The State ex rel. Larry A. Randlett v. Judge Julie M. Lynch

Columbus, OH - Criminal defense attorney represented Larry Randlett with two third degree felonies of sexual battery and six fourth-degree felonies of gross sexual imposition charges.

On February 10, 2003, Mr. Randlett entered pleas of guilty in four cases,

three of which are at issue here. In Franklin C.P. No. 01CR-705, he pled guilty to two thirddegree felonies of sexual battery and six fourth-degree felonies of gross sexual imposition.

In Franklin C.P. No. 01CR-4353, he pled guilty to seven third-degree felonies of gross sexual

imposition, nine fourth-degree felonies of gross sexual imposition, six fourth-degree felony

counts of corruption of a minor, and one fourth-degree and one fifth-degree felony of

disseminating matter harmful to juveniles. In Franklin C.P. No. 02CR-1721, he pled guilty

to nine fourth-degree felonies of corruption of a minor and (under "old law") to eight thirddegree felonies of corruption of a minor and three fourth-degree felony counts of gross

sexual imposition. In Franklin C.P. No. 02CR-1738, he pled guilty (under "old law") to six

third-degree and eight fourth-degree felony counts of gross sexual imposition and to one

third-degree count of corruption of a minor.

{¶ 4} Mr. Randlett signed a total of three plea forms relating to the "new law"

counts as to which postrelease control would attach. Those forms specified that as to the

felony sex offenses (and this box was checked on each of the three forms), Mr. Randlett

certified that: "If the Court imposes a prison term, I understand that the following period(s)

of post-release control is/are applicable: * * * Felony Sex Offense * * * Five YearsMandatory [box checked]." Mr. Randlett further attested on the plea form that "I

understand that a violation of post-release control" could result in certain sanctions.

February 10, 2003 plea forms in 01CR-705, 01CR-4353, and 02CR-1721 (plea form

regarding "new law" counts).

{¶ 5} During the plea colloquy, and consistent with the various plea forms, the trial

judge distinguished between "the new law and the old law." February 10, 2003 Tr. at 28.

After discussing theoretical possibilities for community control (new law) and probation

(old law), the Judge said:

in the new law sections of the case, if you go to prison on these

cases for any, for felony sex offense, once released from prison,

you will be subject to five years mandatory supervision by the

Adult Parole Authority of Ohio, and if you violated the law

while under their five-year supervision, they could send you

back to prison on the new law cases, new law counts of these

No. 20AP-489 3

cases for additional time in addition to what the Court had

given you, but in any event they can't add any more time than

one-half of whatever the total of the Court's sentence was. Do

you understand that?

Id. at 30. Mr. Randlett responded: "Yes, I do, Your Honor." Id.

{¶ 6} The Judge and the parties returned to the matter of postconviction release at

the sentencing hearing, after the court had imposed prison sentences that, as later modified

by this court to be consistent with trial court pronouncements at the hearing, amounted to

what we somehow later calculated as 18 years. Compare April 3, 2003 Judgment Entries

with Randlett I at ¶ 43-45, 55; State v. Randlett, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1073, 2007-Ohio3546, ¶ 3 (Randlett I "determined that the trial court erred in imposing a greater sentence

than that pronounced at the sentencing hearing and, accordingly, modified defendant's

sentence to a prison term of 18 years").

THE [SENTENCING] COURT: Let's see. All right. With

respect to the new law F-3s and F-4s, the F-3 GSIs, the Court

believes -- is it five-year mandatory? You can correct me if I'm

wrong.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Five-year mandatory supervised

release, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right. Once released from prison after twenty

years, you would be supervised, Mr. Randlett, for a five-year

period, mandatory, by the Adult Parole Authority of Ohio. If

you violated the law, you can be sent back to prison for more

time on these cases, on these F-3 new law cases, counts, than

the Court has given you, but in any event, no greater amount of

extra time than one-half of the Court's sentence.

And as to the F-4s and F-5s under the new law, I believe there

is an optional supervision by the Adult Parole Authority. If you

violated the law, they can send you back to prison for more time

than the Court had given you on those counts, but in any event,

no greater amount of extra time than one-half of the Court's

sentence.

