Jack Brockway v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company

This case involves an insurance dispute between

plaintiffs and defendant, Allstate Property and Casualty

Insurance Company (Allstate). After a theft at their home,

plaintiffs filed claims with Allstate, their insurance carrier,

under two policies. More than two years after the loss,

Allstate denied coverage for the loss and plaintiffs brought

an action against Allstate relating to that denial seeking,

among other things, damages for breach of contract and for

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Allstate moved for summary judgment, arguing that

the action was untimely in light of a two-year suit-limitation

provision contained in the insurance contracts. The trial

court agreed and granted the motion. Plaintiffs appeal the

resulting general judgment in favor of Allstate, raising two

assignments of error. In their first assignment, plaintiffs

contend that the court erred in granting the motion “in

light of * * * evidence supporting [plaintiffs’]” position that

Allstate should be estopped from invoking the suit-limitation

provision. In their second assignment of error, plaintiffs

argue that, in any event, the court erred in granting summary

judgment on their claim for breach of the implied covenant

of good faith and fair dealing because that claim “did

not come into existence until Allstate issued its denial letter,”

and the action was filed within two years of that denial.

As explained below, we affirm.

Because the trial court granted a defense motion

for summary judgment, we state the facts in the light most

favorable to plaintiffs. Shell v. Schollander Companies, Inc.,

358 Or 552, 554 n 1, 369 P3d 1101 (2016).

On September 6, 2009, plaintiffs discovered that

a hole had been cut in their fence, and that property had

been stolen from their backyard. They reported the theft to

the police and, on September 8, 2009, called their Allstate

agent to inform him of the theft. After their initial contact

with the Allstate agent, plaintiffs discovered that additional

property was missing (some from their boat and some from

their travel trailer) and, in the summer of 2010, they talked

with their Allstate agent about the additional missing

items. On September 10, 2010, plaintiffs participated in a

86 Brockway v. Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co.

telephone conference with an Allstate investigator regarding

the items they claimed had been stolen during the theft

incident. During that telephone call, the investigator did not

mention the “contractual provision in the insurance policies

which required [them] to file a lawsuit or any other claim

arising from this loss within two years from the date of the

loss itself.”

On September 17, 2010, Allstate sent a letter to

plaintiffs regarding its investigation of their claims. The

letter informed plaintiffs that they were required to provide

Allstate with a sworn statement of proof of loss, and

to include “documentation that supports the ownership

and value of any stolen items claimed.” (Boldface omitted.)

Allstate also informed plaintiffs that the “statute of limitations

on this claim expires 2 years from the date of loss,”

insisted on “complete compliance with all of the terms of the

[insurance] policy and the laws of Oregon,” reserved all of

its rights and defenses in conjunction with the policy, and

stated that “[n]o waiver or estoppel of any kind is intended,

nor may any be inferred.” Thereafter, Allstate sent plaintiffs

a number of letters seeking additional documentation

or information and stating that it was continuing to investigate

the claimed loss. In September 2011, Allstate requested

that plaintiffs participate in examinations under oath. It

conducted those examinations in October 2011. After those

examinations, Allstate again sought additional information

and documents and continued to investigate the loss until

February 2012. In many, but not all, of its letters to plaintiffs,

Allstate repeated its admonishment that it insisted

on compliance with all policy terms, reserved its rights and

defenses, and that no waiver or estoppel of any kind was

intended or should be inferred. In February 2012, Allstate

denied plaintiffs’ claims based on its determination that

plaintiffs had misrepresented material facts and failed to

cooperate with the investigation. Allstate also pointed out

that “Section I—Conditions” of plaintiffs’ insurance policies

provide:

“No one may bring an action against us in any way related

to the existence or amount of coverage or the amount of

loss for which coverage is sought, under a coverage to which

Section I—Conditions applies, unless:

Cite as 284 Or App 83 (2017) 87

“(a) there has been full compliance with all policy

terms; and

“(b) the action is commenced within two years after the

date of the loss.”1

(Emphasis added; boldface omitted.)

