Jessica Millan Patterson v. Alex Padilla, as Secretary of State, etc.

We must decide in this case whether portions of the

recently enacted Presidential Tax Transparency and

Accountability Act (Elec. Code, § 6880 et seq.) (the Act) conflict

with article II, section 5, subdivision (c) of the California

Constitution (article II, section 5(c)) and are therefore invalid.

At issue are the Act’s provisions that prohibit the Secretary of

State from printing on a primary election ballot the name of a

candidate for President of the United States who has not filed

with the Secretary of State the candidate’s federal income tax

returns for the five most recent taxable years. Because of the

important and time-sensitive nature of this controversy, we

have exercised our original jurisdiction to entertain an

emergency petition for a writ of mandate that would forbid the

Secretary of State from enforcing the pertinent sections of the

Act. Upon issuing an order to show cause, we directed the

parties to submit briefing on an expedited basis to ensure the

matter would be decided ahead of the November 26, 2019

statutory deadline for candidates to disclose their tax returns to

appear on the March 3, 2020 primary ballot.

1





1 Several lawsuits pending in federal court assert that the

provisions of the Act that are at issue here also violate federal

law. Last month, the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of California issued an order granting the

federal plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction that

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

2

The dispute before us turns on the interpretation of

article II, section 5(c), which states: “The Legislature shall

provide for partisan elections for presidential candidates, and

political party and party central committees, including an open

presidential primary whereby the candidates on the ballot are

those found by the Secretary of State to be recognized candidates

throughout the nation or throughout California for the office of

President of the United States, and those whose names are

placed on the ballot by petition, but excluding any candidate

who has withdrawn by filing an affidavit of noncandidacy.”

(Italics added.)

In requesting a writ of mandate, petitioners Jessica Millan

Patterson and the California Republican Party (petitioners)

assert that article II, section 5(c) requires a presidential primary



prohibits the Secretary of State from enforcing these provisions.

(Griffin v. Padilla (E.D.Cal., Oct. 2, 2019, No. 2:19-cv-01477-

MCE-DB, No. 2:19-cv-01501-MCE-DB, No. 2:19-cv-01506-MCEDB,

No. 2:19-cv-01507-MCE-DB, No. 2:19-cv-01659-MCE-DB)

__ F.Supp.3d __, __ [2019 WL 4863447, p. *1].) In so ruling, the

federal court determined that the federal plaintiffs were likely

to demonstrate that the challenged sections of the Elections

Code violate the qualifications clause of the United States

Constitution (U.S. Const., art. II, § 1, cl. 5), the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the equal

protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution; and that the provisions of the Act are

preempted by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.A.

Appen. 4, § 101 et seq). (Griffin, at p. __ [2019 WL 4863447,

pp. *8, *10, *11, *12].) The Secretary of State has appealed this

ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit.

No federal claims are raised in the present case;

petitioners’ sole argument is that the Act conflicts with article

II, section 5(c).

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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

3

in which the names of all “recognized candidates throughout the

nation or throughout California for the office of President of the

United States” appear on the ballot. Petitioners cast the Act as

unconstitutional because it imposes an additional disclosure

requirement for appearing on a presidential primary ballot. In

petitioners’ view, this additional prerequisite undermines the

primary process contemplated by article II, section 5(c), and

cannot lawfully be enforced.

Secretary of State Alex Padilla, named as respondent,

counters that article II, section 5(c) does not prevent the

Legislature from prescribing disclosure prerequisites that even

“recognized candidates throughout the nation or throughout

California for the office of President of the United States” must

satisfy if they are to appear on a presidential primary ballot. In

respondent’s view, by stating that “[t]he Legislature shall

provide for . . . an open presidential primary,” article II, section

5(c) confirms that branch’s long-recognized, expansive authority

to devise reasonable rules for primary elections, including

presidential primaries. And subsumed within this power,

respondent argues, is the authority to enact neutral disclosure

laws that provide relevant information to voters and thus enable

the electorate to make a more informed choice among

presidential candidates.

Upon careful consideration of the parties’ briefing and

arguments, as well as the submission by amicus curiae, we

conclude that petitioners are entitled to a writ of mandate. We

direct the Secretary of State to refrain from enforcing Elections

Code sections 6883 and 6884, the relevant provisions of the Act,

insofar as enforcement of these sections would keep the name of

a “recognized candidate[] throughout the nation or throughout

California for the office of President of the United States” from

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

4

being printed on the ballot of a political party that has qualified

to participate in the primary election.

As we shall explain, article II, section 5(c) is properly read

as including a requirement that all persons found to be

“recognized candidates” in the relevant sense must appear on

the appropriate primary ballot, except when an affidavit of

noncandidacy has been filed. This interpretation reflects the

most natural reading of article II, section 5(c), and it vindicates

the intent behind this provision. The language within article II,

section 5(c) providing for the inclusion of “recognized”

candidates on the primary ballot was added to the state

Constitution through a June 1972 ballot measure, Proposition

4. As the history of Proposition 4 makes clear, its purpose was

to ensure that the voters at future California presidential

primary elections would have the opportunity, within each

qualifying political party, to choose among a complete array of

candidates found to be “recognized candidates throughout the

nation or throughout California for the office of President of the

United States,” who had not filed affidavits of noncandidacy to

remove themselves from the ballot.

Elections Code sections 6883 and 6884 purport to make

the appearance of a “recognized” candidate for president on a

primary ballot contingent on whether the candidate has made

the disclosures specified by the Act. This additional

requirement, however, is in conflict with the Constitution’s

specification of an inclusive open presidential primary ballot.

The Legislature may well be correct that a presidential

candidate’s income tax returns could provide California voters

with important information. But article II, section 5(c) embeds

in the state Constitution the principle that, ultimately, it is the

voters who must decide whether the refusal of a “recognized

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

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5

candidate[] throughout the nation or throughout California for

the office of President of the United States” to make such

information available to the public will have consequences at the

ballot box.

We therefore issue the writ of mandate.

I. BACKGROUND

We begin by describing the Act, and then review analyses

of the measure that were prepared while it was still under

consideration by the Legislature. We then discuss

contemporaneous legislation that was enacted earlier this year

as Senate Bill No. 505 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill

No. 505). The latter statute is not directly at issue, but it is

nevertheless relevant to the dispute before the court. The last

portion of this background section will relate the brief history of

this writ proceeding.

A. The Presidential Tax Transparency and

Accountability Act

1. Senate Bill No. 27

The Assembly and the Senate passed the Act in July 2019

as Senate Bill No. 27 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 27),

and the Governor signed the measure into law. As an urgency

statute, the Act went into effect immediately “[i]n order to

ensure that the protections” it affords “are in place for the 2020

primary election.” (Stats. 2019, ch. 121, § 3.)2



The Act directs the Secretary of State not to print on a

primary ballot the names of candidates for President of the



2 The Act was not the Legislature’s first attempt to enact an

income tax return disclosure requirement for presidential

candidates. Senate Bill No. 149 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.),

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6

United States or for Governor of California who have not filed

their federal income tax returns with the Secretary of State.

(Elec. Code, §§ 6883-6884, 8902-8903.) Because article II,

section 5(c) relates only to the presidential primary ballot, only

the provisions of the Act relating to candidates for president are

implicated in this proceeding.

Regarding candidates for president, the Act provides,

“Notwithstanding any other law, the Secretary of State shall not

print the name of a candidate for President of the United States

on a primary election ballot, unless the candidate, no less than

98 days before the presidential primary election, files with the

Secretary of State copies of every income tax return the

candidate filed with the Internal Revenue Service in the five

most recent taxable years . . . .” (Elec. Code, § 6883, subd. (a).)3



The candidate must file with the Secretary of State both

unredacted and redacted versions of these returns, removing



introduced in 2017, also would have required candidates for

president to release their tax returns in order to be included on

the primary ballot. (Id., as enrolled Sept. 20, 2017, § 1.) Both

houses of the Legislature passed this measure, but as discussed

post, the bill was vetoed by then-Governor Jerry Brown.

3 The statute addresses the possibility that a candidate may

not have filed federal income tax returns for all five of the most

recent taxable years. It provides, “If the candidate has not filed

the candidate’s income tax return with the Internal Revenue

Service for the tax year immediately preceding the primary

election, the candidate shall submit a copy of the income tax

return to the Secretary of State within five days of filing the

return with the Internal Revenue Service” (Elec. Code, § 6883,

subd. (b)), and, “The [disclosure] requirement . . . does not apply

to any year in which the candidate was not required to file the

candidate’s income tax return with the Internal Revenue

Service” (id., subd. (c)).

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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

7

certain personal information such as social security numbers,

home addresses, and medical information from the latter

version. (Id., § 6884, subd. (a)(1).) The candidate also must file

with the Secretary of State a signed written consent form that

grants the Secretary of State permission to make a redacted

version of the tax returns publicly available. (Id., subd. (a)(2).)

Upon receiving the income tax returns, the Secretary of

State is to review them to confirm that only the information

identified by statute as subject to redaction has been removed.

