Lisa C. Anderson v. Department of Workforce Services

¶1 Petitioner Lisa C. Anderson seeks judicial review of a

decision of the Workforce Appeals Board (the Board) determining

that her appeal of the initial decision of the Department of

Workforce Services was untimely and that Anderson failed to

demonstrate good cause for the late filing. This case is before the

court on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition.

¶2 In its December 20, 2013 decision, the Department

determined that Anderson was ineligible for unemployment

Anderson v. Workforce Services

2. Utah Code section 35A-4-406(3)(a) allows a claimant who is

denied unemployment benefits just ten days to appeal the

Department's decision. Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-406(3)(a)

(LexisNexis 2011). We do not determine whether the statutory time

period may be altered by administrative rule because the time for

appeal was calculated under the rule and stated within the

Department's decision, and Anderson failed to file her appeal

within that more generous time period.

20140294-CA 2 2014 UT App 149

benefits because she voluntarily quit her employment. Anderson

received the decision electronically on December 20, 2013. The

decision contained a notice that any appeal must be in writing and

must be received or postmarked on or before January 6, 2014. The

notice also stated that an appeal received or postmarked after

January 6 could be considered only if good cause for the late filing

was established. Anderson did not file her appeal of the initial

Department decision until January 7, 2014.

¶3 The Department's administrative rules permit an appeal

from a Department decision to be filed within fifteen calendar days

from the date listed on the decision. Utah Admin. Code R994-508-

102. "A late appeal may 2 be considered on its merits if it is

determined that the appeal was delayed for good cause.” Id. R994-

508-104. Good cause may be established if the decision is not

received until after the time for appeal has expired and the appeal

is filed within ten days of the decision's receipt. Id. There is no

dispute that Anderson received the decision on December 20, 2013,

within the time for filing an appeal. Accordingly, good cause in this

case would be limited to the circumstances where it is shown either

that the delay in filing the appeal was due to circumstances beyond

Anderson's control or that Anderson delayed filing the appeal due

to circumstances that were compelling and reasonable. Id. "The

ultimate decision as to whether good cause exists is a mixed

question of law and fact.” Armstrong v. Department of Emp't Sec., 834

P.2d 562, 565 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). We apply a deferential standard

of review to a mixed question of fact and law when "the mixed

Anderson v. Workforce Services

20140294-CA 3 2014 UT App 149

finding is not 'law-like' because it does not lend itself to consistent

resolution by a uniform body of appellate precedent” or when it "is

'fact-like' because the [factfinder] is in a superior position to decide

it.” Jex v. Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 40, ¶ 15, 306 P.3d 799 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore accord deference

to the decision that Anderson did not demonstrate good cause for

filing a late appeal.

¶4 Anderson argued before an Administrative Law Judge (the

ALJ) that her appeal was filed late because she did not have access

to a personal computer. The Board adopted the ALJ's finding that

this assertion was not credible given the fact that Anderson filed

weekly benefit claims on January 1 and January 6, 2014, during the

appeal period. In addition, Anderson admitted that computers

were available at the employment center but that she chose not to

wait until a computer became available. The Board also rejected

Anderson's argument that she did not understand how to file an

appeal because the instructions for filing were contained in the

decision, and she also could have mailed or faxed an appeal letter

or delivered a handwritten appeal to a Department employee at the

employment center. The Board concluded that Anderson did not

establish that she was prevented from filing an appeal due to

circumstances beyond her control or for reasons that were

compelling and reasonable and therefore did not establish good

cause for the late filing. Anderson claims for the first time before

this court that her untimely appeal was the result of her injury in

an accident and the death of two family members. Because these

claims were not presented to the ALJ or the Board as a basis for the

late filing of her appeal, we do not consider them.

¶5 We decline to disturb the decision of the Workforce Appeal

Board that Anderson’s appeal of the initial Department decision

was untimely and that she did not establish good cause for the late

appeal.