March 31, 2003 Tr. at 247-48.

{¶ 7} This erroneous mandatory/optional spoken distinction between third-degree

felony sex offenses and lesser degree felony sex offenses for purposes of postrelease control

(which under the law is a mandatory five years for all felony sex offenses, R.C.

No. 20AP-489 4

2967.28(B)(1)) was not reflected in the judgment entries filed after sentencing. The

judgment entries for "new law" cases 01CR-705 and 01CR-4353 each recited simply:

"After the imposition of sentence, the Court notified the Defendant, orally and

in writing, of the applicable periods of post-release control pursuant to R.C.

2929.19(B)(3)(c), (d) and (e)." April 3, 2003 Judgment Entries (emphasis added); see

also Mandamus Petition at ¶ 8, 10. That same language also appeared in the judgment

entry for 02CR-1721, which further divided the sentences there between new law and old

law counts, noting with regard to the latter that for offenses that "occurred prior to Am.

Sub. S. B. 2," Mr. Randlett "is not subject to post release control." April 2, 2003 Judgment

Entry; see also Mandamus Petition at ¶ 9. Properly, and of note, no language regarding

postrelease control appeared in the judgment entry for 02CR-1738, which related entirely

to "old law" offenses. April 3, 2003 Judgment Entry; see also Mandamus Petition at ¶ 11.

{¶ 8} Consistent with the judgment entries, the trial court also signed "disposition

sheets," filed on the same April 3, 2003 date, that for the three relevant cases confirmed

that the "Defendant [had been] notified of * * * Post Release Control in writing and orally";

Judge McGrath took care to strike inappropriate reference to "Bad Time" notification on

each of those forms. The record further reflects a "NOTICE (Prison Imposed)" form signed

by Mr. Randlett and his lawyer on the day of the sentencing hearing and filed April 7, 2003

in which the trial court notified the defendant that "felony sex offenders" are subject to a

"mandatory 5 years" of postrelease control: that additional advisement, while not reflected

in the body of that one-page form (where the mandatory and durational aspects of the term

were left blank) was provided in the one-page document's only (and slightly more than oneline-long) footnote.

{¶ 9} The reference in each of the three relevant sentencing entries to "the

applicable periods of post-release control" was not appealed in 2003 or thereafter.

Mr. Randlett did appeal from the consecutive nature and length of the sentences, from the

trial court's determination that he was a sexual predator, and from the trial court's reliance

on undisclosed victim impact statements. See Mandamus Petition at ¶ 12; Randlett I at

¶ 20. This court did modify two judgments of the trial court to reflect the precise sentence

lengths imposed at the sentencing hearing: "With those modifications, the judgments of

the trial court [were] affirmed as modified." Randlett I at ¶ 55.

No. 20AP-489 5

{¶ 10} Nor were the judgments disturbed by Mr. Randlett's February 10, 2006

application to reopen his appeal, see State v. Randlett, 110 Ohio St.3d 1443, 2006-Ohio3862 (declining review of this court's denial), or by his August 25, 2006 motion for relief

from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B), see State v. Randlett, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1073, 2007-

Ohio-3546 (affirming trial court denials of relief from judgment).

{¶ 11} Roughly some 17 years after he was sentenced and after this court resolved

his direct appeal, Mr. Randlett neared his release from prison. See Mandamus Petition at

¶ 22 (citing stated release date of November 30, 2020). Matters took a turn. In a form

letter dated August 6, 2020 and addressed to the Franklin County Prosecutor, Ohio Parole

Board Chief Hearing Officer Brigid Slaton referenced the three relevant case numbers and

opined that the trial court's "entry * * * does not include sufficient notification regarding

post-release control. In order for the [Adult Parole Authority] to assess this individual for

post-release control, post-release control must be properly included in the sentencing

entry. * * * * A corrected entry that imposes post-release control, and includes the

prescribed duration in R.C. 2967.28, will enable the Parole Board to place this individual

on post-release control." Ms. Slaton checked two boxes on the form: "1) As the sentencing

entry for this case omits post-release control, corrective action must be taken to ensure that

the individual can be placed under post-release control supervision," and "2) As the

sentencing entry for this case omits the duration of the post-release control period,

corrective action must be taken to ensure that the individual can be placed under postrelease control supervision."

