IN RE ADDISYN P. ET AL

Nashville, TN - Child Custody lawyer represented appellant with a case involving termination of the his parental rights.

On October 4, 2019, the Tennessee Department of Children's Services ("DCS”)

filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Keith P. ("Father”) and Candice

P. ("Mother”) to their children, Addisyn P., Tristyn P., and Coletyn P. (collectively, "the

Children”), who were ages seven, five, and two, respectively, at the time of the petition's

06/16/2022

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filing.

1

In the petition, DCS averred that the Children were placed in the custody of the

State on May 10, 2018, based on Mother's positive drug screen and her failure to comply

with court-ordered services. DCS stated that the trial court had previously entered a nocontact order concerning Father due to allegations that he had committed domestic

violence against Mother in the Children's presence. According to DCS, the parents also

had previously stipulated that the Children were dependent and neglected due to

educational neglect and exposure to domestic violence. DCS averred that the Children

had been in foster care continuously since they were removed from Mother's custody.

In support of the petition to terminate, DCS relied on the statutory grounds of (1)

abandonment by failure to visit, (2) abandonment by failure to support, (3) abandonment

by failure to provide a suitable home, (4) persistence of the conditions leading to the

Children's removal, (5) failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the

permanency plan, and (6) failure to manifest a willingness to assume legal and physical

custody of or financial responsibility for the Children. DCS also alleged that termination

of Father's parental rights was in the best interest of the Children. An amended petition

was subsequently filed on February 7, 2020.

The record reflects that attorney Cindy Brown, guardian ad litem for the Children,

had filed a dependency and neglect action concerning the Children on January 29, 2018,

in the trial court. In the petition, Ms. Brown asserted that Addisyn was suffering from

educational neglect due to the fact that she had twenty-four unexcused absences from

school during the first half of the 2017-2018 school year. Ms. Brown also stated that

Addisyn had witnessed domestic violence committed by Father against Mother. The trial

court conducted a hearing on March 19, 2018, and determined the Children to be

dependent and neglected. Although the Children were allowed to remain in Mother's

custody at that time, with DCS services in the home, the trial court directed that Father

would have no contact with the Children.

The trial court entered a protective custody order on May 10, 2018, placing the

Children in the temporary custody of DCS. The court stated that the basis for its order

was Mother's failure to comply with court-ordered services and her positive drug screen.

On May 21, 2018, the court entered an order allowing Father to participate in therapeutic

supervised visitation with the Children.

On July 20, 2018, the trial court ratified a permanency plan concerning the

Children that had been created in June 2018. In this initial permanency plan, DCS noted

concerns regarding, inter alia, the parents' drug use and domestic violence in the home.

Father's specific requirements for compliance with the permanency plan included: (1)



1 Mother has not appealed the trial court's termination of her parental rights. We will, therefore, confine

our recitation of the facts and our analysis solely to the facts relevant to and the statutory grounds

applicable to Father.

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obtaining safe and stable housing and maintaining such housing for at least four months,

(2) providing a transportation plan to DCS, (3) attending and completing the Batterer

Intervention Program, (4) participating in individual and family therapy, (5) obtaining a

mental health assessment, (6) signing a release so that DCS could obtain Father's mental

health records from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs ("the VA”), (7)

obtaining an alcohol/drug assessment and following all recommendations, (8) submitting

to and passing random drug screens, (9) providing a list of all prescribed medications and

taking those medications as prescribed, and (10) abiding by the rules of his probation and

avoiding new criminal charges. Both Father and his counsel signed this permanency

plan.

The trial court entered an order on September 7, 2018, stating that DCS had

reported that Father had made no progress toward reunification with the Children. The

court explained that visits had been suspended in July 2018 because both parents had

reported contracting scabies and lice, although no medical documentation had been

provided to DCS.

A subsequent permanency plan was developed on April 3, 2019, and ratified by

the trial court on July 23, 2019. This plan contained largely the same requirements listed

in the prior permanency plan; however, Father was also responsible for resolving his

legal issues. This plan further added an alternative goal of adoption. Another

permanency plan was developed on September 5, 2019, and was ratified by the trial court

on October 10, 2019. Father's requirements under this plan remained substantially the

same as listed in the previous plans. DCS's termination petition was subsequently filed

on October 4, 2019, and amended on February 7, 2020.

The trial court conducted a bench trial with respect to the termination petition on

April 16, 2020, and May 21, 2021. On July 2, 2021, the court entered an order

terminating the parental rights of Father based on its determination that clear and

convincing evidence supported the statutory grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to

provide support, (2) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, (3) persistence

of the conditions leading to the Children's removal, (4) failure to substantially comply

with the requirements of the permanency plan, and (5) failure to manifest a willingness to

assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Children. The

court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that

termination of Father's parental rights was in the Children's best interest. Father timely

appealed.

II. Issues Presented

Father presents the following issues for this Court's review, which we have

restated slightly:

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1. Whether the trial court erred by determining that DCS proved

statutory grounds for termination of Father's parental rights by clear

and convincing evidence.

2. Whether the trial court erred by determining that termination of

Father's parental rights was in the Children's best interest.

III. Standard of Review

In a termination of parental rights case, this Court has a duty to determine

"whether the trial court's findings, made under a clear and convincing standard, are

supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530

(Tenn. 2006). The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed de novo upon the record,

accompanied by a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates against

those findings. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); see also In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d

507, 523-24 (Tenn. 2016); In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d at 530. Questions of law,

however, are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. See In re Carrington

H., 483 S.W.3d at 524 (citing In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009)). The trial

court's determinations regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal

and shall not be disturbed absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See

Jones v. Garrett, 92 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002).

