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Plaintiffs Dr. Ari Weitzner and his professional

corporation, Ari Weitzner M.D. P.C., challenge the

District Court’s conclusion on summary judgment that

their claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection

Act (TCPA) were untimely. There is no dispute that

plaintiffs’ TCPA claims—brought individually and on

behalf of a proposed class—are untimely unless tolling

applies. As a result, the primary question before this

Court is whether tolling is available under American Pipe

& Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).

American Pipe provides that the timely filing of a

class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations for

putative class members until the propriety of maintaining

the class is determined. Id. at 554. This tolling is an

equitable remedy that promotes both the efficiency and

economy goals of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 by

encouraging class members to rely on the named

plaintiff’s filings and protects unnamed class members

who may have been unaware of the class action.

Plaintiffs argue that a previous state court putative

class action brought by Dr. Weitzner, involving the very

4

same claims raised in this case, tolled the statute of

limitations such that Dr. Weitzner and his P.C. should be

allowed to pursue their claims anew in federal court.

Specifically, plaintiffs raise three categories of claims,

each of which they assert is timely under American Pipe:

(1) purported class claims; (2) Dr. Weitzner’s individual

claims; and (3) Weitzner P.C.’s individual claims. For

the reasons outlined below, we decline to extend

American Pipe tolling to each category of plaintiffs’

claims and agree with the District Court that plaintiffs’

claims are untimely.

Plaintiffs also challenge the District Court’s

application of Middle District of Pennsylvania Local

Rule 56.1. Finding no error in the District Court’s

application of the Rule, we will uphold the District

Court’s ruling on this issue as well.

I. BACKGROUND

1

Dr. Ari Weitzner is a physician who maintains a

practice in New York. Dr. Weitzner is, and has always

been, the sole shareholder of co-plaintiff Weitzner P.C.

1 On review of a grant of summary judgment, we

view the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs as

the nonmoving party, drawing all inferences in their

favor. Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 388 (3d

Cir. 2017).

5

During the events at issue in this case, Dr. Weitzner

practiced through the P.C. At the present time, the P.C.

has neither assets nor any ongoing business, yet remains

legally active under New York law.

On April 21, 2004 and March 22, 2005, Sanofi

Pasteur, Inc., the vaccines division of the pharmaceutical

company Sanofi, and VaxServe, Inc., a healthcare

supplier, sent two unsolicited faxes to a fax machine

located in Dr. Weitzner’s office. Based on the receipt of

these two faxes, Dr. Weitzner filed a putative class action

against Sanofi Pasteur and VaxServe in the Court of

Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania.

In the state court action, Dr. Weitzner alleged that

defendants transmitted thousands of faxes in violation of

the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C), including at least

one fax sent to Dr. Weitzner. The proposed class

included all individuals “who received an unsolicited

facsimile advertisement from defendants between

January 2, 2001[,] and the date of the resolution of this

lawsuit.” On June 27, 2008, the Court of Common Pleas

denied class certification,2 after which the case proceeded

as an individual action by Dr. Weitzner against

2 The Court of Common Pleas explained that its

class certification decision was made in the context of the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and not in the

context of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1707

regarding a motion for certification of a class action.

6

defendants. There has yet to be a final judgment in the

state court case. It is undisputed that defendants stopped

sending unsolicited faxes in April 2005.

More than three years after denial of class

certification in the state action, and over six years after

defendants sent any unsolicited faxes, Plaintiffs filed this

case in the Middle District of Pennsylvania on November

26, 2011. Plaintiffs brought individual claims based on

the same two faxes sent on April 21, 2004, and March

22, 2005, along with class claims substantially similar to

those alleged in the state court action.3

The District Court concluded that the four-year

federal default statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1658 applies to claims under the TCPA. On appeal, the

parties do not dispute the application of the four-year

statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for

claims arising from the two faxes actually sent to

plaintiffs therefore ran in 2008 and 2009, respectively,

and the statute of limitations for any class claims had

3 Defendants moved in the District Court for

abstention under Colorado River Water Conservation

District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), based on

the pending state court action. The District Court denied

the motion, and the parties did not raise this issue on

appeal.

7

similarly elapsed by April 2009.4 Accordingly, there is

no dispute that all of these claims are untimely absent

tolling. Plaintiffs rely on Dr. Weitzner’s 2005 state court

action—in which Dr. Weitzner initiated suit as the named

plaintiff in a putative class action and which he continues

to pursue on an individual basis—as the means for tolling

the statute of limitations as Dr. Weitzner and his P.C.

attempt to bring the same claims in the District Court.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on

statute of limitations grounds and filed an accompanying

4 The two faxes received by plaintiffs were sent on

April 21, 2004, and March 22, 2005, respectively.

