Daniel Barge v. Earl and Vera Sadler

Daniel B. Barge III filed a petition seeking to condemn a portion of Earl and Vera Sadler’s property
for use as an easement for access to his landlocked property. The trial court found that Barge already
enjoyed an easement by implication across John Sonday’s property; thus, he could not show, as
required by the condemnation statute, that he had no other access to a public road. The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and held that the Sadler property was the proper location
for an easement to Barge’s land. The Sadlers make two contentions on appeal: (1) that the Court
of Appeals erred in designating the property to be burdened by the easement; and (2) that Barge
failed to join all adjoining landowners as indispensable parties defendant. We hold that the jury of
view, not the intermediate appellate court, is the proper body to determine the location of an
easement granted pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 54-14-101(a)(1) (Supp 2000). We further hold that
those owning property upon which an easement could practically be constructed should be named
as parties defendant. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that the
property is landlocked and reverse the judgment locating the easement; in all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the trial court for the appointment of a jury of view
and other proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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Court's opinion.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed as to its holding that the
easement be located on the Sadler’s property; in all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The
cause is remanded for further proceedings in which the trial court shall require Barge to name as
parties defendant all landowners whose property may provide a useful easement, though the jury of
view shall not thereby be limited in its consideration of all the adjoining property, and for such other
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of the appeal are taxed to Daniel B. Barge III.

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