Cheryl Terry Enterprises, Ltd. v. City of Hartford

In Cheryl Terry Enterprises, Ltd. v. Hartford,
262 Conn. 240, 242, 811 A.2d 1272 (2002), the
plaintiff, Cheryl Terry Enterprises, Ltd., appealed from
the judgment of the trial court setting aside the jury's
verdict for the plaintiff on its antitrust claim against
the defendant, the city of Hartford. We concluded
therein that the plaintiff had not appealed from a final
judgment because the trial court had not yet resolved
the plaintiff's remaining claim for permanent injunctive
relief. The case thereafter was reclaimed to the trial
list and, following additional hearings and briefing from
the parties, the trial court denied the plaintiff's request
for a mandatory injunction. Thereafter, the plaintiff
appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the
Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this
court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and
Practice Book § 65-1.

In the present appeal, the plaintiff claims that the
trial court improperly: (1) set aside the jury's verdict
on its antitrust claim on the ground that, under our
decision in Lawrence Brunoli, Inc. v. Branford, 247
Conn. 407, 722 A.2d 271 (1999), the plaintiff, an unsuccessful
lowest bidder in a municipal bidding process,
lacked standing to bring an antitrust claim against the
defendant; (2) determined that it could effectively
repeal Connecticut's antitrust statute in cases involving
municipal bidding; (3) set aside the jury's verdict on
the plaintiff's antitrust claim on the ground that the
plaintiff had failed to present sufficient proof of damages;
(4) directed a verdict for the defendant on the
plaintiff's equal protection claims; and (5) failed to
award the plaintiff mandatory injunctive relief.

We conclude that the trial court improperly set aside
the verdict on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing
to bring an antitrust claim for damages against a
municipality arising out of the municipal bidding process.

Weconclude further that the trial court improperly
set aside the verdict on the ground that the plaintiff
had not proved its damages to a reasonable certainty.

In light of that conclusion, we need not address the
plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly granted
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on its
equal protection claims. Finally, we conclude that the
trial court properly denied the plaintiff's request for
injunctive relief. Accordingly, we reverse in part the
judgment of the trial court.

The relevant facts and procedural history are set forth
in our opinion in Cheryl Terry Enterprises, Ltd. v. Hartford,
supra, 262 Conn. 240. ‘‘The plaintiff is a school
bus company based in Hartford. The president of the
company, Cheryl Terry, has worked in the school transportation
business for more than thirty years. The plaintiff
was one of three vendors who had submitted sealed
bids to the defendant in response to an invitation to
bid for a proposed five year contract to provide bus
transportation services for the Hartford public schools,
commencing with the 1998–1999 school year. The plaintiff's
bid was lower than either of the other vendors,
Laidlaw Transit, Inc. (Laidlaw), and Dattco, Inc. (Dattco).
Despite being the highest bidder, Laidlaw was
awarded the five year contract.

‘‘After Laidlaw was awarded the contract, the plaintiff
brought the action underlying this appeal, claiming violations
of its equal protection rights and state antitrust
law2 . . . . The plaintiff also claimed that, by awarding
the contract to an entity other than the lowest responsible
bidder, the defendant violated § 2-548 of the Hartford
municipal code.3 The plaintiff's complaint alleged a
violation of the Connecticut Antitrust Act (act); General
Statutes § 35-24 et seq.; in that it was not awarded the
contract due to a conspiratorial agreement between a
[labor] union and the defendant, with the purpose of
obtaining a union contract.4 The plaintiff sought temporary
and permanent injunctive relief relating to the con-
tract, monetary damages and equitable relief. At trial,
the defendant acknowledged that the plaintiff's bid was
the lowest submitted, but it maintained that the plaintiff
was not awarded the contract because the defendant
had been informed that the plaintiff had a pending labor
case with the National Labor Relations Board, and
because its bid did not conform to the specifications
of the bid request. Terry testified, however, that the
plaintiff had ‘fully complied with each and every material
term of [the] defendant's bid specifications . . . .'
‘‘Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on the plaintiff's
motion for a temporary restraining order. On
August 4, 1998, subsequent to the completion of the
hearing, but prior to the issuance of the trial court's
decision, the defendant executed its contract with Laidlaw.

The trial court issued a decision denying the plaintiff's
motion for a temporary restraining order on August
7, 1998.

‘‘After a trial on the plaintiff's equal protection and
state antitrust claims, the trial court granted the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict as to the plaintiff's
equal protection claims, and submitted to the jury only
the claim alleging an antitrust violation. Ultimately, the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount
of $500,000 on that claim. The defendant then filed a
motion to set aside the verdict. The trial court granted
this motion and, thereafter, set aside the verdict for the
plaintiff. The trial court reserved the question as to
whether Laidlaw was a necessary party on the injunction
portion of the claim and noted that it would hold
a hearing on the plaintiff's request for permanent injunctive
relief ab initio if it were to decide that Laidlaw was
indeed a necessary party. The court ultimately determined
that Laidlaw was a necessary party and that it
should be joined as a party within thirty days of that
order. Prior to a resolution of the claim for permanent
injunctive relief, [however] the plaintiff appealed from
the judgment of the trial court setting aside the verdict
on its antitrust claim.''5 Cheryl Terry Enterprises, Ltd.
v. Hartford, supra, 262 Conn. 243–45.

As we noted previously, we dismissed the plaintiff's
first appeal, concluding that the plaintiff had not
appealed from a final judgment because the claim for
injunctive relief had not been determined. Id., 242. Due
to the trial court's subsequent resolution of the plaintiff's
remaining claim for injunctive relief, we now
address the merits of the plaintiff's claims.

I

We address the plaintiff's first two claims together
because they are interrelated. The plaintiff claims that
the trial court improperly granted the defendant's
motion to set aside the verdict on the ground that Lawrence
Brunoli, Inc. v. Branford, supra, 247 Conn. 407,
precludes a plaintiff from pursuing a statutory antitrust
claim for damages against a municipality arising out of
a municipal bidding process. The defendant contends
that the trial court properly found that, under Lawrence
Brunoli, Inc., the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue
its antitrust claim, and, therefore, that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We agree with the
plaintiff.

The following additional facts are relevant to our
resolution of this claim. Prior to trial, the plaintiff was
warned by the trial court that it would allow the antitrust
claim to go to the jury because the court was
unprepared to rule on its ultimate viability, but that the
court would ‘‘closely examine that issue if the jury were
to return a verdict in the plaintiff's favor.'' Ultimately,
the jury did return a verdict in the plaintiff's favor,
and awarded the plaintiff $500,000 in damages. The
defendant filed a motion to set aside the verdict, claiming,
inter alia, that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to award damages on the antitrust claim.6 The
trial court agreed, and granted the defendant's motion
to set aside the verdict.

‘‘The trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a matter
of law and, therefore, our review is plenary. If a
party is found to lack standing, the court is without
subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause. . . .

