimony is sufficient to support a
conviction for indecency with a child. See art. 38.07 (providing that, if at the time the
sexual offense is alleged to have occurred the victim was seventeen years of age or
younger, then a conviction is “supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the
victim”). See also Martinez v. State, 178 S.W.3d 806, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)
(noting that article 38.07 “deals with the sufficiency of evidence required to sustain a
conviction for” certain sexual offenses) (emphasis in original). Under those
circumstances, the State did not have the burden to produce any corroborating or
physical evidence. Martines v. State, 371 S.W.3d 232, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
Here, M.A.’s testimony alone was sufficient evidence enough to allow a rational
trier of fact in this case to find that the essential elements of the offense had been
established by the State. M.A.’s testimony was also supported by the testimony of
Deputy Downs, Poll, C.A., D.M., and even Delisa. Furthermore, the jury was free to
17

disbelieve defense-favorable testimony offered by Delisa and Griffin, and they were at
liberty to find that Appellant’s statements in his letters were incriminating because they
reasonably could have been the direct result of law enforcement learning of his sexual
abuse of M.A. rather than references to an extra-marital affair.
Specifically, Appellant asserts the State’s evidence is insufficient because the
State should have been required to prove with more specificity the dates the actual
sexual misconduct occurred as alleged in the indictment. In that regard we note that the
State is not bound by the “on or about” date alleged in the indictment. Yzaguirre v.
State, 957 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The “on or about” language in the
indictment allows the State to prove a date other than the date alleged in the indictment,
as long as the date is anterior to the presentment of the indictment and within the
offense’s statutory limitation period. Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997). Here, Appellant does not assert that any offense alleged in the indictment
was outside the offense’s statutory limitation period and he does not challenge the
language in the jury charge that comports with the above-stated legal principles.11
Appellant contends the evidence presented showed seven specific instances of
breast touching and only one specific instance of vaginal touching. He then posits that
because the indictment listed five instances of breast touching and five instances of
vaginal touching, the evidence must be insufficient as to four of the counts alleging
vaginal touching. While M.A. may not have described five distinct instances of vaginal

11 If what Appellant asserts is that the State should have been required to make an election, Appellant did not make any such request to the trial court after the State rested at trial. “Once the State rests, upon a timely request by the defendant, the trial court must order the State to make an election, and failure to do so is error.” See Reza v. State, 339 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref’d) (emphasis added).
18

touching, she did testify that vaginal touching occurred more than five times in a
particular residence, within a particular year or span of years corresponding with her
age and the allegations in the indictment. As such, M.A.’s testimony sufficiently
established Appellant’s guilt as to all five counts of vaginal touching. Appellant’s first
issue is overruled.

Outcome:

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Plaintiff's Experts:

Defendant's Experts:

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