Label Systems Corporation v. Samad Aghamohammadi, et al.

This appeal arises out of the internecine
dispute between two former employees, the defendants,
Samad Aghamohammadi and Pamela Markham, and
their former employer, the plaintiff, Label Systems Corporation
(Label Systems), as well as its president, Kenneth
P. Felis. Label Systems commenced this action
against the defendants,1 who counterclaimed against
Label Systems and filed a third party complaint against
Felis.2 A jury found the defendants liable for conversion,
and awarded Label Systems compensatory and punitive
damages. In addition, the jury found Label Systems and
Felis3 liable for vexatious litigation in relation to a prior
action, and awarded the defendants compensatory damages.

The trial court rendered judgment in accordance
with the jury's verdict. The plaintiffs appealed, and the
defendants cross appealed to the Appellate Court, and
we transferred both appeals to this court pursuant to
General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court
improperly failed to set aside the jury's finding on the
vexatious litigation claim because: (1) there was, as a
matter of law, probable cause for the plaintiffs to engage
in litigation; and (2) it was inconsistent with the jury's
other findings. In addition, the plaintiffs claim that the
trial court improperly: (1) denied their motion in limine
regarding the admissibility of Felis' prior criminal convictions,
and failed to grant a mistrial after the defendants
violated the court's order in connection with the
same; (2) failed to set aside or reduce the compensatory
damages awarded to the defendants; and (3) limited
Label Systems' award of punitive damages to $19,303.13
in attorney's fees.4 In their cross appeal, the defendants
claim that: (1) the trial court improperly denied their
motion for a directed verdict and motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on Label Systems' conversion
claim; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by
awarding excessive attorney's fees as punitive damages;
and (3) the amount of punitive damages awarded violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the United States constitution. We reject each
claim raised on appeal and on the cross appeal, and,
accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. Label Systems, a corporation located in Bridgeport,
is in the business of manufacturing and producing,
among other things, labels, stickers and holograms. The
defendants are a married couple, both of whom were
employed by Label Systems. Aghamohammadi, an
immigrant from Iran, began his employment with Label
Systems in 1985, and advanced during his tenure to the
position of head of the finishing department. In that
capacity, Aghamohammadi was responsible for the
examination and inspection of finished products for
defects, packaging finished products for shipment and
shipping products to customers. Markham began her
employment at Label Systems in 1982, and served as
the office manager and bookkeeper, where she was
primarily responsible for paying Label Systems' bills,
managing its finances, and overseeing its medical plan.

Both defendants were regarded as valuable and trusted
employees by Felis. During their employment, the
defendants were provided with a company car, which
they used for their commute from Waterbury to Bridgeport.

In November, 1992, while driving the company
car, their sole means of transportation, the defendants
were rear-ended by another car. Subsequently, the
defendants received a check in the amount of $1095.01
from the tortfeasor's insurance company. Because
Markham was nearing the end of a difficult pregnancy,
her first, the defendants did not want to be without the
car, and they chose to delay having it repaired until
after her delivery. Accordingly, the defendants cashed
the insurance check and deposited the proceeds into
their personal checking account. In early 1993, Felis
equipped the defendants' house with computer equipment
so that Markham could work from home after the
baby was born, and he built and furnished a nursery
in the office for Markham to use after she returned
to work.

On February 15, 1993, upon their arrival at work,
the defendants were met outside by Felis and other
members of his staff. Felis gave the defendants letters
of termination that accused them of wilful and felonious
misconduct in the course of their employment,5 terminated
their employment, and refused to allow them to
enter the facility to collect their personal belongings.

The defendants surrendered the company car to Felis,
and departed in an awaiting limousine, which had been
arranged for by Felis. Later that evening, Aghamohammadi
was arrested based upon Felis' claim that Aghamohammadi
had threatened him when receiving his letter
of termination. Label Systems immediately stopped paying
a salary to both defendants, and terminated their
health insurance.

On February 23, 1993, Markham gave birth to the
defendants' first child. On March 10, 1993, Label Systems
filed a three count complaint against the defendants,
alleging conversion, breach of duties of loyalty
and appropriation of trade secrets. The defendants had
requested unemployment benefits immediately following
their termination, and on April 7, 1993, over the
objection of Label Systems, separate awards of unemployment
benefits were made to both defendants. The
defendants were unable to extend their health insurance
at their own expense, however, because of the
alleged wilful and felonious misconduct underlying the
termination of their employment. On April 22, 1993,
Felis, on behalf of Label Systems, appealed from the
decisions awarding unemployment benefits to the
defendants, claiming that the defendants were terminated
for wilful and felonious misconduct, and, therefore,
that they were precluded from receiving such
benefits. Over the course of the next four months, three
separate hearings were held in which the plaintiffs
offered testimony and evidence in support of their claim
of wilful and felonious misconduct by the defendants.

On August 18, 1993, after the third hearing, both appeals
were unilaterally withdrawn by the plaintiffs.

In April, 1994, in response to the withdrawal of the
appeals, the defendants counterclaimed against Label
Systems, and filed a third party complaint against Felis,
both of which alleged vexatious litigation, abuse of process,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, slander per se,
slander, interference with contractual relations, wrongful
discharge and intentional interference with prospective
contractual relations. In July, 2001, the actions
proceeded to trial, where the jury found the defendants
liable for conversion, rejected all of Label Systems'
remaining claims, and awarded Label Systems $50 in
compensatory damages. In addition, the jury found that
the defendants had converted Label Systems' property
under circumstances warranting punitive damages, in
an amount to be set by the trial court according to
the prior agreement of the parties. In regard to the
counterclaims and third party complaint, the jury found
the plaintiffs liable for vexatious litigation, rejected all
of the remaining claims, and awarded Markham
$160,000 and Aghamohammadi $60,000 in compensatory
damages. These awards were doubled automatically
pursuant to General Statutes § 52-568 (1),6 which
provides for the doubling of damages for groundless or
vexatious actions. The trial court denied several posttrial
motions filed by both parties, awarded Label Systems
$19,460.17 in punitive damages, and rendered
judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict. This
appeal followed.

I

As noted previously, the jury found that the plaintiffs
had engaged in vexatious litigation7 when they pursued
an administrative appeal from the awards of unemployment
benefits made to the defendants based upon an
allegation of wilful and felonious misconduct.8 On
appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly
denied their motion for a directed verdict on the
vexatious litigation claim. Specifically, the plaintiffs
claim that they had probable cause as a matter of law
to appeal from the unemployment awards based upon
a claim of wilful and felonious misconduct by the defendants.
9 The defendants contend that the trial court properly
denied the motion for a directed verdict. We agree
with the defendants.

It is well established that ‘‘[o]ur review of a trial
court's refusal to direct a verdict or to render judgment
notwithstanding the verdict takes place within carefully
defined parameters. We must consider the evidence,
including reasonable inferences which may be drawn
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the parties
who were successful at trial . . . [and] giving particular
weight to the concurrence of the judgments of the
judge and the jury, who saw the witnesses and heard
the testimony . . . . The verdict will be set aside and
judgment directed only if we find that the jury could not
reasonably and legally have reached their conclusion.''
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Cohen v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 260 Conn. 747, 761,
800 A.2d 499 (2002).