{¶ 12} The prosecuting attorney disagreed with the parole authority's

understanding of the state of the law, and advised the trial court that "the * * * notice

requiring [sic] corrective action is in error." August 21, 2020 Motion for Nunc Pro Tunc

Entry at 2. Nonetheless, in what he called "an abundance of caution – and to ensure that

Randlett is subject to the mandatory supervision upon his release," the prosecutor

requested that the trial court "file nunc pro tunc entries in these cases stating that Randlett

is subject to a mandatory five-year term of PRC." Id. at 3. Mr. Randlett opposed the

motion, and, "so that there [would be] no misunderstanding on the part of the Ohio

Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, * * * request[ed] a ruling by the Court

declaring that Postrelease Control is not a part of Defendant's sentence in these cases."

No. 20AP-489 6

September 17, 2020 Memorandum Contra and Cross-Motion at 1 (in trial court docket of

which this court takes judicial notice); see id. at 3-4 ("The language in the Sentencing

Entries does not impose postrelease control, and as such, postrelease control is not a part

of Defendant's sentence. * * * * Because the State did not appeal these 'voidable' Sentencing

Entries, the Court's judgment in these cases is final.").

{¶ 13} The trial court found "good cause" for the state's motion and in each of the

three cases issued a nunc pro tunc order "to reflect that the Defendant is subject to a

mandatory five-year term of Post Release Control." October 6, 2020 Nunc Pro Tunc Order.

For each case, that alteration took the form of adding the phrase "is Five (5) years

mandatory" at the end of the April 3, 2003 sentencing entry's statement that "[a]fter the

imposition of sentence, the Court notified the Defendant, orally and in writing, of the

applicable periods of post-release control pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c), (d), and (e)."

(We see no dispute that as to cases 01CR-705 and 01CR-4353, the nunc pro tunc change

accurately described what actually was said at the sentencing hearing; further, the state

acknowledges that the trial court at the sentencing hearing never correctly advised

Mr. Randlett of the mandatory applicable five-year period of postrelease control in 02CR1721, in that the trial court mistakenly thought that such period did not apply to fourth- or

fifth-degree felony sex offenses. And because they purport to reach back to the March 31,

2003 sentencing hearing, the nunc pro tunc orders naturally do not purport to incorporate

this court's Randlett I sentence modifications: neither those clarifications nor

Mr. Randlett's prison release date is at issue here.)

{¶ 14} Mr. Randlett did not appeal the nunc pro tunc orders, but responded with his

petition seeking mandamus. The gist of his argument is that the "original [three] April 3,

2003 sentencing entries * * * failed to properly impose[] PRC because they did not provide

the statutorily compliant notification regarding postrelease control," Mandamus Petition

at ¶ 42; that "[i]f the entries contain a legal error favoring a defendant, then the State

should have appealed the error * * * * and is therefore barred by res judicata from now

claiming, more than seventeen (17) years later, that the trial court failed to properly impose

PRC in the sentencing entries," id. at ¶ 32, 31 (emphasis in original); and that the trial court

in any event lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the three cases in which it issued nunc

pro tunc entries because Mr. Randlett already had served his sentence in those three cases

No. 20AP-489 7

and was imprisoned only on 02CR-1738, for which postrelease control does not obtain, id.

at ¶ 33-38, 46-48.

{¶ 15} The state moved to dismiss Mr. Randlett's petition, and after review we

consolidated those arguments with further filing and argument on the merits, which we

considered at an oral hearing conducted on January 6, 2021. Both parties have made good

presentations, but we do not accept Mr. Randlett's predicate that postrelease control would

be unenforceable under the 2003 sentencing entries as originally issued. Our reading of

the law is that the nunc pro tunc orders altered neither the fact nor the duration of the

postrelease control imposed by the original entries. Mr. Randlett is correct that those

original entries are res judicata, but that means not that by law he is out from under

postrelease control obligations, but rather that he was to be subject to a mandatory fiveyear period of postrelease control upon his release from prison. Because the nunc pro tunc

additions have no legal effect on the fact and duration of the postrelease control ordered,

we do not find that Mr. Randlett has established a clear legal right to the writ he seeks.