"Parents have a fundamental constitutional interest in the care and custody of their

children under both the United States and Tennessee constitutions.” Keisling v. Keisling,

92 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tenn. 2002). It is well established, however, that "this right is not

absolute and parental rights may be terminated if there is clear and convincing evidence

justifying such termination under the applicable statute.” In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96,

97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)). As our

Supreme Court has explained:

The parental rights at stake are "far more precious than any property right.”

Santosky [v. Kramer], 455 U.S. [745,] 758-59 [(1982)]. Termination of

parental rights has the legal effect of reducing the parent to the role of a

complete stranger and of ["]severing forever all legal rights and obligations

of the parent or guardian of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)(1);

see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (recognizing that a decision terminating

parental rights is "final and irrevocable”). In light of the interests and

consequences at stake, parents are constitutionally entitled to

"fundamentally fair procedures” in termination proceedings. Santosky, 455

U.S. at 754; see also Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty, N.C.,

452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (discussing the due process right of parents to

fundamentally fair procedures).

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Among the constitutionally mandated "fundamentally fair

procedures” is a heightened standard of proof—clear and convincing

evidence. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. This standard minimizes the risk of

unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference with fundamental

parental rights. Id.; In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010).

"Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder to form a firm belief

or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and eliminates any serious or

substantial doubt about the correctness of these factual findings.” In re

Bernard T. 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citations omitted). The clear-andconvincing-evidence standard ensures that the facts are established as

highly probable, rather than as simply more probable than not. In re

Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); In re M.A.R., 183

S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

* * *

In light of the heightened burden of proof in termination proceedings,

however, the reviewing court must make its own determination as to

whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by a

preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and convincing evidence of

the elements necessary to terminate parental rights. In re Bernard T., 319

S.W.3d at 596-97.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522-24. "[P]ersons seeking to terminate [parental]

rights must prove all the elements of their case by clear and convincing evidence,”

including statutory grounds and the best interest of the child. See In re Bernard T., 319

S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010).

IV. Statutory Grounds for Termination of Father's Parental Rights

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113 (2021) lists the statutory requirements for

termination of parental rights, providing in relevant part:

(a) The chancery and circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction

with the juvenile court to terminate parental or guardianship rights to

a child in a separate proceeding, or as a part of the adoption

proceeding by utilizing any grounds for termination of parental or

guardianship rights permitted in this part or in title 37, chapter 1,

part 1 and title 37, chapter 2, part 4.

* * *

(c) Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon:

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(1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that

the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights

have been established; and

(2) That termination of the parent's or guardian's rights is in the

best interests of the child.

In its final order, the trial court concluded that clear and convincing evidence supported a

finding of five statutory grounds to terminate Father's parental rights: (1) abandonment

by failure to provide a suitable home, (2) abandonment by failure to provide support, (3)

persistence of the conditions leading to the Children's removal, (4) failure to substantially

comply with the requirements of the permanency plan, and (5) failure to manifest a

willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the

Children. We will address each statutory ground in turn.

A. Statutory Abandonment

Concerning statutory abandonment, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(1)

(2021) provides as relevant to this action:

(g) Initiation of termination of parental or guardianship rights may be

based upon any of the grounds listed in this subsection (g). The

following grounds are cumulative and nonexclusive, so that listing

conditions, acts or omissions in one ground does not prevent them

from coming within another ground:

(1) Abandonment by the parent or guardian, as defined in § 36-1-

102, has occurred[.]

The version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A) (2017) in effect at the time

the instant petition was filed provided the following definitions of abandonment as

pertinent here:2

(ii)(a) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal

custody of a parent or parents or guardian or guardians by a court

order at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed



2 Effective March 6, 2020, the General Assembly has amended Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-

102(A)(iv) in part to change the language regarding the time period prior to incarceration. See 2020

Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 525, § 1 (S.B. 1769). However, inasmuch as the instant petition was filed prior to

the effective date of the amendment, the prior version of the statute applies. See, e.g., In re Braxton M.,

531 S.W.3d 708, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017).

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in the juvenile court alleging that a child is a dependent and

neglected child, and the child was placed in the custody of the

department or a licensed child-placing agency;

(b) The juvenile court found, or the court where the termination of

parental rights petition is filed finds, that the department or a

licensed child-placing agency made reasonable efforts to prevent

removal of the child or that the circumstances of the child's situation

prevented reasonable efforts from being made prior to the child's

removal; and

(c) For a period of four (4) months following the physical removal, the

department or agency made reasonable efforts to assist the parent or

parents or the guardian or guardians to establish a suitable home for

the child, but that the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians

have not made reciprocal reasonable efforts to provide a suitable

home and have demonstrated a lack of concern for the child to such

a degree that it appears unlikely that they will be able to provide a

suitable home for the child at an early date. The efforts of the

department or agency to assist a parent or guardian in establishing a

suitable home for the child shall be found to be reasonable if such

efforts equal or exceed the efforts of the parent or guardian toward

the same goal, when the parent or guardian is aware that the child is

in the custody of the department;

* * *

(iv) A parent or guardian is incarcerated at the time of the institution of

an action or proceeding to declare a child to be an abandoned child,

or the parent or guardian has been incarcerated during all or part of

the four (4) months immediately preceding the institution of such

action or proceeding, and either has failed to visit or has failed to

support or has failed to make reasonable payments toward the

support of the child for four (4) consecutive months immediately

preceding such parent's or guardian's incarceration, or the parent or

guardian has engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a

wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. If the four-month

period immediately preceding the institution of the action or the

four-month period immediately preceding such parent's

incarceration is interrupted by a period or periods of incarceration,

and there are not four (4) consecutive months without incarceration

immediately preceding either event, a four-month period shall be

created by aggregating the shorter periods of nonincarceration

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beginning with the most recent period of nonincarceration prior to

commencement of the action and moving back in time. Periods of

incarceration of less than seven (7) days duration shall be counted as

periods of nonincarceration. Periods of incarceration not discovered

by the petitioner and concealed, denied, or forgotten by the parent

shall also be counted as periods of nonincarceration. A finding that

the parent has abandoned the child for a defined period in excess of

four (4) months that would necessarily include the four (4) months

of nonincarceration immediately prior to the institution of the action,

but which does not precisely define the relevant four-month period,

shall be sufficient to establish abandonment[.]

