Diane Marsico, et al. v. Francis Diileo

1 Diane Marsico appeals the judgment entered on January 26, 2001 by
the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County. In this case we are
called upon to determine whether Section 3321 of the Motor Vehicle Code
pertaining to vehicle right-of-ways applies to vehicles traveling in parking
lots. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that it does not, and we
vacate and remand this matter for a new trial.

2 The relevant facts of this case are as follows: On July 11, 1997, at
approximately 2:00 p.m., Marsico was driving her Chevrolet Geo Metro in
the designated westbound traffic lane in the parking lot of the Viewmont
Mall. Marsico’s daughter was seated in a child’s car seat in the back seat of
the vehicle. As Marsico was traveling through an intersection in the parking
lot, Francis DiBileo, who was operating her vehicle in the designated southbound traffic lane, proceeded through the same intersection, colliding
with the passenger side door of Marsico’s vehicle.

3 On October 16, 1998, Marsico, in her own right and as guardian of her
daughter, filed a negligence action against DiBileo, seeking compensatory
damages for the injuries she and her daughter sustained in the accident. At
the conclusion of a two-day trial, the trial court instructed the jury that when
two vehicles approach or enter an intersection from different highways at
approximately the same time and there is no controlling traffic device, under
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3321, the driver of the vehicle on the left, in this case
Marsico, shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right. The trial
court further instructed the jury that under Pennsylvania law, a parking lot is
considered a trafficway or highway. Ultimately, the jury determined that
DiBileo was not negligent, and entered a verdict in her favor. Marsico filed a
motion for a new trial; however, the trial court failed to enter an order within
120 days. Thereafter, DiBileo filed a praecipe for entry of judgment, and on
January 26, 2001, judgment was entered. On February 22, 2001, Marsico
filed a notice of appeal from the entry of judgment. On March 6, 2001, the
trial court denied the parties’ motions for post-trial relief.

4 We first note that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reexamined the
appropriate standard of review of a motion for a new trial at both the trial
court and appellate levels in Harman ex rel. Harman v. Borah, 562 Pa.
455, 756 A.2d 1116 (2000). The Court explained that the trial court must follow a two-step process in responding to a request for a new trial. The
trial court first must determine whether a factual, legal or discretionary
mistake was made at trial. Id. at 467, 756 A.2d at 1122. If the trial court
determines that one or more mistakes were made, it must then evaluate
whether the mistake provided a sufficient basis for granting a new trial. Id.
Moreover, the Court noted that “[a] new trial is not warranted merely
because some irregularity occurred during the trial or another trial judge
would have ruled differently; the moving party must demonstrate to the trial
court that he or she has suffered prejudice from the mistake.” Id. (citations
omitted).

5 The Court then set forth an additional two-step analysis for appellate
review of a trial court’s determination to grant or deny 1 a new trial. First,
the appellate court must examine the decision of the trial court to determine
whether it agrees that a mistake was or was not made. Id. In doing so, the
Court noted that the appellate court must apply the appropriate standard of
review. If the alleged mistake involved an error of law, the appellate court
must scrutinize for legal error. Id. at 468, 756 A.2d at 1123. If the alleged
mistake at trial involved a discretionary act, the appellate court must review
for an abuse of discretion. Id. The Court reiterated that a trial court abuses
its discretion by rendering a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, or has failed to apply the law, or was motivated by
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. Id. at 469, 756 A.2d at 1123 (citations
omitted).

6 If the appellate court agrees with the trial court’s determination that
there were no prejudicial mistakes at trial, then a decision by the trial court
to deny a new trial must stand and we need not reach the second prong of
the analysis. If the appellate court discerns that a mistake was made at
trial, however, it must analyze whether the trial court abused its discretion
in ruling on the motion for a new trial. Id. at 468-69, 756 A.2d at 1123.

7 In the present case, the trial court denied Marsico’s motion for a new
trial on the basis of erroneous jury instructions. On appeal, therefore, this
Court must examine the specific allegations of error to determine whether
there indeed were mistakes made at trial. If we determine that there were,
we must then determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the motion for a new trial.