In regard to the appeal from Markham's award, the
plaintiffs advanced two reasons supporting their belief,
prior to the time of termination, that Markham had
engaged in wilful and felonious misconduct. First was
Felis' belief that Markham had met with Henry J. Behre,
Jr., a former employee of Label Systems, and provided
him with confidential company information to assist
him with his arbitration action then pending against
Label Systems for back wages. As the trial court properly
noted, however, the jury reasonably could have
credited Markham's testimony that she had never disclosed
any confidential information to Behre, as well
as Behre's testimony that Felis had disclosed the information
to Behre in earlier conversations. In addition,
it was well within the province of the jury not to credit
the testimony of Felis. Second was Felis' belief that
Markham had leaked information to Behre concerning
a financial investment made in Label Systems by RPM,
Inc. (RPM). The jury reasonably could have declined
to credit this testimony, and instead credit the testi-
mony of Behre that Felis not only told him of RPM's
investment in Label Systems, but that the letter that
had terminated his employment relationship with Label
Systems had the logo of both companies at the top of
the page, thereby making the relationship between the
companies obvious. This letter was admitted into evidence,
and the jury was able to examine it firsthand.
Indeed, Felis testified that in 1992, RPM had circulated
a memo to all of its operating companies, including
Label Systems, that highlighted RPM's concern with
having its logo directly next to each individual operating
company's logo on items such as stationery and
invoices.

In regard to the appeal from Aghamohammadi's
award, Felis testified that, at the time of Aghamohammadi's
termination, Felis believed that Aghamohammadi
was responsible for an alleged shortage of
materials at Label Systems, and that Aghamohammadi
was a partner with Behre in an undisclosed business
venture, Mecca Trading and Shipping (Mecca). With
respect to Mecca, Aghamohammadi testified that he
had disclosed Mecca to Felis previously, had offered
to make Felis a partner in the business, and that Felis
allowed him to make limited use of Label Systems equipment
and facilities in his spare time for activities relating
to Mecca. To the contrary, Felis testified that
Aghamohammadi never disclosed Mecca's existence to
him, and that he discovered Mecca's existence just prior
to terminating the defendants. It was entirely reasonable,
therefore, for the jury to credit Aghamohammadi's
testimony over Felis' testimony. With respect to the
alleged shortage of materials, Aghamohammadi testified
that he was not responsible for any alleged shortage,
and that he never stole or misappropriated any
material from Label Systems. Indeed, Felis testified that
he could not identify whether the alleged shortages
occurred with raw product, partially finished product
or finished product.

In sum, our review of the record reveals that there
was sufficient evidence from which the jury could ‘‘reasonably
and legally have reached their conclusion.''
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 761. Accordingly,
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion for a directed
verdict on the vexatious litigation claim.

II

The plaintiffs' next claim is that the trial court improperly
failed to grant their motion to set aside the jury's
finding that they were liable for vexatious litigation
because it is inconsistent with the jury's finding that
the defendants were liable for conversion. We disagree.
The proper appellate standard of review when considering
the action of a trial court in granting or denying
a motion to set aside a verdict is the abuse of discretion
standard. Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 265
Conn. 210, 276, 828 A.2d 64 (2003); State v. Hammond,
221 Conn. 264, 267–70, 604 A.2d 793 (1992). ‘‘In
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion,
every reasonable presumption should be given in
favor of the correctness of the court's ruling. . . .
Reversal is required only where an abuse of discretion
is manifest or where injustice appears to have been
done.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faraday,
268 Conn. 174, 186, 842 A.2d 568 (2004); State v.
Fitzgerald, 257 Conn. 106, 112, 777 A.2d 580 (2001).

‘‘[I]n civil cases when a verdict rests upon a factual
finding contradictory to another finding of the same
issue by the trier the judgment cannot stand.'' Magnan
v. Anaconda Industries, Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 577, 479
A.2d 781 (1984). The plaintiffs' claim that the jury's
finding that they were liable for vexatious litigation is
inconsistent with the jury's finding that the defendants
were liable for conversion fails because of the separate
evidentiary bases underlying the two findings. The trial
court instructed the jury that probable cause, for purposes
of a claim for vexatious litigation concerning
appeals from awards of unemployment benefits, was
to be measured by the objective evidence held by the
plaintiffs at the time of the defendants' termination, and
not from the time of the initiation of the appeals.10 See
footnote 9 of this opinion. Our review of the record
reveals that the jury was not instructed on any similar
time constraint for the conversion claim.11 Consequently,
under the trial court's instructions in the present
case, the jury properly could have considered any
evidence acquired after the defendants' termination in
the context of the conversion claim, but not on the
vexatious litigation claim. At trial, the defendants testified
that they had informed Felis of the accident, and
that they had received the insurance check and would
keep the proceeds until such time after Markham's
delivery when they could have the car repaired. To
the contrary, Felis testified that he had learned of the
defendants' possession of the insurance proceeds only
after their termination. By finding the defendants liable
for conversion, it is implicitly demonstrated that the
jury credited Felis' testimony over the defendants' testimony,
as the defendants' possession of the proceeds
must have been unauthorized to support the conversion
claim. See part VI B of this opinion. Put another way,
the jury necessarily found that the defendants had not
informed Felis of the insurance proceeds prior to their
termination, thereby making their retention of the monies
unauthorized. Because Felis was made aware of this
conversion after the defendants' termination, it could
not have been evidence in his possession at the time
of the terminations, and, therefore, it could not support
a claim of wilful and felonious misconduct.12

III

The plaintiffs' next claim is that the trial court improperly
denied their motion in limine seeking to preclude
the defendants from admitting evidence of Felis' prior
criminal convictions to impeach his credibility because
of their remoteness. The defendants contend that the
trial court properly denied the motion in limine. We
agree with the defendants.

The following additional facts are relevant to our
resolution of this claim. In 1986, Felis was convicted
of forty-one felonies in federal court, including mail
fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy and securities fraud in
violation of Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.13 After a lengthy set of appeals, Felis' convictions
ultimately were upheld by the United States
Supreme Court,14 and in 1988, he paid a $25,000 fine and
served his sentence of confinement on the weekends for
a period of six months. Prior to trial in the present case,
the plaintiffs filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude
the defendants from admitting evidence of Felis' prior
criminal convictions. After extensive arguments and
briefing from both parties, the trial court ruled that the
convictions were admissible solely for the purpose of
impeaching Felis' credibility as a witness. In so doing,
however, the trial court stressed that the use of the
convictions for any other purpose ‘‘would be to invite
a mistrial motion and a mistrial ruling'' by the court.15
When ruling on the plaintiffs' motion in limine, the
trial court first determined that in order to use a conviction
that is more than ten years old to impeach credibility,
the court must be satisfied that its probative value
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. The trial
court found that the evidence of Felis' prior convictions
met this standard, and denied the plaintiffs' motion. On
appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that the evidence met this standard.