We will address each abandonment ground in turn.

1. Abandonment by Failure to Provide Suitable Home

The trial court determined that clear and convincing evidence supported the

statutory ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home. With respect to

this ground, the trial court stated in its July 2, 2021 order:

The Court finds that there is uncontroverted proof that the children

were removed from the parents on May 10, 2018 based upon a Petition

filed in this Court alleging that the children were dependent and

neglect[ed]. The Ex Parte Protective Custody Order found that the

children's situation prevented the Department from making reasonable

efforts to prevent the removal.

Based upon the uncontroverted testimony of FSW [family services

worker] Gentry and the proof before the Court, the Court further finds that

for a period of four months following the removal, the Department made

reasonable efforts to assist [Father and Mother] to establish a suitable home

for the children. FSW Gentry and Team Leader Fisher testified that the

Department prepared permanency plans for [Father and Mother], setting out

requirements in order to regain custody of the children. Further, the

Department provided services to [Father and Mother] consistent with the

permanency plans. The Department further provided necessary services for

the children, including necessary medical and behavioral health services.

As set out above, at the permanency hearings the Court found that

neither parent had resolved the issues which brought the children into

custody, or provided any proof of completion of any of their responsibilities

on the permanency plans. . . .

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The Court finds that [Father and Mother] have failed to improve

their homes and personal conditions so that the children could be returned

to them, and that their failure to make even minimal efforts to improve their

homes and personal conditions demonstrates a lack of concern for the

children to such a degree that it appears unlikely that [Father and Mother]

will be able to provide a suitable home for the children at an early date.

The Court further finds that the efforts of the Department to assist [Father

and Mother] in establishing a suitable home for the children were

reasonable, in that they were equal to the efforts of [Father and Mother]

toward establishing a suitable home, and that [Father and Mother] were

aware that the children were in DCS custody.

DCS has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, the ground of

abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home against [Father and

Mother].

(Footnotes omitted.)

Upon our thorough review, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial

supports the trial court's findings. The Children were removed from the home of the

parents and from their custody on May 10, 2018, and placed in the custody of DCS

following the filing of a petition alleging dependency and neglect. In its May 2018 order,

the trial court determined that the Children's circumstances prevented further reasonable

efforts from being made by DCS prior to removal.

Nevertheless, for more than four months thereafter, DCS made reasonable efforts

to assist Father in establishing a suitable home for the Children. DCS established

permanency plans for the Children, which outlined the requirements Father needed to

satisfy in order to regain custody. DCS submitted a referral for a mental health

evaluation for Father and requested that Father sign a release so that DCS could obtain

his mental health records from the VA. Father refused to comply with either of these

requested actions. DCS also offered a hair follicle drug screen, which Father refused.

Based on Father's need for safe and stable housing, DCS provided the parents with

listings for affordable rental properties. When the parents obtained a residence, DCS

performed a home visit to determine the suitability of the residence. DCS found the

home to be appropriate; however, the parents moved from that home shortly thereafter

due to an insect infestation.

DCS further provided for therapeutic supervised visits between Father and the

Children. Although DCS offered thirty-six hours of visitation to Father from June 2018

to February 2019, Father only utilized twelve of those hours. Father was then re-

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incarcerated in February 2019 and remained incarcerated at the time of the termination

hearing.

As this Court has previously explained concerning the reasonable efforts analysis:

Reasonable efforts is a fact intensive inquiry and must be examined on a

case-by-case basis. "Reasonable efforts” as defined by the legislature is

"the exercise of reasonable care and diligence by the department to provide

services related to meeting the needs of the child and the family.”

Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-166(g)(1) (2003). However, the

burden of family reunification does not lie entirely with DCS as

reunification is a "two-way street.”

In re C.L.M., No. M2005-00696-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 2051285, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App.

Aug. 25, 2005) (other internal citations omitted). We conclude that the evidence

preponderates in favor of a determination that DCS made reasonable efforts to assist

Father in establishing a suitable home in the four months following removal of the

Children.

The legislature has also stated that "efforts of the department or agency to assist a

parent or guardian in establishing a suitable home for the child shall be found to be

reasonable if such efforts equal or exceed the efforts of the parent or guardian toward the

same goal.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102 (1)(A)(ii)(c). During the approximately

nine-month period following the Children's removal and prior to Father's reincarceration, Father failed to demonstrate reciprocal efforts to improve his situation in

order to provide a suitable home for the Children. Father did not comply with the

requirements of the permanency plans. He never addressed his drug addiction or

domestic violence issues, his lack of safe and stable housing, or his mental health needs.

During trial, Father acknowledged that a practitioner at the VA had diagnosed him with

post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD”) and that he had self-medicated with illicit drugs

rather than addressing his mental health issues. Father acknowledged that he had been

suicidal at times and that he could not have provided care for the Children in 2018 and

early 2019 due to his mental state and drug use.

Although Father acknowledged that he understood the requirements of the

permanency plans, he expressed his disagreement with those requirements, stating

essentially that he did not need to attend domestic violence classes because he had not

been violent with Mother. Father admitted, however, that he had "pushed” Mother and

had held her against a wall by her head and neck. Father remained incarcerated at the

time of the termination trial, having violated his probation by using unlawful drugs. In

Father's own words, he acknowledged that "getting my kids back in the next year or two

will probably be a bad idea.”