(Elec. Code, § 6884, subd. (b).) If additional redactions have

been made to a tax return, “the Secretary of State shall prepare

a new version of the tax return with only the redactions

permitted by” statute. (Ibid.) Within five days of receiving a

candidate’s tax returns, the Secretary of State shall make

appropriately redacted versions of the returns available to the

public on the Secretary’s website. (Id., subd. (c)(1), (2).) These

versions “shall be continuously posted until the official canvass

for the presidential primary election is completed.” (Id., subd.

(c)(3); see also id., subd. (c)(4).)

The Act includes the following findings and declarations

regarding the income tax return disclosure requirement for

presidential candidates: “The . . . State of California has a

strong interest in ensuring that its voters make informed,

educated choices in the voting booth. To this end, the state has

mandated that extensive amounts of information be provided to

voters, including county and state voter information guides.

The Legislature also finds and declares that a Presidential

candidate’s income tax returns provide voters with essential

information regarding the candidate’s potential conflicts of

interest, business dealings, financial status, and charitable

donations. The information in tax returns therefore helps voters

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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

8

to make a more informed decision. The Legislature further finds

and declares that as one of the largest centers of economic

activity in the world, the State of California has a special

interest in the President refraining from corrupt or selfenriching

behaviors while in office. The people of California can

better estimate the risks of any given Presidential candidate

engaging in corruption or the appearance of corruption if they

have access to candidates’ tax returns. Finally, the State of

California has an interest in ensuring that any violations of the

Foreign Emoluments Clause of the United States Constitution

or statutory prohibitions on behavior such as insider trading are

detected and punished. Mandated disclosure of Presidential

candidates’ tax returns will enable enforcement of the laws

against whichever candidate is elected President. The

Legislature finds and declares that compliance costs with this

requirement will be trivial.” (Elec. Code, § 6881.)

2. Legislative History

The analyses prepared in connection with the

Legislature’s consideration of Senate Bill No. 27 detailed the

reasoning behind the measure. A Senate floor analysis

explained, “In 1973, the Providence Journal-Bulletin obtained

and published data showing that President Richard Nixon had

paid an astonishingly low amount in taxes in 1969 given his

income for that year. After initially resisting calls for him to do

so, Nixon eventually released his taxes and underwent an IRS

audit. It turned out he had improperly claimed an exemption of

$500,000 for papers he donated to the National Archives. [¶]

Ever since this incident, it has been customary — though never

required by law — for U.S. Presidential candidates to release

their tax returns. Prior to 2016, only one candidate, President

Gerald Ford in 1976, did not do so. Ford released a summary of

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9

his return instead. [¶] During the 2016 campaign for U.S.

President, Donald Trump broke with this longstanding tradition

and refused to release his tax returns. Though prompted by

Trump’s break with the customary practice, this bill is not

retroactive and would only apply to future presidential

candidates.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analysis,

Unfinished Business Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 27 (2019-2020

Reg. Sess.) as amended June 27, 2019, pp. 4-5.)4

Several of these analyses also considered constitutional

issues that might be implicated by the tax return disclosure

requirement.5

However, these assessments concentrated on



4 Other analyses of Senate Bill No. 27 prepared while the

bill was under consideration by the Legislature included similar

background discussions. (Sen. 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill

No. 27 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 27, 2019, p. 2;

Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis

of Sen. Bill No. 27 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 10,

2019, pp. 4-7; Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen.

Bill No. 27 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 29, 2019,

p. 2; Assem. Com. on Elections and Redistricting, Analysis of

Sen. Bill No. 27 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 29,

2019, p. 4; Sen. Judiciary Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 27

(2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 11, 2019, pp. 4-5; Sen.

Com. on Elections and Const. Amends., Analysis of Sen. Bill

No. 27 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 11, 2019, p. 3.)

5 These analyses commonly expressed some uncertainty

regarding whether courts would find the measure consistent

with the United States Constitution. (E.g., Assem. Com. on

Elections and Redistricting, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 27 (2019-

2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 29, 2019, pp. 4-6; Sen.

Judiciary Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 27 (2019-2020 Reg.

Sess.) as amended Mar. 11, 2019, pp. 5-14; Sen. Com. on

Elections and Const. Amends., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 27

(2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 11, 2019, pp. 3-4.)

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

10

whether the disclosure requirement comported with the federal

Constitution. The only analysis of Senate Bill No. 27 that

mentioned the California Constitution was prepared for the

Senate Judiciary Committee, and this evaluation discussed only

the right to privacy conferred by the state charter (Cal. Const.,

art. I, § 1) — not article II, section 5(c). (Sen. Judiciary Com.,

Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 27, supra, p. 12, fn. 15.)6



The analysis prepared for the Senate Judiciary Committee

recognized that Senate Bill No. 149 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), a

similar proposal that also would have conditioned access to the

presidential primary ballot on a candidate’s disclosure of federal

income tax returns, had been vetoed in 2017 by then-Governor

Jerry Brown. The analysis recited a series of rhetorical

questions Brown had posed in his veto message: “ ‘Today we

require tax returns, but what would be next? Five years of

health records? A certified birth certificate? High school report

cards? And will these requirements vary depending on which

political party is in power? A qualified candidate’s ability to

appear on the ballot is fundamental to our democratic system.

For that reason, I hesitate to start down a road that well might



6 A Senate Judiciary Committee analysis of the earlier

Senate Bill No. 149 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) discussed how that

measure had been amended while under consideration by the

Legislature to avoid a potential conflict with article II, section 5,

subdivision (d) of the state Constitution, which concerns the

inclusion of candidates on the general election ballot. (Sen.

Judiciary Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 149 (2017-2018 Reg.

Sess.) as amended Mar. 20, 2017, p. 11 [concluding the

amendment “appears to eliminate the state constitutional

concern”].) But that analysis did not recognize, much less

address, the separate state constitutional issue presented by

article II, section 5(c).

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lead to an ever escalating set of differing state requirements for

presidential candidates.’ ” (Sen. Judiciary Com., Analysis of

Sen. Bill No. 27, supra, at p. 14.) The committee analysis

acknowledged that “[t]here is, in fact, some precedent for this

[that is, conditioning ballot access upon some disclosure by a

presidential candidate]. In 2011, for example, the Arizona

legislature passed a bill that would have required presidential

candidates to submit a birth certificate in order to appear on the

state’s election ballot. The bill was vetoed by Governor Jan

Brewer. According to a senior fellow with the National

Conference of State Legislatures, 14 other states considered

similar legislation.” (Ibid.) But, the analysis continued, “In

response to this line of concern, the authors assert their belief

that democratically elected legislatures are equipped to make

reasoned assessments about what information is sufficiently

important to their constituents to warrant a disclosure

requirement and what information is not. If legislators go too

far in demanding disclosures of presidential candidates, their

fully informed constituents can always elect other

representatives who will retract the requirement.” (Id., at

p. 15.)

B. Senate Bill No. 505

The Governor signed a separate measure, Senate Bill

No. 505, into law on the same day he signed the Act. Senate Bill

No. 505 codified several criteria to be applied by the Secretary

of State in determining who is to be placed on the appropriate

presidential primary ballot as (i) a “recognized candidate[]

throughout the nation or throughout California for the office of

President of the United States” under article II, section 5(c), or

(ii) a “generally advocated for or recognized” candidate for that

office, in the phrasing of statutes that prescribe rules for the

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presidential primaries of specific political parties. (Elec. Code,

§§ 6041, 6340, subd. (a), 6520, subd. (a), 6720, 6851.)

Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill No. 505, the only

elaboration within the Elections Code of what it means to be a

“recognized” candidate for president appeared in the

aforementioned statutes, each specifically tailored to an

individual party that has qualified to participate in the state

primary election. (See Elec. Code, § 5100 [setting forth the

criteria for party qualification for the primary election].) The

earliest precursors of the current laws to this effect were enacted

in the 1970s, shortly after Proposition 4 was approved by the

voters. (See Elec. Code, former § 6010, added by Stats. 1975,

ch. 1048, § 2, p. 2468; Elec. Code, former § 6210, added by Stats.

1975, ch. 1056, § 3, p. 2509; Elec. Code, former § 6110, added by

Stats. 1975, ch. 1060, § 3, p. 2569; Elec. Code, former § 6310,

added by Stats. 1974, ch. 1184, § 2, p. 2537.)

The terms of the current statutes vary somewhat from

party to party. They presently provide that a candidate for

president is to be placed on the appropriate presidential primary

ballot when the Secretary of State finds the person to be, with

regard to the Democratic Party, “generally advocated for or

recognized throughout the United States or California as

actively seeking the nomination of the Democratic Party for

President of the United States,” with the Secretary of State to

“include as criteria for selecting [such] candidates the fact of

qualifying for funding under the Federal Elections Campaign

Act of 1974, as amended” (Elec. Code, § 6041); with regard to the

Republican Party, “generally advocated for or recognized

throughout the United States or California as a candidate for

the nomination of the Republican Party for President of the

United States” (id., § 6340, subd. (a)); with regard to the

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13

American Independent Party, “generally advocated for or

recognized in the news media throughout the United States or

California as actively seeking the nomination of the American

Independent Party for President of the United States” (id.,

§ 6520, subd. (a)); with regard to the Peace and Freedom Party,

“generally advocated for or recognized throughout the United

States or California as actively seeking the presidential

nomination of the Peace and Freedom Party or the national

party with which the Peace and Freedom Party is affiliated” (id.,

§ 6720); and, with regard to the Green Party, “generally

advocated for or recognized throughout the United States or

California as actively seeking the presidential nomination of the

Green Party or the national political party with which the Green

Party is affiliated” (id., § 6851).

