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STATE OF OHIO vs. DARYL COCHRAN
Date: 04-25-2022
Case Number: C-200365
Judge: Candace C. Crouse
Court:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
On appeal from The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Plaintiff's Attorney: Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith Anton Lapp,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Defendant's Attorney:
Description:
{¶ 2} In February 2000, Cochran pleaded guilty to murder, aggravated robbery,
and tampering with evidence. Cochran agreed to a 15-year to life prison sentence on
the murder count, a ten-year prison sentence on the aggravated robbery count, and a
five-year prison sentence on the tampering with evidence count, to be served
consecutively, for an aggregate prison sentence of 30 years to life. In exchange, the
State dismissed an aggravated murder count. After conducting a sentencing hearing,
the trial court sentenced Cochran to the agreed-upon prison term. Cochran did not
appeal from his conviction.
{¶ 3} In 2005, Cochran filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court
overruled the motion, and we affirmed its judgment on appeal. State v. Cochran, 2d Dist.
Clark No. 2006-CA-87, 2007-Ohio-4545. Cochran filed a second motion to withdraw his
guilty plea in 2009. The trial court also overruled this motion, and we also affirmed this
judgment on appeal. State v. Cochran, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2009-CA-49, 2010-Ohio-2917.
{¶ 4} In 2020, Cochran filed another motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial
court overruled this motion, and Cochran now appeals from that judgment.
Assignment of Error
{¶ 5} Cochran's sole assignment of error is as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING [COCHRAN'S] MOTION TO
-3-
WITHDRAW HIS PLEA.
Analysis
{¶ 6} Crim.R. 32.1 states: "A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may
be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after
sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw
his or her plea.†"A manifest injustice is a clear or openly unjust act; an extraordinary
and fundamental flaw in the plea proceeding.†State v. Hawke, 2d Dist. Greene No.
2019-CA-24, 2020-Ohio-511, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Yapp, 2015-Ohio-1654, 32 N.E.3d
996, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.). "The manifest-injustice standard demands a showing of
extraordinary circumstances, and the defendant bears the burden of proving the
existence of a manifest injustice.†State v. Turner, 171 Ohio App.3d 82, 2007-Ohio-1346,
869 N.E.2d 708, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 7} A motion made pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court, and a trial court's decision on a motion to withdraw a plea will not be
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
27372, 2017-Ohio-9227, ¶ 7. "Abuse of discretion†has been defined as an attitude that
is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d
217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound
reasoning process that would support that decision. AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place
Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597
(1990); Feldmiller v. Feldmiller, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24989, 2012-Ohio-4621, ¶ 7.
{¶ 8} Cochran's appeal focuses on Sierah's Law, which went into effect on March
20, 2019. Sierah's Law established a Violent Offender Database (VOD), and it created
-4-
a presumption that a person convicted of certain violent offenses, including murder, must
enroll in the VOD for a period of ten years following his release from prison.1 See R.C.
2903.41 through R.C. 2903.43. As relevant here, the registration presumption applies
to an offender, like Cochran, who was serving a term of imprisonment for a designated
violent offense on the statute's effective date. R.C. 2903.41(A)(2).
{¶ 9} Cochran asserts that the application of Sierah's Law to him violates the
Retroactivity Clause of Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution. Cochran seems to
assert that such retroactive application constitutes a manifest injustice and, thus, the trial
court abused its discretion by overruling his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. But, quite
recently, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the retroactive application of Sierah's Law
"to conduct that occurred prior to its effective date does not violate the Retroactivity
Clause of Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution.†State v. Hubbard, Ohio Slip
Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3710, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 5. Given this conclusion, the retroactive
application of Sierah's Law to Cochran cannot constitute a manifest injustice warranting
a withdrawal of Cochran's February 2000 guilty plea.
{¶ 10} Cochran also argues that, because the Sierah's Law requirements were not
part of the plea negotiations, there was no "meeting of the minds†regarding the statute's
registration requirements. From this, Cochran seems to argue the parties' failure to have
negotiated and agreed to the Sierah's Law requirements created a manifest injustice
requiring that he be allowed to withdraw the guilty plea.
1 An offender may rebut the presumptive registration requirement by filing a motion and
establishing by the preponderance of the evidence that he was not the principal offender.