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The evidence at trial clearly and convincingly demonstrated that Father was not

able to establish a home to which the Children could safely return due to his

incarceration, drug use, violent tendencies, and mental health issues. As such, Father

demonstrated a lack of concern for the Children to such a degree that it appears unlikely

that he will be able to provide a suitable home for the Children at an early date. We

therefore conclude that the trial court properly determined that clear and convincing

evidence supported the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable

home.

2. Abandonment by Failure to Support

The trial court determined that clear and convincing evidence supported the

statutory ground of abandonment by failure to support. With respect to this ground, the

trial court stated in its July 2, 2021 order:

From June 3 to October 3, 2019, [Mother] made no payments. From

October 2018 - January 2019 (month prior to incarceration) no payments

were received from [Father]. Although he was incarcerated, [Father] made

one payment in March 2019.

The Court finds that [Mother] and [Father] have abandoned these

children in failing to support or make reasonable payments toward the

support of the children for four (4) consecutive months immediately

preceding the filing of the Department's Petition or prior to incarceration.

Therefore, clear and convincing evidence of failure to support has been

established.

The court also found that Father received monthly disability benefits from the VA.

The applicable version of the statute provided that the determinative period for

abandonment by failure to support for an incarcerated parent was the "four (4)

consecutive months immediately preceding such parent's or guardian's incarceration.”

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102 (1)(A)(iv) (2017). Trial exhibits establish that Father's

most recent incarceration had begun on February 11, 2019. As such, the relevant

determinative period was October 11, 2018, through February 10, 2019, the day before

Father was incarcerated. See In re Joseph F., 492 S.W.3d 690, 702 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2016) (explaining that the applicable four-month statutory period "began on March 8,

2011, and concluded on July 7, 2011, the day prior to the filing of the termination

petition”) (citing In re Jacob C.H., No. E2013-00587-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 689085, at

*6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2014)).

It is undisputed that Father made no child support payments during this time

period for two of the Children. However, trial exhibits demonstrate that Father did tender

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one $400 payment for the third child in January 2019. The evidence also demonstrates

that Father was not incarcerated during the determinative period and was receiving

monthly disability benefits from the VA. This Court has previously considered a parent's

disability benefits in the context of parental rights termination to find that a parent could

have provided some amount of support for his child(ren). See, e.g., In re Kierani C., No.

W2020-00850-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 4057222, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2021);

In re Miracle M., No. W2017-00068-COA-R3-PT, 2017 WL 3836020, at *6 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Aug. 30, 2017).

During trial, Father claimed that his disability benefits were in the amount of

$2,000 per month. On his affidavit of indigency filed in February 2018, however, Father

represented that such benefits were in the amount of $3,000 per month. Mother likewise

testified that Father's disability benefits were in the amount of $3,200 to $3,500 per

month.

Father asserted at trial and continues to posit on appeal that his failure to pay

support was not willful. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(I) (2021) ("[I]t shall be a

defense to abandonment for failure to visit or failure to support that a parent or guardian's

failure to visit or support was not willful. The parent or guardian shall bear the burden of

proof that the failure to visit or support was not willful. Such defense must be established

by a preponderance of evidence.”). Father urges that he established this affirmative

defense at trial through his testimony that he was released from incarceration in April

2018, was not employed during the months he was not incarcerated, and suffered a loss

during the summer of 2018 when he was forced to move from his residence due to an

insect infestation.

Although Father's testimony did establish these facts, we note that Father never

claimed during his trial testimony that he lacked the ability to pay support for the

Children. Father presented no evidence concerning his living expenses and admitted that

he had income of at least $2,000 per month during the determinative period regardless of

his employment status. Father also admitted to prolific use of illicit drugs during the

determinative period. A parent's ability to procure illicit drugs has previously been

considered by this Court as a factor demonstrating that parent's ability to pay child

support. See In re Daniel G., No. E2021-00188-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 5297698, at *17

(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2021); In re E.S.L., No. E2015-01709-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL

4532470, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2016); In re Autumn K., No. M2009-01579-

COA-R3-PT, 2010 WL 702307, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2010).

In addition, despite the trial court's finding that no support payments were made

by Father during the determinative period, trial exhibits demonstrate that he paid a $400

child support payment in January 2019. This payment further demonstrates Father's

ability to pay child support. As such, Father's asserted defense that his failure to support

was not willful because he lacked the ability to pay was not proven by a preponderance of

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the evidence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(I). Moreover, given Father's level of

income, we determine this singular payment made during the determinative period to

constitute token support. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(B) (2021) (defining "token

support” to mean "that the support, under the circumstances of the individual case, is

insignificant given the parent's means”).

Father postulates that this Court should consider the child support payments that

he made during his incarceration but prior to the filing of the termination petition.

However, Father cites no authority allowing this Court to consider payments made

outside the determinative period set forth in the statute. We therefore conclude that the

evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court's finding, by clear and convincing

evidence, that the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to support was proven as to

Father.

B. Persistence of Conditions

The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence supporting the ground of

persistence of the conditions that led to removal of the Children from Father's home or

physical or legal custody. Regarding this statutory ground, Tennessee Code Annotated §

36-1-113(g)(3) (2021) provides:

(A) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal

custody of a parent or guardian for a period of six (6) months by a

court order entered at any stage of proceedings in which a petition

has been filed in the juvenile court alleging that a child is a

dependent and neglected child, and:

(i) The conditions that led to the child's removal still persist,

preventing the child's safe return to the care of the parent or

guardian, or other conditions exist that, in all reasonable

probability, would cause the child to be subjected to further

abuse or neglect, preventing the child's safe return to the care

of the parent or guardian;

(ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be

remedied at an early date so that the child can be safely

returned to the parent or guardian in the near future; and

(iii) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child

relationship greatly diminishes the child's chances of early

integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home;

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(B) The six (6) months must accrue on or before the first date the

termination of parental rights petition is set to be heard[.]