The plaintiffs' argument illuminates confusion within
our case law over the proper standard to apply to prior
convictions that are more than ten years old. Accordingly,
we take this opportunity to clarify the proper
standard by which our courts are to pass upon the
admissibility of remote prior convictions in order to
impeach the credibility of a witness.

Generally, evidence that a witness has been convicted
of a crime is admissible to impeach his credibility if
the crime was punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year. General Statutes § 52-145 (b); Conn. Code
Evid. § 6-7 (a). In determining whether to admit evidence
of a conviction, the court shall consider: (1) the
extent of the prejudice likely to arise; (2) the significance
of the particular crime in indicating untruthfulness;
and (3) the remoteness in time of the conviction.
Conn. Code Evid. § 6-7 (a); see State v. Nardini, 187
Conn. 513, 522, 447 A.2d 396 (1982) (recognizing same
three part test at common law prior to adoption of
Connecticut Code of Evidence). ‘‘Moreover, [i]n evalu-
ating the separate ingredients to be weighed in the
balancing process, there is no way to quantify them in
mathematical terms.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Askew, 245 Conn. 351, 370, 716 A.2d 36
(1998). Therefore, ‘‘[t]he trial court has wide discretion
in this balancing determination and every reasonable
presumption should be given in favor of the correctness
of the court's ruling . . . . Reversal is required only
where an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice
appears to have been done.'' (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Rivera, 221 Conn. 58, 72–73,
602 A.2d 571 (1992).

In State v. Nardini, supra, 187 Conn. 520, the defendant
claimed that the trial court improperly had allowed
the state to admit evidence of his twenty-one year old
conviction for carrying a pistol without a permit and
his twenty-six year old conviction for breaking and
entering. Specifically, the defendant claimed that the
trial court abused its discretion because the convictions
were too remote in time and had insignificant bearing
upon his credibility. Id., 521. We concluded that the
trial court improperly had admitted evidence regarding
the conviction for carrying a pistol without a permit
because any significance it had upon the defendant's
credibility ‘‘must have entirely dissipated by the date
of trial . . . .'' Id., 530. Nevertheless, we found the error
to be harmless. Id. In our analysis of the defendant's
remoteness claim, we noted that both rule 609 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence16 and rule 609 of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence contained a ten year limitation on
the use of prior convictions. In addition, we noted that,
‘‘[u]nder the federal standard, rule 609 (b), which is not
ours but may serve as a rough bench mark in deciding
whether trial court discretion has been abused, convictions
having some special significance upon the issue
of veracity surmount the standard bar of ten years and
qualify for the balancing of probative value against prejudice.''
(Emphasis added.) Id., 526. As the plaintiffs
correctly contend, we subsequently have stated that
while ‘‘[t]he determination of remoteness is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court . . . we have sanctioned
a general guideline for the determination of
remoteness that parallels rule 609 (b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Rule 609 (b) establishes a ten year
limitation from conviction or release from resulting confinement
upon the use of the conviction for impeachment
purposes unless the probative value of the
conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial
effect.'' (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) State v.
Sauris, 227 Conn. 389, 409-10, 631 A.2d 238 (1993); see
State v. Dorans, 261 Conn. 730, 755, 806 A.2d 1033
(2002) (same); State v. Carter, 228 Conn. 412, 431, 636
A.2d 821 (1994) (same). To the extent that this language
suggests, as the trial court found when ruling on the
plaintiffs' motion in limine and the plaintiffs now claim
on appeal, that we have sanctioned or adopted the ‘‘sub-
stantially outweighs'' test from rule 609 (b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, it is expressly disavowed for
the following reasons.

First, in Nardini, we stated that the federal standard
‘‘is not ours but may serve as a rough bench mark
. . . .'' State v. Nardini, supra, 187 Conn. 526. In so
doing, however, we were referring solely to the ten year
time limit set forth in rule 609 (b) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, and not to the standard upon which convictions
beyond that ten year mark must be evaluated,
namely, the ‘‘substantially outweighs'' test. Put another
way, we were signaling that, unless a conviction had
some special significance to untruthfulness, the fact
that it was more than ten years old would most likely
preclude its admission under our balancing test.

Indeed, a review of the analysis conducted in Nardini
reveals that, even though the convictions were well
beyond the ‘‘rough bench mark'' of ten years; id.; we
did not apply the ‘‘substantially outweighs'' test from
rule 609 (b) to the defendant's claim. To the contrary,
we concluded that it was not improper for the trial court
to have admitted the evidence of the prior conviction for
breaking and entering because ‘‘despite its antiquity
. . . it could be said still to retain sufficient probative
value for credibility to outbalance the rather minimal
prejudice which arose from its admission . . . .''
(Emphasis added.) Id., 529–30; see also State v. Ciccio,
77 Conn. App. 368, 388, 823 A.2d 1233 (‘‘[w]hen [the
rough ten year bench mark from Nardini is] considered
with the other two factors of the test, we cannot say
that the evidence of the defendant's 1986 conviction
was more prejudicial than probative''), cert. denied, 265
Conn. 905, 831 A.2d 251 (2003).17

Second, in 1999, the judges of the Superior Court
adopted the Connecticut Code of Evidence, which was
intended to restate, in codified form, ‘‘Connecticut case
law regarding rules of evidence as rules of court . . . .''
Conn. Code Evid. § 1-2 (a). The drafters of our code
of evidence appear to have incorporated our current
reading of Nardini into § 6-7 of the Connecticut Code
of Evidence, as the plain language of § 6-7 does not
include the ‘‘substantially outweighs'' language from
rule 609 (b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. To the
contrary, § 6-7 merely identifies the remoteness of the
convictions as one factor, of three, to be considered by
the trial court under our balancing test. See also State
v. Nardini, 187 Conn. supra, 526 (‘‘we have indicated
that remoteness in time, like relevance of the crime to
veracity, is a factor to be weighed by the trial court in
exercising its discretion''). Moreover, the commentary
to § 6-7 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence states that
this court has suggested a rough ten year time limit on
prior convictions, and that crimes involving veracity
may surmount that limit. At no point, however, does
the commentary suggest that prior convictions more
than ten years old, and involving veracity, are subject
to the ‘‘substantially outweighs'' standard of rule 609
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In sum, the plain
language of § 6-7 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence
and its accompanying commentary, which was also officially
adopted by the judges of the Superior Court, support
a conclusion that such evidence is subject to the
same three part balancing test as is evidence of all
other convictions.18

Third, there are significant differences between how
prior convictions involving veracity are treated under
our code of evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
For example, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, convictions
under ten years old and involving crimes of
‘‘dishonestly or false statement'' are admissible regardless
of the type of punishment attached. Fed. Rule Evid.
609 (a). This approach is in direct contrast to our code
of evidence, which limits impeachment to evidence of
prior convictions involving crimes ‘‘punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year.'' Conn. Code
Evid. § 6-7 (a). Further, unlike all other convictions, the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not subject evidence of
convictions for crimes involving ‘‘dishonesty or false
statement'' to the general probative value versus prejudicial
effect balancing test set forth in rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.19 To the contrary, our code
subjects evidence of convictions for all crimes, even
those involving dishonesty or untruthfulness, to the balancing
test set forth in § 6-7 of the Connecticut Code
of Evidence. Lastly, under rule 609 (b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the burden is on the proponent of
the evidence of prior convictions to demonstrate that
the probative value substantially outweighs the prejudicial
effect. United States v. Weichert, 783 F.2d 23, 26
n.3 (2d Cir. 1986). Under our code, however, the burden
is on the party objecting to evidence of prior convictions
to show the prejudice likely to arise from its admission.

