Nishal Keshav Rajsakha v. The State of Texas

A jury convicted Nishal Keshav Rajsakha of driving while intoxicated. In a single issue,

appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

On June 7, 2013, at approximately 12:40 a.m., Officer Boz Rojas was dispatched to the

intersection of McKinnon and Pearl Streets where a minor car accident occurred. By the time

Rojas arrived, the parties had moved their vehicles to a nearby parking lot. Rojas spoke to both

parties involved in the accident. Appellant told Rojas that he was “driving and got T-boned”

when the other car ran a red light. The driver of the second vehicle told Rojas appellant was

driving the wrong way on a one-way street. The second vehicle sustained damage to its front

end while appellant’s vehicle was damaged on its passenger side. Rojas concluded appellant





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drove the wrong direction on a one-way street and was hit by the second car as he went through

the intersection. Rojas created a diagram of the accident scene, which was admitted at trial.

Appellant never denied he was driving and, in a video recording played for the jury, stated he

called 911 after the accident.

Rojas believed appellant was “somewhat intoxicated.” Officer Jason Amaro was

dispatched to the scene to perform standard field sobriety tests. Appellant told Amaro he had

been at a nearby club and was going home. After administering sobriety tests, Amaro concluded

appellant was intoxicated and arrested appellant. Appellant’s blood was drawn at 3:06 a.m, and

testing showed his blood-alcohol content was 0.105. The toxicology chemist who performed the

tests estimated that appellant’s blood-alcohol content was between 0.13 and 0.18 when the

accident occurred.

Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to show he committed the offense because

his extrajudicial statements to Rojas and Amaro are the only evidence he was operating his

vehicle. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on a criminal offense for

which the State has the burden of proof under the single sufficiency standard set forth in Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 624–25 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014). Under this standard, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2011) (footnotes omitted).

This standard accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony,

weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. When

analyzing legal sufficiency, we determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based

upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most





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favorable to the verdict. Id. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that

the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Id.

Direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally: Circumstantial evidence is as probative as

direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be

sufficient to establish guilt. Id.

As applicable here, a person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if he is

intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.04(a).

Appellant argues the corpus delicti rule was not satisfied because there is no evidence

other than his extrajudicial statements to show he operated the vehicle involved in the accident.

The corpus delicti rule concerns evidentiary sufficiency in cases where there is an extrajudicial

confession. See Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also Pace v.

State, No. 05-16-00167-CR, 2017 WL 360669, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 23, 2017, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication); Harrell v. State, No. 05–15–00133–CR, 2016 WL

865464, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas March 7, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). When the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant’s extrajudicial

confession does not constitute legally sufficient evidence of guilt absent independent evidence of

the corpus delicti. Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865. That is, there must be evidence independent of a

defendant’s extrajudicial confession showing the essential nature of the charged crime was

committed by someone. Id. at 866. “The other evidence need not be sufficient by itself to prove

the offense: all that is required is that there be some evidence which renders the commission of

the offense more probable than it would be without the evidence.” Harrell, 2016 WL 865464, at

*3 (citing Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)); see also Salazar v. State, 86

S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (rule satisfied if some evidence exists outside of

extrajudicial confession which, considered alone or in connection with confession, shows crime





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occurred). The corpus delicti of driving while intoxicated is that someone operated a motor

vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. Pace, 2017 WL 360669, at *2 (citing Folk v. State,

797 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, pet. ref’d)); Harrell, 2016 WL 865464, at * 3.

Here, there is direct and circumstantial evidence—other than appellant’s statements—

from which a jury could infer that he was operating the vehicle in a public place while

intoxicated. Appellant called 911 early in the morning about a car accident. Rojas arrived and

found the two cars involved in the accident, appellant, and the other driver in a parking lot.

Based on the other driver’s statements and damage to the vehicles, Rojas concluded the accident

occurred in a public place when appellant’s vehicle was struck by a second vehicle as appellant

drove the wrong way on a one-way street. Finally, appellant’s blood, drawn more than two

hours after the accident occurred, showed his blood-alcohol content was 0.105.

Collectively, the evidence is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of driving while

intoxicated. See Pace, 2017 WL 360669, at *2; Harrell, 2016 WL 865464, at *3. On this

record, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. See Clayton,

235 S.W.3d at 778. We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.