In its final order, the trial court determined as follows concerning this ground:

The Court concludes by clear and convincing evidence that the

children have been removed from the home or the physical or legal custody

of [Mother] since May 10, 2018, as the result of a Petition filed in Juvenile

Court alleging that the children were dependent and neglected. At the time

of this hearing, the children have been removed for a period greater than six

months. The Court further concludes that conditions continue to exist in

the home which prevent the children's return to Mother and Father.

The Order which precipitated the removal of the children alleged

that the children were dependent and neglected based upon drug exposed

children. The conditions which led to the removal still persist.

Therefore, the Court finds that DCS has proven, by clear and

convincing evidence, the ground of persistent conditions against [Mother

and Father].

The evidence presented at trial preponderates in favor of these findings and

determinations. Following the filing of a dependency and neglect petition, the Children

were removed from the legal custody of Father and Mother on May 10, 2018, and placed

in the custody of DCS. By the time the termination trial was conducted, the Children had

been in DCS custody for almost three years.

The conditions leading to the Children's removal included domestic violence in

the home, drug use by the parents, and educational neglect concerning Addisyn. By the

time of trial, Father had not completed a treatment program for his substance abuse

issues. Father had also failed to complete any domestic violence program. Instead,

Father was reincarcerated in February 2019 and remained incarcerated at the time of trial.

Based on Father's incarceration and his lack of progress in dealing with his

substance abuse and mental health issues, it is unlikely that the Children could be safely

returned to Father in the near future. Father admitted as much during his trial testimony.

As such, continuation of the parent/child relationship would greatly diminish the

Children's chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home. The

proof demonstrated that the Children were flourishing in the home of their foster parents

("Foster Parents”), who loved the Children and wished to adopt them.

- 15 -

Predicated upon the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that the trial court

properly determined that clear and convincing evidence supported the statutory ground of

persistence of the conditions leading to removal.

C. Substantial Noncompliance with Permanency Plan Requirements

The trial court also determined that clear and convincing evidence supported the

ground of substantial noncompliance by Father "with the statement of responsibilities in a

permanency plan,” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(2) (2021). In

its order, the trial court specifically found:

There was uncontroverted testimony from FSW Gentry that the

Department prepared multiple permanency plans for [Father and Mother],

and that the responsibilities for [Father and Mother] were consistent on the

plans. This Court has reviewed the plans, and made findings by

preponderance of evidence during the dependency case that the

requirements for [Father and Mother] were reasonable, reasonably related

to the reasons for foster care, and that the plans were in the children's best

interests. This Court makes the same finding today by clear and convincing

evidence and further finds that had [Father and Mother] cooperated with the

plans, it would have addressed the reasons for which the children w[ere] in

DCS custody.

The Court presented termination criterion provided on July 19, 2018.

Specifically, Mother testified she understood failure to comply with the

permanency plan could result in termination of parental rights.

[Father] testified that he withheld his release of information because

that was the only power he had, indicating he understood his obligations

under the Permanency Plan and willfully failed to comply. [Father]

participated in many Child Family Team Meetings. He testified that based

on his diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, he has difficulty

handling conflict and requested all communication be directed to his

attorney on June 25, 2019.

The Court finds neither Mother or Father successfully complied with

their permanency plans. At this time, Father is incarcerated for his

continued drug use. . . . Therefore, the Court finds that DCS has proven, by

clear and convincing evidence, the ground of substantial noncompliance

with the permanency plans against [Father and Mother].

- 16 -

Based upon our thorough review of the evidence presented in this matter, we agree with

the trial court's findings and conclusions concerning this statutory ground as pertinent to

Father.

In the initial permanency plan, DCS clearly set forth specific requirements for

Father's compliance with the permanency plan, including: (1) obtaining safe and stable

housing and maintaining such housing for at least four months, (2) providing a

transportation plan to DCS, (3) attending and completing the Batterer Intervention

Program, (4) participating in individual and family therapy, (5) obtaining a mental health

assessment, (6) signing a release so that DCS could obtain Father's mental health records

from the VA, (7) obtaining an alcohol/drug assessment and following all

recommendations, (8) submitting to and passing random drug screens, (9) providing a list

of all prescribed medications and taking those medications as prescribed, and (10)

abiding by the rules of his probation and avoiding new criminal charges. These

requirements were also incorporated into subsequent plans.

Father acknowledged at trial that he was aware of the permanency plans'

requirements. However, Father made little to no progress toward the requirements during

the three-year period that the Children remained in DCS custody. Although Father was

incarcerated during a portion of that period, thereby limiting his available resources, the

evidence demonstrated that during the nine-month period following the Children's

removal and preceding Father's incarceration, he completed none of the action steps

required by the permanency plan. He failed to establish and maintain a stable home,

failed to complete the Batterer Intervention Program, failed to address his mental health

needs or substance abuse issues, and ultimately had his probation revoked. As such, we

conclude that the trial court properly determined that clear and convincing evidence

supported the statutory ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan

requirements.

D. Failure to Manifest a Willingness to Assume Legal and Physical Custody of

or Financial Responsibility for the Children

The trial court determined that DCS presented clear and convincing evidence that

Father had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical

custody of or financial responsibility for the Children. Regarding this statutory ground,

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(14) (2021) provides:

A parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability

and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or

financial responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person's

legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the

physical or psychological welfare of the child[.]