Conn. Code of Evid. § 6-7, commentary; State v. Harrell,
199 Conn. 255, 262, 506 A.2d 1041 (1986). These general
differences between the treatment of crimes involving
dishonesty under the Federal Rules of Evidence and
our code of evidence counsel strongly against our application
of the ‘‘substantially outweighs'' standard of rule
609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to evidence of
remote prior convictions offered under § 6-7 of the Connecticut
Code of Evidence.

Lastly, we believe that application of the ‘‘substantially
outweighs'' standard to evidence offered under
§ 6-7 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence unnecessarily
complicates the trial court's analysis. More specifically,
under the three part balancing test, the trial court
is already weighing (1) the potential for the evidence
to cause prejudice, (2) its significance to indicate
untruthfulness, and (3) its remoteness in time. Conn.
Code Evid. § 6-7. To require the trial court to conduct
a separate analysis of probative value versus prejudicial
effect within the third prong would be merely to dupli-
cate the first two factors of the balancing test.

Accordingly, we expressly disavow any language in
prior case law suggesting that we have adopted the
‘‘substantially outweighs'' test from rule 609 (b) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. In so doing, however, we
reaffirm the central thrust of Nardini, namely, the fact
that ‘‘the ten year benchmark . . . is not an absolute
bar to the use of a conviction that is more than ten
years old, but, rather, serves merely as a guide to assist
the trial judge in evaluating the conviction's remoteness.''
State v. Askew, supra, 245 Conn. 364–65; see also
State v. Irving, 27 Conn. App. 279, 290, 606 A.2d 17
(‘‘[f]inally, [a] prior conviction which is more than ten
years old may, under some circumstances, retain some
probative value which is minimally sufficient to overcome
any marginal prejudice, and may be admissible,
therefore, without a wholly unreasonable exercise of a
trial court's discretion'' [internal quotation marks omitted]),
cert. denied, 222 Conn. 907, 608 A.2d 694 (1992).

Put another way, the fact that a prior conviction is more
than ten years old should greatly increase the weight
carried by the third prong in the balancing test set forth
in § 6-7 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, unless
that prior conviction relates to the witness' veracity.20
Turning to the present case, we are unpersuaded
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
plaintiffs' motion in limine concerning evidence of Felis'
forty-one federal felony convictions in 1986, which
included convictions for mail fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy
and securities fraud in violation of Rule 10b-5 of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. To begin with,
evidence of Felis' prior criminal convictions has a high
degree of ‘‘significance . . . in indicating untruthfulness
. . . .'' Conn. Code Evid. § 6-7 (a) (2). By taking
the witness stand, Felis put his credibility into question,
and evidence of his prior convictions had a high probative
value on that credibility. Put another way, the
nature of the crimes Felis was convicted of, fraud and
conspiracy, certainly render them probative to the issue
of his credibility and truthfulness. See State v. Nardini,
supra, 187 Conn. 523 (‘‘[s]trictly speaking, only a conviction
for perjury or some kind of fraud bears directly
upon untruthfulness''); see also Gordon v. United
States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1029, 88 S. Ct. 1421, 20 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1968)
(Judge Warren E. Burger declaring that ‘‘[i]n common
human experience acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, or
stealing, for example, are universally regarded as conduct
which reflects adversely on a man's honesty and
integrity''). Moreover, given the nature of the allegations
in this case, the fact that Felis' version of what happened
during the course of this dispute varied considerably
from the testimony of the defendants and other witnesses
further counsels against the exclusion of evidence
of his prior convictions. See State v. Askew,
supra, 245 Conn. 369 (‘‘[w]hen a case [would be] nar-
rowed to the [issue of] credibility of [witnesses] . . .
there [is] greater, not less, compelling reason for exploring
all avenues which would shed light on which of the
. . . witnesses [is] to be believed'' [internal quotation
marks omitted]); see also United States v. Spero, 625
F.2d 779, 781 (8th Cir. 1980) (‘‘in situations such as this,
where the credibility of one witness must be weighed
directly against that of another, the probative value
of a prior conviction may well be enhanced, rather
than diminished'').

Although the probative value of evidence of his prior
convictions is certainly damaging to Felis' credibility,
that does not necessarily impart an undue degree of
prejudicial effect as well. Conn. Code Evid. § 6-7 (a)
(1). The third party complaint did not accuse Felis of
any crime or action similar in nature to those underlying
his prior convictions, and, therefore, this was not a
situation in which there was a danger that the jury
would believe that ‘‘if he did it before he probably did
so this time.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Carter, 189 Conn. 611, 644, 458 A.2d 369 (1993). His
prior convictions also did not involve ‘‘infamous''
crimes, from which the jury may be inclined to punish
Felis based on their view of him as a human being,
without regard to his actual conduct in the present
dispute. See State v. Nardini, supra, 187 Conn. 529
(‘‘murder [and] some other violent offense[s] are . . .
of such a serious or degrading nature that [a] jury might
[be] influenced by the knowledge that the defendant
had committed them many years before'').

Lastly, Felis' confinement ended thirteen years prior
to trial,21 which is not significantly beyond our rough
bench mark of ten years. Conn. Code Evid. § 6-7 (a)
(3). Given the relationship of those prior convictions
to Felis' veracity, we are not persuaded that their admission,
limited to the sole purpose of impeaching his credibility
as a witness, presents a situation where an ‘‘abuse
of discretion is manifest or an injustice appears to have
been done.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Rivera, supra, 221 Conn. 73; see United States v.
Payton, 159 F.3d 49, 56–57 (2d Cir. 1998) (no abuse of
trial court's discretion to admit evidence of witness'
thirteen year old convictions for making intentional
false statement under oath to public official and for
third degree larceny).

IV

The plaintiffs next claim that, even if the evidence
of Felis' prior convictions properly was admitted, the
trial court improperly denied their request for a mistrial
when the defendants' use of that evidence exceeded the
limited scope for which it was admitted. The defendants
contend that their inadvertent use of the evidence did
not warrant a mistrial. Again, we agree with the
defendants.

‘‘While the remedy of a mistrial is permitted under
the rules of practice, it is not favored. [A] mistrial should
be granted only as a result of some occurrence upon
the trial of such a character that it is apparent to the
court that because of it a party cannot have a fair trial
. . . and the whole proceedings are vitiated. . . . If
curative action can obviate the prejudice, the drastic
remedy of a mistrial should be avoided. . . . On
appeal, we hesitate to disturb a decision not to declare
a mistrial. The trial judge is the arbiter of the many
circumstances which may arise during the trial in which
his function is to assure a fair and just outcome. . . .
The trial court is better positioned than we are to evaluate
in the first instance whether a certain occurrence
is prejudicial to the defendant and, if so, what remedy
is necessary to cure that prejudice. . . . The decision
whether to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion
of the trial court.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35, 75–76, 826 A.2d
1126 (2003).