Therefore, we do not reach a conclusion as to the state's further argument that a writ would

be improper because Mr. Randlett had an adequate remedy at law, through appeal, for any

claims.

{¶ 16} "To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a relator must establish, by clear and

convincing evidence, (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on

the part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the

ordinary course of the law." State ex rel. Olmstead v. Forsthoefel, __Ohio St.3d __, 2020-

Ohio-4951, ¶ 7, citing State ex rel. Love v. O'Donnell, 150 Ohio St.3d 378, 2017-Ohio-5659,

¶ 3.

{¶ 17} The premise of Mr. Randlett's writ request is that "To 'Adequately

Impose' PRC, Corrective Action Was Necessary," November 18, 2020

Memorandum Contra Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, [Etc.] at 17 (emphasis in original),

and that because of res judicata and also what he argues was the expiration of his relevant

sentences, the trial court lacked authority to order such corrective action, see, e.g., id. at 22

("Res Judicata Applies") (emphasis in original), 34 ("A trial court lacks jurisdiction to

impose PRC upon an offender when the sentence for the entire case has been already

served").

No. 20AP-489 8

{¶ 18} To bear out the first part of his argument, Mr. Randlett leans on State v.

Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, and argues that it has retroactive effect to mean

that because the April 3, 2003 sentencing entries omitted reference to the consequences of

violating postrelease control and because the entries "do not indicate the length of Relator's

term of post-release control and whether said term is mandatory or not," postrelease

control could not be effectuated absent corrective action by the court. November 18, 2020

Memorandum at 17-20, 21 (also arguing at 21-22 that "the 2003 Sentencing Entries * * *

were clearly not sufficient to comply with pre-Grimes post-release control notification

requirements").

{¶ 19} But Grimes and its progeny, as Mr. Randlett recognizes, have in some

significant part been overtaken by even more recent Supreme Court rulings. Here, we paint

with a bit of a broad brush simply to sketch the background landscape.

{¶ 20} In the years immediately following Mr. Randlett's sentence, the Supreme

Court made clear that " 'unless a trial court includes postrelease control in its sentence, the

Adult Parole Authority is without authority to impose it.' " Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio

St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio6085, ¶ 19 (overruled in part by State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913).

But that postrelease control sentencing language did not need to be perfect, or even entirely

correct, in order to withstand collateral attack. See, e.g., Watkins v. Collins, 111 Ohio St.3d

425, 2006-Ohio-5082, ¶ 53 (the "sentencing entries, although they mistakenly included

wording that suggested that imposition of postrelease control was discretionary, contained

sufficient language to authorize the Adult Parole Authority to exercise postrelease control

over the petitioners. Consequently, * * * habeas corpus is not available to contest any error

in the sentencing entries, and petitioners have or had an adequate remedy by way of appeal

to challenge the imposition of postrelease control").

{¶ 21} Consistent with that guidance, this court regularly upheld against collateral

attack the effectiveness of sentencing entry language advising prison and parole authorities

that the court had imposed postrelease control requirements for the "applicable periods."

For example, in State v. Holloman, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-454, 2011-Ohio-6138, ¶ 10, we

addressed a formulation identical to the 2003 sentencing entries relevant here: "the trial

court's judgment entry imposing appellant's sentence stated that 'the Court notified the

No. 20AP-489 9

Defendant, orally and in writing, of the applicable periods of post-release control pursuant

to R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c), (d) and (e).' " We said: "In similar post-release control

notification cases, this court has concluded that post-release control may be properly

imposed when the 'applicable periods' language in the trial court's sentencing entry, such

as in the present case, is combined with other written or oral notification of the imposition

of post-release control." Id. at ¶ 11 (citations omitted). The entry notification was proper

and effective. Id. at ¶ 13. See also, e.g., State v. King, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-930, 2016-Ohio1247, ¶ 16 ("applicable periods" entry language upheld against collateral attack: "This court

has previously held that 'post-release control may be properly imposed when the

"applicable periods" language in a trial court's sentencing entry "is combined with other

written or oral notification of the imposition of post-release control" ' ") (citations omitted).

