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Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Raiway Co. v. Sheil White
Date: 06-23-2006
Case Number: 05-259
Judge: Breyer
Court: United States Supreme Court on appeal from the Western District of Tennesse, Shelby County
Plaintiff's Attorney:
Donald A. Donati, Donati Law Firm, Memphis, Tennessee
Ann E. Reesman and Robert E. Williams of McGuiness, Norris & Williams, Washington
Defendant's Attorney: Bryan P. Neal of Thompson & Knight, Dallas, Texas and
Ralph T. Gibson of Bates Gibson, Memphis, Tennessee
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a), and its anti-retaliation provision forbids "discriminat[ion] against" an employee or job applicant who, inter alia, has "made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in" a Title VII proceeding or investigation, §2000e–3(a). Respondent White, the only woman in her department, operated the forklift at the Tennessee Yard of petitioner Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. (Burlington). After she complained, her immediate supervisor was disciplined for sexual harassment, but she was removed from forklift duty to standard track laborer tasks. She filed a complaint with the EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), claiming that the reassignment was unlawful gender discrimination and retaliation forher complaint. Subsequently, she was suspended without pay for insubordination. Burlington later found that she had not been insubordinate, reinstated her, and awarded her backpay for the 37 daysshe was suspended. The suspension led to another EEOC retaliation charge. After exhausting her administrative remedies, White filed anaction against Burlington in federal court claiming, as relevant here,that Burlington's actions in changing her job responsibilities andsuspending her for 37 days amounted to unlawful retaliation under Title VII. A jury awarded her compensatory damages. In affirming, the Sixth Circuit applied the same standard for retaliation that itapplies to a substantive discrimination offense, holding that a retaliation plaintiff must show an "adverse employment action," defined as a "materially adverse change in the terms and conditions" of employment. The Circuits have come to different conclusions about whether the challenged action has to be employment or workplace related and about how harmful that action must be to constitute retaliation.
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Click the case caption above for the full text of the Court's opinion.
The anti-retaliation provision does not confine the actions andharms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur atthe workplace. The language of the substantive and anti-retaliationprovisions differ in important ways. The terms “hire,” “discharge,”“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” “employment opportunities,” and “status as an employee” explicitly limitthe substantive provision’s scope to actions that affect employment or alter workplace conditions. The anti-retaliation provision has no such limiting words. This Court presumes that, where words differas they do here, Congress has acted intentionally and purposely. There is strong reason to believe that Congress intended the differences here, for the two provisions differ not only in language but alsoin purpose. The anti-discrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are not discriminated against because of their status, while the anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent an employer from interfering with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees. To secure the first objective, Congress needed only to prohibit employment-related discrimination. But this would not achieve the second objective because it would not deter the many forms that effective retaliation can take,therefore failing to fully achieve the anti-retaliation provision’s purpose of “[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms,” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 346. Thus, purpose reinforces what the language says, namely, that the anti-retaliation provision is not limited to actions affecting employment terms and conditions. Neither this Court’s precedent nor the EEOC’s interpretations support a contrary conclusion. Nor is it anomalous to read the statute to provide broader protection for retaliation victimsthan for victims of discrimination. Congress has provided similarprotection from retaliation in comparable statutes. And differences in the purpose of the two Title VII provisions remove any perceived “anomaly,” for they justify this difference in interpretation. Pp. 6–12.
2.
The anti-retaliation provision covers only those employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee orapplicant. This Court agrees with the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits that the proper formulation requires a retaliationplaintiff to show that the challenged action “well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F. 3d 1211, 1219. The Court refers to material adversity to separate significant from trivial harms. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent employer interference with “unfettered access” to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms by prohibiting employer actions that are likely to deter discrimination victims from complaining to the EEOC, the courts, and employers. Robinson, supra, at 346. The Court refers to a reasonable employee’s reactions because the provision’s standard for judging harm must be objective, and thus judicially administrable. The standard is phrased in general terms because the significance of any given act of retaliation may depend upon the particular circumstances. Pp. 12–15.
harms. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent employer interference with “unfettered access” to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms by prohibiting employer actions that are likely to deter discrimination victims from complaining to the EEOC, the courts, and employers. Robinson, supra, at 346. The Court refers to a reasonable employee’s reactions because the provision’s standard for judging harm must be objective, and thus judicially administrable. The standard is phrased in general terms because the significance of any given act of retaliation may depend upon the particular circumstances. Pp. 12–15.
About This Case
What was the outcome of Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Raiway Co. v. Sheil White?
The outcome was: 1. The anti-retaliation provision does not confine the actions andharms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur atthe workplace. The language of the substantive and anti-retaliationprovisions differ in important ways. The terms “hire,” “discharge,”“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” “employment opportunities,” and “status as an employee” explicitly limitthe substantive provision’s scope to actions that affect employment or alter workplace conditions. The anti-retaliation provision has no such limiting words. This Court presumes that, where words differas they do here, Congress has acted intentionally and purposely. There is strong reason to believe that Congress intended the differences here, for the two provisions differ not only in language but alsoin purpose. The anti-discrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are not discriminated against because of their status, while the anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent an employer from interfering with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees. To secure the first objective, Congress needed only to prohibit employment-related discrimination. But this would not achieve the second objective because it would not deter the many forms that effective retaliation can take,therefore failing to fully achieve the anti-retaliation provision’s purpose of “[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms,” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 346. Thus, purpose reinforces what the language says, namely, that the anti-retaliation provision is not limited to actions affecting employment terms and conditions. Neither this Court’s precedent nor the EEOC’s interpretations support a contrary conclusion. Nor is it anomalous to read the statute to provide broader protection for retaliation victimsthan for victims of discrimination. Congress has provided similarprotection from retaliation in comparable statutes. And differences in the purpose of the two Title VII provisions remove any perceived “anomaly,” for they justify this difference in interpretation. Pp. 6–12. 2. The anti-retaliation provision covers only those employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee orapplicant. This Court agrees with the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits that the proper formulation requires a retaliationplaintiff to show that the challenged action “well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F. 3d 1211, 1219. The Court refers to material adversity to separate significant from trivial harms. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent employer interference with “unfettered access” to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms by prohibiting employer actions that are likely to deter discrimination victims from complaining to the EEOC, the courts, and employers. Robinson, supra, at 346. The Court refers to a reasonable employee’s reactions because the provision’s standard for judging harm must be objective, and thus judicially administrable. The standard is phrased in general terms because the significance of any given act of retaliation may depend upon the particular circumstances. Pp. 12–15. harms. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent employer interference with “unfettered access” to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms by prohibiting employer actions that are likely to deter discrimination victims from complaining to the EEOC, the courts, and employers. Robinson, supra, at 346. The Court refers to a reasonable employee’s reactions because the provision’s standard for judging harm must be objective, and thus judicially administrable. The standard is phrased in general terms because the significance of any given act of retaliation may depend upon the particular circumstances. Pp. 12–15.
Which court heard Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Raiway Co. v. Sheil White?
This case was heard in United States Supreme Court on appeal from the Western District of Tennesse, Shelby County, TN. The presiding judge was Breyer.
Who were the attorneys in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Raiway Co. v. Sheil White?
Plaintiff's attorney: Donald A. Donati, Donati Law Firm, Memphis, Tennessee Ann E. Reesman and Robert E. Williams of McGuiness, Norris & Williams, Washington. Defendant's attorney: Bryan P. Neal of Thompson & Knight, Dallas, Texas and Ralph T. Gibson of Bates Gibson, Memphis, Tennessee.
When was Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Raiway Co. v. Sheil White decided?
This case was decided on June 23, 2006.