STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA V. ALAN HOLLAND GRIFFIN

The evidence presented at trial tended to show the following: One night in

September 2016, multiple officers responded to a report of a suspicious truck parked

on the road in a residential neighborhood. When the initial officer arrived at the

scene, Defendant was standing next to the truck and talking on his cell phone.

Defendant acknowledged the officer’s presence, quickly completed his phone call, and

then approached the officer. The officer questioned Defendant and obtained

Defendant’s license information, but remained with the Defendant until two

additional officers arrived on the scene.

Once the other officers arrived, the initial officer took Defendant’s information

back to his car and conducted a routine license check. The second officer engaged

Defendant in conversation while the third officer circled Defendant’s truck with a

flashlight. The third officer saw a rolled-up dollar bill through the vehicle’s window,

and, based upon experience and training, believed it to have been used in drug

related activity.

The officers requested consent to search the vehicle, and Defendant refused.

When questioned about the currency, Defendant stated he had used the currency in

conjunction with an apple to smoke marijuana, confirming the officer’s suspicions.

Defendant once again refused to give the officers his consent to search the vehicle.

Defendant then informed the officers that he had marijuana in the truck. Then,

without Defendant’s consent, the officers searched the vehicle and found marijuana.

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At trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the

search, alleging the officers seized him without reasonable suspicion. The trial court

denied the motion, and Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty while specifically

reserving the right to appeal the judge’s ruling on his motion to suppress.

II. Analysis

In his first argument, Defendant contends that the trial court should have

granted his motion to suppress, alleging that the officers seized him without

reasonable suspicion. Defendant is not challenging the actual search of his vehicle,

as our Supreme Court has held “a search of an automobile without a warrant is

constitutionally permissible if there is probable cause to make the search.” State v.

Ratliff, 281 N.C. 397, 403, 189 S.E.2d 179, 182 (1972). Here, the officer had probable

cause to engage in the non-consensual search based on Defendant’s admissions

concerning the presence of marijuana in his vehicle and his use of the rolled-up

currency to ingest drugs. Rather, Defendant’s arguments concern what happened

leading up to the search; specifically, he contends that he was unlawfully seized when

he made the statements regarding the marijuana and the rolled-up currency to the

officers. We disagree.

In reviewing the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, this Court is limited

to determining “whether competent evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact

and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” State v. Biber, 365

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N.C. 162, 167-68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011). The trial court’s findings of fact “are

conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence,” even in the presence of

conflicting evidence. State v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 498, 532 S.E.2d 496, 501

(2000). This Court reviews the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo, “consider[ing]

the matter anew and freely substitut[ing] its own judgment for that of the lower

tribunal.” Biber, 365 N.C. at 168, 712 S.E.2d at 878.

The issue at hand is whether the Defendant was unlawfully seized. The Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the “right of the people to be

secure in their persons . . . and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]”

U.S. Const. amend. IV. To ascertain whether a seizure occurred, we consider

“whether under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would feel that

he was not free to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter.”

State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 142, 446 S.E.2d 579, 586 (1994) (citing Florida v.

Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-38 (1991)).

The Constitution does not protect against law enforcement officers merely

approaching an individual in a public place. State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203, 208, 195

S.E.2d 502, 506 (1973). Neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause is required

to do so. Brooks, 337 N.C. at 142, 446 S.E.2d at 586. When no coercion nor detention

is involved, communication between officers and citizens does not implicate the

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Fourth Amendment. State v. Sugg, 61 N.C. App. 106, 109, 300 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1983)

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968)).

In this case, the trial court’s findings support its conclusion that Defendant

was not seized when the initial officer approached Defendant and engaged him in

conversation. The officer did not employ his siren nor his lights in approaching

Defendant, and he allowed Defendant to finish his phone call before asking questions.

Defendant was standing outside of his vehicle on the side of the road when the officer

approached. Defendant and the initial officer talked for as long as ten minutes before

the other officers arrived, but at no point did the officer convey by words or actions

that Defendant was not free to leave.

Further, the trial court’s findings support its conclusion that Defendant was

not seized when the two other officers arrived, stood with Defendant, and looked into

Defendant’s vehicle with a flashlight. See Brooks, 337 N.C. at 144, 446 S.E.2d at 587

(“Officers who lawfully approach a car and look inside with a flashlight do not conduct

a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”).

We note that after spotting the rolled-up currency inside the car, the officers

requested Defendant’s consent to search his vehicle. When he denied the request, the

officers again asked permission, and did not actually search the truck until

Defendant’s statements gave the officers probable cause. Defendant’s repeated

refusals to allow the officers to search suggest that he felt some amount of control

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over the situation, and free to refuse consent. The officers did not use any show of

force or use coercive language during their interaction with Defendant, and the

marijuana was not discovered until Defendant admitted that it may be in the car,

giving the officers probable cause to search the vehicle.

The trial court further found that when Defendant volunteered that he had

marijuana in his truck, the encounter remained consensual. We conclude that the

trial court’s determination is supported by its findings. The trial court also

determined the officers had reasonable suspicion at this point of the encounter, based

on the discovery of the rolled-up currency and the discovery of Defendant’s drug

history by the officer running his record.

In his second argument, Defendant contends that there is a material conflict

of evidence which the trial court failed to address. Specifically, Defendant states that

there was evidence that the initial officer took his actual license to run a record check,

not just his information, and that he did not feel free to terminate the encounter

because the initial officer indeed did have his license. It is true that a seizure occurs

when the situation is such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. State

v. Icard, 363 N.C. 303, 308, 677 S.E.2d 822, 826 (2009). However, in light of the

evidence, we find Defendant’s argument unpersuasive.

There was no evidence presented that the initial officer took Defendant’s

license. Defendant never presented any such evidence. The initial officer testified

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that he took Defendant’s information, stating that he could not remember if he had

taken Defendant’s identification card or if he simply wrote down the information

given to him by Defendant. The police footage presented, though, does not show the

officer taking, handling, nor returning a license during the encounter. In its order,

the trial court did make a finding that Defendant voluntarily gave his “information”

to Defendant. This argument is overruled.

Defendant was not seized during the initial encounter with the officers and

was not unlawfully seized when he volunteered that he had marijuana in his truck. Further, the trial court properly found that the officer only took down Defendant’s “information” and did not otherwise need to make a finding whether the officer took control of Defendant’s license during the encounter. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.