{¶ 22} It is fair to say that the landscape changed with Grimes. That 2017 decision

involved a challenge to sanctions for violation of postrelease control terms that the offender

argued had not been validly imposed in the first instance. In the process of upholding the

sanctions, the Supreme Court majority held that "to validly impose postrelease control

when the court orally provides all the required advisements * * *, the sentencing entry must

contain the following information: (1) whether postrelease control is discretionary or

mandatory, (2) the duration of the postrelease-control period, and (3) a statement to the

effect that the Adult Parole Authority will administer the postrelease control pursuant to

R.C. 2967.28 and that any violation by the offender of the conditions of postrelease control

will subject the offender to the consequences set forth in that statute." 2017-Ohio-2927, at

¶ 1. Grimes further said that it is "the trial judge's responsibility to impose postrelease

control, including the responsibility to interpret the law to determine in each case whether

postrelease control is mandatory or discretionary and to determine the term of supervision

as well as to advise the offender of those determinations * * *. It is the responsibility of the

APA to carry out the sentence after the court imposes it, not to interpret the law and facts

and impose its own sentence based on information in the sentencing entry." Id. at ¶ 21.

{¶ 23} But Grimes was not the end of the saga, as the parties here recognize. State

v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, "realign[ed]" Ohio precedent and

established that "[w]hen a case is within a court's subject-matter jurisdiction and the

accused is properly before the court [as Mr. Randlett unquestionably was in 2003], any

No. 20AP-489 10

error in the exercise of that jurisdiction in imposing postrelease control renders the court's

judgment voidable, permitting the sentence to be set aside if the error has been successfully

challenged on direct appeal." Id. at ¶ 4 (emphasis added). In such circumstances, that is,

"any error * * * in failing to properly impose postrelease control rendered the judgment of

conviction voidable, not void, and it is not subject to collateral attack." Id. at ¶ 5 (adding:

"Therefore, to the extent any prior case conflicts with our holding today, it is overruled").

{¶ 24} Although the sentencing court in Harper had failed to "include the

consequences of a violation of postrelease control in the sentencing entry itself"—thus

violating one of the three Grimes requirements for the "valid[]" imposition of postrelease

control, 2017-Ohio-2927, at ¶ 1—defendant Harper had not appealed that error. 2020-

Ohio-2913, at ¶ 8. The Supreme Court found it "time * * * to reevaluate the basic premise

of our void-sentence jurisprudence and the remedy for the failure to properly impose

postrelease control." Id. at ¶ 34. The court observed that "[i]f the entry were merely

voidable, res judicata would apply," id. at ¶ 18, and it noted the virtues of finality and judicial

economy that come with a definitive end to litigation, id. at ¶ 37. Then the court held: "we

overrule our precedent to the extent that it holds that the failure to properly imp0ose

postrelease control in the sentence renders that portion of a defendant's sentence void." Id.

at ¶ 40. Significantly for the purposes of the matter before us, we note that the Supreme

Court continued: "Any error in imposing the postrelease-control sanction in [Harper's]

sentence * * * could have been objected to at trial and that may have been reversible error

on direct appeal. However, such an error [that is, 'any' error in imposing postrelease

control] did not render any part of Harper's sentence void." Id. at ¶ 41 (emphasis added);

see also id. at ¶ 43 (Court cautions "prosecuting attorneys, defense counsel, and pro se

defendants throughout this state that they are now on notice that any claim that the trial

court has failed to properly impose postrelease control in the sentence must be brought on

appeal from the judgment of conviction or the sentence will be subject to res judicata").

{¶ 25} We understand Harper to mean that the three entries in Mr. Randlett's cases

signaling the imposition of postrelease control are controlled by res judicata regardless of

any Grimes-type error that might have been but that was not raised on direct appeal. That

teaching has the effect of revalidating, where the issue was not taken up on direct appeal,

the result of this district's substantial jurisprudence giving effect against collateral attacks

No. 20AP-489 11

to the "appropriate periods" sentencing entry language that the Randlett sentencing entries

contained.