Plaintiffs concede that defendants sent no faxes after

April 2005. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for

plaintiffs’ individual claims based on the first fax and

second fax expired on April 21, 2008, and March 22,

2009, respectively. The statute of limitations for any

class claims expired in April 2009.

8

statement of material facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1.5

Plaintiffs filed their opposition to defendants’ motion for

summary judgment and their answer to defendants’

statement of material facts. Defendants moved to strike

plaintiffs’ answer to the statement of facts for

noncompliance with Local Rule 56.1. Defendants

argued, in part, that portions of the answer were

argumentative in violation of Local Rule 56.1.

The District Court granted defendants’ motion to

strike plaintiffs’ answer to the statement of facts in part,

5 Local Rule 56.1 provides: “A motion for

summary judgment filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.56,

shall be accompanied by a separate, short and concise

statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs,

as to which the moving party contends there is no

genuine issue to be tried. The papers opposing a motion

for summary judgment shall include a separate, short and

concise statement of the material facts, responding to the

numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required

in the foregoing paragraph, as to which it is contended

that there exists a genuine issue to be tried. Statements

of material facts in support of, or in opposition to, a

motion shall include references to the parts of the record

that support the statements. All material facts set forth in

the statement required to be served by the moving party

will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the

statement required to be served by the opposing party.”

9

striking 19 responses from the answer for noncompliance

with Local Rule 56.1 because they were not concise and

were argumentative. In the same order, the District Court

granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

concluding that American Pipe tolling did not apply to

plaintiffs’ class or individual claims and that plaintiffs’

claims were therefore untimely. Plaintiffs filed a timely

notice of appeal.6

II. APPLICATION OF AMERICAN PIPE TOLLING

The primary issue in this appeal is whether the

District Court correctly concluded that plaintiffs’ claims

were not subject to American Pipe tolling and were

therefore untimely. We review orders granting summary

judgment de novo. Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d

382, 388 (3d Cir. 2017). We may affirm the District

Court on any grounds supported by the record. Nicini v.

Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Under American Pipe, the timely filing of a class

action tolls the applicable statute of limitations for

putative class members. Am. Pipe & Const. Co., 414

U.S. at 554. The Supreme Court held: “[T]he

commencement of a class action suspends the applicable

6 The District Court had federal question

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have

jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

10

statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the

class who would have been parties[7] had the suit been

permitted to continue as a class action.” Id. The

Supreme Court has since clarified that American Pipe

tolling is an equitable remedy, “designed to modify a

statutory time bar where its rigid application would

create injustice.” Cal. Pub. Emps’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec.,

Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2052 (2017).

Of course, “[p]laintiffs have no substantive right to

bring their claims outside the statute of limitations.”

China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct.

1800, 1810 (2018). Instead, any ability to do so is based

only on this “judicially crafted tolling rule.” Id.

Accordingly, the tolling rule need not be applied

mechanically. And it should not be applied where doing

so would result in an abuse of American Pipe. Cf.

Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354

7 American Pipe was decided in 1974, at a time

when courts were still gaining familiarity with the

modern class action. The Court’s use of the term

“parties” is imprecise, as unnamed class members are not

technically “parties” even where a class has been

certified. Nevertheless, the Court’s intent is clear, and, as

we discuss below, subsequent decisions have clarified

that American Pipe tolling applies to putative unnamed

class members.

11

(1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The tolling rule of

American Pipe is a generous one, inviting abuse.”).

Given the nature of plaintiffs’ claims, we are

tasked with answering three discrete questions to

determine whether any of plaintiffs’ claims are timely:

(1) whether tolling applies to plaintiffs’ class claims; (2)

whether tolling applies to Dr. Weitzner’s individual

claims, given his status as a named plaintiff in the state

court action; and (3) whether tolling applies to Weitzner

P.C.’s individual claims, given the P.C.’s connection to

Dr. Weitzner.

A. Application of American Pipe to

Plaintiffs’ Class Claims

The first question is the easiest to resolve.

Subsequent to the District Court’s ruling, the Supreme

Court issued its opinion in China Agritech, 138 S. Ct.

1800, clarifying that American Pipe tolling does not

allow a putative class member to commence a new class

action outside of the statute of limitations:

American Pipe tolls the statute of limitations

during the pendency of a putative class

action, allowing unnamed class members to

join the action individually or file individual

claims if the class fails. But American Pipe

does not permit the maintenance of a follow12

on class action past expiration of the statute

of limitations.