The available historical materials indicate that prior to

the approval of Senate Bill No. 505, the Secretary of State relied

on various criteria or factors in identifying “recognized” or

“generally advocated for or recognized” candidates for president.

In 1976, then-Secretary of State March Fong Eu explained that

in developing an initial list of “active presidential candidates for

California,” she had “taken into consideration a number of

factors, including the fact that the persons are announced

candidates, appear to be actively campaigning, have qualified

for matching federal funds under the 1974 amendments to the

Federal Elections Campaign Act, and are slated to appear on

other states’ primary ballots.” (Sect. of State, News Release,

Secretary of State Eu Selects Presidential Candidates (Jan. 30,

1976) p. 1 (hereafter Secretary of State 1976 Presidential

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14

Candidate Announcement).) Similar criteria have been

articulated by Eu’s successors as Secretary of State.7



Senate Bill No. 505 added sections 6000.1 and 6000.2 to

the Elections Code. Section 6000.1 sets forth criteria for being

identified as a “generally advocated for or recognized” or

“recognized” candidate for president. These criteria overlap to

some extent with the factors applied by former Secretary of

State Eu. (Elec. Code, § 6000.1, subds. (a)-(e).) Section 6000.2

further provides that on or before the 98th day prior to the

presidential primary election, a candidate for president is to file

a form with the Secretary of State, together with any supporting

documentation, establishing that the candidate is a “generally

advocated for or recognized” candidate under the standard set

forth in section 6000.1. (Id., § 6000.2, subds. (a), (b).)

With this action, petitioners challenge only the income tax

return disclosure requirement for presidential candidates that

was adopted through Senate Bill No. 27. Our analysis here



7 For the 2008 California presidential primary, for example,

then-Secretary of State Debra Bowen stated that the

determination of whether a person would appear on the primary

ballot as a candidate for president “is based on a number of

factors, including whether a candidate: [¶] . . . [p]articipates in

candidate debates; . . . [a]ctively campaigns in California; . . .

[a]ppears in public opinion polls; and/or [¶] . . . [q]ualifies for

federal campaign matching funds. [¶] Additionally, Secretary

Bowen asked each of the six California political parties to

submit a list of candidates whom they recognize as seeking their

party’s nomination.” (Sect. of State, News Release, Secretary of

State Releases List of Presidential Candidates for February

2008 Presidential Primary (Oct. 5, 2007) p. 1 (hereafter

Secretary of State 2008 Presidential Candidate

Announcement).)

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15

therefore need not, and does not, address the constitutionality

of Elections Code sections 6000.1 and 6000.2.

C. Procedural History

On August 6, 2019, petitioners filed an emergency petition

for writ of mandate or other extraordinary or immediate relief

with this court. The petition identifies Patterson as “an

individual California voter, a registered Republican, and

current Chairperson of the Petitioner California Republican

Party.” She alleges that she “desires to participate as a voter

and to lead her state political party by supporting the inclusion

of all qualified Republican Presidential candidates in the open

Presidential primary.” The petition for writ of mandate also

alleges that Patterson “fears that a large number of Republican

voters will be suppressed and discouraged from voting at the

primary election as a result of the Secretary of State’s

implementation of [Senate Bill No. 27], if qualified Republican

candidates are excluded from the Republican Party’s

Presidential primary ballot.” The California Republican Party

is identified as “the ballot-qualified statewide political party

representing more than 4.7 million registered Republican

voters,” and the petition states that the party and “its adherents

participate in the partisan Presidential primary,” among other

electoral contests.

Petitioners assert that the Act’s income tax return

disclosure requirement “plainly conflicts with the constitutional

provision of [a]rticle II, section 5(c) guaranteeing an open

Presidential primary.” They request a writ of mandate that

would prohibit respondent “from enforcing Elections Code

sections 6883 and 6884 . . . as fundamentally inconsistent and

in conflict with [a]rticle II, section 5(c).” Petitioners seek this

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16

relief on an emergency basis because the Act’s deadline for

submission of tax returns to the Secretary of State is November

26, 2019 (98 days before the March 3, 2020 primary election; see

Elec. Code, § 6883, subd. (a)), and “the sitting President of the

United States who has announced that he is a Presidential

candidate for the 2020 election has in the past declined to

release his federal tax returns.”

After requesting and receiving preliminary opposition

from respondent, we ordered him to show cause why a writ of

mandate should not issue. To ensure the timely disposition of

the cause, we directed expedited briefing in which the parties

would address, among other subjects, the history of Proposition

4 and related legislation, and any guidelines, including internal

measures and protocols, that the Secretary of State has used to

determine who are “recognized candidates throughout the

nation or throughout California for the office of President of the

United States.”

II. DISCUSSION

Petitioners and respondent advance divergent

constructions of article II, section 5(c), which carry different

implications for the constitutionality of Elections Code sections

6883 and 6884.

As has been explained, petitioners regard article II,

section 5(c) as specifying a rule of inclusivity for presidential

primary contests that cannot be infringed through legislation

such as the Act. According to petitioners, article II, section 5(c)

requires all individuals who are found to be “recognized

candidates throughout the nation or throughout California for

the office of President of the United States” to be named on the

appropriate primary ballot, unless an affidavit of noncandidacy

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is filed. And, their argument continues, even if one assumes

that the Legislature may play a role in defining what it means

to be “recognized . . . throughout the nation or throughout

California” as a candidate “for the office of President of the

United States,” noncompliance with the Act’s disclosure

provisions cannot provide a basis for excluding a candidate from

the ballot because a candidate’s failure to file income tax returns

with the Secretary of State is not a reasonable measure of

whether a candidate is so recognized.

Respondent interprets article II, section 5(c) differently.

He emphasizes the Legislature’s expansive authority to adopt

legislation concerning primary elections — as recognized both

before and after the approval of Proposition 4 (e.g., Libertarian

Party v. Eu (1980) 28 Cal.3d 535, 540; Communist Party v. Peek

(1942) 20 Cal.2d 536, 544) — and argues that in amending the

state Constitution to add the relevant text now found in article

II, section 5(c), voters “did not vitiate the Legislature’s ability to

regulate [primary] elections and pass laws that, for instance,

limit candidates to those within recognized parties, require

forms to be filed, or require information to be disclosed to better

educate California’s voters.” Respondent thus reads article II,

section 5(c) as recognizing, rather than constraining, the

Legislature’s power to prescribe rules governing presidential

primary elections. Pursuant to this authority, the Legislature

may, in respondent’s words, “enact laws regulating the process

by which particular candidates appear on a party’s primary

ballot, even if they are nationally recognized.” (Italics added.)

From this perspective, the Act’s income tax return disclosure

requirement for presidential candidates, including its directive

to the Secretary of State not to place the names of noncompliant

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

18

candidates on the primary ballot, represents an appropriate

exercise of the Legislature’s authority.

To summarize the analysis that follows, we agree with

petitioners that whatever authority the Legislature may have in

defining how presidential primaries are to occur in this state,

the challenged sections of the Act exceed such authority and are

unenforceable. These provisions purport to exclude from the

California presidential primary ballot any candidate who does

not comply with the income tax return disclosure requirement

— even someone who is incontestably “recognized . . .

throughout the nation or throughout California” as a candidate

“for the office of President of the United States” under any

reasonable construction of that phrasing. But as explained

below, article II, section 5(c) is most naturally read as conveying

a rule of inclusivity for presidential primary elections that the

Legislature cannot contravene. This reading is strongly

supported by the history of the constitutional text that now

appears in article II, section 5(c). This history establishes

beyond fair dispute that this language was adopted to ensure

that the ballots for parties participating in the presidential

primary election would include all persons within said parties

deemed to be “recognized candidates throughout the nation or

throughout California for the office of President of the United

States,” except for those candidates who filed affidavits of

noncandidacy, so that voters in the primary election would have

a direct opportunity to vote for or against these candidates.

Because the relevant provisions of the Act condition a

presidential candidate’s placement on the primary ballot on

compliance with an additional requirement that is concededly

not a reasonable measure of whether the candidate is

“recognized” as such throughout the nation or California, it

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

19

conflicts with the rule specified by article II, section 5(c), and is

for that reason invalid. (People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248,

260 [when a statute conflicts with the Constitution, “the latter

must prevail”].)

8

A. Article II, Section 5(c)

Our interpretive task begins with the language of article

II, section 5(c). (See Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of

Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 249-250; cf. Santos v. Brown

(2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 398, 409.) To reiterate, this provision

states as follows: “The Legislature shall provide for partisan

elections for presidential candidates, and political party and

party central committees, including an open presidential

primary whereby the candidates on the ballot are those found

by the Secretary of State to be recognized candidates throughout

the nation or throughout California for the office of President of

the United States, and those whose names are placed on the

ballot by petition, but excluding any candidate who has

withdrawn by filing an affidavit of noncandidacy.”