- 17 -

To prove this ground, DCS was required to show by clear and convincing evidence that

(1) Father failed to manifest either an ability or willingness to assume custody or

financial responsibility of the Children and (2) returning the Children to Father's custody

would pose a risk of substantial harm to the Children's welfare. In re Neveah M., 614

S.W.3d 659, 674, 677 (Tenn. 2020); In re Jeremiah S., No. W2019-00610-COA-R3-PT,

2020 WL 1951880, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2020) ("Under this ground for

termination, the petitioner must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence.”).

In its July 2, 2021 order, the trial court found as follows concerning this statutory

ground:

The Court finds that [Father and Mother] have failed to manifest, by

act or omission, an ability and a willingness to personally assume legal and

physical custody of the children. There was uncontroverted proof that

[Mother] has engaged in acts or omissions that show her failure to manifest

an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody

of the children, despite knowing that the children are in foster care, and

each has chosen not to engage in services with the Department to change

their situations so they could regain custody of the children. [Father and

Mother] have not substantially completed any requirement of the

permanency plans, including maintaining meaningful sobriety or obtaining

a suitable home.

The Court finds that [Father and Mother] have failed to manifest, by

act or omission, an ability and a willingness to personally assume financial

responsibility of the children, as demonstrated by their failures to provide

any support for the children.

The Court further finds that placing the children in [Father's and

Mother's] legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm

to the physical or psychological welfare of the children. In addition to the

lack of progress, failure to complete any task on the permanency plan, and

continued criminal activity, there was uncontroverted testimony from

Brandee Lancaster of Junior's House, Lisa Fisher and Foster Mother that

the children are doing well in their foster home, and that it would be

detrimental to the children to be moved. [The foster mother] testified that

Coletyn does not have any type of relationship with [Father and Mother]

and doesn't even know who they are. The children appear healthy and well

cared for. [Foster Parents] are committed to the children and want to adopt

them. Based on photographs, the children interact well with each other and

other family.

- 18 -

The Court finds that the current placement with [Foster Parents]

supports the children's emotional, psychological and medical needs. It is

this Court's opinion that the children's relationship with [Foster Parents] is

a meaningful family relationship and it would be detrimental to the children

to disturb this bond.

(Footnote omitted.) The evidence supports these findings as pertinent to Father.

At the time of trial, Father was incarcerated. No evidence was presented

concerning Father's projected release date. Father also had not sufficiently addressed his

substance abuse, domestic violence, or mental health issues. Father presented no proof

demonstrating that he would be able to provide a safe and stable home for the Children

even if he were not incarcerated. As such, Father had no ability to assume custody of the

Children.

Although DCS needed to prove only Father's failure to manifest an ability or his

failure to manifest a willingness as it relates to this ground, we likewise conclude that

Father also lacked the willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial

responsibility for the Children. See In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d at 677 ("If a person

seeking to terminate parental rights proves by clear and convincing proof that a parent or

guardian has failed to manifest either ability or willingness, then the first prong of the

statute is satisfied.”). We recognize Father's testimony at trial that he loved the Children

and did not want to lose his parental rights. However, as this Court has previously

explained:

When evaluating willingness, we look for more than mere words. Parents

demonstrate willingness by attempting to overcome the obstacles that

prevent them from assuming custody or financial responsibility for the

child.

In re Cynthia P., No. E2018-01937-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 1313237, at *8 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Mar. 22, 2019) (internal citations omitted).

Father's actions spanning the nearly three years that had elapsed since the

Children's removal by the time of trial established that Father had failed to manifest a

willingness to regain custody of the Children. See In re Keilyn O., No. M2017-02386-

COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3208151, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2018) (finding that a

parent had failed to manifest a willingness to assume custody because, inter alia, she

"was incarcerated and had completed virtually none of her plan responsibilities” by the

time of trial); In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280, at *15

(Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018) ("Father's actions, including his continued criminal

activity and his failure to financially support the Child, raise doubt as to Father's actual

willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the Child.”).

- 19 -

Since the Children were removed in May 2018, Father's actions reflected a lack of

concern for the Children and a lack of willingness to assume legal and physical custody

of or financial responsibility for the Children. When Father was not incarcerated, he did

not complete any of the requirements of the permanency plans and failed to address even

the most basic needs of maintaining a stable residence, maintaining contact with DCS,

participating in consistent visitation, and addressing his substance abuse and mental

health issues. Instead, Father continued to use illicit drugs and refused to cooperate with

DCS at every turn. Father's actions evinced that he was not willing to overcome major

obstacles to regaining custody. We therefore determine that the evidence supported the

trial court's findings concerning Father's failure to manifest an ability and willingness to

personally assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the

Children.

Moreover, we further determine that the evidence preponderated in favor of the

trial court's finding that placing the Children in Father's legal and physical custody

would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the

Children. As the trial court noted, in addition to Father's lack of progress toward

providing a safe and stable home for the Children, the evidence was also clear that the

Children were thriving in the care of Foster Parents and that removing them from that

environment would be "devastating.” The proof demonstrated that Addisyn had

completed two years of trauma therapy and had learned to deal with her anger at and fear

of Father, although she still expressed the desire that she not be placed in his custody.

The younger children, who were two years old and ten months old, respectively, at the

time they were removed, had no meaningful bond with Father, and proof was presented

that they did not know who Father was. Multiple witnesses testified that the Children

were happy, healthy, and thriving in the care of Foster Parents, who loved them and

wished to adopt them. By contrast, Father had failed for a period of three years to take

any significant steps toward regaining custody or being able to provide a safe home to

which the Children could return.

Based upon Father's history of mental health issues, violence, and drug use,

placing the Children in his custody would clearly pose a risk of substantial harm to their

physical and psychological welfare. We therefore conclude that the trial court properly

determined that clear and convincing evidence supported the statutory ground of failure

to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial

responsibility for the Children.