A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law.'' Cadle Co. v. D'Addario,
268 Conn. 441, 446, 844 A.2d 836 (2004).

In its memorandum of decision on the defendant's
motion to set aside the verdict, the trial court analyzed
the act and determined that ‘‘it seems clear that a municipality
can be sued under [the] act.'' We agree. The act
provides, inter alia, that ‘‘[e]very contract, combination,
or conspiracy in restraint of any part of trade or commerce
is unlawful.'' General Statutes § 35-26. For purposes
of the act, ‘‘ ‘[p]erson' '' is defined broadly as ‘‘any
individual, proprietorship, corporation, limited liability
company, firm, partnership, incorporated and unincorporated
association, or any other legal or commercial
entity . . . .'' General Statutes § 35-25 (b). We consistently
have stated that a municipality is a legal entity
that can sue and be sued. See, e.g., Murphy v. Ives, 151
Conn. 259, 264, 196 A.2d 596 (1963) (‘‘[t]owns have no
sovereign immunity, and are capable of suing and being
sued . . . in any action'' [internal quotation marks
omitted]). Therefore, the plain language of the statutory
definition of ‘‘person'' is broad enough to include municipalities,
such as the defendant in the present case.

This broad definition of ‘‘person'' is then utilized by
the legislature to define both who may be liable for
anticompetitive behavior, and who has standing to
recover damages for such behavior. In regard to standing,
General Statutes § 35-35 provides in relevant part
that ‘‘any person . . . injured in its business or property
by any violation of the provisions of this chapter
shall recover treble damages, together with a reasonable
attorney's fee and costs.'' See also General Statutes
§ 35-34 (‘‘any person . . . may sue for injunctive relief,
both temporary or permanent, against threatened loss
or damage to its property or business by any violation
of this chapter'').

Conversely, the legislature also has used that same
broad definition of ‘‘person'' to define any individual or
entity that may be liable under the act for anticompetitive
behavior. See, e.g., General Statutes § 35-38 (‘‘[a]ny
. . . person who has been held to have violated any of
the provisions of this chapter shall forfeit and pay to
the state a civil penalty of not more than two hundred
fifty thousand dollars''); General Statutes § 35-39 (‘‘[a]
corporation, association, firm, partnership, proprietorship,
or any other legal or commercial entity is liable
under this chapter for the acts of its . . . agents'').
Indeed, the only express limitation on the act's applicability
is set forth in General Statutes § 35-31,7 which
contains four classes of exceptions from liability under
the act. None of these exceptions is applicable to the
facts of the present case. See also Mazzola v. Southern
New England Telephone Co., 169 Conn. 344, 355, 363
A.2d 170 (1975) (‘‘[§ 35-31] exceptions are to be strictly
construed''). Thus, although the legislature has
excluded certain organizations and activities from liability
under the act, it has not excluded municipalities,
or the municipal bidding process, from its provisions.8
See Doucette v. Pomes, 247 Conn. 442, 457, 724 A.2d
481 (1999) (‘‘[u]nless there is evidence to the contrary,
statutory itemization indicates that the legislature
intended [a] list to be exclusive'' [internal quotation
marks omitted]). Although the defendant may be correct
that there are significant public policy reasons to
exclude the municipal bidding process from the act,
that is a change that must be made by the legislature,
not this court. See State v. Hanson, 210 Conn. 519, 529,
556 A.2d 1007 (1989) (‘‘It is axiomatic that the court
itself cannot rewrite a statute to accomplish a particular
result. That is the function of the legislature.'' [Internal
quotation marks omitted.]); see also State v. Luurtsema,
262 Conn. 179, 202, 811 A.2d 223 (2002) (rejecting
argument imputing temporal requirement to restraint
element of kidnapping statute). In sum, we conclude
that the trial court properly determined that a municipality
can be sued for violations of the act.9

Despite having reached this conclusion, however, the
trial court granted the defendant's motion to set aside
the judgment, determining that in light of our decision
in Lawrence Brunoli, Inc. v. Branford, supra, 247 Conn.
416, the act was ‘‘effectively repealed'' in actions arising
from the municipal bidding process because ‘‘[t]o allow
antitrust damages here would be repugnant to the public
benefit purposes of the municipal competitive bidding
laws and would not therefore comport with the
similar objectives of the antitrust laws to benefit the
public, not competitors, and lead to results the legislature
could not have intended.'' We disagree.

To begin with, we already have concluded that the
trial court properly determined that the definition of
‘‘persons'' subject to liability under the act is broad
enough to include municipalities. Once the trial court
made this determination, it should have denied the
defendant's motion to set aside the verdict, and declined
to apply the policy reasons set forth in Lawrence Brunoli,
Inc., in order to alter the plain language of the
act. State v. Hanson, supra, 210 Conn. 529.

Moreover, Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., readily is distinguishable
from the present case. In Lawrence Brunoli,
Inc., the plaintiff, an unsuccessful bidder in a municipal
bidding contest, alleged impropriety in the contract
awarding process and brought a breach of contract
action for money damages against the town of Branford.
Lawrence Brunoli, Inc. v. Branford, supra, 247 Conn.
408. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged fraud, corruption
or favoritism on the part of the defendant in awarding
the contract. Id., 410. The trial court dismissed the
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the
ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert a
claim for money damages and was, therefore, limited
to an action for injunctive relief. Id. The issue on appeal
to this court was ‘‘whether the [trial] court [had] subject
matter jurisdiction over a claim for damages, rather
than for injunctive relief, allegedly resulting from fraud,
corruption or favoritism in the award of a contract that
is subject to competitive municipal bidding requirements.''
Id., 408. We answered that question in the negative,
concluding that, ‘‘as a matter of law, an
unsuccessful bidder to a municipal contract has no
standing to assert a cause of action for money damages
for failure of the municipality to follow its competitive
bidding laws, regardless of whether the plaintiff alleges
fraud, corruption or favoritism'' in the bidding process.
Id., 411. We began our analysis by noting that because
the plaintiff only had bid on the contract, and was not
awarded the contract, it lacked standing to bring a common-
law breach of contract action. Id., 411–12. Accordingly,
we concluded that ‘‘[i]f an unsuccessful bidder
has standing to bring a claim against a municipality
. . . such standing must be derived from a source other
than its bid submitted in response to an invitation to
bid. That source is the municipal bidding statutes themselves.''

10 Id., 412. Because the statutes expressly did
not confer standing for money damages, and our prior
case law had limited relief in such actions to injunctive
relief, we considered whether the policy considerations
underlying the bidding statutes were best served by
continuing to limit the remedy to injunctive relief. Id.,
412–16. We concluded that they were, and, accordingly,
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id., 416.