Plaintiffs commenced this action against Allstate on

September 5, 2012. In its answer, Allstate raised as an affirmative

defense the suit-limitation provision of the insurance

policies. Allstate later sought summary judgment, asserting

that plaintiffs’ case should be dismissed in light of the

suit-limitation provision because it was filed approximately

three years after the loss and was, therefore, precluded as a

matter of law. Plaintiffs responded that there were genuine

issues of fact regarding whether Allstate was estopped from

relying on the suit-limitation provisions as a bar to their

claim:

“Clearly Plaintiffs were justified in relying on Allstate’s

conduct since each and every letter, including letters from

Allstate’s lawyer, included the date of loss of September 6,

2009 and recited that Allstate was still continuing to

investigate the claim. Even more telling is the letter from

Allstate’s attorney after the purported two-year limitation

stating ‘Allstate can neither admit or deny coverage at this

time.’ ”

(Underscoring in original.) In plaintiffs’ view, that conduct

created genuine issues of fact regarding estoppel. Plaintiffs

1 As Allstate points out, loss as a result of theft falls within Section I of the

policies, and “Section I—Conditions” applies to such losses.

Furthermore, as Allstate also points out, those provisions are consistent with

ORS 742.240, which states:

“A fire insurance policy shall contain a provision as follows:

“No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable

in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy

shall have been complied with, and unless commenced within 24 months

next after inception of the loss.”

Both insurance policies at issue in this case insure against fire losses, and we

have held that ORS 742.240 applies to homeowner’s insurance policies. See

Herman v. Valley Ins. Co., 145 Or App 124, 126 n 1, 928 P2d 985 (1996), rev den,

325 Or 438 (1997) (although, “by its terms, ORS 742.240 applies only to fire insurance

policies,” as it has been construed, “it applies to homeowner’s insurance

policies as well” (citing Hatley v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 261 Or 606, 494 P2d

426 (1972))).

88 Brockway v. Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co.

also asserted that their claim for breach of the duty of good

faith arose under the General Condition provision of the

insurance contracts:

“Plaintiffs are alleging a claim for breach of the duty of

good faith arising from Allstate’s claims handling as set

forth above, which under Oregon law is separate and distinct

from a claim for breach of the express terms of the

insurance contract. Thus, the applicable provision for

actions against Allstate relating to the claim for breach of

the covenant of good faith is found in the General Provision

section, wherein an action ‘must be commenced within two

years of the date the cause of action accrues’ not two years

from the inception of loss or damage.”

(Citation omitted.) Because, in their view, the claim for

breach of the duty of good faith accrued when Allstate

denied their insurance claims in February 2012, plaintiffs

contended that that claim, at least, was not time barred. As

to that contention, Allstate replied that plaintiffs could not

maintain their claim for breach of the duty of good faith as a

matter of law, regardless of when the denials occurred.

The trial court held a hearing on the summary

judgment motion. At the hearing, among other things, the

court asked the parties to discuss the applicability of ORS

742.056, which provides:

“Without limitation of any right or defense of an insurer

otherwise, none of the following acts by or on behalf of an

insurer shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of or an

estoppel to assert any provision of a policy or of any defense

of the insurer thereunder:

“(1) Acknowledgment of the receipt of notice of loss or

claim under the policy.

“(2) Furnishing forms for reporting a loss or claim,

for giving information thereto, or for making proof of loss,

or receiving or acknowledging receipt of any such forms or

proofs completed or uncompleted.

“(3) Investigating any loss or claim under the policy or

engaging in negotiations looking toward a possible settlement

of any such loss or claim.”

After hearing the parties’ arguments, the court granted

the motion for summary judgment based on the Section I

Cite as 284 Or App 83 (2017) 89

two-year suit limitation. Accordingly, it entered a general

judgment in favor of defendant.

We will affirm a grant of summary judgment if,

viewing the summary judgment record in the light most

favorable to the adverse party, we determine that there are

no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jones v. General

Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 420, 939 P2d 608 (1997); ORCP

47 C.

As noted, plaintiffs raise two assignments of error

on appeal. In their first assignment of error, they contend

that there are issues of fact regarding estoppel and, therefore,

the trial court erred in granting summary judgment

based on the suit-limitation provision.