V. Best Interest of the Children

When a parent has been found to be unfit by establishment of at least one statutory

ground for termination of parental rights, as here, the interests of parent and child

diverge, and the focus shifts to what is in the child's best interest. In re Audrey S., 182

- 20 -

S.W.3d 838, 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); see also In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523

("The best interests analysis is separate from and subsequent to the determination that

there is clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination.” (quoting In re Angela

E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 254 (Tenn. 2010))). Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i)

provides a list of factors the trial court is to consider when determining if termination of

parental rights is in a child's best interest. This list is not exhaustive, and the statute does

not require the court to find the existence of every factor before concluding that

termination is in a child's best interest. See In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523; In re

Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 ("The relevancy and weight to be given each factor

depends on the unique facts of each case.”). Furthermore, the best interest of a child

must be determined from the child's perspective and not the parent's. White v. Moody,

171 S.W.3d 187, 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

The version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) (Supp. 2020) in effect

when the termination petition was filed in the instant action listed the following factors

for consideration:3

(1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of

circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the

child's best interest to be in the home of the parent or guardian;

(2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting

adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social services

agencies for such duration of time that lasting adjustment does not

reasonably appear possible;

(3) Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular visitation or

other contact with the child;

(4) Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been established

between the parent or guardian and the child;

(5) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely

to have on the child's emotional, psychological and medical

condition;



3 Effective April 22, 2021, the General Assembly has amended Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i)

by deleting the previous subsection in its entirety and substituting a new subsection providing, inter alia,

twenty factors to be considered in determining a child's best interest in a case involving termination of

parental rights. See 2021 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 190 § 1 (S.B. 205). However, because the termination

petition in this case was filed prior to the effective date of the amendment, the statutory best interest

factors provided in the prior version of the statute are applicable here. See, e.g., In re Braxton M., 531

S.W.3d at 732.

- 21 -

(6) Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing with the

parent or guardian, has shown brutality, physical, sexual, emotional

or psychological abuse, or neglect toward the child, or another child

or adult in the family or household;

(7) Whether the physical environment of the parent's or guardian's

home is healthy and safe, whether there is criminal activity in the

home, or whether there is such use of alcohol, controlled substances

or controlled substance analogues as may render the parent or

guardian consistently unable to care for the child in a safe and stable

manner;

(8) Whether the parent's or guardian's mental and/or emotional status

would be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent or guardian

from effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision for

the child; or

(9) Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support consistent

with the child support guidelines promulgated by the department

pursuant to § 36-5-101.

As our Supreme Court has instructed regarding the best interest analysis:

"The best interests analysis is separate from and subsequent to the

determination that there is clear and convincing evidence of grounds for

termination.” In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d [240,] 254 [(Tenn. 2010)].

When conducting the best interests analysis, courts must consider

nine statutory factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-

113(i). These statutory factors are illustrative, not exclusive, and any party

to the termination proceeding is free to offer proof of any other factor

relevant to the best interests analysis. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at

523 (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)).

Facts considered in the best interests analysis must be proven by "a

preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.” In

re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d [533,] 555 [(Tenn. 2015)] (citing In re Audrey

S., 182 S.W.3d at 861). "After making the underlying factual findings, the

trial court should then consider the combined weight of those facts to

determine whether they amount to clear and convincing evidence that

termination is in the child's best interest[s].” Id. When considering these

statutory factors, courts must remember that "[t]he child's best interests

[are] viewed from the child's, rather than the parent's, perspective.” In re

Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. Indeed, "[a] focus on the perspective of the

- 22 -

child is the common theme” evident in all of the statutory factors. Id.

"[W]hen the best interests of the child and those of the adults are in

conflict, such conflict shall always be resolved to favor the rights and the

best interests of the child. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d) (2017).

Ascertaining a child's best interests involves more than a "rote

examination” of the statutory factors. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878.

And the best interests analysis consists of more than tallying the number of

statutory factors weighing in favor of or against termination. White v.

Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Rather, the facts

and circumstances of each unique case dictate how weighty and relevant

each statutory factor is in the context of the case. See In re Audrey S., 182

S.W.3d at 878. Simply put, the best interests analysis is and must remain a

factually intensive undertaking, so as to ensure that every parent receives

individualized consideration before fundamental parental rights are

terminated. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523. "[D]epending upon

the circumstances of a particular child and a particular parent, the

consideration of one factor may very well dictate the outcome of the

analysis.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (citing White v. Moody, 171

S.W.3d at 194). But this does not mean that a court is relieved of the

obligation of considering all the factors and all the proof. Even if the

circumstances of a particular case ultimately result in the court ascribing

more weight—even outcome determinative weight—to a particular

statutory factor, the court must consider all of the statutory factors, as well

as any other relevant proof any party offers.

In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681-82 (Tenn. 2017).

In considering the best interest factors, the trial court found concerning both

parents:

The Court concludes that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(2) is

present in that [Mother] has not made such an adjustment of circumstance,

conduct or conditions as to make it safe and in the children's best interest to

be in her home despite reasonable efforts by available social service

agencies for such duration of time that lasting adjustment does not

reasonabl[y] appear possible. [Father] is currently incarcerated; therefore,

[Father] has not made such an adjustment of circumstance, conduct or

conditions as to make it safe and in the children's best interest to be in his

home despite reasonable efforts by available social service agencies for

such duration of time that lasting adjustment does not reasonabl[y] appear

possible.

