State Of Washngton v. Leonard

-Matthew Leonard was convicted in 2012 of second degree

felony murder. The superior court imposed a judgment and sentence that included

discretionary legal financial obligations. Division One of the Court of Appeals

affirmed the judgment and sentence on direct appeal in a partially published opinion.

State v. Leonard, 183 Wn. App. 532, 334 P.3d 81 (2014). Among other things, the

Court of Appeals in the unpublished portion of its opinion declined to consider

Leonard's chall~nge to discretionary legal financial obligations because he did not

object to them at sentencing. Leonard filed a petition for review in this court, raising

only the issue of legal financial obligations. The court initially deferred consideration

of the petition pending its decision in State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680

(2015). Blazina is now final, and for the reasons discussed below, the petition for

No. 90897-4 PAGE2

review is granted and this matter is remanded to the superior court for reconsideration

of discretionary legal financial obligations.1

In Blazina, the superior court imposed discretionary legal financial obligations

under RCW 10.01.160 consisting of the costs of appointed counsel. We held that

before the superior court may impose such costs, it must comply with the mandate of

the statute to determine whether the defendant can or will be able to pay these costs by

conducting on the record an individualized inquiry into the defendant's current and

future ability to pay. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d at 838-39; see RCW 10.01.160(3). The

superior court in this case did not impose costs of appointed counsel or other

discretionary costs under RCW 10.01.160. It did, however, impose costs of

incarceration at a rate of $50 per day pursuant to RCW 9.94A.760(2) and the costs of

medical care Leonard received while in jail, finding as to both categories of costs that

Leonard had the means to pay. Clerk's Papers at 157. These costs, like the costs at

issue in Blazina, are discretionary. And the statutes allowing imposition of these

categories of costs require individualized inquiries regarding the ability to pay similar

to the statute at issue in Blazina. Requiring an offender to pay costs of incarceration

expressly depends on a determination by the trial court "that the offender, at the time

of sentencing, has the means to pay." RCW 9.94A.760(2). Costs of medical care

received while in jail are expressly not a "cost of prosecution" subject to RCW

10.01.160; rather, they are recoverable under RCW 70.48.130. See RCW

10.01.160(5). But it is implicit in RCW 70.48.130 that the superior must find whether

the defendant has the ability to pay, since the statute provides that "[t]o the extent that

a confined person is unable to be financially responsible for medical care" and is

1 Since we stayed consideration of Leonard's petition for review pending Blazina, Leonard should receive the benefit of that decision. Therefore, consistent with Blazina, we exercise our discretion to address the issue of discretionary legal fmancial obligations even though Leonard did not challenge the obligations at sentencing. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d at 834-35.

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otherwise ineligible for public medical care programs or private insurance coverage,

"the governing unit may obtain reimbursement for the cost of such medical services

from the unit of government whose law enforcement officers initiated the charges on

which the person is being held in jail." RCW 70.48.130(5). And in clarifying that

medical costs are not "costs of prosecution" subject to RCW 10.01.160, the legislature

expressly stated that it intended medical costs "to be the responsibility of the

defendant's insurers and ultimately the defendant based on their ability to pay." LAWS

OF 2008, ch. 318, § 1.

Therefore, the assessment of costs of incarceration and costs of medical care

must be based on an individualized inquiry into the defendant's current and future

ability to pay that is reflected in the record, consistent with the requirements of

Blazina. Here, the record reflects no such inquiry at the sentencing hearing, and the

judgment and sentence form contains only boilerplate findings of ability to pay, which

this court in Blazina held to be inadequate. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d at 838.

Accordingly, the petition for review is granted and this case is remanded to the superior court to reconsider discretionary legal financial obligations consistent with the requirements of Blazina