R.C. 2903.42(A)(4). The trial court, assuming the presumption is rebutted, may
nonetheless conclude, following a hearing, that the offender must register as a violent
offender. R.C. 2903.42(A)(4)(a)(i)-(iv).
-5-
{¶ 11} When the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution has not been
violated, the application of a consequence not in existence at the time a plea was
negotiated cannot, as a matter of law, trigger a conclusion that a manifest injustice has
occurred. As such, this portion of Cochran's argument also fails.
Conclusion
{¶ 12} [Cite as State v. Cochran, 2021-Ohio-4589.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
DARYL COCHRAN
Defendant-Appellant
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Appellate Case No. 2020-CA-43
Trial Court Case No. 1999-CR-0628
(Criminal Appeal from
Common Pleas Court)
. . . . . . . . . . .
O P I N I O N
Rendered on the 29th day of December, 2021.
. . . . . . . . . . .
IAN A. RICHARDSON, Atty. Reg. No. 0100124, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Clark
County Prosecutor's Office, 50 East Columbia Street, Suite 449, Springfield, Ohio 45502
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
CHARLES W. SLICER, III, Atty. Reg. No. 0059927, 426 Patterson Road, Dayton, Ohio
45419
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
TUCKER, P.J.
-2-
{¶ 1} Appellant, Daryl Cochran, argues that the trial court erred when it overruled
his motion to withdraw his February 2000 guilty plea. Finding no merit to Cochran's
arguments, the trial court's judgment will be affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In February 2000, Cochran pleaded guilty to murder, aggravated robbery,
and tampering with evidence. Cochran agreed to a 15-year to life prison sentence on
the murder count, a ten-year prison sentence on the aggravated robbery count, and a
five-year prison sentence on the tampering with evidence count, to be served
consecutively, for an aggregate prison sentence of 30 years to life. In exchange, the
State dismissed an aggravated murder count. After conducting a sentencing hearing,
the trial court sentenced Cochran to the agreed-upon prison term. Cochran did not
appeal from his conviction.
{¶ 3} In 2005, Cochran filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court
overruled the motion, and we affirmed its judgment on appeal. State v. Cochran, 2d Dist.
Clark No. 2006-CA-87, 2007-Ohio-4545. Cochran filed a second motion to withdraw his
guilty plea in 2009. The trial court also overruled this motion, and we also affirmed this
judgment on appeal. State v. Cochran, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2009-CA-49, 2010-Ohio-2917.
{¶ 4} In 2020, Cochran filed another motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial
court overruled this motion, and Cochran now appeals from that judgment.
Assignment of Error
{¶ 5} Cochran's sole assignment of error is as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING [COCHRAN'S] MOTION TO
-3-
WITHDRAW HIS PLEA.
Analysis
{¶ 6} Crim.R. 32.1 states: "A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may
be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after
sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw
his or her plea.†"A manifest injustice is a clear or openly unjust act; an extraordinary
and fundamental flaw in the plea proceeding.†State v. Hawke, 2d Dist. Greene No.
2019-CA-24, 2020-Ohio-511, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Yapp, 2015-Ohio-1654, 32 N.E.3d
996, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.). "The manifest-injustice standard demands a showing of
extraordinary circumstances, and the defendant bears the burden of proving the
existence of a manifest injustice.†State v. Turner, 171 Ohio App.3d 82, 2007-Ohio-1346,
869 N.E.2d 708, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 7} A motion made pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court, and a trial court's decision on a motion to withdraw a plea will not be
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
27372, 2017-Ohio-9227, ¶ 7. "Abuse of discretion†has been defined as an attitude that
is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d
217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound
reasoning process that would support that decision. AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place
Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597
(1990); Feldmiller v. Feldmiller, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24989, 2012-Ohio-4621, ¶ 7.
{¶ 8} Cochran's appeal focuses on Sierah's Law, which went into effect on March
20, 2019. Sierah's Law established a Violent Offender Database (VOD), and it created
-4-
a presumption that a person convicted of certain violent offenses, including murder, must
enroll in the VOD for a period of ten years following his release from prison.1 See R.C.
2903.41 through R.C. 2903.43. As relevant here, the registration presumption applies
to an offender, like Cochran, who was serving a term of imprisonment for a designated
violent offense on the statute's effective date. R.C. 2903.41(A)(2).