Id. at 1804. As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he

‘efficiency and economy of litigation’ that support tolling

of individual claims, Am. Pipe & Const. Co., 414 U.S. at

553, do not support maintenance of untimely successive

class actions.” China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 1806.

Further, as the Supreme Court recognized, if the

limitations period for subsequent class claims was also

tolled, the time for filing class suits “could be limitless.”

Id. at 1809. American Pipe tolling thus permits putative

class members to file only individual claims after a denial

of class certification.8

In reaching this conclusion, the China Agritech

Court rejected this Court’s approach in Yang v. Odom,

392 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 2004). In Yang, we held that

American Pipe tolling did not apply to successive class

actions where certification was previously denied due to

a substantive class defect, but did apply where

8 Despite plaintiffs’ contention to the contrary, the

Supreme Court’s broad pronouncement defeats any

argument that the China Agritech rule should apply only

to unnamed class members. There is no logical reason

for named plaintiffs—who have already brought a class

action—to be permitted to bring successive class actions

after class certification has been denied, where putative

class members cannot do so.

13

certification was denied based on a putative

representative’s deficiencies. Id. at 104. The Supreme

Court expressly rejected this distinction:

Justice SOTOMAYOR suggests that the Court

might adopt a rule under which tolling

“becomes unavailable for future class claims

where class certification is denied for a reason

that bears on the suitability of the claims for

class treatment,” but not where “class

certification is denied because of the

deficiencies of the lead plaintiff as class

representative.” But Rule 23 contains no

instruction to give denials of class certification

different effect based on the reason for the

denial.

China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 1809 n.5 (internal citations

omitted). Accordingly, we recognize the abrogation of

Yang v. Odom on this point.9

Because plaintiffs’ class claims are untimely

absent tolling, and China Agritech precludes the

application of American Pipe tolling to such successive

class claims, we conclude that plaintiffs’ class claims are

not subject to tolling and are therefore untimely.

9 Yang’s holding that American Pipe tolling ends

on the day the trial court denies class certification was

not affected by China Agritech and continues to be

authoritative. See Yang, 392 F.3d at 102.

14

B. Application of American Pipe to Dr.

Weitzner’s Individual Claims

The question of whether American Pipe applies to

Dr. Weitzner’s individual claims is less straightforward

than the issue of its application to follow-on class

actions. Dr. Weitzner initiated the state court action as a

named plaintiff in that putative class action. American

Pipe is designed to protect individual claims filed after

the denial of class certification, but the Supreme Court

did not specify whether tolling should protect named

plaintiffs as well as unnamed plaintiffs. Indeed, the

Court included no express restrictions in the broad

language it used to describe the claims to which tolling

would apply: “[T]he commencement of a class action

suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all

asserted members of the class who would have been

parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class

action.” Am. Pipe & Const. Co., 414 U.S. at 554. On

initial review, American Pipe’s broad language would

seem to provide for tolling of the claims of both named

plaintiffs and unnamed putative class members in the

initial class action. The purpose of American Pipe tolling

and subsequent decisions, however, make clear that

tolling does not protect named plaintiffs.

There were two primary purposes underlying the

Supreme Court’s holding in American Pipe. First, the

Court emphasized the “efficiency and economy of

litigation” purposes of Rule 23 as a basis for the tolling

15

rule because, without such a rule, “[p]otential class

members would be induced to file protective motions to

intervene or join.” Id. at 553. This concern does not

apply to named plaintiffs, who have already filed their

claims; neither efficiency nor economy would be

advanced by allowing named plaintiffs to rely on their

own filings. To the extent a named plaintiff could file

claims in multiple jurisdictions, plaintiffs are often tasked

with deciding between multiple jurisdictions when

bringing claims. Where a plaintiff can bring multiple

putative class claims simultaneously, efficiency interests

and judicial comity actually support the plaintiff’s filing

all claims as soon as possible. See China Agritech, 138

S. Ct. at 1811 (“Multiple timely filings might not line up

neatly . . . . But district courts have ample tools at their

disposal to manage the suits, including the ability to stay,

consolidate, or transfer proceedings.”).

Second, the Supreme Court emphasized the need

for tolling to protect the interests of putative unnamed

class members who had not received notice and were

unaware of the pending class action. The Court

described the “passive beneficiar[y]” status of potential

class members, explaining that they have no obligation to

“take note of the suit or to exercise any responsibility

with respect to it” until the existence of the class has been

established. Am. Pipe & Const. Co., 414 U.S. at 552.