Respondent has not sought to justify the Act’s income tax

disclosure requirement on the ground that it represents a

reasonable measure of whether someone is “recognized . . .

throughout the nation or throughout California” as a candidate

“for the office of President of the United States.” At oral

argument, counsel for respondent conceded that whether a



8 Because the issue is not before us, we need not decide here

whether the tax return disclosure requirement can properly be

applied to candidates for president who would qualify for the

primary election ballot through the petition process articulated

in article II, section 5(c).

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

20

candidate for president has filed recent tax returns with the

Secretary of State is not indicative of whether the candidate is

so “recognized.”

9



9 Even apart from this concession, under any reasonable

interpretation of the “recognized” language within article II,

section 5(c), a candidate’s failure to disclose tax returns to the

Secretary of State would not establish that the candidate is not

“recognized . . . throughout the nation or throughout California”

as a candidate “for the office of President of the United States.”

The word “recognized” is susceptible to somewhat

different meanings. (Compare, e.g., Black’s Law Dict. (4th ed.

1968) p. 1436, col. 2 [defining “recognized” as “[a]ctual and

publicly known”] with Random House Dict. of the English

Language (1973) p. 1199, col. 3 [defining “recognize” as, among

other things, “to acknowledge or treat as valid”].) The repeated

use of the word “throughout” within article II, section 5(c)

suggests that the “recognized” language is concerned (although

perhaps not exclusively) with a candidacy’s prominence or

pervasiveness. (See Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1971) p.

2385, col. 1 [defining “throughout” as “in . . . every part of”].) If

this meaning applies, it seems plain that whether a candidate

has disclosed tax returns to the Secretary of State cannot, by

itself, be determinative of whether the candidate is “recognized.”

Such disclosure has, at most, a highly attenuated relationship

to public awareness of a candidacy throughout the nation or

California — or, for that matter, to whether someone is an

“[a]ctual” candidate for the presidency. (Black’s Law Dict., at

p. 1436, col. 2.)

The disjunctive “throughout the nation or throughout

California” language in article II, section 5(c) also suggests that

nondisclosure of tax returns under the Act could not supply a

basis for keeping a presidential candidate off the primary ballot

even if the “recognized” phrasing were to be construed as being

to some extent concerned with a candidacy’s validity. For even

in that case, a failure to comply with the Act’s tax return

disclosure requirement would establish only that someone is not

“recognized,” i.e., not regarded as valid, as a presidential

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

21

Instead, as noted, respondent posits that the legislative

authority envisioned by article II, section 5(c)’s directive that

“[t]he Legislature shall provide for . . . an open presidential

primary” includes the power to adopt additional prerequisites

for appearing on the primary ballot that even a “recognized”

candidate for president must satisfy.

10





candidate in or by California. It would not mean that the

candidate is not “recognized . . . throughout the nation,” because

a failure to satisfy this requirement would not make a candidacy

invalid throughout the nation.

10 Respondent’s interpretation emphasizes language within

article II, section 5(c) that acknowledges the Legislature’s broad

authority to provide for primary elections, a power that was

already well-established at the time of the 1972 primary election

at which Proposition 4 passed.

When the electorate approved Proposition 4, the state

Constitution specifically described the Legislature’s authority

over primary elections as follows: “The Legislature shall have

the power to enact laws relative to the election of delegates to

conventions of political parties; and the Legislature shall enact

laws providing for the direct nomination of candidates for public

office, by electors, political parties, or organizations of electors

without conventions, at elections to be known and designated as

primary elections; also to determine the tests and conditions

upon which electors, political parties, or organizations of

electors may participate in any such primary election. . . .” (Cal.

Const., art. II, former § 2.5.)

“The purpose of this [provision] was to give the Legislature

a free hand in dealing with the evils which had formerly been

prevalent in primary elections, even to the extent of excluding

parties and individuals from participation therein.”

(Communist Party v. Peek, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 544.) This

authority included the power to “determine the tests and

conditions upon which participation in a primary election may

be had either by electors as voters thereat or by electors as

candidates thereunder.” (Socialist Party v. Uhl (1909) 155 Cal.

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

22

But article II, section 5(c) is more readily construed as

both recognizing the Legislature’s authority to provide for

primary elections and imposing a specific constraint on this

power. This provision begins, “The Legislature shall provide for

partisan elections for presidential candidates, and political

party and party central committees” — language that, as

respondent emphasizes, conveys the Legislature’s responsibility

to develop a primary election scheme. Immediately thereafter,

however, the provision continues, “including an open

presidential primary whereby the candidates on the ballot are

those found by the Secretary of State to be recognized

candidates throughout the nation or throughout California for

the office of President of the United States . . . .” (Italics added.)

This language appears to convey an absolute requirement of a

presidential primary ballot for each qualifying party that

includes all persons seeking the party’s presidential nomination

who have been found to be “recognized candidates throughout

the nation or throughout California for the office of President of

the United States.” In other words, the presidential primary

that the Legislature must “provide for” is one in which all

persons deemed to be “recognized candidates throughout the

nation or throughout California for the office of President of the



776, 792.) In an early decision by this court construing article

II, section 2½ of the Constitution (later renumbered section 2.5),

we observed that “[t]he right is thus conferred to prescribe any

reasonable test and it is the duty of the [L]egislature to prescribe

one.” (Socialist Party, at p. 792.)

Article II, section 2.5 of the California Constitution was

repealed upon the approval of Proposition 7 by the electorate at

the November 1972 general election. Today, the various

subdivisions of article II, section 5 of the Constitution address

how primary elections are to occur.

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

23

United States” are to appear on the appropriate primary ballot

(along with presidential candidates who qualify for the ballot

through the petition process), except for those candidates who

file affidavits of noncandidacy pursuant to the final clause of

article II, section 5(c). Under this interpretation, the

Constitution prohibits the Legislature from adopting disclosure

requirements that a presidential candidate identified as so

recognized also must satisfy to appear on the primary ballot.

The text of article II, section 5(c), therefore, does not

support respondent’s view that the Legislature may adopt an

income tax return disclosure requirement that could exclude

“recognized candidates throughout the nation or throughout

California for the office of President of the United States” from

a presidential primary ballot. We now turn to the history of this

provision, which removes any doubt regarding the intent behind

article II, section 5(c).

B. Historical Background

As approved by the electorate in 1972, Proposition 4

changed how candidates for the office of President of the United

States qualify to be named on a primary ballot in this state.

Before this measure came into effect, candidates for president

had to take affirmative steps to enter the California primary.

Advocates for ballot reform perceived that this system

frustrated voters’ ability to choose among a comprehensive

array of candidates at presidential primary elections and

diminished the state’s influence in the national presidential

nomination process. Proposition 4 responded to these concerns

by requiring that all nationally or California-recognized

candidates be included on the ballot, unless a person deemed to

be such a candidate submits an affidavit of noncandidacy.

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

24

Because of this change to the presidential primary ballot,

California voters now have the ability to express their

preferences among candidates for their parties’ presidential

nominations more directly and meaningfully than had

previously been the case.

1. The Prior “Opt-in” Approach to the Primary Ballot

The statutory scheme for primary elections that was in

place in this state prior to Proposition 4 did not guarantee that

even the most prominent presidential candidates would appear

on a primary ballot. To appear on the ballot, a person had to

submit to the Secretary of State written permission for delegate

candidates to pledge themselves to that person. (Elec. Code,

former § 6055.) The candidate for president would appear on

the primary ballot if these candidates for delegates received

enough signatures on nomination papers. (Id., former §§ 6057,

6058, 6080-6088, 6804, 10261; see also Review of Selected 1975

California Legislation (1976) 7 Pacific L.J. 237, 439 [“Prior to

1974, presidential primary ballots for the major political parties

in California listed only those candidates who petitioned to

appear on the election ballot”].)

Under this regime, some noteworthy candidates for

president avoided the California primary. In 1960, John F.

Kennedy, who was elected president that November, was not

among the candidates listed on the ballot for the Democratic

Party primary contest. Instead, the only persons named on that

ballot were then-Governor Pat Brown and activist George

McLain. (Rarick, California Rising: The Life and Times of Pat

Brown (2005) p. 182 (Rarick).) Similarly, in 1968 the eventual

Republican Party nominee, Richard Nixon, did not appear on his

party’s California primary ballot. The only name printed on

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

25

that ballot was that of Ronald Reagan, the governor at that time.

(Owens et al., California Politics and Parties (1970) p. 88

(Owens).) Hubert Humphrey, Nixon’s rival as the Democratic

Party nominee that autumn, did not directly participate in the

1968 California presidential primary, either. The Democratic

Party primary ballot that year named only Senators Eugene

McCarthy and Robert Kennedy, and then-Attorney General

Thomas Lynch. (Id., at p. 84; Ross & Stone, California’s Political

Processes (1973) p. 37 (Ross & Stone).)

The candidacies of Brown in 1960 and Reagan in 1968

involved “favorite son” campaigns for president. “As a favorite

son, a governor or senator entered his state’s primary . . . even

though he had no real hope of becoming president. Assuming

that he won, the state’s delegates would go to the convention

pledged to him. On the convention floor favorite sons had two

alternative strategies, which often overlapped. Sometimes they

dreamed of snatching the nomination if none of the serious

candidates could find a majority and the convention deadlocked.

