Julie Tschaggeny v. Milbank Insurance Company

Unknown1 Julie Tschaggeny was injured in an automobile accident
and submitted a claim to Milbank Insurance Company ("Milbank")
under her uninsured motorist policy. Milbank denied coverage,
and Tschaggeny sued for a determination of benefits.1 A jury
awarded a verdict for Tschaggeny, but she argues that the final
judgment amount was inadequate in three separate respects.

2 First, Tschaggeny argues that the trial court erred
both in granting Milbank's motion in limine to exclude from
evidence medical bills that had been written off and in denying
Tschaggeny's motion to reconsider that issue. Second, Tschaggeny
contends that the trial court failed to follow Utah Code section
78-27-44 in its award of prejudgment interest. Third, Tschaggeny
asserts that the trial court erroneously denied her motion to add
to the jury's verdict the amount of the excluded medical bills
and the value of replacement services. Because we find no
reversible error under any of these theories, we affirm the trial
court.

BACKGROUND

3 At the time of her accident, Tschaggeny was covered
under two separate insurance policies--an uninsured motorist
policy with Milbank and a health insurance policy. Because
Tschaggeny's medical expenses were covered under her health
insurance policy, a portion of her medical expenses were written
off pursuant to a contractual agreement between her health
insurer and the health care providers.

4 When Tschaggeny and Milbank were unable to agree on
Milbank's obligation to cover certain medical expenses,
Tschaggeny sued. On February 18, 2004, Milbank filed a motion in
limine requesting that the trial court prevent Tschaggeny from
submitting evidence of the medical expenses that had been written
off. Tschaggeny failed to file any memorandum in opposition to
the motion. Over four months later, the district court held a
pretrial hearing to resolve all pending matters, including the
motion in limine. When asked at the hearing whether Tschaggeny
opposed the motion in limine, her counsel initially responded
that she did. Later, however, her counsel conceded that "the way
this has been presented by the defense makes sense and probably
does not need an opposition." The trial judge accordingly
granted the motion in limine from the bench.

5 A jury trial was scheduled to begin approximately three
months later. On the morning of trial, however, just minutes
before the jury was to be seated, Tschaggeny's counsel handed the
trial judge a motion to reconsider her ruling on the motion in
limine. In her supporting memorandum, Tschaggeny argued for the
first time that excluding the medical bill write-offs violated
the collateral source rule. The trial court ordered a one-day
continuance to review Tschaggeny's motion. The following day,
the trial judge denied Tschaggeny's motion for reconsideration as
untimely. Even so, the trial judge indicated that if Tschaggeny
would move for a continuance, she would consider the merits of
the motion. Tschaggeny elected not to do so, and the trial
proceeded without any evidence of the written-off medical
expenses.

6 At the conclusion of trial, the jury awarded Tschaggeny
both special and general damages. However, the jury did not award any damages for the replacement services that Tschaggeny
allegedly incurred for household duties that were performed by
others while she was injured.

7 The trial judge entered judgment on the jury's verdict
after adding prejudgment interest on the special damages awarded
by the jury and giving Milbank credit for $12,915.46, which
Milbank had paid to Tschaggeny approximately eighteen months
after the accident.2 In calculating prejudgment interest on the
special damages, the trial court allowed interest from the date
of the accident to the date of judgment, with one exception.
With respect to the $12,915.46 that Milbank had already paid, the
trial court awarded prejudgment interest for only that eighteenmonth
period, rather than for the full period of time from the
date of the accident until the date of judgment.

8 After the trial court entered judgment, Tschaggeny
filed a "Motion to Amend Judgment, Motion for Additur, or in the
alternative, Motion for New Trial." In her memorandum in support
of these motions, Tschaggeny argued that the trial judge should
add to the judgment additional damages for the amount of the
excluded medical bills and the value of the replacement services.
In the alternative, Tschaggeny argued that the court should
require Milbank to stipulate to an additur for those items or
face a new trial. The trial court denied Tschaggeny's motions in
their entirety.

* * *

16 Although a trial court "is free, in the exercise of
sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling,"
Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1984), a trial court
may also exercise its discretion to disregard motions to
reconsider prior in limine rulings when those motions do not
conform to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, see Univ. of Utah
v. Indus. Comm'n, 736 P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1987) ("A trial judge
is accorded broad discretion in determining how a trial shall
proceed in his or her courtroom."). Thus, we review the trial
court's denial of the motion to reconsider under an abuse of discretion standard. Under this standard, the trial court's
ruling may be overturned only "if there is no reasonable basis
for the decision." Langeland v. Monarch Motors, 952 P.2d 1058,
1061 (Utah 1998).

* * *

¶32 In sum, we reject all of Tschaggeny’s claims of error.
First, we do not review the trial court’s grant of the motion in
limine because Tschaggeny invited the court to do so.
Tschaggeny’s motion to reconsider the ruling was untimely, and in
any event, Tschaggeny failed to preserve the issue for appeal
when she rejected the trial court’s invitation to request a
continuance in order to allow adequate time to consider the
issue. Second, we reject Tschaggeny’s claim that Utah Code
section 78-27-44 required the trial court to award prejudgment
interest for the period after the pretrial payment was made.
Third, the trial court properly declined to award a new trial for
the written-off medical bills because there was no legal error at
trial. We do not consider the petition for a new trial on the
issue of replacement services because Tschaggeny has failed to
marshal the evidence. We therefore affirm the trial court.

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