It is undisputed in this case that the insurance contracts

contain a clause providing that no one may bring an

action against Allstate “related to the existence or amount

of coverage or the amount of loss for which coverage is

sought” for a claimed loss such as the one at issue in this

case unless, among other things “the action is commenced

within two years after the date of the loss.” It is also undisputed

that plaintiffs’ action was commenced more than two

years after the date of loss in this case. Nonetheless, plaintiffs

assert, the trial court should not have ruled in favor of

Allstate with respect to any of the claims set forth in the

complaint because the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies.

Specifically, in plaintiffs’ view, the evidence presented on

summary judgment “clearly demonstrates issues of fact on

the issue of estoppel; i.e. affirmative conduct on the part of

Allstate * * * which [plaintiffs were] reasonably justified in

relying upon.”

“Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, ‘a person

may be precluded by his act or conduct, or silence when it is

his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise

would have had.’ ” Day v. Advanced M&D Sales, 336 Or 511,

518, 86 P3d 678 (2004) (quoting Marshall v. Wilson, 175 Or

506, 518, 154 P2d 547 (1944)). In “proper circumstances, an

insurer may be [equitably] estopped from asserting a suit

limitation provision as a defense to liability on an insurance

policy.” Herman v. Valley Ins. Co., 145 Or App 124, 133, 928

90 Brockway v. Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co.

P2d 985 (1996), rev den, 325 Or 438 (1997). The elements of

equitable estoppel are as follows:

“[T]here must (1) be a false representation; (2) it must be

made with knowledge of the facts; (3) the other party must

have been ignorant of the truth; (4) it must have been made

with the intention that it should be acted upon by the other

party; (5) the other party must have been induced to act

upon it.”

Day, 336 Or at 518-19 (internal quotation marks and brackets

omitted); see Herman, 145 Or App at 133-34. For a plaintiff

to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the insurance

company “must have done something that amounted

to an affirmative inducement that would cause [the] plaintiff

to delay” in bringing his or her action. Herman, 145

Or App at 134 (internal quotation marks omitted); see

Lyden v. Goldberg, 260 Or 301, 304-05, 490 P2d 181 (1971).

Furthermore, there must be “justifiable reliance by the

party seeking to invoke estoppel, and that reliance must be

reasonable.” Herman, 145 Or App at 134 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Finally, as relevant to the circumstances of

this case, under ORS 742.056, as a matter of law, an insurance

company’s investigation of a loss or claim under an

insurance policy does not estop the insurance company from

asserting “any provision of [the insurance] policy or of any

defense of the insurer thereunder.”

In this case, viewed in the light most favorable to

plaintiffs, the record does not contain evidence “from which an

objectively reasonable juror could find an estoppel.” Herman,

145 Or App at 134. There is no evidence that Allstate made a

misrepresentation to plaintiffs regarding the suit-limitation

provision. Instead, the evidence is that, on September 17,

2010, Allstate informed plaintiffs that their time to file an

action relating to their claims “expires 2 years from the

date of loss.” See Herman, 145 Or App at 134 (noting that,

although the insurer was not required to “remind” the plaintiff

of “the suit limitation provision in her policy,” it nonetheless

did so). Furthermore, in its letters, Allstate repeatedly

stated that it reserved all its rights and defenses and that

no waiver or estoppel was intended or should be inferred.

See id. (noting insurer’s repeated warnings that it would not

Cite as 284 Or App 83 (2017) 91

waive its rights under insurance policy and that no waiver or

estoppel was intended or should be implied). Furthermore,

Allstate’s numerous communications with plaintiffs stated

that it was continuing to investigate their claim.2 There is no

evidence in the record suggesting that that was not the case

and, under ORS 742.056, Allstate’s investigation of plaintiffs’

claims cannot be used to estop Allstate from asserting

the suit limitation. In sum, we conclude that, on the facts

in the summary judgment record, viewed in the light most

favorable to plaintiffs, no objectively reasonable factfinder

could conclude that Allstate should be estopped from raising

the suit-limitation provision as a defense in this case.

