Todd Dawayne Sturgis v. The State of Texas

Tyler, TX - Criminal defense attorney represented Todd Dawayne Sturgis with an Evading Arrest charge.

Appellant was indicted for evading arrest in a vehicle, a third degree felony.1



The indictment further alleged that Appellant had a previous felony conviction and used or exhibited

a deadly weapon, to wit: a motor vehicle, during the commission of the offense.2 Appellant

elected to enter a plea of "guilty” to the charge of evading arrest and a plea of "true” to the

allegation that he has a previous conviction, but "not true” to the allegation that he used or

exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense.

At a plea hearing, the trial court accepted Appellant's plea of "guilty” and plea of "true”

to the enhancement allegation, ordered a presentence investigation, and set a separate hearing on

punishment. The State called Jeremy Charvoz, the Lufkin Police Department (LPD) officer from

whom Appellant evaded arrest, to offer evidence about the deadly weapon allegation. The State

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04 (b)(2)(A) (West 2016).

2 Id. § 1.07 (a)(17) (West Supp. 2020), § 12.42 (b) (West 2019).

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offered and the trial court admitted Charvoz's body camera, in car video, and audio footage from

the offense. Additionally, the State called LPD Officer Lonnie Dodd, who testified about the

circumstances surrounding Appellant's eventual arrest for evading arrest and other offenses.

Appellant called two witnesses, his mother and girlfriend, who testified about Appellant's

background, substance abuse issues, and character.

At the conclusion of the punishment hearing, the trial court found the allegation that

Appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon to be "true” and sentenced him to imprisonment for

twelve years. This appeal followed.

DEADLY WEAPON FINDING

In one issue, Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial

court's finding that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon and asks that we reform the judgment

to delete the deadly weapon finding.3

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

When there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in

the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have

found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks v. State, 323

S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct.

2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)) (concluding the Jackson standard "is the only standard that a

reviewing court should apply” when examining the sufficiency of the evidence). The factfinder

is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and weight to be given to their testimony. Tate v.

State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The factfinder may draw multiple

reasonable inferences so long as each inference is supported by the evidence admitted at trial.

Id. Accordingly, we must defer to the factfinder's determination of weight and credibility of the

witnesses' testimony. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. Under this standard, we may not

3 A deadly weapon finding is not part of a sentence. Ex Parte Huskins, 176 S.W.3d 818, 820–21 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005); State v. Ross, 953 S.W.2d 748, 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). While a deadly weapon finding does

affect a defendant's eligibility for probation and parole, it does not alter the range of punishment to which the

defendant is subject or affect the number of years assessed. Huskins, 176 S.W.3d at 821; see TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. ART. 42A.054(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2020) (providing that community supervision is not available to a

defendant when it is shown that a deadly weapon was used or exhibited during the commission of a felony offense);

see also TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 508.145(d)(1)(B)(2) (West Supp. 2020) (providing that an inmate whose

judgment of conviction contains a deadly weapon finding is not eligible for parole until his actual calendar time

served, without consideration of good conduct time, equals the lesser of one-half of the sentence or thirty calendar

years).

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substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the

evidence. See id.; see also Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

Instead, we defer to the factfinder's resolution of conflicting evidence unless the resolution is not

rational. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899–900. When the record supports conflicting inferences,

we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore

defer to that determination. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally. Id. Circumstantial evidence is as

probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence

alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007). The duty of a reviewing court is to ensure that the evidence presented supports a

conclusion that the defendant committed the crime charged. See Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d

742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

By statute, a motor vehicle is not a deadly weapon per se, but can be found to be a deadly

weapon if used in a manner that is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(17)(B) (West Supp. 2020) ("Deadly weapon means...anything that in

the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.”).

Specific intent to use a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon is not required. Drichas v. State, 175

S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). When it is alleged that a motor vehicle was used as a

deadly weapon, an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon is appropriate on a sufficient showing

of actual danger, such as evidence that another motorist was on the highway at the same time and

place as the defendant when the defendant drove in a dangerous manner. See id. at 799. The

court of criminal appeals has explained that it "does not suggest that a defendant should be

charged with using a vehicle as a deadly weapon every time the offense of evading arrest or

detention is committed[,]” rather, it is a fact-specific inquiry. Id.

Discussion

Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding that

he used the motor vehicle in a manner that was capable of causing serious bodily injury or death.

Appellant is correct that the evidence must show that the motor vehicle posed an actual danger of

death or serious bodily injury to someone other than Appellant in order to sustain an affirmative

finding that the motor vehicle was used as a deadly weapon. Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 799. Thus,

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in the present case, the State had to show that Appellant used his vehicle in a manner capable of

causing death or serious bodily injury while evading arrest or detention. See id.

