City of Seattle v. Robert J. May

In 2005, Robert May violated a domestic violence protection



order that prohibited him from contacting his ex-wife. As a result, May was convicted,



under a city of Seattle ordinance, of violating the protection order. May contends that



the order he is charged with violating is invalid and that he lacked notice that violating



the no-contact provision of the order was a criminal offense. The superior court



reversed the municipal court convictions, and the Court of Appeals reversed the



superior court, reinstating the convictions. We affirm the Court of Appeals on



different grounds, concluding that May's first challenge is precluded by the collateral



bar rule and that his second challenge fails in light of State v. Bunker, 169 Wn.2d 571,



238 P.3d 487 (2010).





FACTS



On December 30, 1996, the King County Superior Court issued an amended



order for protection to Desiree Douglass, May's ex-wife.1 In that order, the court



found that May had "committed domestic violence as defined in RCW 26.50.010."



Clerk's Papers (CP) at 16. As a result, the order prohibited May from, among other



things, "having any contact whatsoever, in person or through others, directly or



indirectly with" Douglass. Id. The final paragraph of the order included the following



statement:



THIS ORDER FOR PROTECTION IS PERMANENT þ

If the duration of this order exceeds one year, the court finds that an

order of less than one year will be insufficient to prevent further acts of

domestic violence.



Id. at 17. The check mark is handwritten. The order also plainly advised May that



[v]iolation of the provisions of this order with actual notice of its terms is

[a] criminal offense under chapter 26.50 RCW and RCW 10.31.100 and

will subject a violator to arrest.



. . . .



. . . You have the sole responsibility to avoid or refrain from

violation [of] the order's provisions. Only the court can change the order

upon written application.



Id. May signed the order, indicating receipt of a copy.



In spite of the provisions of the domestic violence protection order clearly



prohibiting "any contact whatsoever," id. at 16, May nonetheless contacted Douglass



several times in 2005 regarding nonemergency matters.2 As a result, May was charged



in the Seattle Municipal Court with four counts of violating the domestic violence



protection order. This prosecution was pursuant to former Seattle Municipal Code



12A.06.180(A) (2000). May was ultimately convicted of two counts of violating a



domestic violence protection order, and the court imposed a deferred two-year



sentence. The superior court subsequently reversed the municipal court, finding that



"[t]he protection order was facially invalid because the language in the last paragraph



of the order . . . is not the finding required by RCW 26.50.060(2)." CP at 98. The



Court of Appeals, in turn, reversed the superior court and reinstated May's conviction.



City of Seattle v. May, 151 Wn. App. 694, 699, 213 P.3d 945 (2009). May petitioned



this court for review, which we granted. City of Seattle v. May, 168 Wn.2d 1006, 226



P.3d 781 (2010).



ISSUES



1. Does the collateral bar rule prohibit May from challenging the validity of the



domestic violence protection order in a prosecution for violation of that order?



2. Does the prosecution of May violate due process because the order failed to



give May fair warning of what conduct is prohibited?





ANALYSIS



A. The Collateral Bar Rule Precludes May's Challenge to the Domestic

Violence Protection Order3



The collateral bar rule prohibits a party from challenging the validity of a court



order in a proceeding for violation of that order. State v. Noah, 103 Wn. App. 29, 46,



9 P.3d 858 (2000); State v. Wright, 273 Conn. 418, 426-28, 870 A.2d 1039 (2005).



An exception exists for orders that are void.4 An order is void only if there is "an



absence of jurisdiction to issue the type of order, to address the subject matter, or to



bind the defendant." Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354 v. Mead Educ. Ass'n, 85 Wn.2d 278,



284, 534 P.2d 561 (1975). However, "[t]alismanic invocation of the phrase 'lack of



jurisdiction'" is insufficient to collaterally attack the court order. Id. at 282. In Mead



School District, the court acknowledged that "[t]echnically, the [issuing] court lacked



jurisdiction." Id. at 281. The court went on, however, to find that the collateral bar



rule precluded a challenge to that order. Id. at 284. For an order to be void, the court



must lack the power to issue the type of order. Id. Provided that such power exists,



any error in issuing an order may not be collaterally attacked. In sum, May can



challenge the validity of the underlying domestic violence protection order only



insofar as he can show that the order is absolutely void; the collateral bar rule



precludes him from arguing that the order is merely erroneous.