If not — and this was the more common outcome — they used

their delegations as bargaining chips in dealing with potential

nominees. Once the favorite son withdrew, the delegates were

not legally obligated to follow his lead in voting for another

candidate, but often, through a combination of intimidation or

affection, a favorite son could lead his followers to one camp or

another.” (Rarick, supra, at p. 182; see also Davis, Presidential

Primaries (2d ed. 1980) pp. 189-194 (Davis).)

Although the presence of a “favorite son” in a California

presidential primary did not create a legal impediment to other

candidates entering the fray, the presence of such a candidate

could discourage national politicians from contesting the race.

(Owens, supra, at pp. 87-88.) As one commentator observed in

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

26

1970, “Recent experience suggests that despite all the reasons

for entering the California [primary] race, some active

presidential aspirants decline to enter.” (Id., at p. 87.) With a

favorite son in the mix, “National candidates, out of courtesy,

refrain[ed] from creating delegations in their own names.” (Ross

& Stone, supra, at p. 37.) An out-of-state candidate wading into

a primary already populated by a favorite son not only invited

an embarrassing loss to a more locally well-known contestant;

he or she also risked “alienating party leadership in the state or

damaging party unity, perhaps beyond repair, just prior to a

general election campaign.” (Owens, at p. 88). Meanwhile, the

fact that a favorite son candidate was unlikely to secure a

party’s nomination for president “mean[t] that the voter voting

for a favorite son in reality [did] not know what national

candidate [would] be supported” by the delegates, who were

initially pledged to the local candidate but became free to vote

for other candidates once the favorite son withdrew from the

race. (Ross & Stone, at p. 37; see Rarick, supra, at p. 182.)

Although favorite son candidacies were a longtime feature

of the presidential primary landscape (see Davis, supra, at

p. 90), as the 1960s progressed criticisms of these candidacies

mounted in California. Critics attacked favorite son candidacies

as hindering the ability of California voters to effectively express

their preferences at the ballot box, and as limiting this state’s

relevance in the national presidential primary process. In an

editorial following the failed Reagan candidacy in 1968, the Los

Angeles Times newspaper opined, “Governor Reagan froze out

all other Republican contenders by heading up a ‘favorite son’

delegation . . . [¶] The favorite son device is not new, here or

elsewhere. It has been used in the past by both Democrats and

Republicans. Yet the temper of the times is such that it should

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

27

now be discarded in favor of giving the voters a more direct and

meaningful voice in the selection of their nominees.” (Toward

Better Elections, L.A. Times (Aug. 28, 1968) p. A4; see also

Governor’s Veto of Primary Bill, S.F. Chronicle (Sept. 3, 1968)

p. 38 [editorial]; Open Primary More Vital Than Ever, San Jose

Mercury News (Feb. 27, 1969) p. 2 [editorial].) Communicating

a similar view among the electorate, one poll conducted in 1968

reported that 77 percent of those surveyed would have preferred

a choice among candidates in the 1968 Republican Party

primary, instead of only a delegate slate pledged to Governor

Reagan. (Field Research Corp., The Field Poll, California Poll

68-03 (May 15-18, 1968).)

2. Earlier Attempts To Enact Responsive Statutes

The constitutional amendment adopted through

Proposition 4 was approved by the voters in 1972 after repeated

failures to enact statutes that would have made similar changes

to the presidential primary ballot.

In 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1971, bills were introduced

in the Legislature that, had they become law, would have

replaced the existing “opt-in” scheme for presidential primary

candidates with a more inclusive approach.

11

These proposals

drew from an Oregon law (1961 Or. Laws, ch. 170, § 1, p. 181)

that had made such a change to the presidential primary system

in that state. (See Assem. Com. on Elections and

Reapportionment, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 145 (1968 Reg. Sess.)

p. 1 [“Senate Bill 145 is an act to create for California a



11 The bill introduced in 1965 applied only to the presidential

primary of a party for which there were fewer than 3.5 million

registered voters in the state. (Assem. Bill No. 1414 (1965 Reg.

Sess.), supra, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, § 6300].)

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

28

Presidential Primary system similar to the system now used in

Oregon”].)

Each of the ballot reform measures introduced in the

Legislature provided that the Secretary of State “shall place the

name” of a candidate for president upon the presidential

primary ballot when that state officer “shall have determined in

his sole discretion that such a candidate” (or, in some versions

of the proposed legislation, “such candidate’s candidacy”) “is

generally advocated for or recognized in” the “news media

throughout the United States.”12

(Sen. Bill. No. 3 (1971 Reg.

Sess.) as introduced Jan. 4, 1971, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code,

§ 6052]; Sen. Bill. No. 3 (1969 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 7,

1969, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, § 6052]; Sen. Bill No. 145 (1968

Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 30, 1968, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code,

§ 6052]; Sen. Bill No. 586 (1967 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Mar.

14, 1967, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, § 6051]; Assem. Bill No. 1414

(1965 Reg. Sess.) as introduced February 24, 1965, § 2 [proposed

Elec. Code, § 6351].)13

All of these bills would have allowed a

candidate to avoid being placed on the ballot by executing an



12 The proposed legislation introduced in 1971 would have

added “or California” after “United States.” (Sen. Bill. No. 3

(1971 Reg. Sess.), supra, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, § 6052].)

13 Each of these measures also made provision for the

inclusion of additional candidates on the primary ballot when

petitions on behalf of their candidacy had collected a sufficient

number of signatures. (Sen. Bill No. 3 (1971 Reg. Sess.), supra,

§ 2 [proposed Elec. Code, §§ 6053-6059]; Sen. Bill No. 3 (1969

Reg. Sess.), supra, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, §§ 6053-6059]; Sen.

Bill No. 145 (1968 Reg. Sess.), supra, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code,

§§ 6053-6056]; Sen. Bill No. 586 (1967 Reg. Sess.), supra, § 2

[proposed Elec. Code, § 6051]; Assem. Bill No. 1414 (1965 Reg.

Sess.), supra, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, § 6351].)

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

29

affidavit stating that the person was not, and did not intend to

become, a candidate for president in the forthcoming election.14



The bills that were introduced in 1965 and 1967 died

without a floor vote in either chamber of the Legislature. (Cal.

Legis., Final Calendar of Legislative Business (1965 Reg. Sess.)

p. 458; Sen. Final Hist. (1967 Reg. Sess.) p. 171.) The Assembly

and the Senate passed the 1968, 1969, and 1971 bills,15 but in

each instance the legislation was vetoed by then-Governor

Reagan. In his veto message rejecting Senate Bill No. 145 (1968

Reg. Sess.), Reagan wrote that this measure “adds nothing to



14 As with the other proposed statutory reforms to the

primary ballot discussed in the text, the bills would have

incorporated this requirement into the Elections Code. (Sen.

Bill No. 3 (1971 Reg. Sess.) § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, § 6061];

Sen. Bill No. 3 (1969 Reg. Sess.) § 2 [proposed Elec. Code,

§ 6061]; Sen. Bill No. 145 (1968 Reg. Sess.) § 2 [proposed Elec.

Code, § 6058]; Sen. Bill No. 586 (1967 Reg. Sess.) § 2 [proposed

Elec. Code, §§ 6051, 6052]; Assem. Bill No. 1414 (1965 Reg.

Sess.) § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, §§ 6351, 6352].)

15 The Assembly and Senate passed versions of the 1968,

1969, and 1971 bills that had been amended in the legislative

process. These amendments are generally immaterial to the

issues before the court, with the possible exception of one change

made to the 1971 measure, Senate Bill No. 3 (1971 Reg. Sess.).

That bill was amended in the Assembly to add the italicized

language that appears below: “The Secretary of State shall

place the name of a candidate upon the presidential primary

ballot when the Secretary of State shall have determined in his

sole discretion that such a candidate is generally advocated for

or recognized in the news media throughout the United States

or California as actively seeking his party’s nomination for

President of the United States and that such a candidate has

formed a delegation in conformity with the applicable provisions

of this division.” (Sen. Bill. No. 3 (1971 Reg. Sess.) as amended

Nov. 24, 1971, § 1, italics added [proposed Elec. Code, § 6066].)

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

30

the democratic process. It is, in fact, an infringement on the

rights of certain individuals. It limits the people’s responsibility

by placing the responsibility for putting names on the California

presidential ballot on the shoulders of one man. This is

considerably less desirable than California’s open primary

method which requires a significant number of persons to show

an interest in a man’s candidacy before his name can be placed

on the ballot.” (Governor’s Veto Message to Sen. on Sen. Bill

No. 145 (Aug. 22, 1968) 1969 Sen. J. (1968 Reg. Sess.) p. 4959.)

Reagan issued similar veto messages in rejecting Senate Bill No.

3 (1969 Reg. Sess.), the ballot reform measure approved by the

Legislature in its 1969 Regular Session (Governor’s Veto

Message to Sen. on Sen. Bill No. 3 (Sept. 4, 1969) 1969 Sen. J.