As noted in part III of this opinion, when denying the
plaintiffs' motion in limine, the trial court stressed that
the use of the convictions for any purpose other than to
impeach Felis' credibility ‘‘would be to invite a mistrial
motion and a mistrial ruling'' by the court.22 Despite the
court's ruling, Felis took the stand during the plaintiffs'
case-in-chief and testified about his prior criminal convictions.
During the defendants' case-in-chief, testimony was
elicited from Aghamohammadi that touched upon Felis'
prior criminal convictions. More specifically, following
questions concerning Felis' departure from Label Systems
in order to pursue a career in the financial industry,
the following colloquy occurred between
Aghamohammadi and his attorney:

‘‘[Defendants' Counsel]: And when did Mr. Felis
return to Label Systems?

‘‘[The Witness]: He used to come on and off, and I
think - I'm not exactly sure, but a year later he came
back as a full time.

‘‘[Defendants' Counsel]: And during that time he was
gone or only coming infrequently, did you still have
contact with him on a regular basis?

‘‘[The Witness]: Yes, he used to come down and talk
to me, that what he was doing, and, you know, in the
beginning he was tell[ing] me, you know, how much
money he was making in New York, and at the time
when he had a trouble, he used to tell me that he has
to go for a weekend. (Emphasis added.)

‘‘[Plaintiffs' Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Sustained.''

Immediately after sustaining the objection, the court
excused the jury so that the trial judge could make an
important personal phone call. While the jury was
absent from the courtroom, the plaintiffs moved for a
mistrial based upon Aghamohammadi's testimony that
‘‘[Felis] has to go for a weekend.'' This motion was
denied by an oral ruling of the trial court.

The plaintiffs claim that this was improper because
Aghamohammadi's testimony ‘‘elevated [Felis' convictions]
to something that was not esoteric but something
for which Felis served time . . . [and to] the extent
that incarceration was attached to this crime it made
Felis a bad person who would be capable of all of the
things he was accused of, including initiating a lawsuit
for an improper purpose and without probable cause
. . . .'' Our review of the record persuades us, however,
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
determining that Aghamohammadi's brief and obscure
reference to Felis' prior convictions was not such an
occurrence upon which the plaintiffs ‘‘cannot have a
fair trial . . . and the whole proceedings are vitiated.''
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Higgins,
supra, 265 Conn. 75.

Aghamohammadi's statement that ‘‘[Felis] has to go
for a weekend'' did not reveal necessarily to the jury
the fact that Felis had received a prison sentence after
his conviction, and that he was serving his six month
sentence on the weekends in New York. Even though
Aghamohammadi was referring to the time when
‘‘[Felis] had a trouble,'' we are unpersuaded that any
reasonable juror would infer that activities conducted
on ‘‘a weekend'' would involve incarceration. To the
contrary, we believe most jurors would assume that if
an individual was incarcerated for a criminal conviction,
it would be for an extended and continuous period
of time, and not for weekend stays. The fact that Aghamohammadi
did not use a term such as incarceration,
jail or prison in conjunction with ‘‘go for a weekend''
only serves to enhance the tenuous nature of the plaintiffs'
claim. Moreover, Felis had testified prior to Aghamohammadi,
and during his direct examination he
voluntarily revealed to the jury information relating to
his convictions, including the date of conviction, the
number of counts, the allegations made, and the fact
that a $25,000 fine was paid. Further, on redirect examination,
the following colloquy occurred between Felis
and his attorney:

‘‘[Plaintiffs' Counsel]: What was that [$25,000]
check for?

‘‘[The Witness]: This is for the fine that I received for
my conviction.

‘‘[Plaintiffs' Counsel]: And was that the only punishment
that you received, sir?

‘‘[The Witness]: No.''

This testimony from Felis was just as likely, if not
more likely, to place the notion that Felis was incarcerated
for his crimes into the minds of the jurors as was
Aghamohammadi's brief and obscure statement that
‘‘he has to go for a weekend.''23 Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by finding that Aghamohammadi's testimony did not
warrant a mistrial.

V

After the jury returned its verdict, the plaintiffs filed
a motion for remittitur, claiming that the damages
awarded to the defendants on their vexatious litigation
claims were not supported by the evidence, were excessive,
and, therefore, they should be remitted in toto.

The defendants filed an objection to the motion, and,
after hearing oral argument from the parties, the trial
court issued a memorandum of decision denying the
motion. The plaintiffs now renew these claims on
appeal, and contend that the trial court improperly
denied their motion for remittitur because: (1) there
was insufficient evidence of a causal connection
between their appeal of the awards of unemployment
benefits and the injuries allegedly suffered by the defendants;
and (2) the damages awarded to the defendants
were excessive. We disagree.

‘‘In considering a motion to set aside the verdict, the
court must determine whether the evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party, reasonably
supports the jury's verdict. . . . The trial court's
refusal to set aside the verdict is entitled to great weight
and every reasonable presumption should be indulged
in favor of its correctness.'' (Citation omitted.) Mather
v. Griffin Hospital, 207 Conn. 125, 139, 540 A.2d 666
(1988). A conclusion that the jury exercised merely
poor judgment is an insufficient basis for ordering a
remittitur. Wochek v. Foley, 193 Conn. 582, 587, 477 A.2d
1015 (1984). ‘‘The concurrence of the judgments of the
judge and the jury, who saw the witnesses and heard
the testimony, is a powerful argument for sustaining
the action of the trial court.'' Chanosky v. City Building
Supply Co., 152 Conn. 642, 643, 211 A.2d 141 (1965).
‘‘It is the function of this court to determine whether
the trial court abused its discretion in denying [a defendant's]
motion to set aside the verdict.'' (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Ham v. Greene, 248 Conn. 508,
536, 729 A.2d 740, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 929, 120 S. Ct.
326, 145 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1999).

A

Turning first to the expansive causation claim set
forth by the plaintiffs, we interpret the primary thrust
of that claim to be that ‘‘[a]lthough [the trial court]
correctly set forth the legal standard regarding proximate
cause [the court] did not correctly apply the substantial
factor test to the evidence.''24 We disagree.
‘‘[P]roximate cause [is] defined as an actual cause
that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm . . . .''
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Manheimer,
212 Conn. 748, 757, 563 A.2d 699 (1989), overruled in
part on other grounds, Stewart v. Federated Dept.
Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597, 608, 662 A.2d 753 (1995). The
‘‘test'' for proximate cause is whether the defendant's
conduct was a ‘‘ ‘substantial factor' '' in producing the
plaintiff's injury. Id., 758. This substantial factor test
reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause
questions, namely, ‘‘whether the harm which occurred
was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk
created by the defendant's negligence.'' (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘The question of proximate
causation generally belongs to the trier of fact because
causation is essentially a factual issue. . . . It becomes
a conclusion of law only when the mind of a fair and
reasonable [person] could reach only one conclusion;
if there is room for a reasonable disagreement the question
is one to be determined by the trier as a matter
of fact.'' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc.,
supra, 611.

