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Date: 03-23-2017
Case Style:
Quavize Lejuante Jones v. The State of Texas
|
Case Number: 05-15-01399-CR
Judge: Douglas Lang
Court: In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
Plaintiff's Attorney: Faith Johnson
Justin Johnson
Defendant's Attorney:
 Bruce Anton |
Description:
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The facts are undisputed. Jones killed Shaw by stabbing her multiple times in her upper
body and head. In charging him with murder, the State alleged two punishment-enhancement
paragraphs. Both paragraphs alleged final convictions for the felony offense of possession of a
controlled substance. The second paragraph alleged an April 11, 2007 conviction. The first
paragraph alleged a November 19, 2008 conviction for an offense committed after the April
2007 conviction became final. Following the guilt/innocence phase of trial, Jones pleaded not
true to the enhancement paragraphs, but the judgments of the convictions were admitted into
evidence.1
JURY CHARGE ERROR
Although Jones lodged no objection to the charge at trial, he complains now of the
application paragraph. Relying on Rice v. State, 746 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988,
pet. ref’d), Jones asserts the paragraph was improper because it should have instructed the jury to assess punishment in the identified range only if it found the second previous felony conviction
was for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous felony conviction having
become final. In response, the State asserts, among other arguments, that Jones suffered no harm
from any error in the charge.
A. Applicable Law
The purpose of the jury charge is to instruct the jurors on the law applicable to the case
and to guide them in their application of the law to the facts. See Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.3d
166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (quoting Williams v. State, 547 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977)). To that end, a jury charge consists of abstract paragraphs, which set forth relevant
concepts, terms, and law, and application paragraphs, which apply the relevant law, definitions,
and principles to the facts and authorize the conviction or punishment. See Vasquez v. State, 389
S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Crenshaw v. State, 378 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. Crim.
App, 2012). A punishment charge that does not properly instruct the jury on the full range of
punishment is improper. See Tubert v. State, 875 S.W.2d 323, 324-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
Murder is a first degree felony unless the death was caused “under the immediate
influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause,” in which case it is a second degree
felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(c),(d) (West 2011). As a first degree felony, murder
is punishable by imprisonment for life or for any term of not more than ninety-nine years or less
than five years and a fine not to exceed $10,000. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32. However,
if the State proves the defendant has been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the
second conviction is for an offense that was committed subsequent to the first conviction
becoming final, the minimum punishment range of five years is increased to twenty-five years
and no fine may be imposed. See id. § 12.42(d) (West Supp. 2016); Jordan v. State, 256 S.W.3d
286, 290-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
B. Standard of Review
In reviewing alleged jury charge error, an appellate court begins by examining the charge
to determine if error exists. Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). If the
appellate court determines error occurred, the court then analyzes whether harm resulted from
the error. See id. The degree of harm necessary for reversal is determined based on whether
error was properly preserved at trial by objection or request for instruction. See id. When, as
here, no objection or request was made, the error will result in reversal only upon a showing of
egregious harm, that is, upon a showing the defendant did not have “a fair and impartial trial.”
Id. (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g)).
Errors meeting this standard “affect ‘the very basis of the case,’ ‘deprive the defendant of a
valuable right,’ or ‘vitally affect a defensive theory.’” Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 750 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 171). In assessing harm, the appellate court
considers the entire record, including the charge, the state of the evidence, the contested issues,
and the parties’ arguments. See State v. Ambrose, 487 S.W.3d 587, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
C. Application of Law to Facts
In Rice, 746 S.W.3d 356, the case upon which Jones relies, appellant pleaded not true to
two enhancement paragraphs. Id. at 359. The charge contained multiple application paragraphs,
at least one of which recited the allegations in the enhancement paragraphs of the indictment.
See id. However, the application paragraph authorizing punishment did not set out the details
and sequencing of the convictions alleged in the enhancement paragraphs. Id. at 359-60. The
Fort Worth Court of Appeals concluded the jury charge was improper, but the error was harmless
in light of evidence admitted at punishment showing the sequencing of the convictions and no
argument by Rice against the merits of the enhancement allegations. Id. at 360-61.
In relying on Rice and urging he is entitled to a new punishment hearing, Jones does not
acknowledge the Rice court found the charge error harmless, and he does not argue he was
harmed. Yet, a review of the record here shows, as the State contends and like the record in
Rice, that no harm occurred.
For the jury to find the enhancement paragraphs true, as it did, it necessarily had to find,
based on the instructions in the complained-of application paragraph, that Jones was “the same
person who was convicted as alleged in the first and second enhancement paragraphs in the
indictment.” The record reflects the prosecutor read verbatim to the jury the portion of the
indictment alleging the enhancement paragraphs. Further, as stated, the judgments of
convictions were admitted into evidence. These exhibits demonstrated the second previous
felony conviction was for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous felony
conviction having become final. No evidence to the contrary was admitted. Given the record
before us, we conclude any error in the charge did not egregiously harm Jones. We decide
Jones’s sole issue against him.
Outcome: Having decided Jones’s sole issue against him, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments: