Steven Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., et al.

The dispositive issue in this certified
appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded
that an investigation by the city of Hartford
police department's internal affairs division constituted
a quasi-judicial proceeding, thereby affording absolute
immunity to the citizen complainant whose claim gave
rise to the investigation. The plaintiff, Steven Craig,
appeals, following our grant of certification,1 from the
judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
Eugene Ramistella and his employer, Stafford
Construction, Inc. (Stafford).2 The plaintiff claims that
the Appellate Court improperly concluded that an internal
affairs investigation conducted by the Hartford
police department (department) constituted a quasijudicial
proceeding, thereby triggering the doctrine of
absolute immunity. We affirm the judgment of the
Appellate Court.

The plaintiff, a police officer with the department,
brought this defamation action against the defendants
claiming that they had defamed him when they filed a
citizen complaint with the department alleging that he
had directed racial slurs toward them at a construction
site. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment on the ground that, because the
internal affairs investigation constituted a quasi-judicial
proceeding, the allegedly defamatory statements were
entitled to an absolute privilege. The Appellate Court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Craig v.
Stafford Construction, Inc., 78 Conn. App. 549, 561,
827 A.2d 793 (2003). This certified appeal followed.
The following facts and procedural history were set
forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. ‘‘On March
17, 1997, the plaintiff accepted a private duty job offered
by Stafford at a construction site at 1700 Main Street
in Hartford. Ramistella was employed by Stafford and
was working on the construction site that day. During
a coffee break, the plaintiff made allegedly derogatory
racial comments regarding the purpose of the construction
project.

‘‘On April 14, 1997, Ramistella filed a citizen complaint
with the internal affairs division [of the department].
The internal affairs division conducted an
investigation and formally charged the plaintiff with
‘conduct unbecoming of a police officer.' During the
investigatory process, Ramistella made a false statement
regarding the March 17, 1997 incident.3 A hearing
was held on June 16, 1998, at which Ramistella withdrew
his complaint.4 Several months later, the plaintiff
was found not guilty.'' Id., 552–53.

Thereafter, ‘‘[t]he plaintiff . . . brought a defamation
action against . . . Ramistella and Miguel Aceves,
as well as . . . Stafford . . . . In his second amended
complaint . . . the plaintiff alleged that, in a citizen
complaint against him, the defendants knowingly and
falsely had accused him of having made derogatory
racial comments. The plaintiff further alleged that, as
a result of these allegedly false statements, he had suffered
emotional harm and loss of respect and had been
turned down for several requested promotions.

‘‘The defendants denied the allegations of the plaintiff
and asserted, as a special defense, that Ramistella's
statements were not actionable because of the doctrine
of absolute immunity. Ramistella's immunity, they
alleged, arose out of the fact that the statements of
which the plaintiff complained had been made in the
course of an investigation conducted by the internal
affairs division of the . . . department. The defendants
claimed that the investigation was a quasi-judicial proceeding
. . . [and] the defendants moved for summary
judgment on the basis of their claim of absolute immunity.

. . . [The trial] court granted the motion and rendered
judgment in their favor.'' Id., 550–51.

The plaintiff thereafter appealed to the Appellate
Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had concluded
that Ramistella's statements were protected by
the doctrine of absolute immunity. Id., 551. The Appellate
Court disagreed with the plaintiff, and affirmed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Id., 561.
Specifically, the Appellate Court concluded that the
internal affairs investigation constituted a quasi-judicial
proceeding because it involved the exercise of discretion
at different levels of the process and included an
investigation specifically intended to ascertain facts.
Id., 556–57. The Appellate Court further concluded that
affording complaints of police misconduct made to the
department's internal affairs division absolute immunity
‘‘serves the public policy of protecting free speech
that furthers the interests of a democratic society.''
Id., 561.

On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the
Appellate Court improperly concluded that the investigation
conducted by the internal affairs division constituted
a quasi-judicial proceeding. We disagree.

Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff's claim
on appeal, we note the standard that governs our review
in the present case. ‘‘[T]he standard of review of a
trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary
judgment is well established. Practice Book [§ 17-49]
provides that summary judgment shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof
submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for
summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pelletier v.
Sordoni/Skanska Construction Co., 264 Conn. 509, 514,
825 A.2d 72 (2003). In addition, the determination of
whether an internal affairs investigation constitutes a
quasi-judicial proceeding is a question of law over which
our review is plenary. Within this limitation, however,
whether a particular proceeding is quasi-judicial in
nature, for the purposes of triggering absolute immunity,
will depend on the particular facts and circumstances
of each case. With this standard of review in
mind, therefore, we turn to the plaintiff's claim on
appeal.

‘‘A defamatory statement is defined as a communication
that tends to harm the reputation of another as to
lower him in the estimation of the community or to
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him

. . . . To establish a prima facie case of defamation,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant
published a defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory
statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; (3)
the defamatory statement was published to a third person;
and (4) the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as
a result of the statement.'' (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical
Co., 267 Conn. 210, 217, 837 A.2d 759 (2004).

‘‘The effect of an absolute privilege in a defamation
action [however] is that damages cannot be recovered
for a defamatory statement even if it is published falsely
and maliciously. . . . [L]ike the privilege which is generally
applied to pertinent statements made in formal
judicial proceedings, an absolute privilege also attaches
to relevant statements made during administrative proceedings
which are quasi-judicial in nature. . . . Once
it is determined that a proceeding is quasijudicial in
nature, the absolute privilege that is granted to statements
made in furtherance of it extends to every step
of the proceeding until final disposition.'' (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelley v.
Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 565–66, 606 A.2d 693 (1992).

‘‘The judicial proceeding to which [absolute] immunity
attaches has not been defined very exactly. It
includes any hearing before a tribunal which performs
a judicial function, ex parte or otherwise, and whether
the hearing is public or not. It includes, for example,
lunacy, bankruptcy, or naturalization proceedings, and
an election contest. It extends also to the proceedings
of many administrative officers, such as boards and
commissions, so far as they have powers of discretion
in applying the law to the facts which are regarded as
judicial or quasi-judicial, in character.'' (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 566. In addition, this court
previously has delineated several factors that assist in
determining whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial in
nature. These factors include ‘‘whether the body has
the power to: (1) exercise judgment and discretion; (2)
hear and determine or to ascertain facts and decide;
(3) make binding orders and judgments; (4) affect the
personal property rights of private persons; (5) examine
witnesses and hear the litigation of the issues on a
hearing; and (6) enforce decisions or impose penalties.''
Id., 567. ‘‘Further, it is important to consider whether
there is a sound public policy reason for permitting the
complete freedom of expression that a grant of absolute
immunity provides.'' Id.

In Kelley, we concluded that schoolteacher license
revocation proceedings before the state board of education
were quasi-judicial in nature. Id., 571. In support
of that determination, we noted that the proceedings
had to conform to statutory regulations that listed well
delineated causes for license revocation. Id., 568. In
addition, the request for revocation was taken under
oath and had to be filed with the secretary for the
state board of education. Id., 568–69. If probable cause
existed for revocation of the teaching certificate, the
teacher was afforded formal notice of the decertification
proceedings and the teacher could demand a formal
hearing. Id., 569. At the hearing, the teacher was entitled
to counsel, to be present during the hearing, and to
cross-examine all witnesses. Id., 570. At the conclusion
of the hearings, the state board of education was
required to state in writing the reason for its decision
and notify all parties to the proceedings. Id.

Within that factual environment, it was clear to us
that ‘‘the state board of education possessed significant
regulatory authority to conduct proceedings of a quasijudicial
nature. The detailed procedures, which ensure
the reliability of teacher decertification proceedings,
and the compelling public policy concern for the protection
of school age children persuade us that the decertification
proceedings before the state board of education
were quasijudicial in nature, and that any statements
made as a requisite step in those proceedings were
absolutely privileged.'' Id., 571; see also Petyan v. Ellis,
200 Conn. 243, 252, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986) (absolute privilege
afforded to letter sent to employment security division
of state labor department regarding reasons
employee was terminated); Preston v. O'Rourke, 74
Conn. App. 301, 312, 811 A.2d 753 (2002) (arbitration
entered into pursuant to collective bargaining
agreement constituted quasi-judicial proceeding).

In the present case, the undisputed deposition testimony5
revealed the details of the process of an internal
affairs investigation by the department. That process
is governed by two sources: (1) the department's official
code of conduct; and (2) the collective bargaining
agreement between the city of Hartford and the union
representing the police officers. The process provides
as follows.

When a complaint is made regarding the alleged conduct
of one of the department's officers, it is put into
written form and sent to the internal affairs division.
Thereafter, the commander of the internal affairs division
determines whether the charges will be investigated
by the officer's immediate supervisor or by an
internal affairs investigator. If an internal affairs investigator
is assigned, as was done in the present case,
the investigator acts as a fact finder by interviewing
witnesses and interviewing the officer who is the subject
of the complaint. The witnesses give sworn statements
to the investigator during the investigation, and
the form on which they sign their statement informs
the witness that he or she can be criminally liable for
filing a false statement. The investigator then compiles
a report with his findings and presents it to the commander
of the internal affairs division.

After reviewing the investigator's report, the commander
of the internal affairs division then forwards
the report to a bureau commander, who reviews it in
order to determine if the department should further
investigate the claims made against the officer. If the
bureau commander determines that there should be
further investigation, the case is given to the department
advocate, who represents the chief of police and the
department, and the advocate ‘‘prosecutes'' the case
against the officer. The advocate then reviews the
charges against the officer and consults with the chief
of police regarding what further action should be taken.
At this point, the chief of police has several options,
including: ordering command discipline, which is documented
counseling, for the officer; issuing an oral reprimand
to the officer; issuing a written reprimand;
ordering an expedited hearing, which carries a penalty
of between one and five days suspension; or ordering
a formal hearing, which carries a penalty of six or more
days suspension, and includes possible termination. In
the present case, the chief of police at the time, Joseph
Croughwell, ordered that a formal hearing be held.
Once the decision to hold a formal hearing has been
made, the officer is given notice of the charges against
him pursuant to the department's code of conduct and
the date of the formal hearing. At the formal hearing,
the officer has a right to be represented by counsel. In
the present case, the plaintiff was represented by an
attorney assigned to him by his union. The hearing
officer presiding over the formal hearing is chosen by
the officer from a pool consisting of three department
captains. In addition, the department subpoenas witnesses
to testify at the formal hearing, and in the present
case, it is undisputed that the witnesses complied with
the subpoena and testified before the hearing officer.

Witnesses who testify at the formal hearing are sworn
and must testify under oath. The officer also has the
right to cross-examine the witnesses. In addition, at the
formal hearing, a city attorney is present in order to
rule on questions of evidence. During the hearing, the
hearing officer takes notes on the testimony and evidence
presented and, thereafter, transcribes his notes
into typed form, which constitutes the record for the
purposes of the hearing. After the hearing is concluded,
the hearing officer makes findings and a recommendation
of decision regarding the appropriate punishment.

Thereafter, the hearing officer's findings of facts and
recommendations are reviewed by the chief of police,
who can adopt the hearing officer's findings, modify
those findings or reject the findings. If the officer is not
satisfied with the decision by the chief of police, the
officer has a right to appeal to the personnel board of
the city of Hartford. Thereafter, the officer has a right
to appeal to the state labor board.

With this background in mind, we conclude that the
investigation conducted by the internal affairs division
constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding and, accordingly,
any statements made within the context of that
investigation are an afforded absolute privilege. With
regard to the first factor articulated in Kelley v. Bonney,
supra, 221 Conn. 567, it is clear that the investigation
entails the exercise of judgment and discretion at several
levels of the process. First, the investigator makes
recommendations through his initial report after conducting
the investigation into the complaint. Second,
the hearing officer exercises discretion and judgment
by making recommended findings and proposed punishments
after the conclusion of the formal hearing.

Finally, the chief of police exercises discretion and judgment
by either adopting, modifying or rejecting the
hearing officer's findings. In addition, the officer's
bureau commander exercises discretion in determining
whether further investigation should continue into the
allegations. Similarly, pursuant to the second prong of
Kelley v. Bonney, supra, 567, both the initial internal
affairs investigator and the hearing officer ascertain
and determine facts. As the Appellate Court noted, ‘‘[a]
primary function of the internal affairs process is to
investigate and to ascertain facts.'' Craig v. Stafford
Construction, Inc., supra, 78 Conn. App. 557.
With regard to the third factor outlined in Kelley v.
Bonney, supra, 221 Conn. 567, namely, whether the
body makes binding orders and judgments, the undisputed
testimony revealed that, after both the internal
affairs investigator and the hearing officer make their
findings of fact and recommendations, the chief of
police makes the final determination within the department
itself regarding the outcome of the allegations
made against the officer. The decision by the chief of
police is appealable to the personnel department of the
city of Hartford. The fact that that decision is appealable,
however, does not outweigh the other factors in
favor of the determination that the investigation is a
quasi-judicial proceeding. In addition, although that
decision is appealable, any punishment meted out by
the chief of police can be ordered served immediately,
notwithstanding any subsequent appeal by the officer.

The fourth factor discussed in Kelley v. Bonney,
supra, 221 Conn. 567, namely, whether the personal or
property rights of private persons are affected, also
supports a conclusion that the internal affairs investigation
is quasi-judicial in nature. As the testimony
revealed, a possible consequence of a citizen complaint
that has reached the formal hearing stage is suspension
or termination of the officer. Accordingly, the potential
impact on the officer's employment status certainly
affects the personal or property rights of the officer.
See Preston v. O'Rourke, supra, 74 Conn. App. 312 (arbitration
regarding appropriateness of discharge from
employment constitutes quasi-judicial proceeding).

Further, the investigation process clearly entitled the
officer to examine witnesses and ‘‘hear the litigation of
the issues on a hearing'' during the formal hearing stage
of the proceedings, thereby fulfilling the fifth factor
discussed in Kelley v. Bonney, supra, 567. The formal
hearing process permits the officer to cross-examine
witnesses and call witnesses on his or her own behalf.
Moreover, the hearing officer takes detailed notes during
the formal hearing and transcribes them into typed
form, which constitutes an adequate record of the
issues litigated at the formal hearing. Finally, the department
can enforce its decisions by imposing a suspension
of the officer's duties and pay, and can include
termination. Thus, we conclude that, like the license
revocation proceedings at issue in Kelley, the internal
affairs investigation conducted in the present case constituted
a quasi-judicial proceeding and, therefore, any
statements made during the course of that investigation
triggered the doctrine of absolute immunity from any
subsequent defamation claim.

Our conclusion that statements made in connection
with an internal affairs investigation are afforded an
absolute privilege also finds support in the case law
from other states. The most persuasive example is
Miner v. Novotny, 304 Md. 164, 166, 498 A.2d 269 (1985),
in which the plaintiff, a deputy county sheriff, brought
an action against the defendant for making allegedly
defamatory statements about him in a complaint made
to the county sheriff's office. Prior to the plaintiff's
cause of action, the defendant had brought a complaint
against the plaintiff for allegedly mistreating the defen-
dant during an arrest. Id. After an internal affairs investigation
into the incident, the sheriff's department
concluded that the plaintiff was not guilty of any misconduct.
Id. The plaintiff's claim for defamation followed
soon thereafter. Id., 167. After the trial court
granted a demurrer on the defamation claim, the plaintiff
appealed.

On appeal, Maryland's highest court addressed the
question of whether the internal affairs investigation
that occurred in the plaintiff's case constituted a quasijudicial
proceeding. It first noted that the procedural
safeguards provided by the statutory scheme governing
disciplinary proceedings were adequate to ‘‘minimize
the occurrence of defamatory statements.'' (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 174. The procedural safeguards
that existed in Miner included, inter alia, subjecting
a person who makes a false complaint to
criminal liability, informing the officer of the nature
of the investigation and the right to representation by
counsel, and making available to the officer a complete
record of the investigation. Id. In addition, the Maryland
court noted that during the hearing phase of the investigation,
the officer is represented by counsel, and is
given the opportunity to present his or her case. Id.,
175. Further, each party to the hearing may request that
the hearing officers issue summonses compelling the
testimony of witnesses. Id.

With this background in mind, the Maryland Court
of Appeals next explained that citizen complaints of
alleged police misconduct and the disciplinary procedures
that follow from those complaints, ‘‘serve a public
function of vital importance by providing a mechanism
through which abuses may be reported to the proper
authorities, and the abusers held accountable.'' Id., 176.
The Maryland court went on to note: ‘‘The viability of
a democratic government requires that the channels
of communication between citizens and their public
officials remain open and unimpeded. Were complaints
such as [the defendant's] not absolutely privileged, the
possibility of incurring the costs and inconvenience
associated with defending a defamation suit might well
deter a citizen with a legitimate grievance from filing
a complaint. We therefore conclude that the possible
harm a false brutality complaint may cause to a lawenforcement
officer's reputation, despite the procedural
safeguards provided by [the statutory scheme governing
disciplinary proceedings], is outweighed by the
public's interest in encouraging the filing and investigation
of valid complaints.'' Id.;6 see also Gray v. Rodriguez,
481 So. 2d 1298, 1299–1300 (Fla. App. 1986);
Magnus v. Anpatiellos, 130 App. Div. 2d 719, 720, 516
N.Y.S.2d 31 (1987); Campo v. Rega, 79 App. Div. 2d 626,
631, 433 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1980), appeal denied, 52 N.Y.2d
705, 419 N.E.2d 876, 437 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1981); Putter
v. Anderson, 601 S.W.2d 73, 76–77 (Tex. App. 1980);
but see Barge v. Ransom, 30 S.W.3d 889, 892 (Mo. App.
2000) (affording qualified privilege to complaints made
against police officers); Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15,
21–22, 155 S.E.2d 369 (1967) (same).

We agree with the reasoning of the Maryland Court
of Appeals, particularly regarding the public policy
served by the doctrine of absolute immunity in this
context, and we adopt it in the present case. Accordingly,
we conclude that the internal affairs division
investigation conducted by the department in the present
case constituted a quasi-judicial proceeding and,
therefore, that statements made in connection with that
investigation are afforded an absolute privilege.

The defendant, however, relies on the fact that any
decision or recommendation made by the hearing officer
can be overruled by the chief of police. Specifically,
the defendant claims that, because the chief of police
can modify or even reject the hearing officer's findings
of facts and recommendations regarding punishment,
the internal affairs investigation cannot be quasi-judicial
in nature. As we repeatedly have noted, however,
‘‘[o]nce it is determined that a proceeding is quasi-judicial
in nature, the absolute privilege that is granted to
statements made in furtherance of it extends to every
step of the proceedings until final disposition.''
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Kelley v. Bonney, supra, 221 Conn. 566. Thus, as the
review conducted by the chief of police was merely
the final step of the internal affairs investigation, it
constituted a part of the proceedings that are quasijudicial
in nature.

The plaintiff also claims that, because the department
lacks the authority to subpoena witnesses, the investigation
does not meet the fifth factor described in Kelley,
that the body ‘‘examine witnesses and hear the litigation
of the issues on a hearing . . . .'' Id., 567. In support
of his claim that the department lacks the authority to
subpoena witnesses to testify before a formal hearing,
the plaintiff relies on the testimony of Richard Calderone,
an investigator with the department's internal
affairs division. During his deposition, Calderone
opined that the subpoenas issued by the department are
not enforceable. Specifically, in response to a question
regarding whether the department issues subpoenas to
civilians to appear at the formal hearing, Calderone
stated: ‘‘They do to a hearing, however, the subpoena
doesn't hold any weight. Even though they can subpoena
somebody to the second step or third step [in
the internal affairs investigation process], it doesn't
hold any [legal] weight . . . it has no value.'' We need
not address the authority of the department to issue
subpoenas to nonpolice officers in the context of an
internal affairs formal hearing. It is sufficient for the
purposes of this appeal that, at the formal hearing
involving the plaintiff in the present case, two witnesses7
testified in compliance with a subpoena and the
plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine
those witnesses. Moreover, even if we were to assume
that the department lacked the authority to subpoena
witnesses to the formal hearing, the undisputed testimony
revealed that during its investigation, the internal
affairs investigator interviews witnesses and takes their
sworn statements. We further note that even if the
department had not subpoenaed witnesses to testify
before the formal hearing, the lack of subpoena power
is not necessarily dispositive of the question of whether
the proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature. See
Thomas v. Petrulis, 125 Ill. App. 3d 415, 420, 465 N.E.2d
1059 (1984) (‘‘[a] quasi-judicial body need not possess
all six powers; however, the more powers it possesses,
the more likely the body is acting in a quasi-judicial
manner'').8

The plaintiff next claims that, regardless of whether
the internal affairs investigation constituted a quasijudicial
proceeding, public policy concerns counsel
against affording an absolute privilege to defamatory
statements made in a citizen complaint. We disagree.

As stated in Miner, and discussed previously in this
opinion, if citizen complaints such as those involved in
the present case were not absolutely privileged, ‘‘the
possibility of incurring the costs and inconvenience
associated with defending a defamation suit might well
deter a citizen with a legitimate grievance from filing
a complaint.'' Miner v. Novotny, supra, 304 Md. 176.
Put differently, as the Appellate Court in the present
case noted, ‘‘[the policy of affording absolute immunity]
reflects the unspoken reality that, if there were no absolute
immunity, good faith criticism of governmental misconduct
might be deterred by concerns about
unwarranted litigation.'' Craig v. Stafford Construction,
Inc., supra, 78 Conn. App. 557; see also Lewis v.
Benson, 101 Nev. 300, 301, 701 P.2d 751 (1985) (‘‘the
application of an absolute privilege to civilians filing
complaints with an internal affairs bureau sufficiently
promotes the interests of the public to warrant the
availability of an absolute privilege''). Moreover,
although we recognize the debilitating affect that a false
allegation of racial discrimination can have on a police
officer, we conclude that the policy of encouraging citizen
complaints against those people who wield extraordinary
power within the community outweighs the need
to protect the reputation of the police officer against
whom the complaint is made.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 We granted the plaintiff's petition for certification for appeal limited to
the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly determine that an
internal affairs investigation conducted by the Hartford police department
is a quasi-judicial proceeding so that statements made in the course of
such a proceeding are entitled to an absolute privilege?'' Craig v. Stafford
Construction, Inc., 266 Conn. 916, 833 A.2d 466 (2003).

2 The plaintiff originally brought a claim against Ramistella, Stafford, and
Miguel Aceves, another employee of Stafford. Aceves was defaulted in the
trial court and did not join the remaining defendants' answer or their motion
for summary judgment. See Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 78 Conn.
App. 549, 550 n.1, 827 A.2d 793 (2003). Aceves, therefore, is not involved in
this appeal. Accordingly, we refer to Ramistella and Stafford collectively as
the defendants.

3 ‘‘As with the defendants' motion for summary judgment before the trial
court, the defendants, for purposes of this appeal, do not challenge the
plaintiff's contention that the statements made regarding the plaintiff were
false.'' Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., supra, 78 Conn. App. 552 n.3.

4 ‘‘Ramistella withdrew his complaint because he believed that the March
17, 1997 incident was nothing more than a misunderstanding.'' Craig v.
Stafford Construction, Inc., supra, 78 Conn. App. 553 n.4.

5 The testimony detailing the process of an internal affairs investigation
was derived from two sources: Richard Calderone, an internal affairs investigator

with the department, and Louis Wolf, the department advocate involved
in the present case. As discussed later in this opinion, the department
advocate acts as the prosecutor in cases involving claims of disciplinary
infractions within the department.

6 The court in Miner finally noted that, ‘‘[w]e are not unmindful of the
deeply disturbing and demoralizing effect a false accusation of brutality
may have on a law enforcement officer. . . . [N]o one likes to hear, or have
his family and friends hear, such allegations. . . . It is regrettable that our
holding here will, in some instances, afford an immunity to the evil disposed
and malignant slanderer. . . . We are satisfied, however, that the inhibition
of citizens' criticism of those entrusted with their protection is a far worse
evil. Accordingly, we hold that a citizen's brutality complaint filed against
a law-enforcement officer is protected by the same absolute privilege as
are statements made by witnesses in judicial proceedings, and that such
complaints cannot, therefore, serve as the basis for a defamation suit.''
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miner v. Novotny,
supra, 304 Md. 177.

7 Both Ramistella and Aceves testified at the formal hearing in response
to subpoenas issued by the department in the present case.

8 The plaintiff also contends that because police officers are not ‘‘private
citizens,'' the department's investigation can not ‘‘affect the personal or
property rights of private persons'' pursuant to the fourth factor outlined
in Kelley v. Bonney, supra, 221 Conn. 567. Although it is true that police
officers may be subject to a higher standard of proof in defamation cases,
i.e., that the statement was published with malice or reckless disregard of
the truth, they are still private citizens with respect to whether the department
has the power to deprive them of personal or property rights. Accordingly,
we reject the plaintiff's claim.