In RE the Parentage Of: Logan Russell Jannot v. David Russell Jannot and Stephanie M. Jannot

Stephanie and David Jannot were divorced in 1991. At that time they had
one child. After the divorce, the couple had a second child. The final
parenting plans placed the primary care and custody of both children with
David Jannot (Mr. Jannot) and provided for alternate residential time with
Stephanie Jannot (Ms. Jannot).
In 2000, Ms. Jannot filed petitions to modify the parenting plans and
custody of both children and submitted affidavits in support of her request
as required by RCW 26.09.270. Mr. Jannot responded with contrary
affidavits. A detailed summary of each parent's supporting affidavits is
not necessary here. It is sufficient to state that the court denied Ms.
Jannot's petition, finding that she did not establish adequate cause to
justify a full hearing. The court did so without written findings,
checking a box indicating that adequate cause for hearing the petition had
not been established. Ms. Jannot's motion for reconsideration was also
denied.

Ms. Jannot appealed. Division Three of the Court of Appeals held that the
trial court's adequate cause determination could be reviewed only for abuse
of discretion and, because the trial court had not given reasons for its
finding, it remanded to the trial court for articulation on the record of
its reasons for denying a full hearing in this case. In re Parentage of
Jannot, 110 Wn. App. 16, 22, 25, 37 P.3d 1265 (2002). Ms. Jannot filed a
petition for review, arguing that Division Three's decision conflicted with
Divisions One and Two of the Court of Appeals, which had reviewed RCW
26.09.270 adequate cause determinations de novo. This court granted
review. In re Parentage of Jannot, 147 Wn.2d 1001 (2002)

ISSUE
Where a trial court has determined, based on affidavits alone, that
adequate cause does not exist to justify a full hearing on a petition to
modify a parenting plan or custody decree, what standard of review is
appropriate on appeal?

RCW 26.09.270 reads in relevant part:
A party seeking . . . modification of a custody decree or parenting plan
shall submit together with his {or her} motion, an affidavit setting forth
facts supporting the requested order or modification . . . {. O}ther
parties to the proceedings . . . may file opposing affidavits. The court
shall deny the motion unless it finds that adequate cause for hearing the
motion is established by the affidavits.

At issue is whether a trial court's decision under this statute should be
reviewed de novo or whether that ruling should be upheld absent abuse of
discretion.

Ms. Jannot contends that application of the abuse of discretion standard
constitutes a radical departure from Washington precedent, citing cases in
which appellate courts have applied de novo review to trial court decisions
based on affidavits alone. Ms. Jannot also relies on In re Marriage of
Roorda, 25 Wn. App. 849, 850, 611 P.2d 794 (1980), in which Division One of
the Court of Appeals reviewed a RCW 26.09.270 adequate cause determination.
In the last paragraph of that opinion, after holding that the petition was
properly dismissed, the Roorda court noted:
Roorda raises the issue of the scope of appellate review of the trial
court's decision. As the trial court decided the matter on affidavits
alone, we stand in the same position as the trial court and decide the
issue as a matter of law. See Rau v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 21 Wn. App.
326, 585 P.2d 157 (1978).

25 Wn. App. at 853. Subsequently, Division Two of the Court of Appeals
applied the de novo standard when reviewing an RCW 26.09.270 adequate cause
determination:
When the trial court makes that initial determination on affidavits alone,
the appellate court stands in the same position as the trial court and
decides the issue as a matter of law. Roorda, 25 Wn. App. at 853.

In re Marriage of Mangiola, 46 Wn. App. 574, 577, 732 P.2d 163 (1987).
We disagree. Instead, we recognize that a trial judge does stand in a
better position than an appellate judge to decide whether submitted
affidavits establish adequate cause for a full hearing on a petition to
modify a custody decree or parenting plan. We adopt the reasoning of
Division Three of the Court of Appeals in this case and Division One of the
Court of Appeals in In re Marriage of Maughan, 113 Wn. App. 301, 53 P.3d
535 (2002), and hold that an appellate court may overturn a trial court's
RCW 26.09.270 adequate cause determination only if the trial court has
abused its discretion.

