United States of America v. Mary Francis Chupck Bennett

Brownsivlle, Texas condemnation lawyers represented the Defendant in in eminent domain case.



Bennett contends that the government exceeded the scope of its easement

when it built the wall, that she therefore owns the wall, and that as a result

she is entitled to just compensation for the value of the wall. Bennett sought

to present expert testimony regarding the value of the wall. The district court

excluded the testimony, concluding that Bennett is not entitled to just com-

pensation for the value of the wall.



In the district court, the parties focused on the general common-law

rule recognized in Searl v. School-Dist. No. 2, 133 U.S. 553 (1890), that fix-

tures upon land built by a trespasser become part of the estate—the trespass

rule. The district court read Searl to include an exception to the trespass rule

for trespassers with an objective, good-faith belief in their right to build the

fixture. The district court concluded that the government had such a belief,

so Bennett was precluded from recovering the wall's value. The parties dis-

pute Searl's holding on appeal, but the government asserts an additional ar-

gument for affirmance. It contends that, even if it exceeded the scope of its

easement, it was acting under its power of eminent domain, so the trespass

rule could not limit or subvert its constitutional authority.



Ms. Bennett is certainly entitled to compensation for the value of the

taken land. And we do not address whether Bennett is entitled to just com-

pensation for other reasons, such as aesthetic damages or loss of or restricted

access to other parts of the farm. But she is not entitled to the value of the

wall that the government built at its own expense on land that it acquired—

and will pay for—through eminent domain.

Affirmed