{¶ 9} Cochran asserts that the application of Sierah's Law to him violates the
Retroactivity Clause of Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution. Cochran seems to
assert that such retroactive application constitutes a manifest injustice and, thus, the trial
court abused its discretion by overruling his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. But, quite
recently, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the retroactive application of Sierah's Law
"to conduct that occurred prior to its effective date does not violate the Retroactivity
Clause of Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution.†State v. Hubbard, Ohio Slip
Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3710, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 5. Given this conclusion, the retroactive
application of Sierah's Law to Cochran cannot constitute a manifest injustice warranting
a withdrawal of Cochran's February 2000 guilty plea.
{¶ 10} Cochran also argues that, because the Sierah's Law requirements were not
part of the plea negotiations, there was no "meeting of the minds†regarding the statute's
registration requirements. From this, Cochran seems to argue the parties' failure to have
negotiated and agreed to the Sierah's Law requirements created a manifest injustice
requiring that he be allowed to withdraw the guilty plea.
1 An offender may rebut the presumptive registration requirement by filing a motion and
establishing by the preponderance of the evidence that he was not the principal offender.
R.C. 2903.42(A)(4). The trial court, assuming the presumption is rebutted, may
nonetheless conclude, following a hearing, that the offender must register as a violent
offender. R.C. 2903.42(A)(4)(a)(i)-(iv).
-5-
{¶ 11} When the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution has not been
violated, the application of a consequence not in existence at the time a plea was
negotiated cannot, as a matter of law, trigger a conclusion that a manifest injustice has
occurred. As such, this portion of Cochran's argument also fails.
Cincinnati, Ohio - Criminal Defense lawyer represented defendant with arguing that the trial court erred when it overruled his motion to withdraw.
{¶ 2} In February 2000, Cochran pleaded guilty to murder, aggravated robbery,
and tampering with evidence. Cochran agreed to a 15-year to life prison sentence on
the murder count, a ten-year prison sentence on the aggravated robbery count, and a
five-year prison sentence on the tampering with evidence count, to be served
consecutively, for an aggregate prison sentence of 30 years to life. In exchange, the
State dismissed an aggravated murder count. After conducting a sentencing hearing,
the trial court sentenced Cochran to the agreed-upon prison term. Cochran did not
appeal from his conviction.
{¶ 3} In 2005, Cochran filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court
overruled the motion, and we affirmed its judgment on appeal. State v. Cochran, 2d Dist.
Clark No. 2006-CA-87, 2007-Ohio-4545. Cochran filed a second motion to withdraw his
guilty plea in 2009. The trial court also overruled this motion, and we also affirmed this
judgment on appeal. State v. Cochran, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2009-CA-49, 2010-Ohio-2917.
{¶ 4} In 2020, Cochran filed another motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial
court overruled this motion, and Cochran now appeals from that judgment.
Assignment of Error
{¶ 5} Cochran's sole assignment of error is as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING [COCHRAN'S] MOTION TO
-3-
WITHDRAW HIS PLEA.
Analysis
{¶ 6} Crim.R. 32.1 states: "A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may
be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after
sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw
his or her plea.†"A manifest injustice is a clear or openly unjust act; an extraordinary
and fundamental flaw in the plea proceeding.†State v. Hawke, 2d Dist. Greene No.
2019-CA-24, 2020-Ohio-511, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Yapp, 2015-Ohio-1654, 32 N.E.3d
996, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.). "The manifest-injustice standard demands a showing of
extraordinary circumstances, and the defendant bears the burden of proving the
existence of a manifest injustice.†State v. Turner, 171 Ohio App.3d 82, 2007-Ohio-1346,
869 N.E.2d 708, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 7} A motion made pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court, and a trial court's decision on a motion to withdraw a plea will not be
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
27372, 2017-Ohio-9227, ¶ 7. "Abuse of discretion†has been defined as an attitude that
is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d
217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound
reasoning process that would support that decision. AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place
Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597
(1990); Feldmiller v. Feldmiller, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24989, 2012-Ohio-4621, ¶ 7.