First, many local trial judges decide factual domestic relations questions
on a regular basis, Jannot, 110 Wn. App. at 21, and the adequate cause
determinations at issue here often involve facts that are very much in
dispute. Maughan, 113 Wn. App. at 305. Thus, the Roorda court erred when
it improperly relied on Rau, 21 Wn. App. 326, a case in which the facts
were undisputed, to justify de novo review. Id. at 328, 335. Because
adequate cause determinations are fact intensive, we recognize that a trial
judge generally evaluates fact based domestic relations issues more
frequently than an appellate judge and a trial judge's day-to-day
experience warrants deference upon review.

Moreover, parenting plans and custody determinations are individualized
decisions that depend upon a wide variety of factors, including 'culture,
family history, the emotional stability of the parents and children,
finances, and any of the other factors that could bear upon the best
interests of the children.' Jannot, 110 Wn. App. at 19-20. The
combination of relevant factors and their comparative weight are certain to
be different in every case, and no rule of general applicability could be
effectively constructed. See id. at 20. The very nature of a trial court
makes it better suited than an appellate court to weigh these varied
factors on a case-by-case basis. Maughan, 113 Wn. App. at 305; Jannot, 110
Wn. App. at 20. Ms. Jannot argues that this conclusion would improperly
authorize consideration of factors not argued in the submitted affidavits.
Nothing in this decision authorizes consideration of evidence outside of
the record before the court. We simply conclude that a trial judge is in
the best position to assign the proper weight to each of the varied factors
raised by the submitted affidavits in a particular case.

Most importantly, in the area of domestic relations, the appellate courts
have granted deference to the trial courts because ''{t}he emotional and
financial interests affected by such decisions are best served by
finality,'' Jannot, 110 Wn. App. at 21 (quoting In re Marriage of Landry,
103 Wn.2d 807, 809, 699 P.2d 214 (1985)), and de novo review may encourage
appeals. Maughan, 113 Wn. App. at 305-06. We also recognize that extended
custody litigation can be harmful to children. The Roorda court ignored
these considerations, instead relying on an insurance case to support its
de novo review. Jannot, 110 Wn. App. at 21-22. Similarly, Ms. Jannot
refers to a long list of unrelated cases in which appellate courts have
applied de novo review. However, these dissimilar questions simply do not
involve the child's weighty interest in finality.1 That interest is
particularly strong in cases where a child's living arrangements are at
stake. Thus, we recognize that the child's interest in finality
distinguishes this case from other, nondomestic relations cases and the
interest in finality is best served if an appellate court can overturn a
trial court's denial of a full hearing only for abuse of discretion.
It is important to note that Washington courts have applied the abuse of
discretion standard when reviewing child support modifications and
temporary parenting plans, determinations that are also based on affidavits
alone. Maughan, 113 Wn. App. at 306 (citing Lambert v. Lambert, 66 Wn.2d
503, 508, 403 P.2d 664 (1965) (child support modification)); see also RCW
26.09.175(5); Bower v. Reich, 89 Wn. App. 9, 19, 964 P.2d 359 (1997)
(temporary parenting plan); RCW 26.09.270. Thus, application of the abuse
of discretion standard to a trial court's RCW 26.09.270 adequate cause
determination is not the departure from Washington precedent that Ms.
Jannot suggests.

For all of these reasons, we hold that a trial court's RCW 26.09.270
adequate cause determination should be overturned only where the trial
court has abused its discretion. Because the trial court in this case
simply checked a box indicating that adequate cause for full hearing did
not exist, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, requiring the trial
court to articulate its reasons for denying a full hearing. Jannot, 110
Wn. App. at 25. Mr. Jannot does not request that we apply the abuse of
discretion standard to the facts of this case, but instead asks only that we remand. Thus, we do not decide
whether the record in this case could support a claim that the trial court
abused its discretion.

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