United States of America v. Jeffery Wills

Cincinnati, Ohio - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant charged with

drug trafficking.

After a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Wills with various

methamphetamine-trafficking offenses, the government filed an information pursuant to

21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) giving notice of its intent to seek an enhanced sentence based on Wills's

prior felony drug conviction. Wills entered into an agreement to plead guilty to conspiring to

distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 846. In April 2017, the district court

sentenced Wills to the mandatory minimum sentence, 240 months of imprisonment, followed by

ten years of supervised release. Wills did not appeal.

In September 2020, after exhausting his administrative remedies, Wills filed a motion for

compassionate release or a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) on the basis of

"extraordinary or compelling circumstances.” Wills asserted that, if sentenced today, he would

not be subject to the 20-year mandatory minimum sentence because his prior felony drug

conviction would not qualify as a "serious drug felony” under section 401 of the First Step Act

of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, and therefore would not trigger a sentence

enhancement. Denying Wills's motion, the district court pointed out that section 401 does not

apply retroactively and therefore declined to find that extraordinary and compelling reasons

justified a sentence reduction.

We review a district court's denial of a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th

Cir. 2020). An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court "relies on clearly erroneous

findings of fact, uses an erroneous legal standard, or improperly applies the law.” United States

v. Flowers, 963 F.3d 492, 497 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 408

(6th Cir. 2007)).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court may reduce a defendant's sentence if

it finds (1) that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction”; (2) that the

"reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing

Commission”; and (3) that the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent

that they apply, support the reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see Ruffin, 978 F.3d at

1004–05. The statute does not define "extraordinary and compelling reasons,” a task that is

No. 20-6142 United States v. Wills Page 3

instead delegated to the Sentencing Commission. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t); Ruffin, 978 F.3d at

1004. The Sentencing Commission has done so in the commentary to USSG § 1B1.13. See

USSG § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1. However, this court has held that USSG § 1B1.13 applies only to

sentence-reduction motions brought by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), not motions brought by

defendants. United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Jones,

980 F.3d 1098, 1110 (6th Cir. 2020). When considering a defendant-filed motion for a sentence

reduction, the district court has "full discretion” to determine whether extraordinary and

compelling reasons exist without reference to USSG § 1B1.13. Jones, 980 F.3d at 1111; see

Elias, 984 F.3d at 519.

Here, the district court construed Wills's motion for a sentence reduction as brought

under the catch-all category set forth in the commentary to USSG § 1B1.13, see USSG § 1B1.13

cmt. n.1(D), and recognized a split of authority in the district courts as to whether that category

may be used by the courts or only by the BOP. The district court declined to "wade into that

dispute” because Wills's motion did not establish extraordinary and compelling reasons "in any

event.”

In order to establish an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence

reduction, Wills argued that, if sentenced today, he would not face a 20-year mandatory

minimum sentence. When Wills was sentenced in April 2017, the penalty provision for his drug

offense stated: "If any person commits such a violation after a prior conviction for a felony drug

offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may

not be less than 20 years . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Section 401 of the First Step Act

amended that provision as follows: "If any person commits such a violation after a prior

conviction for a serious drug felony or serious violent felony has become final, such person shall

be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 15 years . . . .” Pub. L. No. 115-391,

§ 401(a)(2)(A)(i), 132 Stat. 5194, 5220. Section 401 also added the following definition of

"serious drug felony” to 21 U.S.C. § 802:

(57) The term 'serious drug felony' means an offense described in section

924(e)(2) of title 18, United States Code, for which—

(A) the offender served a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months; and

No. 20-6142 United States v. Wills Page 4

(B) the offender's release from any term of imprisonment was within 15 years of

the commencement of the instant offense.

Id. § 401(a)(1).

In his motion for a sentence reduction, Wills argued that, under section 401 of the First

Step Act, he would not be subject to a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence because his prior

felony drug conviction would not qualify as a "serious drug felony” and therefore would not

trigger the sentence enhancement. But, as the district court pointed out, section 401 does not

apply retroactively, applying only to defendants who had not yet been sentenced as of December

21, 2018, the date of the First Step Act's enactment. Id. § 401(c). The district court declined to

circumvent Congress's expressed intent and found no extraordinary and compelling reasons to

warrant a sentence reduction. "[I]n federal sentencing the ordinary practice is to apply new

penalties to defendants not yet sentenced, while withholding that change from defendants already

sentenced.” Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 280 (2012). What the Supreme Court views

as the "ordinary practice” cannot also be an "extraordinary and compelling reason” to deviate

from that practice.1

Wills contends that other courts have found that the First Step Act's amendment of the

sentence enhancement provisions constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason to warrant

a sentence reduction. But "[t]he mere fact that a defendant cites other cases in which courts

determined certain defendants to be deserving of different sentences does not demonstrate abuse

of discretion in the instant case.” United States v. Corp, 668 F.3d 379, 393 (6th Cir. 2012).

Wills has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a

sentence reduction.

1Even if section 401 of the First Step Act applied retroactively, Wills's prior drug conviction would qualify

as a "serious drug felony.” The government's information notified Wills of its intent to seek an enhanced sentence

based on his January 2012 conviction for delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance in violation of Tennessee

law. The presentence report reflects that Wills received a three-year jail sentence for his conviction for delivery of a

Schedule II controlled substance (Oxycodone) in January 2012 and was released in July 2013. Delivery of a

Schedule II controlled substance is a Class C felony, subject to a term of imprisonment not less than three years nor

more than fifteen years. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417(c)(2)(A), 40-35-111(b)(3). Wills thus was convicted of an

offense under state law involving distribution of a controlled substance for which a maximum term of imprisonment

of ten years or more is prescribed and for which he served a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months and was

released within 15 years of the commencement of the instant offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), 21 U.S.C.

§ 802(57).

No. 20-6142 United States v. Wills Page 5

Wills also argues on appeal that his 20-year mandatory minimum sentence should no

longer apply and that he should face only a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under section

401 of the First Step Act. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401(a)(2)(A)(i), 132 Stat. 5194, 5220.

Wills did not raise this argument in his motion for a sentence reduction. Regardless, this

argument fails for the same reason that his argument about the sentence enhancement fails:

section 401 does not apply retroactively. Id. § 401(c)

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Wills’s motion for a

sentence reduction.