Melodye Broadley, Guardian for Linda Sue Broadley et al. v. State of Rhode Island

This case came before the Supreme Court on
December 10, 2007, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause
why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. After hearing the
arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda submitted by the parties, we are of
the opinion that cause has not been shown. Accordingly, we shall decide the appeal
without further briefing or argument.

Facts and Travel

The plaintiffs, Melodye Broadley (Melodye), as guardian of Linda Sue Broadley
(Linda), and Linda (hereinafter referred to collectively as plaintiffs), appeal from
Superior Court judgments in favor of the defendants, Samuel Waddington (Waddington)
and the State of Rhode Island (state and collectively defendants), on all counts of
plaintiffs' complaint.1

The genesis of this dispute was the discovery in 1994 that Linda, a severely
handicapped person, who resided at Smithfield Commons Apartments (Smithfield
Commons), a facility for the disabled that was state financed and operated, suffered a
severe bruise that extended from the vagina to the rectum. Linda was examined at
Women and Infants Hospital, and the Smithfield police were notified; however, criminal
charges were not brought against anyone. Subsequently, a civil action was filed that
alleged intentional and negligent tortious conduct on the part of numerous named and
unnamed defendants.

In the original complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Linda was "a severely retarded
woman, non-ambulatory, confined to a wheel chair, legally blind and incapable of
speech, who has been declared by the State of Rhode Island to be unable to care for
herself." The complaint alleged that while a resident at Smithfield Commons, she
suffered an assault and battery, including sexual assault. The plaintiffs also alleged that
numerous defendants were negligent in caring for Linda; that certain physicians engaged
in negligent treatment of Linda; and that various officials were negligent in their
supervision of employees at Smithfield Commons. There also was a claim for punitive
damages based on intentional misconduct.

After summary judgments were entered in 1998 in favor of several defendants,2
plaintiffs twice amended their complaint. The first amended complaint, filed in 2003,
added an allegation of negligence against Mark O'Brien, M.D. (Dr. O'Brien), the
Medical Program Director for the Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and
Hospitals, who was responsible for the overall operation of several state-run facilities,
including Smithfield Commons.3

Subsequently, several orders were entered that permitted the substitution of the
state for several defendants, and a second amended complaint was filed in 2006, which
alleged that the state was liable for the intentional and negligent acts of its employees.
Thus, at the time of trial, the remaining defendants consisted of the state, Smithfield
Commons, and Waddington, the alleged assailant.4

A nonjury trial was held in the Superior Court in September 2006. At the close of
plaintiffs' evidence, defendants moved, under Rule 52 of the Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure, for judgment as a matter of law. Although this was a jury-waived trial,
the trial justice declared that she "must review the evidence presented in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party without weighing evidence or evaluating the credibility
of witnesses and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party."

The trial justice granted the motion, finding that plaintiffs failed to introduce the
requisite evidence to support their allegations. She found that plaintiffs failed to produce
any evidence that Linda was assaulted or otherwise was caused to be in fear of imminent
bodily harm. As to the battery claim, the trial justice determined that there was evidence
that Linda "experienced contact with some person or thing that resulted in an extensive
bruise to her body," but she further determined that plaintiffs had failed to present
evidence that anyone intentionally touched Linda in a tortious manner. Because there
was no evidence of an intentional touching, plaintiffs' allegation of battery was
speculative and unproven.

With respect to the count alleging sexual assault, the trial justice found that there
was no prima facie case of "battery of a sexual nature." The record discloses that Dr.
Renee Eger, who, in 1994, characterized Linda's injury as an "apparent penetrating anal
injury," testified at trial that she could not say whether a sexual assault had occurred.

There was no evidence presented tending to show that Linda was sexually assaulted and
no evidence that linked Waddington to any sexual assault. Additionally, the trial justice
rejected the allegation of negligence and found that the plaintiffs failed to offer any
evidence of the standard of care in this case, failed to provide expert testimony on the
standard of care or the element of causation, and failed to prove a prima facie case of
negligence under a theory of res ipsa loquitur.

The trial justice also granted judgment for defendants on the allegation for
negligent supervision or hiring and concluded that plaintiffs did not offer any evidence to
support the allegations. She declared that plaintiffs failed to show that defendants knew
that Waddington had an aggressive nature, and in fact there was little evidence to suggest
that he actually did have an aggressive nature. Accordingly, on October 2, 2006, an order
and two judgments were entered for Waddington and the state on all counts. The
plaintiffs appealed.

Analysis

We first must address the standard to be applied to defendants' motion for
judgment as a matter of law in a jury-waived trial. In actions tried by a jury, a party may
move for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a)(1) of the Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure5 after an opposing party has been fully heard on an issue. The motion
may be granted by the trial justice upon a finding that "there is no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue * * *." Rule
50(a)(1). However, the motion must be denied if there are factual issues upon which
reasonable people may have differing conclusions. Trainor v. The Standard Times, 924
A.2d 766, 769 (R.I. 2007). Significantly, under Rule 50, the trial justice views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, without weighing the
evidence or passing on the credibility of the witnesses. Trainor, 924 A.2d at 769.

