State of Tennessee v. Kejuan King

Memphis, Tennessee, criminal defense lawyer represented the Defendant charged with being a felon in possession of a /firearm and second-degree murder.<br>
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On the afternoon of January 13, 2017, Adarrell Anderson arrived at the Grizzly Mart gas station and store with two friends, Anthony Holloway and Julin Sanders. As the trio pulled into the parking lot, they noticed a silver, four-door Hyundai car entering the parking lot from the opposite direction. All three men recognized Defendant as the front passenger in the Hyundai. The Hyundai parked next to pump four, with the front of the car pointed away from the store. The female driver of the Hyundai got out and went into the store while Petitioner remained seated in the front passenger seat. Id. Petitioner's two young children were also in the Hyundai at the time. While Petitioner remained seated, the victim approached on foot to Petitioner's front passenger door. The Defendant testified that he did not see the victim approach until the victim was already standing at the car door. The Defendant and the victim exchanged words, although accounts differed on how long the exchange lasted. The then fired five or six gunshots from his seated position in the Hyundai, striking the victim. Paramedics later pronounced the victim deceased at the scene. In the seconds after the shooting, at least three eyewitnesses heard Petitioner yell, "Come on! Come on!" and watched as the female driver of the Hyundai-later identified as Nakia Moore-ran from the store back to her car before speeding away. Mr. Holloway immediately called the victim's family and then 911.<br>
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Historically, Tennessee observed the common law rule on self-defense, which included an affirmative duty to retreat before using or threatening to use force. See, e.g., State v. Kennamore, 604 S.W.2d 856, 858-59 (Tenn. 1980) (rejecting the "no duty to retreat" rule, which is "sometimes referred to as the 'true man' doctrine . . . ."). Then, in 1989, our General Assembly codified the law on self-defense; in doing so, they included an express provision that eliminated the duty to retreat. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(a) (1989); see also State v. Renner, 912 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tenn. 1995) ("With this enactment, Tennessee joined the majority of jurisdictions which adhere to the 'true man' doctrine."). Under the "true man" doctrine, one need not retreat from the threatened attack of another or pause and consider whether it is reasonably possible to flee. Renner, 912 S.W.2d at 704. In 2007, our General Assembly again amended the self-defense statute to include language that, in effect, codified the common law "true man" doctrine as described in Renner. See id. (concluding the "true man" doctrine applies only when the defendant is (1) "without fault in provoking the confrontation, and (2) in a place where he has a lawful right to be . . . ."). The relevant portion of the self-defense statute in effect at the time of the commission of the offense and at the time of Petitioner's trial, read: <br>
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In Tennessee, "whether an individual acted in self-defense is a factual determination to be made by the jury as the sole trier of fact." State v. Goode, 956 S.W.2d 521, 527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citing State v. Ivy, 868 S.W.2d 725, 725 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)). However, "the trial court makes the threshold determination whether to charge the jury with self-defense," and thus "the trial court should consider whether the State has produced clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity such that the 'no duty to retreat' instruction would not apply." Perrier, 536 S.W.3d at 403.[6] "[T]he phrase 'engaged in unlawful activity' applies only to a person's duty to retreat." Id. at 399. Thus, "a person is entitled to a jury instruction that he or she did not have to retreat from an alleged attack only when the person was not engaged in unlawful activity and was in a place the person had a right to be." Id. at 401. In Perrier, our supreme court did not address whether the unlawful activity by the defendant had to have a causal nexus to the defendant's perceived need to defend himself. Id. at 404. Almost two years after Petitioner's trial, this court concluded in State v. Booker, No. E2018-01439-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 1697367, at *27 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2020), rev'd on other grounds by State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022), that there must be a causal nexus "between a defendant's unlawful activity and his or her need to engagte in self-defense."<br>
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The record reflects that at the close of the State's case-in-chief, the trial court held a hearing outside the jury's presence to determine the admissibility of Petitioner's prior convictions if he testified at trial. The State established that Petitioner had prior felony convictions in Georgia for possession of amphetamine, theft by receiving stolen property, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, as well as two prior misdemeanor theft convictions from Tennessee. The trial court determined that Petitioner could be questioned regarding all of his prior convictions if he testified at trial. Counsel then announced his intention to seek a jury instruction on self-defense. The trial court found that Petitioner was a convicted felon in possession of a handgun at the time of the offense and that, as a result, Petitioner had a duty to retreat before using deadly force. However, the trial court reserved any decision regarding whether it would issue a self-defense instruction until after Petitioner testified at trial.<br>
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After Petitioner testified, the trial court announced that it would instruct the jury on self-defense but include language that Petitioner had a duty to retreat. While the State objected to the instruction, Counsel argued that self-defense was fairly raised based on Petitioner's testimony, and the court agreed. The court instructed the jury as follows:<br>
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Included in the defendant's plea of not guilty is his plea of self-defense.<br>
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The defendant would have a right to threaten or use force against the deceased when and to the degree the defendant reasonably believed the force was immediately necessary to protect against the alleged victim's use or attempted use of unlawful force. The defendant would also have a right to threaten or use force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury if the defendant had a reasonable belief that there was an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, the danger creating the belief of imminent death or serious bodily injury was real, or honestly believed to be real at the time, and the belief of danger was founded upon reasonable grounds. <br>
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In determining whether the defendant's use of force in defending himself was reasonable, you may consider not only his use of force but also all the facts and circumstances surrounding and leading up to it. Factors to consider in deciding whether there were reasonable grounds for the <br>
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defendant to fear death or serious bodily injury from the deceased include but are not limited to any previous threats of the deceased made known to the defendant; the character of the deceased for violence, when known to the defendant; the animosity of the deceased for the defendant, as revealed to the defendant by previous acts and words of the deceased; and the manner in which the parties were armed and their relative strengths and sizes. <br>
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The use of force against the deceased would not have been justified if the defendant provoked the deceased's use or attempted use of unlawful force, unless the defendant abandoned the encounter or clearly communicated to the deceased the intent to do so, and the deceased nevertheless continued or attempted to use unlawful force against the defendant. <br>
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The use of force against another is not justified if the defendant consented to the exact force used or attempted by the other individual. <br>
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The burden is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. <br>
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To convict the defendant, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. If from all the facts and circumstances you find the defendant acted in self-defense, or if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant acted in self-defense, you must find him not guilty.<br>
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The Defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to 20 years in prison.<br>
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Affirmed on appeal.<br>
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