See Herman, 145 Or App at 134 (on summary judgment, no

evidence from which an objectively reasonable factfinder

could find that insurer should be estopped from raising suitlimitation

provision where record showed no false representations,

and the insurer reminded the plaintiff of suitlimitation

provision in insurance policy and warned the

plaintiff that it would not waive its rights under the policy

and that no waiver or estoppel was intended or should be

implied). Cf. Wright v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.

Co., 223 Or App 357, 371-72, 196 P3d 1000 (2008) (genuine

issues of material fact existed regarding waiver of suitlimitation

provision where letter from insurer that was sent

three years after the expiration of the policy’s suit-limitation

provision stated that the plaintiff had coverage for her claim

and the only “remaining issues [were] liability and damages

due to” the plaintiff (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, we reject plaintiffs’ first assignment of error.

2 We note that, as they did before the trial court, plaintiffs emphasize that

Allstate sent letters more than two years after the date of loss that stated that

Allstate was continuing to investigate their claim and that plaintiffs’ lack of

cooperation was impeding the investigation. They assert that, to be consistent

with their present assertion of the suit-limitation provision, Allstate “should

have written, ‘This claim is now barred and Allstate is closing its file.’ ” As we

explained in Herman, a suit-limitation is not a condition of forfeiture, which “disallows

claims that otherwise are covered under a policy.” 145 Or App at 131.

Instead, a suit-limitation provision “does not nullify insurance coverage. Rather,

it precludes an insured from starting an action against its insurer once the limitation

period had passed, regardless of the extent of coverage.” Id. (emphasis

added). Furthermore, for purposes of evaluating the issue of estoppel, Allstate

correctly observes that letters sent more than two years after the date of loss

could not “have influenced the decision by [plaintiffs] not to file suit” before the

end of that two year period.

92 Brockway v. Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co.

In their second assignment of error, plaintiffs argue

that, in any event, the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment as to their claim for breach of an implied

covenant of good faith. They contend that that claim is not

covered by the Section I suit-limitation provision and is,

instead, governed by a different suit limitation provision

in the insurance contracts. Specifically, the policies, in the

General Conditions, set forth a default suit-limitation as

follows:

“No one may bring an action against us unless there has

been full compliance with all policy terms.

“Any action against us to which neither the Action Against

Us provision located in Section I—Conditions nor the Action

Against Us provision located in Section II—Conditions

applies must be commenced within two years of the date

the cause of action accrues.”

(Boldface omitted.) It is that default suit-limitation provision

that plaintiffs contend applies to their claim for a

breach of the duty of good faith. Plaintiffs point out that the

Section I suit-limitation provision applies to an action “in

any way related to the existence or amount of coverage or

the amount of loss for which coverage is sought, under a coverage

to which Section I—Conditions applies.” They assert

that the claim in question does not relate to the existence or

amount of coverage or the amount of loss for which coverage

is sought. Instead, it relates to Allstate’s conduct in processing

and investigating the claim. Thus, in their view, their

action based on that claim had to be brought within two

years of the date it accrues and, they assert, the claim did

not accrue until Allstate denied coverage.

Allstate responds that plaintiffs cannot circumvent

the Section I suit limitation through their claim for

breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. According

to Allstate, contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, only the

“Section I suit limitation” has “any relevance in this matter.”

Allstate further asserts, in the alternative, that, in the

circumstances here, plaintiffs cannot maintain their claim

for breach of the implied duty of good faith, which “does not

vary the substantive terms of the bargain” but, instead, only

effectuates the reasonable expectations of the parties to the

Cite as 284 Or App 83 (2017) 93

contract. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In Allstate’s

view, in light of the summary judgment record in this case,

plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair

dealing fails as a matter of law.

With respect to that issue, plaintiffs reply that they

can maintain an action for breach of the duty of good faith

based on the facts in the summary judgment record. They

assert:

“Allstate’s conduct was contrary to [plaintiffs’] reasonable

expectations. [Plaintiffs] expected that Allstate would fairly

evaluate and investigate the claim. A jury could find that

* * * Allstate’s conduct in taking more than 17-months to

evaluate a simple property theft, requiring Examinations

under Oath and production of documents past the limitation

deadline and the issuance of a denial asserting misrepresentation

and concealment well past the limitation

deadline to be a breach of the duty of good faith and fair

dealing.”