8 Marsico argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her
motion for a new trial because the trial court’s instruction regarding Section
3321 was erroneous, in that Section 3321 is inapplicable because the
accident occurred in a parking lot rather than on two intersecting highways.
Marsico further contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that
a parking lot is a highway under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102. We review challenges
to jury instructions “to determine if the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. We will not grant a new trial because of an
erroneous jury instruction unless the jury charge in its entirety was unclear,
inadequate, or tended to mislead or confuse the jury.” Fragale v.
Brigham, 741 A.2d 788, 790 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citations omitted).
Further, “a trial judge has wide latitude in his or her choice of language
when charging a jury, provided always that the court fully and adequately
conveys the applicable law.” Wilson v. Anderson, 420 Pa. Super. 169,
173, 616 A.2d 34, 36 (Pa. Super. 1992). In the instant case, we conclude
that the trial court’s instructions to the jury were erroneous and,
accordingly, that a new trial is warranted.

9 Section 3321 provides: “When two vehicles approach or enter an
intersection from different highways at approximately the same time, the
driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on
the right.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3321(a). A “highway” is defined under Section
102 as:

The entire width between the boundary lines of every way
publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of
the public for purposes of vehicular travel. The term includes a
roadway open to the use of the public for vehicular travel on
grounds of a college or university or public or private school or
public or historical park.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102.

10 The trial court granted DiBileo’s request for a jury instruction regarding
Section 3321 on the basis that “there’s case law showing that a parking lot
aisle is a traffic or highway.” (N.T. Trial, 9/13/00, at 3.) However, while this Court previously has determined that a parking lot is a trafficway for the
purpose of a violation of Section 3731, relating to the offense of driving
under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”),2 we are unaware of any prior case
wherein we held that a parking lot was a “highway” as defined in Section
102. Indeed, we have held the contrary.

11 For example, in Commonwealth v. Cozzone, 406 Pa. Super. 42, 593
A.2d 860 (Pa. Super. 1991), the appellant was charged with and convicted
of DUI after he lost control of his vehicle and struck two parked cars and a
mailbox while in the parking lot of a residential condominium complex. On
appeal, the appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
conviction because the Commonwealth had failed to prove that he operated
his vehicle on a highway or trafficway. Although this Court ultimately
determined that the parking lot in which the accident occurred was a
trafficway for the purpose of Section 3101, we explained that “[t]he
evidence in this case is clear that the parking lot on which appellant had his
accident was not a publicly maintained highway.” Id. at 862.

12 This Court’s classification of a parking lot as a trafficway in cases
involving DUI charges does not support the trial court’s jury instruction in
the instant case. Under Section 3101(b), “[t]he provisions of Subchapter B
of Chapter 37 (relating to serious traffic offenses) shall apply upon highways
and trafficways throughout this Commonwealth.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101(b).
A DUI offense under Section 3731 is specifically referenced as a serious
traffic offense under Section 3101(b). 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101(b), n.1. Thus,
the language of Section 3101(b) clearly provides that the provisions of
Chapter 37 relating to DUI offenses apply to offenses committed on
highways or trafficways.

13 However, Section 3321, the relevant statute in the instant case, on its
face is limited to vehicles approaching an intersection from a highway.
Section 3321 is not designated as a “serious traffic offense” under Section
3101(b), and its application is not extended to trafficways by any other
provision of the Vehicle Code. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101(a) (“the provisions
of this part relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the
operation of vehicles upon highways except where a different place is
specifically referred to in a particular provision.”) We further note that
application of Section 3321 to vehicles traveling in parking lots would lead to
absurd results. Such an application would require a vehicle traveling on the
main road in a parking lot to stop and yield to all traffic at every “feeder”
lane on the right side.

14 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s instructions
to the jury were erroneous. Furthermore, the trial court’s instructions were
misleading to the extent the jury was told that Marsico had a duty to yield to
DiBileo’s vehicle at the intersection in the parking lot. Thus, it was error for
the trial court to deny Marsico’s motion for a new trial. See Fragale,
supra. For this reason, we are constrained to reverse the judgment entered
in favor of DiBileo, and remand this matter for a new trial.

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¶ 15 Judgment vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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