Our decision in Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., was limited
to actions based on common-law breach of contract
claims or the municipal bidding statutes. In the present
case, the plaintiff did not assert a common-law breach
of contract action, nor an action for injunctive relief
under the municipal bidding statutes, but, rather, sought
relief under the act. We simply were not called upon
in Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., to address whether an
unsuccessful lowest bidder had standing to bring an
action under the act. Furthermore, as we stated in that
case, ‘‘[i]f an unsuccessful bidder has standing to bring
a claim against a municipality . . . such standing must
be derived from a source other than its bid submitted
in response to the invitation to bid.'' Id., 412. As we
noted previously, the legislature expressly has conferred
standing on a broad range of individuals under
the act, including unsuccessful bidders in a municipal
bidding process. Thus, an independent source of standing,
which was absent in Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., exists
in the present case. Put another way, in Lawrence Brunoli,
Inc., we were attempting to discern whether, in
the absence of a direct conferral of standing by the
legislature in the municipal bidding statutes, this court
should recognize a right to standing for money damages.
See id., 412–16. To the contrary, in the present case the
legislature has conferred standing to a broad class of
persons that includes a municipality, and this court
cannot now limit that standing in a manner contrary to
the plain language of the act.

Finally, we note that the policy considerations supporting
our decision in Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., are
rendered inapplicable to the present case due to the
legislature's broad conferral of standing under the act,
which is based on several important principles, including,
the protection of the public from anticompetitive
behavior and the promotion of competition in the marketplace.

See, e.g., Shea v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Assn. of New Haven, 184 Conn. 285, 294, 439 A.2d
997 (1981) (‘‘[b]oth federal and Connecticut antitrust
law attempt to promote competition in the marketplace'').
Put another way, although this court was hesitant
to expose taxpayers to the additional costs of
money damages in Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., the legislature
has not expressed a similar hesitation within the
language of the act. Indeed, as the plaintiff correctly
contends, it would be incongruous to allow a municipality
to bring an action against contractors under the act
for anticompetitive behavior, yet preclude those same
contractors from bringing an action against a municipality
that has engaged in anticompetitive behavior.11 The
trial court's reliance on Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., therefore,
was misplaced.

II

We turn next to the plaintiff's claim that the trial
court improperly granted the defendant's motion to set
aside the verdict on the ground that the plaintiff had
failed to prove its claim of lost profits to a reasonable
degree of certainty. The defendant contends that the
trial court properly determined that the plaintiff had
introduced no evidence of lost profits. We agree with
the plaintiff.

The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of this claim. At trial, the
evidence concerning the plaintiff's lost profits consisted
of the bid on the Hartford school transportation contract
(bid) and the testimony of Terry, the plaintiff's
president. The bid was for a five year contract, with
busing services to commence on July 1, 1998, and to
terminate on June 30, 2003. On the bid forms, bidders
had to specify the price of five items for each of the
five years. Specifically, the bid forms requested prices
for three ‘‘runs'' consisting of morning, midday and
afternoon service, whereby bidders had to specify the
annual unit price per school bus, and then multiply that
price by the number of buses to arrive at an annual
price per run.12 The bid forms also requested an annual
price for 180 half hours of ‘‘additional service.'' Finally,
the bid forms requested the annual price of bus monitors,
to be calculated by multiplying a monitor's hourly
salary by 15,120 hours. Each of these prices were added
together to arrive at the total annual price of the busing
service. The bidder was then required to add together
the annual prices for each of the five years, adjusted
for present value, to arrive at the net present value, or
total price, of the bid.

The net present value of the plaintiff's bid was
$5,862,997.93. Terry testified that this figure included
all of the plaintiff's costs, as well as its usual anticipated
profit of 8 to 10 percent. Specifically, Terry testified
that, in preparing the bid, she had calculated the following
costs: the cost of purchasing new or used school
buses, including the cost of financing those purchases;
payroll, including taxes and workers' compensation
insurance; facility costs, including the cost of gasoline
for the school buses; property costs; and the cost of
liability insurance. Terry further testified that she had
calculated each of these costs on the basis of the individual
specifications of the bid. She then testified that,
after calculating the plaintiff's costs, she had added its
anticipated profit. Terry stated that her usual practice
was to add between 8 and 10 percent profit to her bids.
In addition, Terry testified at length concerning her
approximately thirty years of experience in the school
transportation business. She stated that she had started
as a school bus driver in the 1960s, and soon thereafter
was managing school transportation contracts for a
number of cities and towns throughout the state,
encompassing ‘‘well over 200'' school buses at one time
and ‘‘[forty-eight school buses] in Norwich alone.'' In
1984, Terry incorporated the plaintiff, which has provided
school transportation services since that time.

On cross-examination by the defendant, Terry
acknowledged that she was unable to produce the exact
figures that she had used in calculating the bid. She
stated, however, that, although she had prepared the
bid two and one-half years before the trial and could
not remember the actual figures she had used, she could
explain how she had calculated the bid. Terry explained
that she had calculated the bid the same way that she
calculates all of her bids: ‘‘I took my costs, as I always
do, and add[ed] a profit, and that is all I can tell you
because that is the way you do it.'' Although Terry
acknowledged that it was ‘‘possible'' that she could
have miscalculated the bid, she stated: ‘‘I have been
doing this for a long time, and I have been pretty much
on target. . . . I amnot infallible, no one is infallible,
but I have a record.'' When the defendant's attorney
asked Terry, a second time, if she could have miscalculated
her expenses, she replied: ‘‘I have a record, that
is why I am in business. . . . I amconfident of my past
experience which has been many many years in the
business, or I wouldn't have been in the business.''

At the end of Terry's testimony, the defendant moved
to strike her testimony concerning anticipated profits
as irrelevant because ‘‘she does not have the knowledge
upon which to base an estimate of the profits.'' The
trial court denied the motion to strike, but indicated
that, ‘‘unless there is more offered in the way of facts
and figures that [Terry] relied on, I may be in a position
where I grant a motion for a directed verdict . . . .''13

The plaintiff presented no further evidence concerning
Terry's preparation of the bid or the plaintiff's anticipated
profits.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
on its antitrust claim, and awarded damages in the
amount of $500,000.14 The defendant thereafter filed a
motion to set aside the verdict, claiming, inter alia, that
‘‘[t]he verdict bears no relationship to [the] damages
proved in the case.'' The trial court agreed, and concluded
that the plaintiff had ‘‘fail[ed] to prove damages
to a reasonable certainty [and] that the jury verdict
was based on sheer speculation.'' Specifically, the court
stated that, ‘‘the plaintiff, through . . . Terry, presented
no experts, statistics, financial records as to
costs or any information from which a reasonable calculation
of lost profits could be made for this contract.
[Terry] simply testified that she had been in the school
transportation business for thirty years and her rate of
profit was between 8 and 10 percent. . . . Terry was
a very candid witness . . . [and] repeatedly said that
she had done the calculation on cost for this bid over
two years ago and did not have her records nor any
present memory of any of the cost items that went into
determining the expenses of completing the contractual
obligations she was bidding for . . . . In the court's
opinion, that will not do. Profits are determined by
subtracting expenses from anticipated revenue.