Giving every reasonable presumption in favor of its
correctness, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when denying the plaintiffs' motion
for remittitur. See Mather v. Griffin Hospital, supra,
207 Conn. 139. As previously noted in this opinion, Felis
appealed from the awards of unemployment benefits
in April, 1993. Over the next four months, three separate
hearings were held prior to the appeals being withdrawn
summarily. During the time that the appeals were pending,
the defendants were faced with trying to defend
against serious charges of wilful and felonious misconduct,
the possible loss of their only source of income,
namely, the unemployment benefits, and the possibility
that they would have to return any benefits that they
already had received. While the plaintiffs are correct
in noting that other factors, including the defendants'
actual termination, the birth of their child, and the present
civil action, also may have contributed to the defendants'
emotional harm, this did not preclude the jury
from reasonably concluding, on the basis of the evidence
presented at trial, that the initiation and pursuit
of the appeals of the awards of unemployment benefit,
without probable cause, were a substantial and concurrent
cause25 of the defendants' injuries, and thus that
the defendants had established proximate causation.

Accordingly, we reject the plaintiffs' claim.

B

The plaintiffs further claim that the trial court improperly
denied their motion for remittitur because the damages
awarded to the defendants were excessive and
offend the sense of justice. Again, we disagree.

The law concerning excessive verdicts is well settled.
‘‘The amount of a damage award is a matter peculiarly
within the province of the trier of fact, in this case, the
jury. . . . The size of the verdict alone does not determine
whether it is excessive. The only practical test to
apply to [a] verdict is whether the award falls somewhere
within the necessarily uncertain limits of just
damages or whether the size of the verdict so shocks
the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that
the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake
or corruption. . . . The trial court's refusal to set aside
the verdict is entitled to great weight and every reasonable
presumption should be indulged in favor of its
correctness. . . . This is so because [f]rom the vantage
point of the trial bench, a presiding judge can sense
the atmosphere of a trial and can apprehend far better
than we can, on the printed record, what factors, if any,
could have improperly influenced the jury.'' (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Ham v. Greene, supra, 248
Conn. 536; Mather v. Griffin Hospital, supra, 207
Conn. 138–39.

As an initial matter, we must first establish the contours
of the awards that are subject to our appellate
review. The jury awarded Aghamohammadi $60,000 and
Markham $120,000 in compensatory damages for vexatious
litigation. These amounts were automatically doubled
pursuant to the terms of § 52-568 (1). See footnote
6 of this opinion. Therefore, when evaluating whether
the damages awarded to the defendants were excessive,
the trial court properly focused on the amounts actually
awarded, and not on the amount resulting from the
application of the statutory damages. See Goral v. Kenney,
26 Conn. App. 231, 239, 600 A.2d 1031 (1991)
(excluding from determination of excessiveness statutory
damages awarded for defendant's rejection of
plaintiff's offer of judgment). Further, we will review,
as did the trial court, the awards made to the defendants
separately, as they constitute two distinct awards. The
trial court determined that the individual awards,
‘‘though ample,'' were certainly ‘‘ ‘within the necessarily
uncertain limits of just damages,' '' and, therefore,
declined to remit any portion of the awards.

Giving every reasonable presumption in favor of its
correctness, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when denying the plaintiffs' motion
for remittitur. See Mather v. Griffin Hospital, supra,
207 Conn. 139. In regard to Aghamohammadi, the jury
reasonably could have credited his testimony that the
initiation of the appeal, the accusation of wilful and
felonious misconduct, and the concomitant threatened
loss of benefits, caused him such emotional harm as
to give up all hope of being successful in the United
States, and to plead with his wife to move back to his
native country of Iran.26 Thus, we agree with the trial
court that Aghamohammadi's feelings, ‘‘as he expressed
and visibly displayed them to the jury,'' reasonably supported
the jury's award of $60,000 and that the jury's
award ‘‘reflects a thoughtful exercise of judgment
and discretion.''

The award of $120,000 to Markham, while certainly
more substantial than the award to Aghamohammadi,
also is reasonably supported by the evidence presented
at trial. Specifically, viewed in the light most favorable
to Markham, the jury reasonably could have found that
she had endured mental and emotional suffering due
to the vexatious appeal of the unemployment awards
for the same reasons as we discussed with regard to
Aghamohammadi. In addition, the jury could have found
that the emotional damage to Markham was exacerbated,
in comparison to Aghamohammadi, by virtue of
the fact that she recently had given birth and had a
prior history of depression. Indeed, Markham's testimony
provided reasonable support for the jury's conclusion
that the appeal deeply distressed her, both while
the appeal was pending and for a long period after it
was withdrawn summarily.27 If the jury thought Markham
was embellishing her testimony, or exaggerating
the impact the appeal had on her well-being, it could
have rejected her claim or awarded her a smaller
amount in damages. In its memorandum of decision,
however, the trial court noted that when ‘‘the [c]ourt
saw her give that testimony, it knew at once that the jury
would be moved by it.'' See Chanosky v. City Building
Supply Co., supra, 152 Conn. 643 (‘‘[t]he concurrence
of the judgments of the judge and the jury, who saw
the witnesses and heard the testimony, is a powerful
argument for sustaining the action of the trial court'').

Accordingly, while we agree that the damages awarded
to Markham were ‘‘ample,'' we nevertheless are unable
to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying the plaintiffs' motion for remittitur.

The plaintiffs contend, however, that our resolution
of this claim should be controlled by Buckman v. People
Express, Inc., 205 Conn. 166, 530 A.2d 596 (1987). We
disagree. In Buckman, after the plaintiff was terminated
from his employment with the defendant, the plaintiff
attempted to notify the defendant, by mail and orally,
that he wished to continue his health insurance and
that he needed a conversion form. Id., 167. The defendant
was aware that the plaintiff was suffering from an
ulcer and from dental problems, and that his wife was
enduring a difficult pregnancy, yet the defendant never
replied to the plaintiff's request. Id. Although the plaintiff
never actually had his insurance coverage suspended,
he eventually brought an action against the
defendant to recover damages for the emotional distress
he had suffered as a result of the defendant's
inaction, and his resulting belief that he lacked health
insurance. Id., 167–69. The jury found in favor of the
plaintiff, and awarded him $51,595.94 in damages. Id.,
169. The trial court subsequently denied the defendant's
motion to set aside the verdict and for remittitur. Id.
On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed that
the $50,00028 awarded to the plaintiff in compensatory
damages so shocked one's sense of justice that the trial
court erred in denying its motion for remittitur. Id., 174.
We agreed, and ordered a new trial unless the plaintiff
filed a remittitur of $35,000 within three weeks time.
Id., 177. In so ordering, we noted that there was ‘‘no
claim and no proof . . . of a permanent injury in this
case.'' Id., 176. Furthermore, we noted that while we did
‘‘feel that the award was excessive, the excessiveness
appears attributable to [jury] outrage over the total
lack of regard for the rights of the plaintiff which the
defendant exhibited in this matter.'' Id., 176 n.10.
Buckman is distinguishable from the present case
for several reasons. To begin with, in Buckman, the
defendant merely failed to act, while in the present case,
the plaintiffs made affirmative charges of felonious and
wilful misconduct against the defendants, appealed the
unemployment benefits awarded to both defendants,
and forced the defendants to attend three separate hearings
over the course of four months before the appeals
were abandoned summarily. Second, in the present
case, the defendants have claimed lasting emotional
distress, extending well beyond the withdrawal of the
appeals, whereas in Buckman we noted that there was
‘‘no claim and no proof . . . of a permanent injury
. . . .'' Id., 176. Third, in Buckman we concluded that
the jury likely awarded damages based on its outrage
over the defendant's overall conduct. Id., 176 n.10. The
jury in the present case, however, rejected several of
the claims made by the defendants in their counterclaim
and third party complaint. If the jury were acting with
the same outrage over the plaintiffs' conduct as the jury
in Buckman, it would be reasonable to expect the jury
to have found for the defendants on at least some of
their remaining claims. By rejecting certain claims, and
awarding differing amounts to the defendants, however,
the jury demonstrated that it reached its verdict by
carefully considering all of the evidence, and not
through prejudice, mistake or corruption. In sum, the
plaintiffs have ‘‘provided us with no persuasive reason
to disturb the work of either the jury or the trial court
with respect to noneconomic damages, and our independent
review of the record has not disclosed any.''

Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Corp., 249 Conn. 523,
553, 733 A.2d 197 (1999).

VI

The plaintiffs' remaining claim on appeal, and all of
the defendants' claims on cross appeal, relate to the
jury's finding that the defendants were liable for converting
the proceeds of the insurance check resulting
from their car accident, and the trial court's subsequent
award of $19,303.13 in punitive damages to Label Systems.

In their cross appeal, the defendants first claim
that the trial court improperly denied their motion for
a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on the conversion claim because: (1) Label Sys-
tems lacked standing to bring a conversion claim on
the insurance proceeds; and (2) Label Systems did not
establish a prima facie case of conversion. We reject
both of these claims.

It is well established that ‘‘[o]ur review of a trial
court's refusal to direct a verdict or to render judgment
notwithstanding the verdict takes place within carefully
defined parameters. We must consider the evidence,
including reasonable inferences which may be drawn
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the parties who
were successful at trial . . . giving particular weight to
the concurrence of the judgments of the judge and the
jury, who saw the witnesses and heard the testimony
. . . . The verdict will be set aside and judgment
directed only if we find that the jury could not reasonably
and legally have reached their conclusion.'' (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cohen
v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 260 Conn. 761.

A

Because standing implicates the subject matter jurisdiction
of a court, we must first address the defendants'
claim that the trial court improperly determined that
Label Systems had standing to bring a conversion claim
as to proceeds of the insurance check resulting from
the defendants' accident in the company car.

‘‘Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery
in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction
of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or
representative capacity, some real interest in the cause
of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest
in the subject matter of the controversy. . . . Standing
is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties
out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather
it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts
and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate
nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions
which may affect the rights of others are forged in
hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously
represented.'' (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Unisys Corp. v. Dept. of Labor, 220
Conn. 689, 693, 600 A.2d 1019 (1991).

Conversion is ‘‘some unauthorized act which deprives
another of his property permanently or for an indefinite
time; some unauthorized assumption and exercise of
the powers of the owner to his harm. The essence of
the wrong is that the property rights of the plaintiff have
been dealt with in a manner adverse to him, inconsistent
with his right of dominion and to his harm.'' (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Aetna Life & Casualty Co.
v. Union Trust Co., 230 Conn. 779, 790–91, 646 A.2d
799 (1994). ‘‘The term ‘owner' is one of general application
and includes one having an interest other than the
full legal and beneficial title. . . . The word owner is
one of flexible meaning, and it varies from an absolute
proprietary interest to a mere possessory right. . . . It
is not a technical term and, thus, is not confined to a
person who has the absolute right in a chattel, but also
applies to a person who has possession and control
thereof.'' (Citations omitted.) Hope v. Cavallo, 163
Conn. 576, 580–81, 316 A.2d 407 (1972); id., 583–84
(although not title holder, state was owner of truck and
subject to suit under General Statutes § 52-556, because
state had exclusive possession and control over truck,
and insured it).

The trial court, taking the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prevailing party, reasonably could have
concluded that Label Systems had standing to bring a
conversion claim on the insurance proceeds. Both Felis
and the defendants testified that Felis had arranged for
the defendants to obtain and use a company car, and
the defendants eventually surrendered the car to Felis
on the morning of their termination. Indeed, the primary
purpose for which the defendants used the car was to
commute between their residence in Waterbury and the
Label Systems' office in Bridgeport. While there was
testimony that Label Systems did not hold title to the
car, and that the financing of the car was arranged
through RPM,29 the parent company for Label Systems,
the primary benefit derived from the defendants' use
of the car, and any detriments that would have arisen
from their inability to use the car, flowed to Label Systems.

Further, upon demand for the proceeds, the
defendants tendered a check to Felis, and not to RPM
or any other entity. Accordingly, we conclude that the
trial court properly found that Label Systems' possession
and control of car gave them standing to bring a
conversion claim as to the insurance proceeds related
to an accident involving the company car. See, e.g., Gill
v. Petrazzuoli Bros., Inc., 10 Conn. App. 22, 27, 521
A.2d 212 (1987) (although not title holder, plaintiff had
requisite standing as owner to bring action for loss
of car).

B

The defendants' next claim is that the trial court
improperly determined that Label Systems had established
a prima facie case of conversion. To establish a
prima facie case of conversion, Label Systems had to
establish that: (1) the insurance proceeds given to the
defendants belonged to Label Systems; (2) the defendants
deprived Label Systems of the funds for an indefinite
period of time; (3) the defendants' conduct was
unauthorized; and (4) the defendants' conduct harmed
Label Systems. See Devitt v. Manulik, 176 Conn. 657,
660, 410 A.2d 465 (1979); Durso v. Vessichio, 79 Conn.
App. 112, 125, 828 A.2d 1280 (2003); Aubin v. Miller,
64 Conn. App. 781, 796, 781 A.2d 396 (2001).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party, the trial court reasonably could
have found that Label Systems established each of these
elements. As discussed in part VI A of this opinion,
Label Systems established that it had a right to the
insurance proceeds, as Felis had provided the car to
the defendants, and the defendants ultimately returned
possession to him upon their termination. Accordingly,
if Label Systems had a right to possess the car, it also
had a right to possess the insurance proceeds designated
for the repair of the car. Second, the defendants
conceded that they had received the insurance check
in December, 1992, and had deposited the check in their
personal checking account, where it remained until they
tendered a check for the same amount to Felis in March,
1993. Therefore, the defendants deprived Label Systems
of the proceeds for several months. Third, there is no
evidence in the record that suggests that Label Systems
ever authorized the defendants to place the proceeds
into their personal checking account prior to their termination,
or to keep the proceeds there after their termination.
30

Finally, the defendants' retention of the
insurance proceeds harmed Label Systems, as it denied
the company the ability to use those proceeds to repair
the car. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Label
Systems established a prima facie case of conversion.

