Rosling v. State Of Montana

Jared Rosling appeals the order of the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and

Clark County, dismissing with prejudice his second petition for postconviction relief.

Rosling’s convictions and sentences for deliberate homicide, aggravated kidnapping,

aggravated burglary, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, and criminal

possession of dangerous drugs were upheld by this Court in State v. Rosling,

2008MT62, 342 Mont. 1, 180 P.3d 1102. We affirmed the dismissal of his first petition

for postconviction relief in Rosling v. State, 2012 MT 179, 366Mont. 50, 285 P.3d 486.

Rosling’s federal habeas corpus petition also was denied in Rosling v. Kirkegard,

2014U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22498, No. CV 12-161-M-DLC-JCL, at *8-9 (D. Mont. Feb. 21,

2014). Here, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Rosling’s second petition for

postconviction relief.

¶3 This Court reviews a district court’s denial of a petition for postconviction relief to

determine whether the district court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether

its conclusions of law are correct. Marble v. State, 2015 MT 242, ¶ 13, 380 Mont. 366,

355P.3d 742. A petitioner must raise all grounds for relief in the original or amended

original petition. Section 46-21-105(1)(a), MCA. The petition must “identify all facts

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supporting the grounds for relief . . . and have attached affidavits . . . or other evidence

establishing the existence of those facts.” Section46-21-104(1)(c), MCA. A district

court must dismiss a second or subsequent petition that raises grounds that

reasonablycould have been raised in the original or amended original petition.

Section46-21-105(1)(b), MCA.

¶4 Rosling’s second petition fails to comply with our postconviction relief statutes.

Rosling alleges that a material witness has recanted his testimony, but he offers no

affidavit or other substantive evidence in support of this allegation. Rosling’s second

petition, like his first petition, alleges ineffective assistance of his trial counsel for not

testing and presenting at trial a latent palm print taken from the crime scene. Under

§46-21-105(1)(b), MCA, Rosling cannot raise this claim again. Finally, Rosling does

not cite any “newly discovered evidence” to satisfy §46-21-102(2), MCA. The District

Court correctly dismissed Rosling’s petition.

We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of

our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion

of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear

application of applicable standards of review. The District Court’s interpretation and

application of the law were correct, and its findings of fact are not clearly erroneous.

Affirmed.