May's order is not void. The superior court possessed jurisdiction "to issue the



type of order," id., that is, to issue a permanent domestic violence protection order.



RCW 26.50.020(5) creates such jurisdiction. Any defects within the order simply go



to whether the order was "merely erroneous, however flagrant" and cannot be



collaterally attacked. State ex rel. Ewing v. Morris, 120 Wash. 146, 158, 207 P. 18



(1922); see Noah, 103 Wn. App. at 47 ("A court does not lose jurisdiction by



interpreting the law erroneously."). May contends that his order is invalid because the



issuing court allegedly failed to find that May was likely to resume acts of domestic



violence. This assertion of factual inadequacy does not go to the court's jurisdiction to



issue a permanent domestic violence protection order, and, accordingly, the collateral



bar rule precludes May's challenge.



State v. Miller, 156 Wn.2d 23, 123 P.3d 827 (2005), is entirely consistent with



the collateral bar rule. In Miller, the defendant in a prosecution for violation of a



domestic violence no-contact order, Clay Jason Miller, contended that the validity of



the underlying no-contact order was an element of the crime that the State had to



prove beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. Id. at 25. We held that the validity of the



order, as opposed to its existence, was neither a statutory nor an implied element of



the crime. Id. at 31. Instead, we held that "[t]he court, as part of its gate-keeping



function, should determine as a threshold matter whether the order alleged to be



violated is applicable and will support the crime charged." Id. We then expressly



noted that "[w]e do not suggest that orders may be collaterally attacked after the



alleged violations of the orders. Such challenges should go to the issuing court, not



some other judge." Id. at 31 n.4.



Our discussion of the applicability of orders in Miller was an effort to



harmonize that case with the results in City of Seattle v. Edwards, 87 Wn. App. 305,



941 P.2d 697 (1997), and State v. Marking, 100 Wn. App. 506, 997 P.2d 461 (2000),



both of which were overruled in part by Miller. Miller, 156 Wn.2d at 30-31. In



Edwards, the language in a no-contact order regarding its date of expiration was



ambiguous, and the Court of Appeals construed it to mean that the order expired one



year after its issuance unless the trial court extended the order. 87 Wn. App. at 309.



Because Edwards's charged violation occurred more than one year after issuance of



the no-contact order and no further order extending the order's duration had been



issued, id. at 307, 309, Miller holds that the trial court should have excluded the order



as inapplicable to the charged violation. Similarly, in Marking, the Court of Appeals



confronted a situation in which a no-contact order lacked statutorily required notice



that the no-contact provisions applied even if the contact occurred at the request of the



protected party. 100 Wn. App. at 508 (citing former RCW 10.99.040(4)(d) (1997),



recodified as RCW 10.99.040(4)(b)). The defendant was charged with violation of the



no-contact order following an agreed meeting between the defendant and the protected



party that led to an altercation. Id. at 507. At least arguably, the order failed to give



the defendant notice that contact with consent of the protected party violated the order.



This was an issue that should have been considered by the trial court prior to admitting



the order; if the order failed to give the defendant notice that the charged conduct was



prohibited, the order should have been excluded as inapplicable.