{¶ 26} State v. Hudson, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-3849, buttresses our reading

of Harper. "Relying on Grimes," the offender there argued that he could not be subject to

postrelease control because the sentencing entry did not include notice of the consequences

of postrelease control violation; it was too late to correct the entry, he urged, because he

had served the prison term to which postrelease control attached. Id. at ¶ 1. The Supreme

Court said again that the sentencing entry's "failure [to include consequence language] does

not render any part of the sentence void." Id. at ¶ 3 (emphasis added). We take that to

mean that the failure did not invalidate the entry's imposition of postrelease control, which

was res judicata. See also id. at ¶ 16 (any error in properly imposing postrelease control

"did not render any part of [the] sentence void") (emphasis added); ¶ 17 (when sentencing

court has jurisdiction, "sentencing errors in imposing postrelease control render the

sentence voidable, not void, and the doctrine of res judicata will apply to collateral attacks

on it"). Thus, the Supreme Court said that it did not need to decide whether Hudson had

fully served the sentence to which postrelease control attached, "because * * * this collateral

attack on his sentence is barred by res judicata." Id. at ¶ 10.

{¶ 27} The Supreme Court "therefore" reversed a remand that this court had

ordered requiring the trial court to correct its postrelease control entry. Id. at ¶ 19. Harper

had done the same thing. 2020-Ohio-2913, at ¶ 44. Informed by Harper and Hudson, we

agree with what we take to be Mr. Randlett's assumption that "absent a timely appeal, res

judicata generally allows only the correction of a void sanction." State v. Holdcraft, 137

Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, ¶ 9, citing State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio6238, ¶ 40. Postconviction release sentences that at one point may have been voidable, but

that were not voided and are not void, cannot appropriately be revised, nor can postrelease

control be added to res judicata sentences that did not mention postrelease control in the

first place. But here, the more salient point—and the place where we part company with

Mr. Randlett's analysis—is that because the imperfect imposition of postrelease control in

his cases was never voided, that part of his sentences remained in full force.

{¶ 28} The legal effect of the challenged nunc pro tunc entries was redundant: the

imposition of postrelease control for "appropriate periods" in this case already had the

No. 20AP-489 12

effect of imposing a five-year mandatory period of PRC in each of the three cases. (That is

true, we conclude, even with regard to case number 02CR-1721, where the entry—n0w res

judicata—contained the "appropriate periods" language despite seeming incongruity with

certain remarks at the sentencing hearing.)

{¶ 29} State v. Bell, 160 Ohio St.3d 216, 2020-Ohio-3104, puts an even finer point

on the analysis. This court had affirmed a trial court judgment denying a motion to vacate

postrelease control as not in compliance with Grimes, but remanded the matter for the trial

court to issue a nunc pro tunc entry correcting the sentencing entry. See State v. Bell, 10th

Dist. No. 17AP-645, 2018-Ohio-3576, ¶ 13. The Supreme Court reversed the remand, while

leaving the affirmance in place. 2020-Ohio-3104, at ¶ 1. Bell again confirms that res

judicata entries that imposed postrelease control in a way violative of Grimes stand,

unaltered (and unchangeable).

{¶ 30} Mr. Randlett cites to State v. Payne, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-248, 2020-Ohio1009, for the proposition that "the trial court's judgment entries [there, and by extension

here] were contrary to law because, under Grimes, they did not properly impose postrelease control"; therefore, he urges, the " 'applicable periods' language [employed only for

the 'possibility' of use in the original entries in Payne, id. at ¶ 35]" does not "mean ' " 'the

statute controls.' " ' " December 30, 2020 Relator's Reply at 4, citing Payne at ¶ 33-39 as

in contrast with the state's briefing. But the single-judge lead opinion in Payne issued

before Harper and Hunter realigned Ohio precedent and made clear that Grimes-type

errors in imposing postrelease control do not make the postrelease control part of a

sentence void. See, e.g., Harper at ¶ 5 ("any error * * * in failing to properly impose

postrelease control rendered the judgment of conviction voidable, not void, and it is not

subject to collateral attack"; previous decisions in conflict with that holding are

"overruled"). The view of the lead opinion in Payne that "[w]hen post-release control is not

appropriately imposed [under Grimes analysis] in a trial court's judgment entry, the

sentence is partially void and never becomes final in that limited respect," 2020-Ohio-1009,

at ¶ 37, has been overtaken by subsequent Supreme Court authority (here with regard to

sentencing entries that did impose postrelease control, see 2003 sentencing entries; see

also Mandamus Petition at ¶ 39 ("[t]hese three cases were the only cases for which

postrelease could be, and was, in fact, imposed by the trial court at sentencing").