- 23 -

There was uncontroverted testimony from FSW Gentry and Team

Leader Fisher that the Department attempted to assist [Mother] to remedy

the situation that brought the children into foster care, appropriate referrals

were made and utilized. Nonetheless, [Mother] has not complied with

those services, and as a result she has not been successful in maintaining

her sobriety or obtaining the security and stability necessary to support the

children. The Court is truly encouraged by the progress shown by Mother

in the last few months; nonetheless, her significant delay in seeking

treatment and achieving sobriety was of unreasonable duration. Therefore,

the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of termination.

The Court finds that § 36-1-113(i)(4) is present in that there is no

meaningful relationship between the parents and the children. The

testimony of Brandee Lancaster demonstrated the significant trauma

endured by this family. The relationship with the birth parents, particularly

for Addisyn, is a painful one. This factor weighs heavily in favor of

termination.

The Court finds that . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(5) is present

in that a change of caregivers at this stage of the children's lives would

have a detrimental effect on the children. The Court finds that any change

of caregivers resulting in a return to Mother would have a detrimental effect

on the children as there was uncontroverted testimony from [Mother] that

she does not currently have a suitable home and [Father] is currently

incarcerated and otherwise not stable. Despite completing alcohol and drug

treatment and maintaining sobriety recently, Mother's delay in achieving

her stability and the fragility of her housing situation does not make

reuniting with her children safe. The Court further finds that a change of

caregivers would also be detrimental to the children if they were to leave

[Foster Parents'] home, which the Court finds to be the only meaningful

relationships that the children have, and that the children are extremely

well-cared for in [Foster Parents'] home. This factor weighs in favor of

termination.

The Court finds that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(6) is present in

that [Mother] has shown neglect towards the children as evidenced by her

exposure of the children to drug use, and by failing to provide them a

suitable home. This factor weighs in favor of termination.

The Court finds that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(7) is present in

that the physical environment of [Mother's] home is not healthy and safe

for the children. The Court finds that [the paternal grandmother's] home

does not offer sufficient support for the children based on their need for

- 24 -

protection from further trauma; therefore, the Court cannot consider that

Mother has a physical environment that is healthy and safe for the children.

Further, Mother has not demonstrated an ability to protect the children from

abusive circumstances and inappropriate household members. This factor

weighs in favor of termination.

Further, the Court concludes that termination of [Mother's] parental

rights is in the best interests of the children because [Mother] has received

appropriate referrals and appropriate treatment, yet she has been unable to

change her circumstances to provide stability for the children. Although

she is in a much stronger position than she was six months ago, she is still

not in a position to parent.

Further, the Court concludes that termination of [Father's] parental

rights is in the best interests of the children because [Father] has received

appropriate referrals and appropriate treatment, yet he has been unable to

change his circumstances to provide stability for the children.

The court also noted that evidence demonstrated that the Children had developed a strong

bond with Foster Parents, who wished to adopt the Children.

Upon our thorough review of the evidence presented in this matter, we determine

that the trial court's findings concerning the statutory best interest factors are supported

by a preponderance of the evidence. With regard to the first factor, Father had made no

adjustment to his circumstances, conduct, or conditions by the time of trial so as to make

it safe or in the Children's best interest to be in his home. Father was incarcerated and

had failed to comply with the permanency plan requirements, which were reasonably

related to remedying the conditions leading to the Children's removal. Likewise, with

regard to the second factor, Father had failed to effect a lasting change despite reasonable

efforts by DCS to assist him. Considering especially that three years had passed in the

interim, we find it unlikely that change would occur.

Concerning the third factor, Father had not maintained consistent visitation with

the Children, having only utilized one-third of the hours offered to him before he was

reincarcerated. Because of this, Father had no meaningful relationship with the Children

in accordance with factor four. The evidence demonstrated that Addisyn had expressed a

continuing fear of Father and that the younger children did not know him.

With regard to the fifth factor, multiple witnesses testified that removing the

Children from Foster Parents' home would be detrimental to their emotional and

psychological health. The Children were thriving with Foster Parents, had bonded with

them as a family, and referred to Foster Parents as "Mom” and "Dad.” The Children

were happy, and Addisyn was performing well in school. The Children's mental and

- 25 -

physical health had improved since being placed with Foster Parents. Significant

evidence existed demonstrating that removing the Children from that home would have a

devastating impact on them. The Children's foster mother, who was also their maternal

aunt, described the Children as "energetic and fun” and explained that they had overcome

the trauma to which Father had subjected them through therapy and a loving and stable

environment. Addisyn's therapist described her relationship with Foster Parents as

loving and healthy.

Respecting factor six, Father had committed domestic violence toward Mother

while the Children were present, resulting in trauma to the Children. Mother testified at

trial concerning Father's violent acts toward her, which included choking her until she

blacked out and holding a knife to her throat. Mother testified that one episode of

violence became so prolonged and traumatic that she asked Father to allow her to lock

the Children in a closet so they would no longer be forced to witness it. Moreover, when

the Children lived with Father, they were also subjected to his illicit drug use, which

would impact consideration of factor seven. With regard to factor eight, Father's mental

health issues also had been detrimental to the Children and, inasmuch as Father had never

sufficiently addressed those issues, would prevent Father from effectively parenting the

Children in the future. Father's mental health appeared to be reflected in his somewhat

bizarre trial testimony, wherein he acknowledged telepathic communications and

described himself as being held "hostage” and the victim of "domestic terrorism.”

Finally, concerning factor nine, Father failed to pay consistent child support for

the Children, having tendered only one payment during the determinative period even

though he received regular income via his disability benefits. In sum, based on our

careful review of the evidence, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supported

the trial court's determination that termination of Father's parental rights was in the best interest of the Children. Con

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s judgment terminating

Father’s parental rights to the Children should be affirmed in its entirety. Costs on appeal are assessed to the appellant, Keith P. This case is remanded to the trial court for collection of costs assessed below.