United States of America v. Brent Edington

Cincinnati, Ohio, criminal defense lawyer represented defendant charged with conspiring to "knowingly make[] a false statement or report . . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of the” Farm Services Agency.

In 2019, the government filed a felony information charging Edington with conspiring to

violate 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which makes it illegal to "knowingly make[] a false statement or report

. . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of the” Farm Services Agency. The

information contained the following allegations.

In March 2012, Edington and his father agreed Edington would apply for a Farm Services

Agency (FSA) farm operating loan and list assets belonging to his father as collateral. Edington

submitted the applicable forms, including a list of his assets to be used as collateral. Edington

listed many assets he did not own.1

On April 30, 2012, Edington signed the terms and conditions

of the FSA loan. On June 5, 2012, Edington filled out and submitted the security agreement,

which pledged assets owned not by Edington but by his father. Later that month, Edington

presented a handwritten document to the FSA falsely claiming he had purchased cattle from his

friend's father.

After Edington defaulted on the loans, his father died, and Edington did not inherit or

receive the assets listed in the security agreement. In February 2016, Edington signed a sworn

statement falsely stating that he had purchased cattle from his friend's father. Edington later

admitted that he lied. The United States Attorney's Office for the Western District of Michigan

issued a target letter to Edington, negotiated plea resolution, and filed a felony information

charging Edington with conspiracy to make false statements to influence the FSA in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 371 and § 1014. Edington appeared before a magistrate judge and entered a plea of

guilty to the felony information pursuant to a plea agreement and the magistrate judge

recommended that the district court accept Edington's guilty plea. In 2019, the district court

1The district court noted that there are issues with the factual basis supporting the tendered plea including

facts that negate the element of intent to defraud. We decline to address any factual basis issues because the district

court granted Edington's motion to dismiss based only on the statute of limitations.

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rejected the magistrate judge's report and recommendation due to "concerns regarding a

potential statute of limitations defense, and potential gaps in the factual basis defendant was

prepared to admit.”

In 2020, the district court granted Edington's motion to dismiss based on the five-year

statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). The district court acknowledged there is no

other statutory vehicle to charge a conspiracy to violate § 1014 and opined that to the extent

there was a "statutory gap,” it was "for Congress to fill.” The government appealed.

II.

We review decisions granting motions to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds de

novo. United States v. Grenier, 513 F.3d 632, 636 (6th Cir. 2008).

III.

The government argues that while the five-year limitations period in § 3282(a) applies to

many conspiracies charged under § 371, where the object of the conspiracy is a violation of

§ 1014, the statute mandates that § 3293(1)'s ten-year statute of limitations governs.

The plain language of a statute is the starting point for its interpretation. Consumer Prod.

Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). It "should also be the ending

point if the plain meaning of that language is clear.” United States v. Jackson, 635 F.3d 205, 209

(6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). A statute must, if possible, be construed in such a way that

every word has effect. Hoffman v. Conn. Dept. of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 103 (1989)

(internal citations omitted). Statutes of limitations for criminal cases are "to be liberally

interpreted in favor of repose,” United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 222, 227 (1968) (citation

omitted), but courts should not apply that principle to negate the plain meaning of the statutory

text, id. at 226-27.

The five-year statute of limitations in § 3282(a) generally applies to § 371 violations

unless a different statute of limitations explicitly applies. See United States v. Lash, 937 F.2d

1077, 1081 (6th Cir. 1991). Section 3293 extends the statute of limitations from five to ten years

for certain crimes including a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 and a conspiracy to violate § 1014:

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No person shall be prosecuted, tried or punished for a violation of or a conspiracy

to violate – . . . (1) section . . . 1014 . . . unless the indictment is returned or the

information is filed within 10 years after the commission of the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 3293 (emphasis added). The plain language expressly includes a "conspiracy to

violate” § 1014. Accordingly, courts must apply a ten-year statute of limitations to a charge of

conspiracy to violate any of the named sections. See United States v. Knipp, 963 F.2d 839, 841,

843 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding defendants' convictions and applying the ten-year statute of

limitations pursuant to § 3293 for "one count of conspiracy (a) to defraud a federally insured

financial institution and (b) to misapply the monies, funds, credits and securities of a federally

insured financial institution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371,” among others); see also United

States v. Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 607 n.5 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Heinz, 790 F.3d 365, 367

(2d Cir. 2015).

The felony information charges Edington with a conspiracy to violate § 1014. The

information listed the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, and § 1014, as the basis for

the charge. Edington's plea agreement describes the offense as a conspiracy "to defraud,” but

the felony information to which he pleaded guilty charges a conspiracy to violate § 1014. The

charge of conspiracy to violate § 1014 falls under the ten-year statute of limitations in § 3293(1).

The most recent alleged overt acts listed in the filed information occurred in 2012. The

government filed the felony information on June 3, 2019, before the expiration of the ten-year

period in 2022. Here, § 3293(1) applies because the object of the conspiracy was a violation of

§ 1014, and, therefore, the charges against Edington were timely.

The district court relied on United States v. Rabhan, 2007 WL 9627795, No. 4:06-CR124-P-B (N.D. Miss. June 28, 2007), in its determination to apply the five-year statute of

limitations. In Rabhan, the court held that § 3293 did not apply because the underlying aiding

and abetting offense required not just a § 1014 charge, but also a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 2. Id.

at *2. However, Rabhan involved a charge of aiding and abetting a violation of § 1014 and not

a conspiracy to violate § 1014. The court in Rabhan—in applying the five-year statute of

limitations—explicitly contrasted aiding and abetting § 1014 with a conspiracy to violate § 1014,

which it stated would indeed be subject to the ten-year limitations period. Id. It stated that

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"[n]either a violation nor a conspiracy to violate § 1014 is involved in Count 8 regarding [the

defendant]. Rather, [the defendant] is charged with aiding and abetting someone else's violation

of § 1014.” Id. Therefore, the ten-year statute of limitations applies in Edington's case.

In sum, we reverse the district court’s dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. The plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3293(1) explicitly provides a ten-year statute of limitations for a conspiracy to violate § 1014.



REVERSED and REMANDED