(1969 Reg. Sess.) p. 5695 (hereafter 1969 Veto Message)), and

the Senate Bill No. 3 that was approved by the Legislature in its

1971 Regular Session (Governor’s Veto Message to Sen. on Sen.

Bill No. 3 (Dec. 30, 1971) 1972 Sen. J. (1972 Reg. Sess.) p. 9939).

In vetoing the 1969 measure, Reagan added, “If a candidate is,

indeed, ‘generally recognized’ as a serious presidential

contender, his supporters should have no difficulty in gathering

sufficient signatures to place his name on the California ballot.”

(1969 Veto Message, supra, at p. 5696.)

3. The Electorate’s Approval of Proposition 4 as a

Constitutional Amendment, Creating an “Open

Presidential Primary”

In 1970, after several attempts at making changes to the

presidential primary election by statute had failed, a

constitutional amendment with a similar goal (Sen. Const.

Amend. No. 3 (1970 Reg. Sess.)) was introduced in the

Legislature. This proposal would have added section 7 to article

II of the state Constitution, with the text, “The Legislature shall

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

31

provide for an open presidential primary whereby the

candidates on the ballot are those found by the Secretary of

State to be recognized candidates throughout the nation or

throughout California for the office of President of the United

States, and those whose names are placed on the ballot by

petition, but excluding any candidate who has withdrawn by

filing an affidavit that he is not a candidate.” (Sen. Const.

Amend. No. 3 (1970 Reg. Sess.).) The Senate approved this

proposed amendment, but it was tabled in the Assembly and

never came before the electorate for approval. (Cal. Legis., Final

Calendar of Legislative Business (1970 Reg. Sess.) p. 362.)

The next year, both chambers of the Legislature approved

a similar proposal, Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 3

(1971 Reg. Sess.). (Sen. Final Hist. (1971 Reg. Sess.) p. 501.)

This measure represented an alternative method of

accomplishing the goals of the aforementioned Senate Bill No. 3

(1971 Reg. Sess.), in the event Governor Reagan vetoed the bill.

(See letter from Sen. Alfred E. Alquist to Governor Ronald

Reagan (Dec. 8, 1971) p. 1 [explaining that, should the Governor

approve Sen. Bill No. 3 (1971 Reg. Sess.), the bill’s sponsor

would “utilize the appropriate legislative provisions for the

removal of [the proposed constitutional amendment] from the

June, 1972, ballot”].) After Governor Reagan vetoed Senate Bill

No. 3 (1971 Reg. Sess.), Senate Constitutional Amendment No.

3 appeared on the ballot as Proposition 4 at the June 1972

primary election, at which time it was approved by the voters.

Proposition 4 added article II, section 8 to the state

Constitution, providing, “The Legislature shall provide for an

open presidential primary whereby the candidates on the ballot

are those found by the Secretary of State to be recognized

candidates throughout the nation or throughout California for

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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

32

the office of President of the United States, and those whose

names are placed on the ballot by petition, but excluding any

candidate who has withdrawn by filing an affidavit that he is

not a candidate.” Subsequent amendments to the state

Constitution have altered this phrasing somewhat and moved

the pertinent text to article II, section 5(c), but have not made

any changes fundamental to the issue before the court.

16



The analysis and arguments regarding Proposition 4 that

appeared within the ballot materials before the voters at the

1972 primary election provide substantial insight into the intent

behind this measure. (See People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th

858, 881 [describing ballot materials as “a useful source of

ascertaining voter intent”]; Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Assn., Inc.

v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th

431, 445.) These materials situate the amendment in the

historical context summarized above (see Robert L. v. Superior

Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 904; Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v.

City of San Jose (2000) 24 Cal.4th 537, 542, 560) and manifest

an intent, through the measure, to require all “recognized”

candidates for president to be placed on the appropriate party’s

primary ballot, in order to avoid the candidate participation

problems associated with the then-existing primary process.



16 Most recently, Proposition 14, which the electorate

adopted in 2010 to create a new “top-two candidates open

primary election” procedure for state and congressional primary

elections, redesignated the presidential primary provision as

subdivision (c) of section 5, article II, and slightly revised the

opening passage of that subdivision to indicate that partisan

elections are to be retained for presidential candidates and

political party and party central committees.

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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

33

Within the relevant ballot materials, the Legislative

Counsel’s general analysis of the measure explained, “A ‘Yes’

vote on this measure is a vote to require the placement on the

presidential primary ballot of the names of all recognized

candidates for president and all candidates qualified by virtue

of nominating petitions, unless such a candidate withdraws. [¶]

A ‘No’ vote is a vote to reject this requirement.” (Ballot Pamp.,

Primary Elec. (June 6, 1972) general analysis of Prop. 4 by

Legis. Counsel, p. 9, italics added (hereafter June 1972 Ballot

Pamphlet).) The Legislative Counsel’s detailed analysis added,

in relevant part, “This measure would add Section 8 to article II

of the California Constitution and direct the Legislature to

provide for an open presidential primary. It would require the

Secretary of State to place upon the presidential primary ballot

of the appropriate political party as its candidates for the office

of President of the United States, the names of those persons

who he determined to be either (a) recognized as candidates

throughout the nation or (b) recognized as candidates

throughout California.” (Id., detailed analysis of Prop 4. by

Legis. Counsel, p. 10, italics added.)

The arguments in favor of Proposition 4 within the official

ballot pamphlet also described how the measure would function,

and explained why it was being proposed. Proponents stated, in

pertinent part, “This Constitutional Amendment is designed to

give voters a meaningful voice in choosing their party’s

presidential nominee. It requires the Legislature to provide for

an open presidential primary in which the Secretary of State

places on the ballot the names of recognized candidates for the

office of President of the United States.” (June 1972 Ballot

Pamp., supra, argument in favor of Prop. 4, p. 10.) The

argument in favor of Proposition 4 later continued, “The present

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

34

system of selecting presidential candidates often leaves the

voter without a direct voice in the decision. The ‘favorite son’

device has been used by Governors from both parties to prevent

a contested primary, depriving the voters of a chance to vote for

the candidate of his choice. [¶] In the last presidential primary

election, California voters were denied the opportunity of voting

for or against either of the men who eventually became the

presidential nominees. [¶] Opponents claim an open primary

would impair ‘party unity’ and would require costly election

campaigns. But who wants ‘party unity’ at the expense of party

members? And why shouldn’t the candidates campaign in

California as well as in New Hampshire, Indiana, and Oregon?

[¶] The open primary plan would make California the key state

every presidential election. As the most populous state in the

union, it should be. It is time the voters have a say in

nominating their party’s candidate for the highest office in the

land.” (Ibid.) Later, in rebutting the arguments advanced

against Proposition 4, its advocates stated, “By placing the

names of all recognized candidates on the ballot the Secretary of

State can help ensure that Californians have a chance to choose

which candidate they wish to represent their party. California

is the most populous state in the Union and serves as a cross

section of the entire nation. It is only fitting that our

presidential primary should be important in the selection of

presidential nominees. [¶] The open presidential primary will

free the voters of California to choose their own candidates for

President of the United States and take the decision out of the

smoke-filled rooms.” (June 1972 Ballot Pamp., supra, rebuttal

to argument against Prop. 4, p. 11, italics added.)

The opponents of Proposition 4, meanwhile, argued in

their statements to voters within the ballot materials that the

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

35

existing regime did not meaningfully impede the ability of

leading candidates for president to appear on the primary ballot.

They explained that “[t]o appear on the ballot, a candidate and

his supporters need only gather a reasonable number of

signatures of registered voters who wish to have the candidate’s

name placed on the ballot.” (June 1972 Ballot Pamp., supra,

argument against Prop. 4, p. 11.) Thus, with regard to Richard

Nixon and Hubert Humphrey, the Republican and Democratic

Party nominees in 1968 who had not participated in that

spring’s California primary, “if one or both of those men had

desired to place their name before their own party members in

California in June 1968, they could have done so. There is

absolutely nothing in present law which prevented them from

entering the primary. For their own reasons, they chose not to

do so.” (Id., rebuttal to argument in favor of Proposition 4,

p. 10.)

The opponents of Proposition 4 characterized the measure

as objectionable because it would deny future presidential

candidates the right to similarly choose whether to participate

in the state primary. They asserted, “Proposition 4 forces a

candidate to enter the California primary. This means that he

must commit an immense amount of time and money to a

campaign here, even though he may feel that his chances for the

nomination might better be served by using that time and

money elsewhere.” (June 1972 Ballot Pamp., supra, argument

against Prop. 4, at p. 11.) The opponents maintained that “each

presidential candidate should be free to decide which primaries

he will enter, and Proposition 4 will deny such candidates their

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

36

freedom of decision.” (Id., rebuttal to argument in favor of

Prop. 4, p. 10.)17

The consistent characterizations of Proposition 4 within

the ballot materials provided to voters at the June 1972 primary

election illuminate the intent behind this measure. They

establish that this legislative constitutional amendment

responded to concerns that voters in previous California

presidential primary elections had not consistently been

provided with an adequate choice among candidates for

president. To address this problem, the proposition upended the

preexisting system, in which all candidates had to take

affirmative steps to appear on the primary election ballot, and



17 Analyses of Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 3

(1971 Reg. Sess.) that were prepared before Proposition 4 came

before the electorate for approval reflect a similar

understanding of the ballot measure. An analysis by the

Assembly Committee on Elections and Reapportionment stated

that the measure “would place on the . . . ballot the question

whether California should have an ‘open’ Presidential primary.