At the hearing, Charvoz testified to Appellant's use of the vehicle during the commission

of the offense. And as previously noted, the footage from Charvoz's body camera, in car video,

and audio was admitted into evidence. Charvoz testified, and the footage confirms, that he and

another LPD officer, Zack Klein, initiated a traffic stop of Appellant's vehicle.4 Appellant pulled

his vehicle into a convenience store parking lot at approximately 3:00 p.m. Charvoz testified that

several people were at the convenience store using gas pumps, and several vehicles were in the

parking lot, including a vehicle on each side of Appellant's vehicle. Charvoz and Klein

approached Appellant, told him he was under arrest for outstanding warrants, and asked him to

exit the vehicle. Appellant refused and Charvoz opened the door to pull Appellant from the

vehicle and place him under arrest. While Charvoz's hand was in the door and he was leaning

into the driver's side of the vehicle, Appellant shifted the vehicle in reverse and abruptly backed

up, narrowly missing Klein's patrol vehicle. On Charvoz's camera footage, Appellant's tires can

be heard screeching as he backs up.

Charvoz moved his body to avoid Appellant's vehicle, and Appellant drove around the

convenience store parking lot and the corner of the building, maneuvering between a parked,

unoccupied vehicle and the building. Klein was unable to follow Appellant's path, but Charvoz

pursued Appellant by taking a different route out of the parking lot. Charvoz observed Appellant

drive through a ditch on his way out of the parking lot. Appellant entered the roadway and ran a

red light. Charvoz activated his vehicle's lights and sirens and pursued Appellant. Appellant cut

through several ditches and made several turns, passing through roadway intersections, until he

finally pulled his vehicle into the driveway of a residence. After pulling into the driveway,

Appellant hit a tree and went through a barbed wire fence on the property before coming to a

stop. Appellant exited the vehicle and fled into the woods. Charvoz testified he was unable to

locate Appellant but that Appellant was later arrested for evading arrest and outstanding

warrants. Charvoz testified that he was in fear of serious bodily injury or death when Appellant

4 Initially, Charvoz and Klein were dispatched to a disturbance at Appellant's girlfriend's home. Upon

arrival, Charvoz testified that Klein told him the disturbance was verbal, and Appellant had agreed to leave the

home. Charvoz testified that while Appellant was in the process of leaving, Klein discovered that Appellant had

outstanding warrants for felony offenses, which led to Klein and Charvoz following Appellant to place him under

arrest.

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reversed his vehicle and almost struck him. He was likewise concerned for the safety of the

public during the pursuit because of Appellant's unsafe driving.

On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence does not support a deadly weapon finding

because it does not show that he used the motor vehicle in a manner that placed anyone in actual

danger. In support of this argument, Appellant contends that his "door in fact did close and

[Appellant's] vehicle backed away without the officers being in the path of the door or the

vehicle itself.” Appellant also argues that the evidence did not show that his use of the motor

vehicle presented actual danger to any members of the public because the vehicle Appellant

squeezed by in the parking lot was unoccupied. Appellant acknowledges that the evidence

shows his driving was "erratic and inappropriate,” but he maintains that his driving did not

present any actual danger to the officers or the general public. In support of this argument,

Appellant cites several cases holding the evidence insufficient to support a finding that a motor

vehicle was a deadly weapon. However, those cases are based upon facts distinguishable from

the facts of this case. See Couthren v. State, 571 S.W.3d 786, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)

(evidence insufficient to sustain deadly weapon finding where appellant struck an intoxicated

pedestrian who stepped in front of his vehicle because no evidence was presented about the

manner in which the appellant was driving when the collision occurred); see also Clark v. State,

573 S.W.3d 367, 373 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2019, no pet.) (speeding and rolling through stop

signs insufficient to support finding that vehicle was used as deadly weapon where no other

traffic was on roadway and officer in pursuit kept some distance behind the appellant); Foley v.

State, 327 S.W.3d 907, 917 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2010, pet. ref'd) (evidence insufficient

to sustain deadly weapon finding where defendant crashed his vehicle into road barrier but no

other motorists on roadway at time of crash).

The relevant inquiry is whether Appellant used the motor vehicle during the commission

of the offense in such a manner that it was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 799-800. Capability is evaluated based on the circumstances that

existed at the time of the offense. Id. The evidence need not show that death or serious bodily

injury was probable or that others were in the "zone of danger.” See id. In the present case,

Appellant abruptly backed up his vehicle, causing his tires to screech, while Charvoz had his

hand on the open driver's side door and was leaning in the driver's side of the vehicle. Charvoz

had to move out of the way of Appellant's vehicle to avoid being struck. Further, the evidence

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demonstrates that Appellant disregarded a red light and drove through several ditches to evade

Charvoz while other motorists where present on the roadway. Thus, the evidence shows that the

manner in which Appellant drove his vehicle placed Charvoz and other motorists in danger of

death or serious bodily injury. See id. (evidence sufficient to sustain deadly weapon finding

where the appellant pulled out of gas station parking lot abruptly cutting off an officer and fled at

a high rate of speed leading officers on high speed chase during which the appellant disregarded

traffic signals, wove between lanes, knocked down barricades and drove on wrong side of road

with traffic present); see also Mann v. State, 58 S.W.3d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (evidence

sufficient to sustain deadly weapon finding where the appellant narrowly avoided a head on

collision because the other vehicle took evasive action). Therefore, viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that the manner in which Appellant drove his car during the offense placed

others in actual danger of death or serious bodily injury. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912.

Because the evidence is sufficient to support a deadly weapon finding, we overrule Appellant's

sole issue.

Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.