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THREE ACES TOWING, INC. D/B/A THREE ACES STORAGE v. CASSIE LANDRUM, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY LANDRUM

Date: 11-22-2022

Case Number: 21-0652

Judge: Margaret "Meg" Poissant

Court:

Supreme Court of Texas, Texas

On appeal from the 344th District Court of Chambers County

Plaintiff's Attorney:



Houston Texas Personal Injury Lawyer Directory

Defendant's Attorney: Janson Bailey, Matthew Paul Skrabanek, Betty Feng, Kyle Chapel

Description:

Houston, Texas personal injury lawyer represented Plaintiff, who sued Defendant on a wrongful death negligence theory.





"Texas law imposes no general duty to 'become a good Samaritan,'

[though] . . . a duty to use reasonable care may arise when a person

undertakes to provide services to another, either gratuitously or for

compensation.” Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 837 (Tex.

2000) (brackets omitted) (quoting Fort Bend Cnty. Drainage Dist. v.

Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d. 393, 396 (Tex. 1991)).1 But that duty of reasonable

1 Accord Elephant Ins. Co. v. Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d 137, 151 (Tex. 2022);

Colonial Sav. Ass'n v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Tex. 1976).

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care "is limited to that undertaking.” Id. at 839 (quoting Sbrusch, 818

S.W.2d at 397). A divided court of appeals misapplied that limit in this

case. 628 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021).

Accordingly, we reverse and render judgment for petitioner.

The facts are undisputed. Petitioner 3 Aces Towing, Inc. d/b/a

3 Aces Storage is owned by Dawn and Robert Hancock. Though 3 Aces

is primarily a wrecker company, it also operates a public mini-storage

facility and contracts with General Shelters of Texas to sell storage

shelters on commission. General Shelters' employee, Jeffrey Landrum,

delivered two 8' x 8' portable storage units by tractor trailer to 3 Aces'

facility. Landrum had no one with him to assist with unloading them.

Dawn, then 54, was present, along with two of her grandchildren, but

she had never helped with unloading storage units. Robert, her

husband, had occasionally assisted General Shelters' drivers, but he was

away on a wrecker. Rather than wait for his return, Landrum proceeded

to unload the units on his own.

The truck was equipped with a winch, which Landrum did not

use. Instead, he pushed the storage units by hand to the end of the

trailer over rollers mounted on the trailer bed. He then pulled them

down ramps extending to the ground. After successfully unloading one

unit, the rollers under the second unit stuck. Landrum asked Dawn to

help him push the unit "maybe a foot” to the end of the trailer, and Dawn

did. At that point, Landrum said he would pull the unit over the end of

the trailer and walk it down the ramps with his hands. He told Dawn

to step away while he did that in case the unit fell. Dawn stepped back

about 12 feet and turned her attention to her grandchildren, who were

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standing there. Moments later, Dawn heard the unit crash as it fell off

the trailer, crushing Landrum. She could not budge the unit but

mounted a nearby excavator,2 which she had never operated, and

managed to use it to lift the unit off Landrum. Despite her best attempts

to save him, Landrum died at the scene from his injuries.

Landrum's daughter, Cassie Landrum, brought this wrongfuldeath and survival action against 3 Aces. The trial court granted 3 Aces'

motion for summary judgment.3 A divided court of appeals reversed in

part, reasoning that because Dawn "insert[ed] herself in the unloading

procedure, [she] undertook a duty to protect Landrum from dangers that

an ordinarily prudent person could foresee were a likely result of the

situation.” 628 S.W.3d at 354. The court thus concluded that "[a] fact

issue remains as to whether Dawn . . . failed to continue to render

Landrum assistance.” Id. at 355.4

The dissent pointed out the "undisputed [evidence] that [Dawn's]

actions were limited to helping [Landrum] push the building

approximately one foot to the end of the trailer.” Id. at 356 (Wilson, J.,

dissenting). "[W]hen [Landrum] started to unload the building from the

2 "Excavators are heavy construction equipment featuring a bucket,

arm, rotating cab, and movable tracks. Excavators are used for construction

tasks, including landscaping, digging holes and trenches, lifting, placing large

objects, and demolition of structures.” 628 S.W.3d at 349 n.2.

3 Cassie sued the Hancocks individually but nonsuited them. She also

sued General Shelters, Landrum's subscriber employer.

4 The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, dismissing other claims

that Cassie had asserted. 628 S.W.3d at 352.

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end of the trailer by himself,” the dissent reasoned, "Dawn's

participation in the unloading process ended,” as did any duty imposed

on her by undertaking to help him. Id.

We agree with the dissent. The undisputed facts are that

Landrum asked Dawn only to help him push the storage unit one foot to

the end of the trailer. That is all she did, and she did it safely. She

stopped when Landrum told her to. Any duty she undertook to exercise

reasonable care ceased by the time Landrum began to unload the unit by

himself. See Kuentz v. Cole Sys. Grp., Inc., 541 S.W.3d 208 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (affirming summary judgment for an

employment-screening company on a negligent-undertaking claim after

the company failed to discover red flags in a workplace shooter's

background because the evidence conclusively established that the

company's engagement was limited to discrete, unrelated inquiries);

Knife River Corp.–S. v. Hinojosa, 438 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (rendering judgment for a TxDOT

contractor on a negligent-undertaking claim arising from a driver's

death because the evidence showed that the scope of the contractor's

work included notifying TxDOT of any dangerous road conditions but

did not include repairing dangerous conditions).

Cassie argues that once Dawn joined in the unloading procedure, she

unreasonably removed her voluntary assistance. "Whatever might be

said about [Landrum's] warning to [Dawn] to 'stand back,'” Cassie

contends, "the use of practical, common experience should have clued

[Dawn] in that attempting to lower the building down on one's own was

manifestly unsafe.” Cassie argues that Dawn should have expressed

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that concern, was not free to disregard her duty at her choosing, and

failed to continue rendering the assistance voluntarily assumed. These

arguments are contradicted by the undisputed facts that Dawn pushed

the storage unit safely as Lancaster asked; that she stopped when he

told her to; and that she did not know, and never undertook to advise

him, how best to unload the unit.

As the court of appeals acknowledged, 628 S.W.3d at 353, the

existence of a legal duty is a question of law. Elephant Ins. Co. v.

Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d 137, 145 (Tex. 2022). Assuming that Dawn

undertook a duty of care by assisting Landrum when and how he asked,

which we need not decide, the undisputed facts establish that any duty

ended when he told her to step away while he finished. The court of

appeals erred in reversing summary judgment for 3 Aces.