Under the measure the Secretary of State would be required to

place all publicly recognized candidates for President on the

primary ballot. Other candidates could qualify by petition.

A candidate could withdraw by filing an affidavit that he is not

a candidate.” (Assem. Com. on Elections and Reapportionment,

Analysis of Sen. Const. Amend. No. 3 (1971 Reg. Sess.) p. 1,

italics added.) A summary by the Legislature’s Constitutional

Amendments Committee similarly explained that the measure

“[r]equires [the] Secretary of State to place all publicly recognized

candidates for President on the primary ballot. Other

candidates could qualify by petition. Any candidate could

withdraw his name by filing an affidavit with the Secretary of

State stating that he is not a candidate.” (Const. Amends. Com.,

Final Summary of Selected Legislation Relating to Amending

the Cal. Const. (1971 Reg. Sess.) p. 7, italics added.)

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

37

had sometimes declined to do so. That paradigm was replaced

by one in which the Secretary of State must place on the ballot

all persons found to be “recognized . . . throughout the nation or

throughout California” as candidates for president within

parties that qualify for the primary election (along with

candidates who qualify through the petition process), except for

candidates who file affidavits of noncandidacy.

18

C. Subsequent Developments

The foregoing establishes that when Proposition 4 was

approved by voters, it was understood to require that all persons

identified as “recognized candidates throughout the nation or

throughout California for the office of President of the United

States” be included on the appropriate primary ballot, absent an

affidavit of noncandidacy. The subsequent affirmation and

implementation of the ballot reform effected by Proposition 4

manifest a similar understanding.

First, at the November 1972 general election, voters

approved Proposition 7. This proposition adopted several

recommendations of the Constitutional Revision Commission



18 These ballot materials also clarify that the affidavit of

noncandidacy that would remove a “recognized” candidate for

president from the ballot must do more than merely disavow

participation in the California primary. The argument in favor

of Proposition 4 stated, “Persons placed on the ballot and

wishing to be removed may withdraw simply by filing an

affidavit that they are not a candidate for President.” (June 1972

Ballot Pamp., supra, argument in favor of Prop. 4, p. 10, italics

added.) The arguments made by the measure’s opponents in the

ballot materials, such as their assertion that it would deny

presidential candidates their “freedom of decision” regarding

“which primaries [to] enter” (id., rebuttal to argument in favor

of Prop. 4, p. 10), carry similar connotations.

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

38

regarding article II of the state Constitution, relating to

elections. Among its provisions, Proposition 7 renumbered

article II, section 8 of the state Constitution as article II, section

4, and revised the introductory language of this section to

provide (the italicized language being added through the

proposition), “[t]he Legislature shall provide for primary

elections for partisan offices, including an open presidential

primary whereby the candidates on the ballot are those found

by the Secretary of State to be recognized candidates throughout

the nation or throughout California for the office of President of

the United States, and those whose names are placed on the

ballot by petition, but excluding any candidate who has

withdrawn by filing an affidavit that he is not a candidate.”

(Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972) text of Prop. 7, appen.

p. 9, italics added (hereafter November 1972 Ballot

Pamphlet).)

19

Concerning this provision, opponents of Proposition 7

revived an argument that had been made against Proposition 4

at the preceding June 1972 primary election, asserting that the

electorate should vote against the later measure because voters

should not allow “the Secretary of State in his judgment and his

judgment alone [to] pass[] on the candidate’s ‘recognition,’ and

thus decid[e] as a practical matter which candidates will be

voted on by the people. This is too important a matter to be left

to the judgment of any one person.” (Nov. 1972 Ballot Pamp.,



19 A subsequent amendment to the Constitution, approved

by the voters as Proposition 14 in June 1976, shifted this text

(with its language regarding the affidavit of noncandidacy

having been made gender-neutral through the intervening

passage of Prop. 11 in November 1974) to article II, section 5 of

the Constitution.

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

39

supra, argument against Prop. 7, p. 20.) The proponents of

Proposition 7 cast the issue as already settled by Proposition 4,

explaining, “The open presidential primary was added to the

Constitution by the people in June 1972. A ‘Yes’ vote merely

renumbers that provision to conform to other language in Article

II.” (Nov. 1972 Ballot Pamp., supra, rebuttal to argument

against Prop. 7, p. 20.) Nothing associated with this back-andforth,

which implicitly equated a candidate’s “ ‘recognition’ ”

(id., argument against Prop. 7, p. 20) with that candidate’s

appearance on the primary ballot, suggests a view that under

the Constitution as amended earlier that year through

Proposition 4, the Legislature retained the authority to adopt

disclosure requirements for presidential candidates that could

function to exclude from the ballot even “recognized candidates

throughout the nation or throughout California for the office of

President of the United States.”

Actions taken to implement Proposition 4 shortly after its

approval also offer no indication of such an understanding. Two

years after Proposition 4 passed, the Legislature enacted the

Alquist Open Presidential Primary Act (Stats. 1974, ch. 1184).

This statute revamped the procedures applicable to the

Democratic Party presidential primary. As enacted, the sole

requirement within this statute for inclusion on a presidential

primary ballot was that a candidate be deemed “generally

advocated for or recognized in the news media throughout the

United States or California as actively seeking the nomination

of the Democratic Party for President of the United States.” (See

Stats. 1974, ch. 1184, § 2, p. 2537 [Elec. Code, former § 6310].)

Substantively similar language was included in other

presidential primary laws, applicable to other political parties,

passed by the Legislature shortly thereafter. (See Elec. Code,

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

40

former § 6010, added by Stats. 1975, ch. 1048, § 2, p. 2468; Elec.

Code, former § 6210, added by Stats. 1975, ch. 1056, § 3, p. 2509;

Elec. Code, former § 6110, added by Stats. 1975, ch. 1060, § 3,

p. 2569.)

By contemplating that a presidential candidate would

appear on the appropriate primary ballot when found to be

“generally advocated for or recognized” in the specified manner,

these statutes and their present-day counterparts (Elec. Code,

§§ 6041, 6340, subd. (a), 6520, subd. (a), 6720, 6851) convey a

conception of article II, section 5(c) that is consistent with the

one we adopt. As with the approval of Proposition 7 by the

electorate, nothing within these laws implies a view that the

Legislature can adopt disclosure requirements for presidential

candidates that, if not complied with, would keep persons

determined to be “recognized candidates throughout the nation

or throughout California for the office of President of the United

States” from appearing on a primary ballot.

Similarly, there is no indication that the Secretary of State

has traditionally construed article II, section 5(c) or its

predecessor provisions as contemplating additional

requirements for appearing on a presidential primary ballot,

unrelated to whether someone is a “recognized candidate[]

throughout the nation or throughout California for the office of

President of the United States.” As discussed ante, when

Secretaries of State have disclosed the factors they took into

account in deciding whether a person qualified to appear as a

candidate on a presidential primary ballot, these considerations

all have had a reasonable relationship to whether a candidate

was known throughout the nation or California, or was actively

participating in the presidential race. (E.g., Sect. of State 2008

Presidential Candidate Announcement, supra, at p. 1; Sect. of

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

41

State 1976 Presidential Candidate Announcement, supra, at

p. 1.)

Last, although as has been explained there was no

discussion of article II, section 5(c) in connection with legislative

deliberations over Senate Bill No. 27 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.),

such a conversation did occur when the Legislature debated

Senate Bill No. 505, which was enrolled and signed by the

Governor on the same days as Senate Bill No. 27. Committee

analyses of Senate Bill No. 505 reflect a common understanding

that under article II, section 5(c), all presidential candidates

found to be “recognized . . . throughout the nation or throughout

California” must appear on the appropriate qualifying party’s

ballot unless an affidavit of noncandidacy is filed. Two of these

analyses state that Proposition 4 “placed on the 1972 primary

ballot the question whether California should have a

Presidential primary that required the SOS [Secretary of State]

to place all publicly recognized candidates for President on the

primary ballot.” (Sen. Com. on Elections and Const. Amends.,

Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 505 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended

March 25, 2019, p. 5; Sen. Rules Com., Office of Floor Analyses,

Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 505 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended

May 30, 2019, at p. 6.)

In short, by all available indications, for more than four

decades after Proposition 4’s approval in 1972, the electorate,

the executive, and the Legislature all interpreted the

constitutional text now found at article II, section 5(c) similarly

to how we construe it, i.e., as requiring an open presidential

primary in which all persons within qualifying parties found to

be “recognized candidates throughout the nation or throughout

California for the office of President of the United States” are to

be included on the appropriate presidential primary ballot.

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

42

D. The Act’s Income Tax Return Disclosure

Requirement Conflicts with Article II, Section

5(c) and Cannot Be Enforced

It follows from the discussion above that insofar as

sections 6883 and 6884 of the Elections Code make a

presidential candidate’s disclosure of income tax returns an

absolute prerequisite for having the Secretary of State print the

candidate’s name on a primary ballot, this requirement conflicts

with the more inclusive presidential primary that the electorate

endorsed when it approved Proposition 4.