Again, this interest supports tolling only for unnamed

class members. Named plaintiffs are necessarily aware

16

of the pending litigation and will be made aware of any

denial of class certification such that tolling is

unnecessary to protect their interests. Indeed, a named

plaintiff’s individual claim will remain viable upon

denial of class certification because the putative class

action is then simply transformed into an individual

action.

The Supreme Court has confirmed that the purpose

of American Pipe tolling is that “unnamed plaintiffs

should be treated as though they had been named

plaintiffs during the pendency of the class action,” with

their rights protected accordingly. Chardon v. Fumero

Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 659 (1983) (emphasis added).

Multiple Supreme Court opinions have since described

the American Pipe rule as applying to only unnamed

class members. See, e.g., China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at

1804 (“American Pipe tolls the statute of limitations

during the pendency of a putative class action, allowing

unnamed class members to join the action individually or

file individual claims if the class fails.” (emphasis

added)); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 313 n.10

(2011) (describing American Pipe as demonstrating that

“a person not a party to a class suit may receive certain

benefits (such as the tolling of a limitations period)

related to that proceeding”); Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536

U.S. 1, 10 (2002) (citing American Pipe for the

proposition that “[n]onnamed class members are, for

instance, parties in the sense that the filing of an action

17

on behalf of the class tolls a statute of limitations against

them”); Chardon, 462 U.S. at 664 (Rehnquist, J.,

dissenting) (“The question in American Pipe was whether

the pendency of this class action warranted tolling of the

Clayton Act’s limitations period as to unnamed plaintiffs

in the class.”).

Given the equitable nature of American Pipe

tolling, we discern no reason to extend its reach to named

plaintiffs. Allowing named plaintiffs to file new

individual claims outside the statute of limitations—

when they can instead pursue their original, timely filed

individual claims in the first case, after class certification

has been denied—serves no legitimate purpose. Quite

simply, no injustice results from denying those parties

tolling. To the contrary, allowing an individual to file

repetitive claims outside the statute of limitations would

be an abuse of American Pipe and contrary to its

underlying policy.

Accordingly, we hold that American Pipe does not

toll the statute of limitations for named plaintiffs such as

Dr. Weitzner. We therefore conclude that his individual

claims in this case are untimely.

18

C. Application of American Pipe to Weitzner

P.C.’s Individual Claims

Given the facts of this case, we conclude that the

same reasoning applicable to Dr. Weitzner bars the P.C.’s

individual claims. The rationale underlying American

Pipe tolling does not apply to Weitzner P.C., so applying

it here would constitute an abuse of American Pipe.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning in American Pipe

does not extend to Weitzner P.C. Although Weitzner

P.C. may have been a putative class member in Dr.

Weitzner’s state court action, it was not the type of

unaware, absent class member American Pipe was

designed to protect.10 Dr. Weitzner has always been the

sole shareholder of Weitzner P.C., so there can be no

dispute that Weitzner P.C. received actual notice of the

pending state court action and of the denial of class

certification in that case. Yet Weitzner P.C. took no

steps to pursue its claims within the statute of limitations

and waited over three years following the denial of class

certification to first bring its claims. Accordingly, we

conclude that Weitzner P.C. is not entitled to the benefit

10 Dr. Weitzner testified in 2006 that, apart from

this case and the related state case, he had filed 17 other

lawsuits under the TCPA. Some of these lawsuits were

filed on behalf of Dr. Weitzner individually, while the

P.C. was the plaintiff in other cases. As a result, the P.C.

itself is an experienced TCPA litigant.

19

of American Pipe equitable tolling. See China Agritech,

138 S. Ct. at 1808 (“Ordinarily, to benefit from equitable

tolling, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have been

diligent in pursuit of their claims.”).

Tolling Weitzner P.C.’s individual claims would

also result in an abuse of American Pipe. Having always

been the sole shareholder of Weitzner P.C., Dr. Weitzner

did business through the P.C. during the time periods at

issue here. The same two faxes allegedly sent in

violation of the TCPA form the bases of both Dr.

Weitzner and Weitzner P.C.’s claims. Any judgment in

favor of Weitzner P.C.—a nonoperational, but legally

active corporation—would benefit only Dr. Weitzner.

Given the nature of the plaintiffs’ claims and the close

relationship between Dr. Weitzner and Weitzner P.C.,

applying American Pipe tolling to Weitzner P.C.’s claims

would effectively allow Dr. Weitzner to pursue his

claims for a second time outside the statute of limitations,

despite our conclusion that tolling does not apply to Dr.

Weitzner’s personal claims.

Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that

American Pipe tolling does not apply to any of plaintiffs’

claims, and such claims are therefore barred as untimely.