Today, we clarify that, in a proceeding for violation of a court order, the trial



court's gate-keeping role includes excluding orders that are void, orders that are



inapplicable to the crime charged (i.e., the order either does not apply to the defendant



or does not apply to the charged conduct), and orders that cannot be constitutionally



applied to the charged conduct (e.g., orders that fail to give the restrained party fair



warning of the relevant prohibited conduct). Though some language in Miller may be



capable of being read more broadly when viewed in isolation, Miller specifically stated



that no-contact orders issued pursuant to chapter 10.99 RCW may not be "collaterally



attacked after the alleged violations of the orders." 156 Wn.2d at 31 n.4. We see no



reason this should apply differently to orders issued pursuant to chapter 26.50 RCW.



The collateral bar rule precludes challenges to the validity - but not the



applicability - of a court order in a proceeding for violation of such an order except for



challenges to the issuing court's jurisdiction to issue the type of order in question.



Void orders and inapplicable orders are inadmissible in such proceedings.5



In the present case, the court issuing the permanent domestic violence



protection order against May had jurisdiction to issue such orders, and its subject



matter and personal jurisdiction are unchallenged. As such, the order was not void.



The collateral bar rule therefore prohibits May's challenge to the validity of the



underlying protection order.6 If May believes the domestic violence protection order



against him is invalid, RCW 26.50.130(1) permits him to seek modification of that



order by the issuing court.



B. May's Prosecution Does Not Violate Due Process



May next contends that the protection order failed to give him fair notice of



what conduct the order criminalized and, as such, was unconstitutionally vague. Cf.



State v. Watson, 160 Wn.2d 1, 6, 154 P.3d 909 (2007) ("The due process clause of the



Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires statutes to provide



fair notice of the conduct they proscribe."). The essence of May's argument is that he



lacked notice that violation of the no-contact provisions of the protection order could



result in criminal, rather than contempt, penalties. This is so, May argues, because the



notification of criminal penalties in the order of protection cites only chapter 26.50



RCW, which does not criminalize violation of no-contact provisions of domestic



violence protection orders, only the Seattle Municipal Code does so, and the protection



order issued against May does not notify him that he is subject to criminal penalties of



the Seattle Municipal Code. We may assume without deciding that even where the



conduct prohibited by a protection order is clear, failure to indicate that a violation will



result in criminal penalties - as opposed to contempt penalties - gives rise to a



vagueness challenge. Even so, May's argument lacks merit.



The protection order against May states, "Violation of the provisions of this



order with actual notice of its terms is [a] criminal offense under chapter 26.50 RCW



and RCW 10.31.100 and will subject a violator to arrest." CP at 133. May's argument



is premised on the proposition that chapter 26.50 RCW does not criminalize violation



of a no-contact provision of an order of protection. This premise is incorrect in light



of Bunker. In Bunker, this court held that former RCW 26.50.110 (2000), which was



in effect at the time May violated the order of protection, criminalized all violations of





no-contact and protection orders.7 169 Wn.2d at 574, 577 n.2. The Seattle ordinance



under which May was convicted, Seattle Municipal Code 12A.06.180 (2000), is no



broader, but is instead simply the type of "equivalent municipal ordinance" expressly



contemplated by chapter 26.50 RCW. RCW 26.50.020(5). Thus, because May had



notice that violation of the order of protection was a crime under chapter 26.50 RCW,



May had "fair warning of the type of conduct" that was criminal. State v. Wilson, 117



Wn. App. 1, 11, 75 P.3d 573 (2003). Consequently his prosecution did not violate due



process.



* * *



See: http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/index.cfm?fa=opinions.showOpinion&filename=836779MAJ

May made a choice to violate the plain and unambiguous terms of the domestic



violence protection order that prohibited him from contacting his ex-wife. May might



earnestly believe that the order is invalid, but his remedy is to seek modification of the



order by the court that issued it; he is not free to violate the order with impunity. The



collateral bar rule precludes May's challenge to the validity of the domestic violence



protection order. In addition, because May had fair notice that violation of the no-



contact provision of the domestic violence protection order would result in criminal



penalties, his prosecution for such conduct does not violate due process. We affirm



the Court of Appeals.