Although expenses for a five year contract cannot be
calculated precisely in every category, some credible
and concrete figures must be provided - [Terry] admitted
at one time she had those very figures, she just did
not bring them to court or no longer had them.'' The
trial court further stated that, even if the plaintiff could
have established lost profits ‘‘by proving the amount of
the bid and the rate of profit it traditionally received
by running this business for over thirty years,'' there was
‘‘no evidence that the school transportation contracts it
had performed in the past were anything comparable
to the prospective Hartford five year contract.''

Consequently,
the trial court granted the defendant's motion
to set aside the jury's verdict.

We begin with a brief discussion of the appropriate
standard of review. ‘‘The trial court possesses inherent
power to set aside a jury verdict which, in the court's
opinion, is against the law or the evidence. . . . The
supervision which a judge has over the verdict is an
essential part of the jury system. . . . [The trial court]
should not set aside a verdict where it is apparent that
there was some evidence upon which the jury might
reasonably reach their conclusion, and should not
refuse to set it aside where the manifest injustice of
the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote
that some mistake was made by the jury in the application
of legal principles, or as to justify the suspicion
that they or some of them were influenced by prejudice,
corruption or partiality. . . . The court has a duty to
set aside the verdict where the jury's action is so unreasonable
as to suggest that it was the product of such
improper influences. . . .

‘‘We recognize that, [i]n determining whether to set
aside the verdict, the trial court walks a thin line. . . .
Ultimately, [t]he decision to set aside a verdict entails
the exercise of a broad legal discretion . . . that, in
the absence of clear abuse, we shall not disturb. Our
review of the trial court's action on a motion to set
aside the verdict involves a determination of whether
the trial court abused its discretion, according great
weight to the action of the trial court and indulging
every reasonable presumption in favor of its correctness
. . . since the trial judge has had the same opportunity
as the jury to view the witnesses, to assess their
credibility and to determine the weight that should be
given to their evidence. . . . Moreover, the trial judge
can gauge the tenor of the trial, as we, on the written
record, cannot, and can detect those factors, if any,
that could improperly have influenced the jury. . . .

‘‘Finally, in evaluating the exercise of the trial court's
discretion, we are mindful that litigants have a constitutional
right to have juries decide issues of fact. The
right to a jury trial is fundamental in our judicial system,
and this court has said that the right is one obviously
immovable limitation on the legal discretion of the court
to set aside a verdict, since the constitutional right of
trial by jury includes the right to have issues of fact as
to which there is room for a reasonable difference of
opinion among fair-minded men passed upon by the
jury and not by the court. . . . Since, in setting aside
the verdict, the trial court has deprived the party in
whose favor the verdict was rendered of his constitutional
right to have factual issues resolved by the jury,
we must examine the evidential basis of the verdict
itself to determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion.'' (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Howard v. MacDonald, 270 Conn. 111,
126–28, A.2d (2004).

In the present case, the trial court set aside the jury's
verdict because it concluded that the plaintiff had not
proved its damages to a reasonable certainty. ‘‘The
amount of a damage award is a matter peculiarly within
the province of the trier of fact, in this case, the jury.
. . . In considering a motion to set aside the verdict,
the [trial] court must determine whether the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party, reasonably supports the jury's verdict.'' (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
262 Conn. 433, 449, 815 A.2d 119 (2003). Accordingly,
we must determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion in making its determination that the evidence
reasonably did not support the jury's award of damages.
‘‘In deciding whether damages properly have been
awarded . . . we are guided by the well established
principle that such damages must be proved with reasonable
certainty. . . . Although we recognize that
damages for lost profits may be difficult to prove with
exactitude . . . such damages are recoverable only to
the extent that the evidence affords a sufficient basis
for estimating their amount with reasonable certainty.
. . . Consequently, we have permitted lost profits to
be calculated by extrapolating from past profits.'' (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Beverly
Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff &
Kotkin, 247 Conn. 48, 69, 717 A.2d 724 (1998).
‘‘This court and courts of other jurisdictions have
looked to a number of factors in evaluating whether
the plaintiff has proved lost profits to a reasonable
certainty. A plaintiff's prior experience in the same business
has been held to be probative . . . as has a plaintiff's
experience in the same enterprise subsequent to
the interference. . . . [T]he experience of the plaintiff
. . . in a similar business [has] been admitted to prove
lost profits. . . . In addition, the average experience
of participants in the same line of business as the injured
party has been approved as a method of proving lost
profits. . . . Similarly, prelitigation projections, particularly
when prepared by the defendant, have also been
approved. . . . The underlying requirement for each
of these types of evidence is a substantial similarity
between the facts forming the basis of the profit projections
and the business opportunity that was destroyed.''
(Citations omitted.) Id., 72–74.

Finally, this court has recognized that, ‘‘[t]he vagaries
of the marketplace usually deny us sure knowledge of
what [the] plaintiff's situation would have been in the
absence of the defendant's antitrust violation. This fact
and the general belief that it would be inequitable to
allow a wrongdoer to defeat recovery by insisting on
rigorous proof of damages have resulted in a lesser
burden of proving the amount of damages in antitrust
suits than in other contexts.'' (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit
District, 235 Conn. 1, 28, 664 A.2d 719 (1995), quoting
1 A.B.A. Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments
(3d Ed. 1992) p. 668. Accordingly, ‘‘[a] damage theory
may be based on assumptions so long as the assumptions
are reasonable in light of the record evidence.
. . . The reasonableness of the assumptions underlying
the plaintiff's damage theory is determined by the trier
of fact. . . . Federal appellate courts have refused to
find damage evidence insufficient unless there was no
basis for critical assumptions made by the [trier of
fact].'' (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v.
Westport Transit District, supra, 28.
Our review of the record reveals that the jury's award
of damages was reasonably supported by the evidence,
which proved those damages to a reasonable certainty.
First, the plaintiff's bid on the Hartford school transportation
contract stated a net present value of
$5,862,997.93. This figure reflects the net present value
of the requested three daily runs of school bus service,
additional service and bus monitors over the course
of five years. On the basis of this evidence and any
assumptions reasonably drawn therefrom, the jury reasonably
could have concluded that, in the absence of
the defendant's antitrust violation, the plaintiff would
have performed the Hartford school transportation contract
at a price of $5,862,997.93.