20

III. LOCAL RULE 56.1

To address plaintiffs’ second claim on appeal—

that the District Court erred in striking portions of their

answer to the statement of facts under Middle District of

Pennsylvania Local Rule 56.1—we must first determine

what standard of review to apply to a district court’s

application of its own local rules. We have previously

held that an appellate court “owes deference to a district

court’s interpretation of its local rules.” Gov’t of V.I. v.

Mills, 634 F.3d 746, 750 (3d Cir. 2011). We now clarify

that a district court’s application and interpretation of its

own local rules should generally be reviewed for abuse of

discretion.11 “An abuse of discretion may occur as a

result of an errant conclusion of law, an improper

application of law to fact, or a clearly erroneous finding

of fact.” McDowell v. Phila. Hous. Auth. (PHA), 423

F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2005). We see no abuse of

discretion here.

Under Local Rule 56.1, a party must file a separate

statement of material facts along with any motion for

summary judgment. M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. A party

opposing summary judgment must file a corresponding

answer to the statement of material facts, responding to

11 Some exceptions exist. For example, where the local

rules are substantively identical to the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, we apply a plenary standard of

review. See Mills, 634 F.3d at 750.

21

the moving party’s filing. Id. Where an opposing party

fails to object in its answer, those facts in the moving

party’s statement are considered admitted. Id.

Local Rule 56.1 was promulgated to bring greater

efficiency to the work of the judges of the Middle

District. As opinions from that Court have explained, the

Rule “is essential to the Court’s resolution of a summary

judgment motion” due to its role in “organizing the

evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating

precisely how each side proposed to prove a disputed fact

with admissible evidence.” Kramer v. Peerless Indem.

Ins. Co., No. 3:CV-08-2096, 2010 WL 11553711, at *1

(M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2010); see also Hartshorn v. Throop

Borough, No. CIV.A. 3:07-CV-01333, 2009 WL 761270,

at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2009) (“The purpose of this rule

is to structure a party’s summary judgment legal and

factual theory into a format that permits and facilitates

the court’s direct and accurate consideration of the

motion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, the District Court is in the best position to

determine the extent of a party’s noncompliance with

Local Rule 56.1, as well as the appropriate sanction for

such noncompliance. An abuse of discretion standard of

review is therefore wholly appropriate.

Plaintiffs here primarily argue that the District

Court erred by striking entire paragraphs of their answer

to the statement of facts where only a portion was

noncompliant with Local Rule 56.1. They further

22

suggest that the District Court should have allowed

plaintiffs to refile, rather than deeming defendants’

uncontroverted facts admitted. Under these

circumstances, the District Court’s decision to employ

any given sanction—out of the many possible sanctions

available to it—is fully within the discretion of that

Court. Plaintiffs offer no persuasive reason for us to

disturb the District Court’s conclusion that portions of

plaintiffs’ answer to the statement of facts were not

concise and were argumentative in violation of Local

Rule 56.1. Nor does the District Court’s decision to

strike the portions it concluded were noncompliant,

rather than choosing to employ a more forgiving

sanction, constitute an abuse of discretion. It is beyond

question that the District Court has the authority to strike

filings that fail to comply with its local rules.

Finally, though the District Court was still required

to conduct a full analysis to determine whether granting

summary judgment was appropriate, we find no error in

the District Court’s Rule 56 analysis, which fully

23

addressed plaintiffs’ factual allegations.12 See Anchorage

Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d

Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse

its discretion in applying Local Rule 56.1.



12 Even if the District Court’s application of Local

Rule 56.1 were improper, plaintiffs fail to identify any

prejudicial error. Plaintiffs do not identify any stricken

statement that would have affected the District Court’s

conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims were untimely.

Accordingly, we conclude that any error as to Local Rule

56.1 was harmless.

American Pipe created a generous tolling rule that

applies broadly to protect putative class members in

pending class actions. Yet the rule is not without limits.

As the Supreme Court clarified in China Agritech, tolling

does not apply to successive class actions under any

circumstances. We now hold that American Pipe tolling

does not allow individuals who were named plaintiffs in

an initial class action to toll their own statute of

limitations. We emphasize that American Pipe tolling

has long been recognized as an equitable remedy that

applies only where necessary to prevent injustice. Courts

should not permit tolling where doing so would result in

an abuse of American Pipe. As a result, American Pipe

does not apply to preserve any of plaintiffs’ untimely

claims. Finally, we conclude that the District Court’s

application of Local Rule 56.1 was not an abuse of

discretion and, in any event, had no effect on its

appropriate grant of summary judgment. We will

therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary

judgment.