Rachelle Rand, et al. v. Eyemart Express, L.L.C.

Dallas, Texas, personal injury lawyers represented the on an unauthorized disclosure of private health information.

Plaintiffs are five Facebook users who used the Site. They brought
suit under the Federal Wiretap Act, the Missouri Wiretap Act, and the
Illinois Eavesdropping Act, in addition to an intrusion upon seclusion tort
claim and breach of contract claims. They contend that the information the
Pixel tracked from the Site—related to viewing and purchasing prescription
eyeglasses and scheduling eye exams—is private health information that
Eyemart should not have permitted Meta to access without Plaintiffs’
knowledge or consent.

Eyemart seeks to provide customers with “all the eye and vision care
services” they need “in one place.” Eyemart owns and operates a chain of
physical stores as well as a website (“the Site”) on which users can browse
products, purchase prescription eyewear, and schedule eye exams. On its
Site, Eyemart utilizes an Internet tracking tool from Meta (Facebook’s
parent company) called “the Pixel,” which tracks and shares information
across websites using that software.

Meta developed the Pixel to improve targeted advertising by
collecting data on Meta users from third-party websites, such as Eyemart’s
Site. Through agreements with Meta, websites add the Pixel to their pages
and can control what information the Pixel collects and whether any data is
encrypted. With this browsing information, Meta creates profiles, which it
then uses to send targeted advertisements to users. In return, websites like
Eyemart gain more insights into their own advertising efforts and can
improve their targeted advertising by purchasing ads through Meta. This
arrangement incentivizes both Meta and sites like Eyemart to collect as much
information as possible.

The Pixel tracks users’ searches, clicks, product
viewing information, and appointment scheduling information from the Site,
giving that data to Meta. Eyemart does not receive users’ consent to track
their information, nor does it notify users about the Pixel’s tracking on the
Site.

Plaintiffs divide themselves into two categories: the “Search
Plaintiffs” and the “Prescription Plaintiffs.” The Search Plaintiffs allege
that they used the Site to browse and search for prescription glasses, which
triggered the Pixel to track their activity on the Site and share it with Meta.
One Search Plaintiff also alleges that when she used the Site to schedule an
eye exam, the Pixel sent the name and location of the Eyemart store she
visited to Meta. The Prescription Plaintiffs allege that they purchased
prescription eyewear from Eyemart, which required them to enter their
prescription information into the Site, and in turn led to their prescriptions
and other health information being shared with Meta through the Pixel. Both
sets of Plaintiffs had already shared other personal information with Meta
through their Facebook accounts—including their names and photos, and
other information varying by Plaintiff, such as gender, location, and
relationship status—before using the Site. With this information, Meta
could combine Plaintiffs’ personal details with their data from Eyemart’s Site
to identify them and then send them targeted ads.

Plaintiffs have suffered an actionable injury in fact in the
unauthorized disclosure of their IIHI to Meta.
Although this injury is intangible, it is cognizable. As the Supreme
Court explained in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, “[c]hief among” the
intangible harms that are sufficiently concrete for standing purposes “are
injuries with a close relationship to harms traditionally recognized as
providing a basis for lawsuits in American courts.” 594 U.S. at 425 (citing
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340–41 (2016)). “Those include, for
example, reputational harms, disclosure of private information, and intrusion
upon seclusion.” Id. Our court has since expanded on what this means for a
plaintiff to successfully plead an injury in fact: “[A] plaintiff doesn’t need to
demonstrate that the level of harm he has suffered would be actionable under
a similar, common-law cause of action. But he does need to show that the
type of harm he’s suffered is similar in kind to a type of harm that the common
law has recognized as actionable.” Perez, 45 F.4th at 822 (emphasis added);
see also Cranor v. 5 Star Nutrition, L.L.C., 998 F.3d 686, 690–91 (5th Cir.
2021) (“[O]ur inquiry is focused on types of harms protected at common
law . . . .” (citation omitted)); Cochenour v. 360Training.com, Inc., No. 1:25-
CV-7, 2025 WL 3251719, at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2025) (applying Perez
and Cranor to a Pixel tracking case).

Dismissed

Reversed