Second, Terry testified at length concerning her substantial
experience in preparing bids for school transportation
contracts. Specifically, Terry testified that she
had approximately thirty years of experience in preparing
such bids, and that she had run her own school
transportation company since 1984. She also stated,
several times, that she prepared her bids by first calculating
her costs, and then adding in an anticipated profit,
which was usually between 8 and 10 percent of the
price of the bid. Although Terry could not produce the
exact figures she had used in calculating the costs for
the bid, she discussed, in detail, the nature of those
costs. On cross-examination, Terry candidly acknowledged
the possibility that she could have miscalculated
the bid. She stated, however, that ‘‘I have been doing
this for a long time, and I have been pretty much on
target.'' Terry also stated: ‘‘I am confident of my past
experience which has been many many years in the
business, or I wouldn't have been in the business.'' On
the basis of this testimony, the jury reasonably could
have inferred that Terry accurately had predicted the
plaintiff's profits on previous bids. Moreover, her testimony
was consistent with our well settled principle
that ‘‘the owner of property is competent to testify to
its value. . . . Furthermore, we have determined that
a franchise owner is competent to testify as to the value
of a franchise. . . . This is based in part on the common
experience that an owner is familiar with her property
. . . . The weight to be accorded such testimony
is for the trier to decide.'' (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Westport Taxi Service, Inc.
v. Westport Transit District, supra, 235 Conn. 35.
In Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit
District, supra, 235 Conn. 32–36, in which the plaintiff
had alleged antitrust violations, this court upheld an
award of damages for lost profits and lost business
value. In that case, the plaintiff, a private taxi company,
claimed that the defendant municipality had committed
an antitrust violation by operating a government subsidized,
below cost taxi service for the purpose of monopolizing
the town's taxi business, thereby forcing the
plaintiff out of business. After a court trial, the trial
court agreed with the plaintiff and awarded it damages
for lost profits and lost business value. With regard to
lost profits, the trial court found that the plaintiff had
not sought a fare increase with the state public utilities
commission, because it ‘‘legitimately [had] feared that
it would have trouble enough competing with [the
defendant's] service at present rates, without adding to
the problem by increasing its fares.'' (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 30. Accordingly, the court awarded
damages of $12,144 in lost profits based upon the difference
in what the plaintiff had been charging and what
it could have charged but for the defendant's conduct.15
Id., 30–32.

The trial court in Westport Taxi Service, Inc., then
determined that the plaintiff also was entitled to
$150,000 in damages for lost business value. In arriving
at this figure, the trial court noted its reliance on the
testimony of the plaintiff's vice president, who stated
that a fair return on a taxi business would be between
10 and 12 percent. Specifically, ‘‘[t]he trial court determined
that [the witness'] valuation of the business was
based on his own experience in the taxi business for
more than twenty years, his knowledge of how a taxi
business was valued by the industry, his discussions
with other owners, his knowledge of other sales, his
membership in the Connecticut Taxi Cab Association,
his membership in the International Taxi Cab Association,
and finally, his own personal experience and prac-
tice . . . .'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 34.

In accordance with the testimony of the plaintiff's vice
president, the trial court applied a 10 to 12 percent
rate of return to its own calculation of the plaintiff's
projected profits to arrive at its ultimate determination
in lost business value. Id., 33.

The defendant appealed to this court, which affirmed
the award of damages for lost profits and lost business
value. Id., 45. With respect to lost profits, this court
concluded that ‘‘the trial court based its calculation of
the plaintiff's damages due to lost profits on sufficient
evidence and reasonable assumptions . . . .'' Id., 32.
In addition, this court concluded that the trial court
properly had relied on the testimony of the plaintiff's
vice president to establish the lost value of the plaintiff's
business. In so concluding, we noted ‘‘that the trial
court has broad discretion to admit the testimony of
anyone who is involved with a business or property
and may have personal knowledge of its value.'' Id., 35.
Because the plaintiff's vice president was competent
to testify to the methods he had employed in valuing
the business, the weight given his testimony was for
the trial court, as the trier of fact, to decide. Id. Just
as the plaintiff's vice president in Westport Taxi Service,
Inc., was competent to testify as to the plaintiff's lost
anticipated profits and to his reliance on those figures
in valuing his business, Terry was competent to testify
in the present case as to the methods she had used in
predicting a profit in the plaintiff's bid for the Hartford
school transportation contract, and, therefore, the jury
was entitled to credit her testimony as it did.16 See
Capitol City Personnel Services, Inc. v. Franklin, 52
Conn. App. 783, 787, 727 A.2d 1284 (1999) (plaintiff
proved damages with reasonable certainty when principal
shareholder estimated profits as 25 percent of
adjusted gross receipts, and testified that 25 percent
was ‘‘accurate'' for both industry and this particular
plaintiff).17

Moreover, in Bead Chain Mfg. Co. v. Saxton Products,
Inc., 183 Conn. 266, 439 A.2d 314 (1981), this court
concluded that, under the Uniform Commercial Code;
General Statutes § 42a-1-101 et seq.; lost profits on a
breached contract for the sale of goods may be established
through the opinion testimony of the seller. Specifically,
this court stated: ‘‘With regard to the loss of
profits, [the plaintiff's] president testified, without
objection, about the elements he considered in pricing
the job for [the defendant]. Under the [Uniform Commercial]
Code, it is not fatal that his cost and price
estimates about the actual production run were necessarily
theoretical, since [the defendant's] breach made
it impossible to go forward with the production that
would have made historically accurate figures available.
. . . [The plaintiff's] president based his estimates on
his experienced view of the equipment that would be
required, the difficulty of maintaining production, and
the time required for the job. Having taken account of
these and related factors, he built a 20 percent profit
into the contract price of $13.95 per thousand units.

The award of $3000 lost profits on a contract for
5,000,000 units at a total contract price of approximately
$70,000 was therefore well within the supporting evidence.''
(Citations omitted.) Bead Chain Mfg. Co. v.
Saxton Products, Inc., supra, 279–80. Although Bead
Chain Mfg. Co. was decided under the Uniform Commercial
Code, ‘‘[w]e have often drawn upon provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code as a source of analogy
for the emergent common law.'' Normand Josef Enterprises,
Inc. v. Connecticut National Bank, 230 Conn.
486, 501, 646 A.2d 1289 (1994). Therefore, as in Bead
Chain Mfg. Co., it is not fatal in the present case that
Terry's estimated profits under the Hartford school
transportation contract were necessarily theoretical,
since it was the defendant's antitrust violation, in the
first instance, that rendered the historically accurate
figures unavailable.

The defendant, relying on Beverly Hills Concepts,
Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff & Kotkin, supra, 247
Conn. 70, and Gordon v. Indusco Management Corp.,
164 Conn. 262, 320 A.2d 811 (1973), contends that this
court previously has set aside damage awards that were
‘‘supported by far more evidence than the verdict here.''
A review of those cases, however, reveals that they do
not support the defendant's characterization. In Beverly
Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff &
Kotkin, supra, 50–52, the plaintiff, a corporation that
sold exercise equipment, brought an action against the
defendant law firm and certain individual attorneys for
malpractice in connection with the plaintiff's failed
attempt to establish a new business that would franchise
fitness clubs. After a court trial, the trial court
rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, and awarded the
plaintiff approximately $15.9 million in lost profits. Id.,
51. On appeal, this court reversed the damages award,
because ‘‘the trial court improperly concluded that the
plaintiff had established its damages to a reasonable
certainty.'' Id., 59. Specifically, the plaintiff in that case
had not sold any fitness franchises; id., 72; therefore,
there was no record of such sales from which to extrapolate
anticipated future profits. Accordingly, the plaintiff
attempted to establish lost profits through the expert
testimony of a certified public accountant, who estimated
the plaintiff's lost profits on the basis of its prior
sales of fitness equipment. Id., 70–72. As this court
noted, however, this testimony was based on the faulty
assumption that, because the plaintiff previously had
sold fitness equipment, it would have been able to sell
fitness franchises with a similar rate of success. Id.

