Prince of Peace Lutheran Church v. Mary Linklater

In the case at bar, this Court granted both a petition and cross-petition for a writ of certiorari to address two issues of public importance: (1) the extent to which the First Amendment's "ministerial exception” is applicable to a sixteen count civil action asserted against a church by a former employee who claims that she was the victim of sexual harassment and employment discrimination; and (2) whether the former employee's "hostile work environment” claim was timely filed under the "continuing violation doctrine” exception to the applicable statute of limitations. 409 Md. 47, 972 A.2d 861 (2009). Before addressing these issues, however, it is necessary that we clear away a good deal of flotsam and jetsam produced by the two hundred seventy-five paragraph,1 fifty-one page Complaint in which the former employee asserted her sixteen claims. At this point in these needlessly complicated proceedings, there are four Petitioners/Cross Respondents ("Petitioners”): (1) Prince of Peace Lutheran Church ("the Church"), (2) Rufus S. Lusk, III ("Lusk"), (3) the Metropolitan Washington D.C. Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America ("the Synod"), and (4) Bishop Theodore Schneider ("Schneider"). Having ultimately prevailed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, they argue that the Court of Special Appeals has erroneously concluded that Respondent/Cross Petitioner, Mary Linklater (Respondent) is entitled to a new trial on four of the claims asserted in her Complaint.2 Respondent, who was awarded compensatory and punitive damages by a jury, argues that the Court of Special Appeals has erroneously concluded that she is not entitled to the entry of a judgment that conforms to that verdict.3 For the reasons that follow, we hold that (1) the ministerial exception does not apply to two of the claims that Respondent has asserted, and (2) the "continuing violation doctrine” is applicable to those claims.

Background

As the issues before us involve questions of law rather than questions of fact, there is no need to set forth each and every item of conflicting evidence in the record of this "she said, they said” case.4 Suffice it to say that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Respondent (1) was the victim of sexual harassment, (2) complained about the harassment, and (3) was the victim of additional harassment and retaliation as a result of her complaints.

On October 16, 2002, Respondent filed a Complaint against the Petitioners in which she asserted the following causes of action:

COUNT I

Sexual Harassment and Hostile Work Environment Against all Defendants

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COUNT II

Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment

Against all Defendants

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COUNT III

Gender Discrimination Against all Defendants

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Count IV

Retaliatory Harassment and Constructive Discharge Against All Defendants

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Count V

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Against All Defendants

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Count VI

Invasion of Privacy and False Light Against all Defendants

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Count VII Fraud Against All Defendants

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Count VIII

Injurious Falsehood Against Defendants Lusk, Schneider and D.C. Metropolitan Synod

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Count IX

Tortious Interference With Business Relations Against Defendants Lusk, Schneider, and D.C. Metropolitan Synod

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Count X

Negligent Retention and Supervision Against Defendants Prince of Peace and D.C. Metropolitan Synod

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Count XI

Respondeat Superior Against All Defendants Prince of Peace and D.C. Metropolitan Synod.

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Count XII

Conspiracy Against All Defendants

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Count XIII

Aiding and Abetting Against All Defendants

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Count XIV

Breach of Contract Against Defendants Schneider and the D.C. Metropolitan Synod

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Count XV

Breach of Implied Contract Against Defendant Prince of Peace

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Count [XVI]

Breach of Fiduciary Duty Against Defendant Schneider

Respondent's Complaint included the following assertions:

160. On March 4, 2001, [Respondent] found a defaced picture of herself that had been horribly stabbed numerous times, stuck to a bulletin board on the wall of the church next to the music room where [Respondent] worked. [Respondent] was extremely distraught by this hateful act, and immediately fled the church.

161. Over the course of the next three days, [Respondent] suffered from disabling emotional and psychological distress. . . . [Respondent] continuously agonized over her circumstances, and the defaced photo, which symbolized a great hatred of her that was felt by others – others who had previously been her friends and supporters. . . .

162. By March 7, 2001, [Respondent] concluded that the environment at Prince of Peace had become so hostile and hateful and intimidating that, emotionally and psychologically, she simply could no longer bring herself to come in to work, unless there was a dramatic and fundamental improvement in the work environment. . . .

Respondent's Complaint included the following Prayer for Relief:

WHEREFORE, [Respondent] respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment:

A. declaring that the acts complained of herein are in violation of the laws of the State of Maryland and Montgomery County Code § 27-19;

B. directing Defendants to make [Respondent] whole for all earnings and other job benefits she would have received but for Defendants' unlawful conduct, including but not limited to, wages, retirement benefits, bonuses, and other lost benefits, plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;

C. directing Defendants to pay [Respondent] compensatory damages, including damages for her mental anguish and psychological treatment in an amount appropriate to the proof at trial;

D. awarding [Respondent] punitive damages in an amount appropriate to the proof at trial;

E. awarding [Respondent] the costs of this action, including reasonable attorneys' fees; and

F. granting such other and further relief as this Court Deems necessary and proper.

The first Circuit Court ruling of consequence occurred on March 10, 2003, when the pretrial motions hearing court resolved Petitioners' motions to dismiss in an on-therecord proceeding during which it stated:

In deciding the motion to dismiss as to the first amendment issues that have been raised, I decided that what I needed to do was look at the allegations in each count of the complaint and determine on a claim-by-claim basis whether or not the issues raised constituted - - and I'm quoting from which case is this, McKelvey v. Pierce[, 173 N.J. 26, 800 A.2d 840 (2002),] which, although none of these cases are technically binding, I felt that this language was instructive as to the analysis the Court needed to conduct. And that was requiring an assessment of every issue raised in terms of doctrinal and administrative intrusion and entanglement. I thought that was a pretty good description for the process we were required to go through.

The Court is going to grant the motion to dismiss as to Counts 4, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and denying the motion to dismiss as to the remaining counts. I did also consider separately the statute of limitations arguments that have been raised with respect to the remaining counts and do not find that they are barred by the statute of limitations, at least for motions to dismiss purposes. So the counts remaining are 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11.

The second Circuit Court ruling of consequence occurred on January 19, 2005, when the trial court filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order that included the following findings and conclusions:

The issues presented [by the Petitioners in their Motions for Summary Judgment] were: (1) Whether the ecclesiastical exception bars Ms. Linklater's causes of actions against all of the Defendants; (2) Whether the Statute of Limitations has already run for Ms. Linklater's Montgomery County Code causes of actions (Counts I-III); and (3) Whether Ms. Linklater has presented enough evidence to establish a claim on any of the counts?

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A. The Ecclesiastical Exception

1) Bishop Schneider and the Synod

This Court finds that the ministerial exception bars Ms. Linklater's claims as they apply to the Defendants Bishop Schneider and Synod. Bishop Schneider became involved in this litigation matter only to help resolve ongoing conflicts in the Prince of Peace church between Pastor Lusk, Neil Howard, and Ms. Linklater. The Bishop and the Synod were not Ms. Linklater's employers and were never accused of sexually harassing her. Rather the Bishop worked with Ms. Linklater, Pastor Lusk, and Howard only to mend the rifts that had developed in Prince of Peace. Once Ms. Linklater elected to file a formal complaint with the Montgomery County Human Relations Commission, the Bishop was no longer involved in the matter. The Bishop was merely acting in his role as Bishop, and therefore this Court finds that the First Amendment prohibits Ms. Linklater from pursuing any of her claims against Bishop Schneider or the Metropolitan Washington, D.C. Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America.

2) Pastor Lusk and Prince of Peace

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In the case at bar, Ms. Linklater's claims derive from the alleged sexual harassment by [a fellow employee] and Pastor Lusk and the alleged statements that publicly discredited her. She is not challenging any employment decisions regarding her termination in March 2001. Numerous courts have recognized that tort claims based on harassment are not barred by the First Amendment.... In as much as Ms. Linklater's claims do not implicate any employment decisions or religious beliefs of Prince of Peace, the First Amendment's ecclesiastical exception will not bar her causes of action as they relate to Pastor Lusk and Prince of Peace.

B. Statute of Limitations

Counts I-III of Ms. Linklater's suit pertains to the Montgomery County Code and therefore are subject to the statute of limitations enunciated in the Maryland Code pertaining to discriminatory acts in violation of the Montgomery County Code. Pursuant to MD. CODE ANN. ART. 49B §42 (1997), "[a]n action... of this section shall be commenced in the circuit court for the county in which the alleged discrimination took place not later than two years after the occurrence of the alleged discriminatory act."

Ms. Linklater filed suit on October 16, 2002. If the causes of action occurred before October 16, 2000, Ms. Linklater's claims are untenable. [The fellow employee's] inappropriate conduct could not have continued after he resigned on July 15, 2000. According to Ms. Linklater's deposition Pastor Lusk's alleged sexual harassment ended on March 18, 2000. Thus, the statute of limitations has already run as it pertains to [the fellow employee] and Pastor Lusk.

Additionally, Ms. Linklater made her claims against [the fellow employee] and Lusk public on July 19, 2000. All of the actions taken by Pastor Lusk and the church which occurred after July 19, 2000 implicate the ministerial exception discussed above because they are not relevant to the harassment and abusive treatment alleged by Ms. Linklater, but rather with an employment decision of the church. A close reading of National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 [122 S.Ct. 2061] (2002), indicates that hostile work environment claims primarily focused on acts which occur beyond the statute of limitations can be filed as long as at least one event occurred within the statute of limitations period. This court finds Morgan has no bearing on the case at bar because any actions which occurred after October 16, 2000 were effectively barred by the ministerial exception.

Therefore, since there is only a two year statute of limitations for Counts I-III and the basis for the causes of action occurred before October 16, 2000 these counts will be dismissed.

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see: http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2011/66a09.pdf

In light of the findings of this Court, the Defendants, Bishop Theodore Schneider, and the Metropolitan Washington, DC Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.