{¶ 8} Cochran's appeal focuses on Sierah's Law, which went into effect on March
20, 2019. Sierah's Law established a Violent Offender Database (VOD), and it created
-4-
a presumption that a person convicted of certain violent offenses, including murder, must
enroll in the VOD for a period of ten years following his release from prison.1 See R.C.
2903.41 through R.C. 2903.43. As relevant here, the registration presumption applies
to an offender, like Cochran, who was serving a term of imprisonment for a designated
violent offense on the statute's effective date. R.C. 2903.41(A)(2).
{¶ 9} Cochran asserts that the application of Sierah's Law to him violates the
Retroactivity Clause of Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution. Cochran seems to
assert that such retroactive application constitutes a manifest injustice and, thus, the trial
court abused its discretion by overruling his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. But, quite
recently, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the retroactive application of Sierah's Law
"to conduct that occurred prior to its effective date does not violate the Retroactivity
Clause of Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution.†State v. Hubbard, Ohio Slip
Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3710, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 5. Given this conclusion, the retroactive
application of Sierah's Law to Cochran cannot constitute a manifest injustice warranting
a withdrawal of Cochran's February 2000 guilty plea.
{¶ 10} Cochran also argues that, because the Sierah's Law requirements were not
part of the plea negotiations, there was no "meeting of the minds†regarding the statute's
registration requirements. From this, Cochran seems to argue the parties' failure to have
negotiated and agreed to the Sierah's Law requirements created a manifest injustice
requiring that he be allowed to withdraw the guilty plea.
1 An offender may rebut the presumptive registration requirement by filing a motion and
establishing by the preponderance of the evidence that he was not the principal offender.
R.C. 2903.42(A)(4). The trial court, assuming the presumption is rebutted, may
nonetheless conclude, following a hearing, that the offender must register as a violent
offender. R.C. 2903.42(A)(4)(a)(i)-(iv).
-5-
{¶ 11} When the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution has not been
violated, the application of a consequence not in existence at the time a plea was
negotiated cannot, as a matter of law, trigger a conclusion that a manifest injustice has
occurred. As such, this portion of Cochran's argument also fails.
Conclusion
{¶ 12} [Cite as State v. Cochran, 2021-Ohio-4589.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
DARYL COCHRAN
Defendant-Appellant
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Appellate Case No. 2020-CA-43
Trial Court Case No. 1999-CR-0628
(Criminal Appeal from
Common Pleas Court)
. . . . . . . . . . .
O P I N I O N
Rendered on the 29th day of December, 2021.
. . . . . . . . . . .
IAN A. RICHARDSON, Atty. Reg. No. 0100124, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Clark
County Prosecutor's Office, 50 East Columbia Street, Suite 449, Springfield, Ohio 45502
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
CHARLES W. SLICER, III, Atty. Reg. No. 0059927, 426 Patterson Road, Dayton, Ohio
45419
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
TUCKER, P.J.
-2-
{¶ 1} Appellant, Daryl Cochran, argues that the trial court erred when it overruled
his motion to withdraw his February 2000 guilty plea. Finding no merit to Cochran's
arguments, the trial court's judgment will be affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In February 2000, Cochran pleaded guilty to murder, aggravated robbery,
and tampering with evidence. Cochran agreed to a 15-year to life prison sentence on
the murder count, a ten-year prison sentence on the aggravated robbery count, and a
five-year prison sentence on the tampering with evidence count, to be served
consecutively, for an aggregate prison sentence of 30 years to life. In exchange, the
State dismissed an aggravated murder count. After conducting a sentencing hearing,
the trial court sentenced Cochran to the agreed-upon prison term. Cochran did not
appeal from his conviction.
{¶ 3} In 2005, Cochran filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court
overruled the motion, and we affirmed its judgment on appeal. State v. Cochran, 2d Dist.
Clark No. 2006-CA-87, 2007-Ohio-4545. Cochran filed a second motion to withdraw his
guilty plea in 2009. The trial court also overruled this motion, and we also affirmed this
judgment on appeal. State v. Cochran, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2009-CA-49, 2010-Ohio-2917.
{¶ 4} In 2020, Cochran filed another motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial
court overruled this motion, and Cochran now appeals from that judgment.
Assignment of Error
{¶ 5} Cochran's sole assignment of error is as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING [COCHRAN'S] MOTION TO
-3-
WITHDRAW HIS PLEA.