The lost profits of a new business also was an issue
in Gordon v. Indusco Management Corp., supra, 164
Conn. 262, the other case relied on by the defendant.
In Gordon, the plaintiff, who had acquired an area dis-
tributorship franchise in a fast-food restaurant operation,
entered into a contract with the defendant for the
construction and lease of a building in Danbury in which
the plaintiff would operate an outlet of the restaurant
chain. Id., 264. After the defendant had failed to construct
the outlet, as it had promised to in the contract,
the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant
for breach of contract. Id., 263. In an effort to establish
lost profits, the plaintiff presented the testimony of the
operator an outlet of the fast-food chain located in
Orange. That witness testified that his outlet's gross
receipts were $175,000, and that his net profit was 12
percent of the gross receipts. Id., 275. As this court
noted, however, the operator of the outlet in Orange
had managed that outlet himself, and his stated figure
of a 12 percent profit had included the value of his own
services to the operation in that capacity. Id., 276. The
plaintiff, by contrast, had intended to hire a manager
to run his outlet for him. Id. Accordingly, the court in
Gordon concluded that the plaintiff had not proved his
damages, because, ‘‘[s]ince the plaintiff would not have
given his services but would have employed a manager
for his outlet, it is not clear that he would have enjoyed
a similar profit margin.'' Id.

Unlike the businesses in both Beverly Hills Concepts,
Inc., and Gordon, the plaintiff in the present case is
not a new business.18 As we previously have stated,
Terry testified that she had approximately thirty years
of experience in the school transportation industry and
had been running her own school transportation company
since 1984. She also testified that, prior to incorporating
her own company, she had managed a school
transportation company that had ‘‘well over 200'' school
buses and ‘‘[forty-eight school buses] in Norwich
alone.'' The bid form in the present case indicates that
only thirty-four school buses would have been required
for performance of the Hartford school transportation
contract. See footnote 12 of this opinion. Finally, Terry
discussed the specific types of expenses that she had
considered in preparing the bid, and she testified that
she always had prepared her bids by first calculating
the costs, and then adding in the anticipated profit.

Accordingly, Terry's testimony established that she previously
had managed school transportation contracts
that were similar to the contract at issue in the present
case, and on the basis of this testimony, the jury reasonably
could have concluded that Terry's anticipated
profit of between 8 and 10 percent was appropriate.
Because the jury's damage award of $500,000, or
approximately 8.5 percent in lost profits, was well
within this range; see footnote 14 of this opinion; the
trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the
jury's verdict.

III

The plaintiff next claims that the trial court improp-
erly granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict
on its equal protection claims on the ground that
the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law in its antitrust
claim, because the trial court subsequently
deprived the plaintiff of that adequate remedy when it
set aside the jury's verdict on the antitrust claim. The
defendant contends that the trial court properly
directed the verdict on the plaintiff's constitutional
claims because the plaintiff had the remedy of a permanent
injunction available to her. Because we have concluded
that the trial court's judgment setting aside the
verdict was improper, we need not decide this issue
because a litigant may recover just damages only once.19

IV

The plaintiff's final claim is that the trial court improperly
failed to grant it a mandatory injunction requiring
that the defendant enter into a prospective, five year
contract with the plaintiff on a cost plus 10 percent
profit basis.20 The defendant contends that the trial
court was within its discretion to deny the relief
requested by the plaintiff. Laidlaw21 claims that, because
the 1998 contract has terminated, and it already is performing
work under a new five year contract awarded
in 2003, issuance of the mandatory injunctive relief
sought by the plaintiff would severely harm Laidlaw.
We agree with the defendant.

‘‘A mandatory injunction . . . is a court order commanding
a party to perform an act.'' Tomasso Bros.,
Inc. v. October Twenty-Four, Inc., 230 Conn. 641, 652,
646 A.2d 133 (1994). ‘‘Relief by way of mandatory injunction
is an extraordinary remedy granted in the sound
discretion of the court and only under compelling circumstances.

. . . Ordinarily, an injunction will not lie
where there is an adequate remedy at law.'' (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Monroe v.
Middlebury Conservation Commission, 187 Conn. 476,
480, 447 A.2d 1 (1982); accord Harvey v. Daddona, 29
Conn. App. 369, 377, 615 A.2d 177 (1992) (‘‘[i]njunctions
should not be issued when damages can adequately
protect the injured party''). Moreover, ‘‘[w]here the
granting of the injunction would cause damage to the
defendant greatly disproportionate to the injury of
which the plaintiff complains, it may be held inequitable
to grant a mandatory injunction and the plaintiff may
be remitted to her remedy by way of damages.'' Moore
v. Serafin, 163 Conn. 1, 6–7, 301 A.2d 238 (1972). In
sum, ‘‘[m]andatory injunctions are . . . disfavored as
a harsh remedy and are used only with caution and in
compelling circumstances.'' 42 Am. Jur. 2d 560, Injunctions
§ 5 (2000).

We conclude that the trial court properly determined
that the present case failed to present the ‘‘ ‘compelling
circumstances' '' required for the issuance of a mandatory
injunction. Monroe v. Middlebury Conservation
Commission, supra, 187 Conn. 480. The plaintiff had
an adequate remedy under the act, namely, an action for
damages against the defendant, on which she prevailed.

Moreover, even if the plaintiff had not had the ability
to collect damages, we would conclude that the trial
court properly exercised its discretion in denying the
relief requested. See id. (‘‘mandatory injunction is an
extraordinary remedy granted in the sound discretion
of the court'' [internal quotation marks omitted]). The
plaintiff was requesting that the trial court award a new
contract to the plaintiff, for a term of five years, and
for a total value of cost plus a guaranteed profit of 10
percent. The plaintiff has failed to cite, before both the
trial court and this court, any authority for such a broad
use of the extraordinary remedy of a mandatory injunction.
Indeed, the contract underlying the present case
has expired, and the defendant already has entered into
a new five year contract with Laidlaw. Thus, if that
contract, which is not challenged in the present case,
remained in effect, and the plaintiff's request for a new
contract was granted, the result would be that two
contracts would be in effect for the same project.22 This
court previously has rejected such a bizarre result. See
Blesso Fire Systems, Inc. v. Eastern Connecticut State
University, 245 Conn. 252, 257, 713 A.2d 1283 (1998).
Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's request
for a mandatory injunction.

The judgment is reversed in part and the case is
remanded with direction to reinstate the judgment for
the plaintiff in accordance with the jury's verdict.

In this opinion SULLIVAN, C. J., and BORDEN,

PALMER and ZARELLA, Js., concurred.