Plaintiffs argue, as they did with respect to the issue of estoppel,

that “the evidence and conduct of Allstate, affirmative

as it was, reasonably induced [plaintiffs] not to commence

any legal action prior to September 6, 2011.” Accordingly,

in plaintiffs’ view, the “facts presented warrant review by

a trier of fact.” We agree with Allstate that, based on the

record on summary judgment, there are no issues of fact

regarding the alleged breach of the duty of good faith and

fair dealing and that, under the circumstances, plaintiffs

cannot maintain that claim as a matter of law. Accordingly,

we address only that issue.

As explained in Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc.

v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634, 659-60, 20 P3d 180 (2001),

we may affirm the ruling of a lower court on an alternative

basis when certain conditions are met:

“The first condition is that, if the question presented is

not purely one of law, then the evidentiary record must

be sufficient to support the proffered alternative basis for

affirmance. That requires: (1) that the facts of record be

sufficient to support the alternative basis for affirmance;

(2) that the trial court’s ruling be consistent with the view

of the evidence under the alternative basis for affirmance;

94 Brockway v. Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co.

and (3) that the record materially be the same one that

would have been developed had the prevailing party raised

the alternative basis for affirmance below. In other words,

even if the record contains evidence sufficient to support an

alternative basis for affirmance, if the losing party might

have created a different record below had the prevailing

party raised that issue, and that record could affect the disposition

of the issue, then we will not consider the alternative

basis for affirmance. The second condition is that the

decision must be correct for a reason other than that upon

which the lower court relied. Third, and finally, the reasons

for the lower court’s decision must be either (a) erroneous

or (b) in the reviewing court’s estimation, unnecessary in

light of the alternative basis for affirmance.”

(Emphasis in original.) The requirement that the record be

“materially the same one as would have been developed had

the prevailing party raised the alternative basis for affirmance

below” is of particular importance on summary judgment.

See Eklof v. Steward, 360 Or 717, 736, 385 P3d 1074

(2016) (that “criterion is of particular importance where * * *

the [party opposing summary judgment] had no reason to

adduce evidence on an issue that was not raised in the summary

judgment motion”).

Here, Allstate asserted before the trial court that

plaintiffs could not maintain a claim for breach of the

duty of good faith and fair dealing. To the extent that, on

appeal, Allstate relies on different arguments in support of

that contention, we conclude that the record is materially

the same as would have been developed had the arguments

been raised below. In support of their claim for breach of the

implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, plaintiffs rely on

the same conduct that they assert estopped Allstate from

relying on the suit-limitation provision. In particular, plaintiffs

assert a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing

based on Allstate’s continued investigation and communications

with them, which they say reasonably induced them

not to commence any legal action prior to September 6, 2011,

when the two-year period in the Section I suit-limitation

provision expired. Because plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the

duty of good faith is premised on the same conduct that they

assert supported the application of estoppel to this case, in

the circumstances of this case, we are convinced that the

Cite as 284 Or App 83 (2017) 95

record on summary judgment, which includes affidavits and

documentation detailing plaintiffs’ description of interactions

with Allstate through the time that Allstate denied

the claim, is sufficient to support the alternative basis. In

other words, given the nature of the claims and defenses in

this case, plaintiffs created the same record that would have

been created had the issue been addressed before the trial

court. See Eklof, 360 Or at 736. Accordingly, it is appropriate

to consider the alternative basis for affirmance.

We begin by observing that plaintiffs’ claim for

breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in this case

“sounds in contract.” Employers’ Fire Ins. v. Love It Ice Cream,

64 Or App 784, 791, 670 P2d 160 (1983) (insurance first party

bad faith claim sounds in contract). In other words, plaintiffs’

claim for breach of the duty of good faith is a claim for

breach of the insurance contracts. Every “contract contains

an implied duty of good faith.” Uptown Heights Associates v.