No. 20AP-489 13

{¶ 31} Understood in light of Harper and Hudson and Bell and for the reasons

discussed above, the legal effect of the nunc pro tunc entries here was to add a coda

signifying little more than, 'and the court means it.' The imposition of postrelease control

had not been appealed, and was res judicata. The law requires a five-year period of

postrelease control for Mr. Randlett. R.C. 2967.28(B)(1); see also R.C. 2967.28(F)(4)(c)

("period of post-release control for all of the sentences should be the period of post-release

control that expires last"). Here, moreover, and even beyond the "appropriate periods"

sentencing entry language that had effectuated postrelease control in many cases under

reasonably longstanding authority of this court, the record contains a clear "Notice (Prison

Imposed)," signed by the defendant and his lawyer and filed in the trial court on April 7,

2003 reciting that the relevant "Post-Release Control" period is, for "felony sex offenders –

mandatory 5 years."

{¶ 32} Thus, in appraising whether the res judicata entries' imposition of postrelease

control without specification of the mandatory five-year nature of that term adequately

directs that postrelease control be for the "appropriate periods," we need not even turn to

the direction provided by Fraley v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab & Corr., __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-

Ohio-4410. That decision states: "When a statute requires sentences to be served

consecutively and the sentencing entry is silent as to how the sentences are to run, the

statute controls." Id. at ¶ 13 (citation omitted). Analogy from that principle of Fraley to

this current matter, with the trial court having adverted to postrelease control for the

"appropriate periods," would not be much of a stretch in concluding that the Department

of Corrections must observe statutory law in the face of silence as to the mandatory fiveyear nature of the period. See also id. at ¶ 17-18 ("DRC's role is not to correct a sentencing

court's errors and impose the sentence it believes the court should have imposed. * * * *

DRC has a clear legal duty to carry out the sentence that the trial court imposed * * *."). As

we have observed, however, the written court record, including the "Notice (Prison

Imposed)" document, is not silent (and is consistent with statute). The Fraley reminder

thus supports, but is not necessary to, the conclusion that the sentencing entries as they

issued in 2003 required a five-year mandatory period for the postrelease control to which

they adverted.

No. 20AP-489 14

{¶ 33} Because Mr. Randlett had been sentenced in the original 2003 entries to what

was to amount to a five-year mandatory period of postrelease control, we do not accept his

predicate that the nunc pro tunc entries imposed that component of his sentence for the

first time. See supra at ¶ 17. We conclude, therefore, that Mr. Randlett does not have a

clear legal right to the "extraordinary remedy" he seeks. Compare, e.g., State ex rel. Evans

v. Chambers-Smith, 156 Ohio St.3d 430, 2019-Ohio-1335, ¶ 13 (prison record case:

"Mandamus, as an extraordinary remedy, is available to inmates to correct prison records

only upon an allegation of present harm"); State v. White, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-153, 2020-

Ohio-4313, ¶ 3 (offender "cannot be heard now to complain that the trial court improperly

used the nunc pro tunc mechanism to reduce the postrelease control term to its statutorily

specified three-year period: as the state submits, that alteration in no way harms" him; also

citing Hudson and Harper in noting at ¶ 2 that "[b]ecause a claimed mistake in postrelease

control does not make even that portion of [a years' old] sentence void, any such asserted

error that was not challenged on direct appeal from the sentence 'is now barred by the

doctrine of res judicata' ").

Lacking a clear legal right to the extraordinary remedy he seeks, Mr. Randlett

is not entitled to the writ. Therefore we need not explore whether any adequate remedy at law also would operate to bar his mandamus pursuit. We deny Mr. Randlett's petition for a writ of mandamus, and the state's motion to dismiss the petition is rendered moot.



Petition for writ of mandamus denied