In a nonjury case, a party may also move for judgment as a matter of law after the
presentation of an opponent's case, but the standard applied to that motion differs from
the above criteria. Rule 52(c)6 provides that the court may enter judgment as a matter of
law against the party who has been fully heard on an issue, but "[s]uch a judgment shall
be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law * * *."7 Thus, in considering a
Rule 52(c) motion, the trial justice weighs "the credibility of witnesses and determines
the weight of the evidence presented by plaintiff." Pillar Property Management, L.L.C.
v. Caste's, Inc., 714 A.2d 619, 620 (R.I. 1998) (mem.). Additionally, when deciding a
motion for judgment as a matter of law in a nonjury trial, unlike a jury trial, the trial
justice need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Estate of Meller v. Adolf Meller Co., 554 A.2d 648, 651 (R.I. 1989).

In this case, although the trial justice cited Rule 52 when she passed on the
evidence, she actually employed the standard set forth in Rule 50. Rather than make
factual findings and credibility determinations, the trial justice declared that there was no
evidence to support the allegations in plaintiffs' complaint. Although this is an incorrect
standard, we deem this error harmless because the trial justice conducted a careful review
of the evidence and employed a standard of review that was more stringent than that
provided by Rule 52. Further, we are of the opinion that the trial justice's ultimate
conclusion that there was no evidence to support plaintiffs' claims was correct. We
previously have determined that a trial justice's use of the wrong rule may amount to
harmless error. See Bielecki v. Boissel, 715 A.2d 571, 572 (R.I. 1998) (ruling that
application of incorrect standard was harmless error). Thus, we are satisfied that this
error was harmless.

Our review of the trial record reveals that the trial justice neither misconceived
nor overlooked any material evidence, and her finding that there was insufficient proof to
support a prima facie case was not clearly wrong. Her decision was supported by the
evidence or lack of evidence in this case, including plaintiffs' failure to establish a
standard of care for negligence and the absence of proof of intentional misconduct.

Moreover, a finding on a Rule 52(c) motion must comport with the requirements in Rule
52(a),8 which does not require extensive analysis and discussion of all the evidence
presented in a bench trial. Donnelly v. Cowsill, 716 A.2d 742, 747 (R.I. 1998). "Even
brief findings and conclusions are sufficient if they address and resolve the controlling
and essential factual issues in the case." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Town of East
Greenwich, 460 A.2d 420, 423 (R.I. 1983)).

The plaintiffs contend that Linda's inability to speak for herself and to express
any fear she may have felt should not prevent her from recovering compensatory
damages. From the trial record, it is evident that the trial justice did not deny recovery
because of Linda's handicap, but rather because of the lack of evidence that she was
placed in fear or physical harm or that any intentional conduct caused the injury. Assault
has been defined as "a physical act of a threatening nature or an offer of corporal injury
which puts an individual in reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm," and the
apprehension of injury renders the defendant's act compensable. Hennessey v. Pyne, 694
A.2d 691, 696 (R.I. 1997) (quoting Picard v. Barry Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 654 A.2d 690,
694 (R.I. 1995)). This is different from a battery, which is defined as "an act that was
intended to cause, and does cause, an offensive contact with or unconsented touching of
or trauma upon the body of another, thereby generally resulting in the consummation of
the assault." Fenwick v. Oberman, 847 A.2d 852, 855 (R.I. 2004) (quoting Proffitt v.
Ricci, 463 A.2d 514, 517 (R.I. 1983)). In the present case, plaintiffs' witnesses were
unable or unwilling to testify that either an assault or a battery occurred, and the trial
justice, as she was required to do, correctly dismissed those allegations.

Further, we are of the opinion that the allegation of negligence properly was
dismissed. "To prevail on a claim of negligence, ‘a plaintiff must establish a legally
cognizable duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff, a breach of that duty, proximate
causation between the conduct and the resulting injury, and the actual loss or damage.'"
Selwyn v. Ward, 879 A.2d 882, 886 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Mills v. State Sales, Inc., 824
A.2d 461, 467 (R.I. 2003)). Furthermore, expert testimony must be presented "to
establish any matter that is not obvious to a lay person and thus lies beyond common
knowledge." Mills, 842 A.2d at 468. In the present case, the trial justice found that
plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden; there was no expert testimony that established the
standard of care owed to Linda, nor was there evidence of causation. Although several
witnesses speculated about the cause of the injury, there was no testimony that the injury
was caused by the breach of a standard of care on the part of Waddington or anyone else.

The plaintiffs also contend that defendants provided negligent supervision of their
employees. This Court has permitted a cause of action against an employer for the
negligent retention and/or supervision of an employee when a third party is injured by the
act of an unfit employee. Rivers v. Poisson, 761 A.2d 232, 235 (R.I. 2000) (citing Welsh
Manufacturing, Division of Textron, Inc. v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 474 A.2d 436 (R.I. 1984)).
However, in the case before us, the trial justice correctly concluded that plaintiffs failed
to prove that Waddington was known to exhibit aggressive behavior toward patients or
that any supervisors failed to properly monitor his job performance; therefore, the
allegation properly was dismissed.

* * *

http://www.courts.state.ri.us/supreme/pdf-files/07-80.pdf

Although the trial justice applied the incorrect standard in this case, we are
satisfied that the error was harmless. The judgment in this case turned on a failure of
proof that the trial justice adequately addressed when she reviewed the evidence and
ordered judgment for the defendants.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court, to which
we remand the papers in this case.

Unknown

Unknown

None