1 This case was argued on May 19, 2004, before a panel of this court
consisting of Chief Justice Sullivan and Justices Norcott, Katz, Vertefeuille
and Zarella. Thereafter, the court, pursuant to Practice Book § 70-7 (b), sua
sponte, ordered that the case be considered en banc. Justices Borden and
Palmer were added to the panel, and they have read the record and the
briefs, and have listened to the tape recording of the original oral argument.

2 The plaintiff's complaint also contained a breach of contract claim, which
was dismissed by the trial court prior to trial. The plaintiff has not appealed
from that ruling, and, therefore, it is not before us in the present appeal.

3 Section 2-548 of the Hartford municipal code provides in relevant part:
‘‘(a) The contract for which sealed bids are invited shall be awarded to the
lowest responsible bidder. Any person or organization is deemed not to be
a responsible bidder that . . .
‘‘(2) Has been found by a court or administrative body of competent
jurisdiction to be in violation of the National Labor Relations Act and that
such violation continues to exist . . . .
‘‘(c) The city manager shall certify whether the bidder is deemed to be
a responsible bidder. If the city manager deems a bidder to meet the city's
requirements, the bidder will be certified for a period of one (1) year. In
each case, where the city manager determines that a bidder is not deemed
to be a responsible bidder, he shall state his reasons in a written opinion
to be forwarded to . . . the bidder. . . .''

4 Laidlaw was the only union shop of the three bidders on the contract.

5 At the time of the plaintiff's first appeal to this court, Laidlaw had not
been joined as a defendant, and, therefore, it was not a party to that appeal.
Cheryl Terry Enterprises, Ltd. v. Hartford, supra, 262 Conn. 241. As we
noted previously, however, when the case was reclaimed to the trial list,
Laidlaw subsequently was a defendant in the plaintiff's action. In the current
appeal, Laidlaw is involved as an appellee only as to the plaintiff's final
claim - whether the trial court properly denied the plaintiff's request for
injunctive relief. In conformity with our prior opinion, therefore, we will
continue to refer to the city of Hartford as the defendant, and we refer to
Laidlaw by name in part IV of this opinion, which addresses the plaintiff's
final claim.

6 The defendant's motion to set aside the verdict also claimed that: (1)
there was no evidence submitted upon which a reasonable jury could have
concluded that the defendant conspired to restrain trade; and (2) there was
no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have concluded that the
plaintiff suffered damages or an antitrust injury. Because the trial court
found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the present case, it declined
to address the defendant's claim that there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding that the defendant had conspired to restrain trade. Therefore,
that claim is not before us in the present appeal. The defendant's
remaining claim, that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding
that the plaintiff had suffered damages for an antitrust injury, is addressed
in part II of this opinion.

7 General Statutes § 35-31 provides: ‘‘(a) Nothing contained in this chapter
shall be construed to forbid the existence or operation of labor, agricultural,
or horticultural organizations instituted for the purpose of mutual help, and
not having capital stock and not conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain
individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the
legitimate objects thereof. Such organizations, or the members thereof, shall
not be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies or
monopolies in restraint of trade, under the provisions of this chapter.

‘‘(b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall apply to those activities of
any person when said activity is specifically directed or required by a statute
of this state, or of the United States.

‘‘(c) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to prevent
persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as farmers,
planters, dairymen or growers from acting together in associations, corporate
or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively processing,
preparing for market, handling and marketing in interstate and foreign commerce,
such products of persons so engaged. Such associations may have
marketing agencies in common; and such associations and their members
may make the necessary contracts and agreements to effect such purposes;
provided, such associations are operated for the mutual benefit of the members
thereof, as such producers, and conform to one or both of the following
requirements: (i) That no member of the association is allowed more than
one vote because of the amount of stock or membership capital he may
own therein, or, (ii) that the association does not pay dividends on stock
or membership capital in excess of eight per cent per annum, and, (iii) that
the association shall not deal in the products of nonmembers to an amount
greater in value than such as are handled by it for members.''

8 ‘‘[I]n construing [the act] . . . the courts of this state shall be guided
by interpretations given by the federal courts to federal antitrust statutes.''
General Statutes § 35-44b. We note, therefore, that the federal courts, including
the United States Supreme Court, consistently have held that a municipality
is a ‘‘person'' within the federal antitrust statutes. See, e.g., Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 396, 98 S. Ct. 1123, 55 L. Ed.
2d 364 (1978).

9 Our resolution of this issue is informed further by our decision in Westport
Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit District, 235 Conn. 1, 26, 664
A.2d 719 (1995). In that case, the defendant, a transit district established
by the town of Westport, provided bus and taxi services in direct competition
with the plaintiff. After the plaintiff was forced out of business, it brought
an action against the defendant, alleging violations of the act. Id., 11–12.

The trial court found that the defendant had engaged in attempted monopolization
and actual monopolization in violation of the act, and awarded the
plaintiff damages for lost profits, the value of the business, and prejudgment
interest. In addition, the trial court awarded the plaintiff treble damages
under § 35-35. Id., 12–13. On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed,
inter alia, that it was entitled to ‘‘governmental immunity applicable to
municipalities and their agencies because it is a transit district established
by the town of Westport.'' Id., 26. We declined to review this claim, concluding
that the record was insufficient to analyze the defendant's claim properly.
Id., 27. Accordingly, we concluded that the trial court properly awarded the
plaintiff treble damages for lost profits and the lost value of the business.
Id., 45.

10 See, e.g., Blesso Fire Systems, Inc. v. Eastern Connecticut State University,
245 Conn. 252, 254–55, 713 A.2d 1283 (1998); Unisys Corp. v. Dept. of
Labor, 220 Conn. 689, 693–95, 600 A.2d 1019 (1991); Ardmare Construction
Co. v. Freedman, 191 Conn. 497, 501, 467 A.2d 674 (1983); Spiniello Construction
Co. v. Manchester, 189 Conn. 539, 543–44, 456 A.2d 1199 (1983); John
J. Brennan Construction Corp., Inc. v. Shelton, 187 Conn. 695, 702, 448
A.2d 180 (1982); Austin v. Housing Authority, 143 Conn. 338, 349, 122 A.2d
399 (1956).

11 We note that the defendant's anticompetitive behavior in the present
case resulted in a greater cost to taxpayers for the contract, not less. Although
awarding damages to the plaintiff, the injured party, may exacerbate the
additional costs paid by the taxpayers, thus bolstering the defendant's policy
argument for exempting the municipal bidding process from the act, any
change to the act must come from the legislature, not this court.

12 With regard to morning, midday and afternoon service, the bid form
requested prices for the following specifications: thirty-four school buses
for morning service, running from 6:30 a.m. to 9:15 a.m.; one school bus for
midday service, running from 10:30 a.m. to 12 p.m.; and thirty-four school
buses for afternoon service, running from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m.

