Christopher Michael Allen v. The State of Texas

A jury convicted appellant of assault causing bodily injury to a member of his family or

household. In a single issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to

quash the information because it failed to allege the acts and circumstances relied on to

constitute the element of recklessness. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.15. We affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

Appellant was charged by information with “intentionally and knowingly and recklessly

caus[ing] bodily injury to another . . . by striking complainant with a hand and by biting

complainant with a mouth.”1 The information further alleged appellant had a dating relationship

1 The State filed a motion to amend the information to allege appellant acted “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” when causing bodily injury to another. The State’s motion did not include a proposed amended information and, although the trial court granted the State’s motion, the State did not file an amended information. Based on this record, we conclude the information was not amended. See generally Perez v. State, 429 S.W.3d 641-643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (discussing amendment of indictment); see also Martinez v. State, No. 05-12-00917-CR, 2014 WL







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with the complainant and was a member of her family and household. Appellant filed a motion

to quash the indictment, which the trial court denied.

The sufficiency of the charging instrument presents a question of law, and we review the

trial court’s ruling on a motion to quash a charging instrument de novo. See Smith v. State, 309

S.W.3d 10, 13–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also State v. Drummond, 501 S.W.3d 78, 81

(Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Appellant asserts the information does not meet the requirements of

article 21.15 of the code of criminal procedure, which states that whenever recklessness is a part

or an element of an offense, or it is charged that the accused acted recklessly in the commission

of an offense, the information must allege with reasonable certainty the act or acts relied upon to

constitute recklessness. TEX. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.15.

An information may properly charge the offense of assault by alleging the defendant

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 22.01(a)(1). The information in this case alleged these essential elements. The court of

criminal appeals has stated that when, as here, the State alleges culpable mental states, such as

intentionally or knowingly, along with recklessness it is not necessary for it to allege with

reasonable certainty the act or acts relied on, to constitute recklessness. See Crawford v. State,

646 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); see also State v. Castorena, 486 S.W.3d 630, 635

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.) (because State alleged defendant acted intentionally,

knowingly, or recklessly, it was not required by article 21.15 to allege act relied on to constitute

recklessness); Carroll v. State, No. 05-07-01087-CR, 2009 WL 3366532, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Oct. 21, 2009, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (under Crawford, indictment

alleging conduct committed intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly need not allege act relied

2921654 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 25, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Our conclusion is also supported by the fact that the language from the original information was read to the jury.





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upon to constitute recklessness). Because the information alleged appellant acted intentionally,

knowingly, and recklessly, we conclude the State was not required to set forth specific facts

supporting the allegation of recklessness pursuant to article 21.15. Even if the State was required under the information in this case to meet the requirements

of article 21.15, the State did so by alleging appellant caused bodily injury to the complainant by

striking her with his hand and biting her with his mouth. See Leavitt v. State, No. 05-07-00364

CR, 2008 WL 1850777, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 28, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (concluding allegation that defendant recklessly caused bodily injury

by throwing wife to the ground causing her to strike head and body on ground sufficient).