VII

Label Systems' remaining claim on appeal, and the
defendants' remaining claims on cross appeal, all
address the specific amount awarded by the trial court
as punitive damages. Specifically, Label Systems claims
that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly
limiting the amount of attorney's fees awarded as punitive
damages to $19,303.13, as that amount was significantly
lower than the actual attorney's fees that it had
incurred. To the contrary, the defendants claim that: (1)
the award exceeds the constitutional limits on punitive
damage awards, as set forth in State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419–28, 155
L. Ed. 2d 585, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003); and (2) the trial
court abused its discretion by awarding damages that
exceeded Label Systems' reasonable litigation
expenses. We reject the claims of both parties, and,
accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A

We turn first to the defendants' claim that under the
principles set forth in State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra, 538 U.S. 419–28, the punitive
damage award of $ 19,303.13 in attorney's fees violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of
the United States constitution. Label Systems contends
that this claim was not properly presented to the trial
court, and, therefore, that we should not address it in
this appeal. We agree with Label Systems.

Practice Book § 60-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The
court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it
was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to
the trial. The court may in the interests of justice notice
plain error not brought to the attention of the trial court.
. . .'' See also Rivera v. Double A Transportation, Inc.,
248 Conn. 21, 33, 727 A.2d 204 (1999) (claims not
addressed nor decided by trial court are not properly
before appellate court). In the present case, Label Systems
filed a motion requesting that the trial court award
approximately $252,481.25 in attorney's fees as punitive
damages. The defendants were able to express their
strenuous objection to this motion via a memorandum
in opposition, a supplemental memorandum and oral
argument before the trial court. All of this argument
concerning punitive damages was conducted after the
jury had awarded Label Systems $50 in compensatory
damages. In their memorandum in opposition, the
defendants claimed that, given the small amount of
compensatory damages awarded by the jury, ‘‘the
amount of attorney's [fees Label Systems] seeks to
recover is grossly excessive, and if any attorney's fees
are awarded as punitive damages, they should be appropriately
limited in relation to the claim [Label Systems]
prevailed on and the jury's compensatory award and
would be nominal.'' Despite pursuing this line of argument,
the defendants never once raised a claim regarding
the constitutionality of punitive damage awards, or
alerted the trial court to the three guideposts31 governing
such claims, as enunciated in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75, 134 L. Ed.
2d 809, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).32 The defendants also
failed to raise their constitutional argument in any
appropriate postjudgment motion, and now raise it for
the first time in their brief to this court. Accordingly, we
conclude that the defendants failed to properly preserve
their claim at trial, and we decline to address it in this
appeal. See Local Union No. 38 v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73, 89
(2d Cir. 2003) (Court declined to address constitutional
challenge to punitive damage award stating: ‘‘Where a
party contends that a punitive damages award is excessive,
that issue is ripe for legal challenge after a verdict
is entered. . . . For that reason, excessive punitive
damages that violate the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause can
be challenged through post-trial motions.'').33

B

Turning to the remaining two claims, we note that,
although from opposite perspectives, both Label Systems
and the defendants claim that the trial court
abused its discretion in awarding $19,303.13 in attorney's
fees as punitive damages. We disagree, and affirm
the judgment of the trial court.

To furnish a basis for recovery of punitive damages,
the pleadings must allege and the evidence must show
wanton or wilful malicious misconduct, and the language
contained in the pleadings must be sufficiently
explicit to inform the court and opposing counsel that
such damages are being sought. Markey v. Santangelo,
195 Conn. 76, 77–78, 485 A.2d 1305 (1985); Manning v.
Michael, 188 Conn. 607, 619, 452 A.2d 1157 (1982). If
awarded, punitive damages are limited to the costs of
litigation less taxable costs, but, within that limitation,
the extent to which they are awarded is in the sole
discretion of the trier. Chykirda v. Yanush, 131 Conn.
565, 568, 41 A.2d 449 (1945); Hanna v. Sweeney, 78
Conn. 492, 494, 62 A. 785 (1906); Bennett v. Gibbons,
55 Conn. 450, 452, 12 A. 99 (1887). Limiting punitive
damages to litigation expenses, including attorney's
fees, ‘‘ ‘fulfills the salutary purpose of fully compensating
a victim for the harm inflicted on him while avoiding
the potential for injustice which may result from the
exercise of unfettered discretion by a jury.' Waterbury
Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co.,
[193 Conn. 208, 238, 477 A.2d 988 (1984)].'' Berry v.
Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 827, 614 A.2d 414 (1992). ‘‘We
have long held that in a claim for damages proof of the
expenses paid or incurred affords some evidence of the
value of the services, and if unreasonableness in amount
does not appear from other evidence or through application
of the trier's general knowledge of the subjectmatter,
its reasonableness will be presumed.'' (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Markey v. Santangelo,
supra, 80.

After reviewing the evidence in the record concerning
the attorney's fees incurred by Label Systems, and the
trial court's extensive memorandum of decision, we
are unable to conclude that an award of $19,303.13 in
punitive damages constituted an abuse of discretion.

Label Systems incurred more than $250,000 in attorney's
fees throughout the course of this dispute, and
requested a comparative amount in its original motion
for punitive damages. In response to the trial court's
request to isolate those fees incurred in relation to the
claim of conversion of the insurance proceeds, Label
Systems reduced its request by $44,934.66. Undertaking
its own review of Label Systems' fees, and drawing
upon its observations during the course of the trial, the
trial court estimated that the conversion claim constituted
5 percent of Label Systems' attorney's fees prior
to trial, 10 percent during trial, and 100 percent of the
fees incurred in defending the favorable jury verdict
on the conversion claim from the defendants' posttrial
motions and attack. Although Label Systems only recovered
$50 in interest, this does not necessarily make
the pursuit of that claim, and the concomitant fees it
incurred, de minimis, and, therefore, unable to support
an award of punitive damages almost 400 times greater.

To the contrary, although the conversion claim was a
small part of the overall claims presented at trial, the
importance of that claim was, as the trial court noted,
twofold. First, it buttressed the other claims asserted
by Label Systems, including breach of duty of loyalty
and conversion of company goods, by demonstrating
the defendants' dishonesty and willingness to line their
own pockets with their employer's money. Second, it
provided Label Systems with a defense to the defendants'
wrongful termination counterclaim, and it
alleged that the conversion constituted evidence of wilful
and felonious misconduct.

On the other hand, this claim was not so tightly interwoven
with the other claims asserted by Label Systems,
and with the concomitant fees incurred pursuing them,
that the trial court would have been warranted in awarding
Label Systems the full amount of fees requested.

The trial judge who awarded punitive damages is the
same judge who presided over the entire trial and posttrial
proceedings, and, therefore, he had a firm knowledge
from which to make a reasonable determination
as to the time and resources necessary for Label Systems
to pursue this claim. Accordingly, we are unwilling
to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
by determining that reasonable attorney's fees for this
claim constituted 5 percent of the fees incurred prior
to trial, 10 percent during trial, and 100 percent posttrial.