13 In denying the defendant's motion to strike Terry's testimony as irrelevant,
the trial court stated: ‘‘My difficulty now is in [granting] a motion to
strike if the trial isn't over, so I can't say that the testimony is not relevant,
you know, as such. But I am telling you, counsel, in fairness to you, that
unless it is tied up, I am going to have a problem, because one of the aspects
of this case is a request for an injunction, and the other aspect of this case
is a request for damages. . . . The law permits speculation, but in certain
respects on future earnings, and the cases are pretty liberal. Like a claim
for future earnings, but there has to be some foundational requirement. And
[Terry] didn't remember any costs of this contract, she didn't remember
maintenance, facilities, she had no access to these figures. And yet she says
that she relies on these figures in determining what her bid price was and
what her rate of profit is. . . . I can't say that her testimony was completely
irrelevant, but I am telling you, counsel, unless there is more offered in the
way of facts and figures that [Terry] relied on, I may be in a position where
I grant a motion for a directed verdict . . . . And in fairness to you, I will
allow you to recall her if she has figures.''
14 Approximately 8.5 percent of the net present value of $5,862,997.93, the
plaintiff's bid on the Hartford school transportation contract, amounted to
approximately $500,000, the amount awarded the plaintiff. Terry's estimated
profit of between 8 and 10 percent of the net present value represents a
profit between $469,039.83 and $586,299.79. Accordingly, the jury's damage
award falls within this range.

15 The plaintiff had been charging a fare of $1.80 for an average three
mile trip, whereas taxi companies in the surrounding areas of Bridgeport,
Greenwich and Stamford had been charging $2.70 for the same distance.

The trial court therefore awarded lost profits on the basis of the difference
between the $1.80 average fare that the plaintiff had been charging and the
$2.70 average fare that it could have charged. Westport Taxi Service, Inc.
v. Westport Transit District, supra, 235 Conn. 30–31.

16 We note, in addition, that our observation in Westport Taxi Service,
Inc. v. Westport Transit District, supra, 235 Conn. 29, that the trial court
in that case had ‘‘made meticulous findings of fact and clearly detailed
its calculations'' regarding the plaintiff's lost profits, does not lessen the
applicability of that case to our resolution of this issue in the present case.

This detail was the result of the fact that Westport Taxi Service, Inc., was
tried to the court, which has the ability, and indeed the obligation, to provide
such findings. See Practice Book § 6-1 (a).

17 The defendant attempts to distinguish the present case from Capitol
City Personnel Services, Inc. v. Franklin, supra, 52 Conn. App. 787, because
in that case, ‘‘the plaintiff's witness testified that [the] plaintiff had earned
a 25 percent profit markup on its billings for the same type of business in
the same locality over the past three years. [The] [p]laintiff also presented
testimony that other businesses in the same industry and area also earned
about the same percentage profit at the time.'' This is a distinction without
a difference. In the present case, Terry testified that she always anticipates
a profit of between 8 and 10 percent, and that she usually is accurate.

Therefore, Terry's estimate of lost profits was not a ‘‘pure guess [that] was
wholly unsupported as to either the amount of business lost or the profit
to be expected.'' Doeltz v. Longshore, Inc., 126 Conn. 597, 602, 13 A.2d 505
(1940). Moreover, the fact that the plaintiff had submitted the lowest bid
on the Hartford school transportation contract, is evidence that the plaintiff's
bid was competitive in the industry. Therefore, the jury reasonably could
have inferred that Terry's stated anticipated profit of 8 to 10 percent was
accurate as to the state's school transportation industry, as well as to this
particular plaintiff. Finally, the fact that the plaintiff's anticipated profit had
ranged from 8 to 10 percent is not fatal to its claim for lost profits; that
range of anticipated profit was sufficiently restrictive to permit the jury to
determine the damages with reasonable certainty. See Westport Taxi Service,
Inc. v. Westport Transit District, supra, 235 Conn. 33–34 (trial court's
reliance on fair rate of return of between 10 to 12 percent in valuing plaintiff's
business was proper).

Similarly, the dissent's reliance on Doeltz is misplaced.

In that case, this
court determined that lost profits had been improperly awarded for the
plaintiff's new business when profits had actually increased after the defendant's
interference and the plaintiff had presented no evidence of costs
other than rent. Doeltz v. Longshore, Inc., supra, 126 Conn. 601. In addition,
the plaintiff's testimony that ‘‘[w]e usually figure on the liquor 100 [percent
profit] and food 50 [percent profit]''; id., 599; in an attempt to establish lost
profits was deficient. Id., 601. This court concluded in Doeltz that, without
more evidence, simply averaging the two figures to arrive at a claim for 75
percent lost profit, was insufficient, because ‘‘[n]o attempt was made to
show what relative proportion of [the plaintiff's] total sales fell within one
class or the other. The evidence quoted shows that the estimate of the
plaintiff was a pure guess and was wholly unsupported as to either the
amount of business lost or the profit to be expected.'' Id., 601–602.

18 In addition, we note that neither Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc., nor Gordon
were antitrust cases and, accordingly, both can be distinguished on that
ground alone. See Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit District,
supra, 235 Conn. 28 (there is ‘‘a lesser burden of proving the amount of
damages in antitrust suits than in other contexts'' [internal quotation marks
omitted]); see also Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff
& Kotkin, supra, 247 Conn. 92 (Peters, J., dissenting).

19 ‘‘The rule precluding double recovery is a simple and time-honored
maxim that [a] plaintiff may be compensated only once for his just damages
for the same injury. . . . Plaintiffs are not foreclosed from suing multiple
defendants, either jointly or separately, for injuries for which each is liable,
nor are they foreclosed from obtaining multiple judgments against joint
tortfeasors. . . . The possible rendition of multiple judgments does not,
however, defeat the proposition that a litigant may recover just damages
only once. . . . Double recovery is foreclosed by the rule that only one
satisfaction may be obtained for a loss that is the subject of two or more
judgments.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Haynes v. Yale-New Haven
Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 22 n.6, 699 A.2d 964 (1997).

20 In its complaint, the plaintiff also sought prohibitory injunctive relief,
namely, that the court temporarily restrain the defendant from entering into
the contract with another party, and temporarily restrain the defendant from
permitting any party to perform work under the contract. The plaintiff
concedes that, because the contract was in fact almost complete at the time
of the hearing, its request for prohibitory injunctive relief was moot and
nonjusticable. Consequently, we will address only the trial court's denial of
the plaintiff's request for prospective mandatory relief. See Tomasso Bros.,
Inc. v. October Twenty-Four, Inc., 230 Conn. 641, 652, 646 A.2d 133 (1994)
(distinguishing prohibitory injunctions from mandatory injunctions).

21 Laidlaw is involved as an appellee solely for this claim. See footnote 5
of this opinion.
22 Such a remedy also would create an expansive range of practical problems
for the trial court when developing, and subsequently monitoring, the
new contract, including: how would cost be determined; what services would
be covered under the contract; how would changes resulting from changed
market conditions be addressed; and how would the level of service provided
by the plaintiff be measured.