Analysis
{¶ 6} Crim.R. 32.1 states: "A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may
be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after
sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw
his or her plea.†"A manifest injustice is a clear or openly unjust act; an extraordinary
and fundamental flaw in the plea proceeding.†State v. Hawke, 2d Dist. Greene No.
2019-CA-24, 2020-Ohio-511, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Yapp, 2015-Ohio-1654, 32 N.E.3d
996, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.). "The manifest-injustice standard demands a showing of
extraordinary circumstances, and the defendant bears the burden of proving the
existence of a manifest injustice.†State v. Turner, 171 Ohio App.3d 82, 2007-Ohio-1346,
869 N.E.2d 708, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 7} A motion made pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court, and a trial court's decision on a motion to withdraw a plea will not be
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
27372, 2017-Ohio-9227, ¶ 7. "Abuse of discretion†has been defined as an attitude that
is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d
217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound
reasoning process that would support that decision. AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place
Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597
(1990); Feldmiller v. Feldmiller, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24989, 2012-Ohio-4621, ¶ 7.
{¶ 8} Cochran's appeal focuses on Sierah's Law, which went into effect on March
20, 2019. Sierah's Law established a Violent Offender Database (VOD), and it created
-4-
a presumption that a person convicted of certain violent offenses, including murder, must
enroll in the VOD for a period of ten years following his release from prison.1 See R.C.
2903.41 through R.C. 2903.43. As relevant here, the registration presumption applies
to an offender, like Cochran, who was serving a term of imprisonment for a designated
violent offense on the statute's effective date. R.C. 2903.41(A)(2).
{¶ 9} Cochran asserts that the application of Sierah's Law to him violates the
Retroactivity Clause of Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution. Cochran seems to
assert that such retroactive application constitutes a manifest injustice and, thus, the trial
court abused its discretion by overruling his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. But, quite
recently, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the retroactive application of Sierah's Law
"to conduct that occurred prior to its effective date does not violate the Retroactivity
Clause of Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution.†State v. Hubbard, Ohio Slip
Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3710, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 5. Given this conclusion, the retroactive
application of Sierah's Law to Cochran cannot constitute a manifest injustice warranting
a withdrawal of Cochran's February 2000 guilty plea.
{¶ 10} Cochran also argues that, because the Sierah's Law requirements were not
part of the plea negotiations, there was no "meeting of the minds†regarding the statute's
registration requirements. From this, Cochran seems to argue the parties' failure to have
negotiated and agreed to the Sierah's Law requirements created a manifest injustice
requiring that he be allowed to withdraw the guilty plea.
1 An offender may rebut the presumptive registration requirement by filing a motion and
establishing by the preponderance of the evidence that he was not the principal offender.
R.C. 2903.42(A)(4). The trial court, assuming the presumption is rebutted, may
nonetheless conclude, following a hearing, that the offender must register as a violent
offender. R.C. 2903.42(A)(4)(a)(i)-(iv).
-5-
{¶ 11} When the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution has not been
violated, the application of a consequence not in existence at the time a plea was
negotiated cannot, as a matter of law, trigger a conclusion that a manifest injustice has
occurred. As such, this portion of Cochran's argument also fails.
Outcome:
Based upon our rejection of Cochran’s arguments, his assignment of error
is overruled. The judgment of the Clark County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
is overruled. The judgment of the Clark County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments:
About This Case
What was the outcome of STATE OF OHIO vs. DARYL COCHRAN?
The outcome was: Based upon our rejection of Cochran’s arguments, his assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Clark County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Which court heard STATE OF OHIO vs. DARYL COCHRAN?
This case was heard in <center><h4><b> IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO </b> <br> <br> <font color="green"><i>On appeal from The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas </i></font></center></h4>, OH. The presiding judge was Candace C. Crouse.
Who were the attorneys in STATE OF OHIO vs. DARYL COCHRAN?
Plaintiff's attorney: Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith Anton Lapp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney. Defendant's attorney: Click Here to Watch How To Find A Lawyer by Kent Morlan Click Here For The Best Cincinnati, Ohio Criminal Defense Lawyer Directory.
When was STATE OF OHIO vs. DARYL COCHRAN decided?
This case was decided on April 25, 2022.