Seafirst Corp., 320 Or 638, 645, 891 P2d 639 (1995). “The

purpose of that duty is to prohibit improper behavior in the

performance and enforcement of contracts, and to ensure

that the parties will refrain from any act that would have

the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other

party to receive the fruits of the contract.” Klamath Off-

Project Water Users v. PacifiCorp, 237 Or App 434, 445, 240

P3d 94 (2010), rev den, 349 Or 602 (2011) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

The duty of good faith and fair dealing is to be

applied in a manner that will effectuate the objectively reasonable

expectations of the parties to the contract. Id. In

particular, because the rights and duties of the parties to

an insurance policy are contractual, “the duties of each are

limited to those derived from the policy.” Safeco Ins. Co. v.

Masood, 264 Or App 173, 178, 330 P3d 61, rev den, 356 Or

638 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). An “implied

duty of good faith and fair dealing [cannot] be construed in

a way that changes or inserts terms into a contract.” Id.; see

Uptown Heights Associates, 320 Or at 645 (implied contractual

obligation of good faith cannot serve to vary the terms

of a contract, nor does it provide a remedy for an unpleasantly

motivated act that is expressly permitted by contract).

Instead, the law imposes that duty “in contracts to facilitate

96 Brockway v. Allstate Property and Casualty Ins. Co.

performance and enforcement in a manner that is consistent

with the terms of the contract.” Masood, 264 Or App at

178 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under those principles, “if a written contract between

the parties expressly allows for a particular remedy by one

of the parties, in the face of a specified breach, the parties’

objectively ‘reasonable expectations’ under the contract

include invocation of that remedy in the face of that breach.

The party invoking its express, written contractual right

does not, merely by doing so, violate its duty of good faith.”

Uptown Heights Associates, 320 Or at 645.

Here, we conclude that, viewed in the light most

favorable to plaintiffs, there is not a genuine issue of material

fact with respect to a breach of the duty of good faith

and fair dealing, and Allstate is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. We begin by noting that plaintiffs emphasize

that, in many of its communications, Allstate failed to state

its view that any action to enforce plaintiffs’ claims had to be

commenced on or before September 6, 2011. However, that

two-year limitation provision is contained in the insurance

contracts and state statute and was pointed out by Allstate

in an early letter to plaintiffs. More importantly, the insurance

contracts impose no duty on Allstate to remind plaintiffs

of the terms thereof, Herman, 145 Or App at 134, and

the implied duty of good faith cannot be construed in a way

that inserts new terms into the contracts. Plaintiffs had

no objectively reasonable expectation that Allstate would

inform them of the suit-limitation set forth in the written

contracts, much less that Allstate would repeat that information

having once included it in a communication with

plaintiffs during its investigation of their claims.

Likewise, the remaining conduct asserted by plaintiffs

in this case cannot support their claim for breach of

the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Again, in its

letters, Allstate repeatedly informed plaintiffs that it continued

to investigate their claims; it did not make any representation

that could reasonably have led them to believe

that their claims would inevitably be accepted. Further, as

we noted above, there is no evidence that, despite its communications,

Allstate was not, in fact, investigating the claims.

Cite as 284 Or App 83 (2017) 97

To the contrary, Allstate’s communications reflect its continued

attempts to ascertain the losses attributable to the

theft of plaintiffs’ property, and plaintiffs point to nothing in

the record suggesting that such investigation was improper.

Furthermore, contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, there is no

evidence that Allstate engaged in behavior to reasonably

“induce [plaintiffs] not to commence any legal action prior

to September 6, 2011.” To the contrary, as we discussed with

respect to the first assignment of error, Allstate repeatedly

informed plaintiffs that it insisted on compliance with all

policy terms, reserved its rights and defenses, and that no

waiver or estoppel of any kind was intended or should be

inferred. In light of those admonishments, along with all

of the other circumstances in this case, no reasonable juror

could conclude that Allstate breached its duty of good faith

and fair dealing in this case. In short, none of the conduct

plaintiffs assert on Allstate’s part contravened plaintiffs’

reasonable expectations based on the terms of the contracts.

Accordingly, regardless of whether the Section I suitlimitation

provision applies, the trial court did not err in

granting summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ claim for

breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.

Affirmed.