20





20 In his preliminary opposition, respondent argued that

petitioners lack standing to pursue a writ of mandate, and that

section 13314 of the Elections Code makes the Superior Court

for the County of Sacramento the exclusive venue for this action.

(Elec. Code, § 13314, subds. (a)(1), (b).) His response to our

order to show cause stated that it incorporated by reference the

arguments made in the preliminary opposition, but respondent

did not otherwise renew these arguments in responding to our

order to show cause — even as he advanced other reasons why

no writ should issue.

Assuming these arguments remain before us, they lack

merit. We perceive no standing issue that keeps us from

deciding the important issues presented in the petition. (See

Code Civ. Proc., § 1086; Elec. Code, § 13314, subd. (a)(1); Save

the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011)

52 Cal.4th 155, 166, 170, fn. 5; Weatherford v. City of San Rafael

(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1247-1248.) Meanwhile, article VI,

section 10 of the California Constitution vests this court with

“original jurisdiction in proceedings for extraordinary relief in

the nature of mandamus.” Although Elections Code section

13314, subdivision (b) states that “[v]enue for a proceeding

under this section shall be exclusively in Sacramento County

[when]: [¶] (1) The Secretary of State is named as a real party

in interest or as a respondent,” we do not read this provision as

depriving this court of its original jurisdiction to entertain

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

43

As has been explained, Proposition 4 was approved by the

electorate after voters had been denied the opportunity in

previous California primary elections to vote for or against

leading candidates for president, with several prominent

candidates for that office having declined to take the steps

necessary to qualify for the primary ballot. To avoid a

recurrence in future primaries, Proposition 4 instituted a

system whereby all persons within qualifying parties who are

found to be “recognized candidates throughout the nation or

throughout California for the office of President of the United

States” must be included on the appropriate presidential

primary ballot, unless they file an affidavit of noncandidacy,

along with candidates who qualify for the ballot through the

petition process. This reform advanced the interest of California

voters in more consistently having direct and substantial

influence in the primary process.

Allowing the income tax return disclosure requirement

before us to stand could effectively revoke article II, section

5(c)’s guarantee to voters of a choice among all “recognized”

candidates for president who do not file affidavits of

noncandidacy. The statutory prerequisite, if not complied with,

would exclude from the ballot even someone who is actively

seeking the presidential nomination of a political party that

participates in the primary election, and is widely regarded as

a leading contender for that nomination — precisely the sort of

presidential candidate that article II, section 5(c) specifies must



petitions such as the one at bar. (See Vandermost v. Bowen

(2012) 53 Cal.4th 421, 451; California Redevelopment Assn. v.

Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 252-253.)

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

44

appear on the ballot, absent the filing of an affidavit of

noncandidacy.

In arguing that the Legislature may properly condition a

presidential candidate’s access to the primary ballot on

compliance with the Act’s disclosure requirement, respondent

emphasizes the Legislature’s broad authority to provide for a

system of primary elections, including presidential primaries.

(E.g., Libertarian Party v. Eu, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 540.) Prior

to the adoption of Proposition 4, we recognized that this

authority includes the ability to enact reasonable rules that may

operate to exclude some candidates from the primary ballot.

(E.g., Communist Party v. Peek, supra, 20 Cal.2d at pp. 542-

545.) But as discussed ante, the language and history of article

II, section 5(c) establish that this general authority does not

include the more specific power to exclude persons found to be

“recognized candidates throughout the nation or throughout

California for the office of President of the United States” from

appearing on the ballot of a party that participates in the

primary election. Whatever the Legislature’s authority may be

to define ground rules for presidential primary elections, article

II, section 5(c) also includes a requirement of an inclusive ballot

that such legislation must respect and embrace.

Respondent further asserts that the Legislature’s general

power to provide for primary elections makes it both inevitable

and appropriate that it will have some role in defining, directly

or indirectly, who will appear on the primary ballot as a

candidate for president. Making this point, respondent states

in his briefing that “[t]he Legislature has already permissibly

acted to define who may be a ‘recognized candidate’ through

laws that only allow candidates identified with qualified parties

to appear on ballots.”

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

45

It is true that under current law, individuals who compete

for the presidential nominations of parties that have not

qualified to participate in the state primary election (see Elec.

Code, § 5100) will not have their names printed on the primary

election ballot, because with these candidates, there is no party

ballot to appear on. This is true regardless of whether such a

candidate might meet generic criteria for being “recognized . . .

throughout the nation or throughout California” as a candidate

“for the office of President of the United States.” We have no

need here, however, to decide whether the presidential primary

laws of this state relating to subjects such as the necessary

qualifications of participating political parties also may

implicate article II, section 5(c).21 Respondent’s observation

regarding the exclusion of candidates from nonparticipating

parties is adequately addressed by observing that whatever

questions may exist about the intent behind Proposition 4, this

measure manifestly sought to provide California voters eligible

to vote for a political party that participates in the primary

election with the opportunity to choose among all “recognized”

candidates seeking the presidential nomination of that party —

except, again, for those candidates who have filed affidavits of

noncandidacy. Insofar as the Act would make such a candidate’s

disclosure of income tax returns a requirement for inclusion on

a qualifying party’s primary ballot, its provisions conflict with

this intent, and are therefore unconstitutional.



21 Nor, given the limited ambit of article II, section 5(c), do

we have occasion to opine on conditions for appearing on the

primary ballot that may be placed on candidates for political

offices other than President of the United States.

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

46

Finally, respondent observes that Proposition 4 omitted

language found in the earlier proposed legislation relating to the

presidential primary ballot, discussed ante, that was introduced

between 1965 and 1971 but failed to become law. These

unsuccessful measures all had provided that the Secretary of

State would determine “in his sole discretion” whether a

candidate was sufficiently “recognized” to be included on the

primary ballot. (Sen. Bill. No. 3 (1971 Reg. Sess.) as introduced

Jan. 4, 1971, § 2; Sen. Bill. No. 3 (1969 Reg. Sess.) as introduced

Jan. 7, 1969, § 2; Sen. Bill No. 145 (1968 Reg. Sess.) as

introduced Jan. 30, 1968, § 2; Sen. Bill No. 586 (1967 Reg. Sess.)

as introduced Mar. 14, 1967, § 2; Assem. Bill No. 1414 (1965

Reg. Sess.) § 2.)

Respondent would have us infer from the absence of this

“sole discretion” language in Proposition 4 that voters, in

approving this measure, intended for the Legislature to have the

authority to exclude even “recognized” candidates for president

from the primary ballot. This argument reads far too much into

this shift in phrasing. In light of the text and history of article

II, section 5(c), the most that can be said is that the Legislature

might properly claim some role in defining when someone is

“recognized . . . throughout the nation or throughout California”

as a candidate “for the office of President of the United States,”

with the precise parameters of any such authority to be defined

another day, in another case. Yet article II, section 5(c) also

clearly prohibits the Legislature from imposing prerequisites

such as the income tax return disclosure requirement before us

PATTERSON v. PADILLA

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

47

that a presidential candidate who is so recognized also must

satisfy in order to appear on a primary ballot.

22

E. Petitioners Are Entitled to a Writ of Mandate

Respondent argues that no writ of mandate should issue

because the Secretary of State has some discretion in

determining who is “recognized . . . throughout the nation or

throughout California” as a candidate “for the office of President

of the United States,” and therefore, according to respondent,

“there is no purely ministerial duty that can be mandated by

this Court.” But “a writ of mandate is available, in the absence

of a ‘plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course

of law’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086), against the implementation of

an invalid statute.” (Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees

Internat. Union v. Davis (1999) 21 Cal.4th 585, 590.) We have

in the past issued writs of mandate directing state officers not

to enforce statutes we found unconstitutional. (Hardie v. Eu

(1976) 18 Cal.3d 371, 380; Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971)



22 Moreover, it is debatable at best whether this difference in

phrasing between the unsuccessful earlier measures and

Proposition 4 is even material to the interpretative question

before the court. This distinction was not brought before the

electorate in the ballot materials associated with this

proposition. In fact, voters were told by the opponents of

Proposition 4 that, in this respect, the amendment would

function similarly to the scheme envisioned by the earlier

measures. (June 1972 Ballot Pamp., supra, argument against

Prop. 4, p. 11 [asserting that the proposition would “give[] just

one man, the California Secretary of State, the right to

determine which names will be placed on the ballot for the

highest office in this country”].)

We hold that Elections Code sections 6883 and 6884 are invalid under article II, section 5(c) of the California Constitution insofar as they purport to require someone who is “recognized . . . throughout the nation or throughout California”

as a candidate for the office of President of the United States to file with the Secretary of State federal income tax returns as a necessary condition for appearing on the primary election ballot of a political party that has qualified to participate in that election. In accordance with this holding, let a peremptory writ of mandate issue that directs the Secretary of State to refrain from enforcing Elections Code sections 6883 and 6884 as to such candidates. Our judgment is final forthwith. (See Vandermost v. Bowen, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 486; California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 276.)