STATE OF OHIO v. RAKEEM FORD

Springfield, OH - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant Rakeem Ford with appealing from his conviction in the Clark County Court of Common Pleas after he pled guilty to one count of possession of heroin and one count of obstructing official business.

{¶ 2} On July 9, 2019, a Clark County grand jury returned an indictment charging

Ford with single counts of trafficking in heroin, possession of heroin, trafficking in

marijuana, improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, receiving stolen property,

and obstructing official business. The charge for receiving stolen property and each of

the drug charges included a firearm specification. The charges for trafficking in heroin

and possession of heroin also included forfeiture specifications for $2,230.

{¶ 3} The charges stemmed from Ford’s encounter with police while he was riding

as a front-seat passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for minor traffic violations during

the early morning hours of March 17, 2019. The officer who initiated the traffic stop

searched the driver and Ford after he noticed odors of brunt marijuana and an alcoholic

beverage coming from the interior of the vehicle. The officer also observed a baggie of

marijuana lying on Ford’s seat in plain view. While searching Ford, the officer located

several baggies of marijuana, a large bundle of currency, and a small baggie of off-white

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powder in the pockets of Ford’s pants. The off-white powder was later confirmed to be

0.714 grams of heroin.

{¶ 4} When the officer attempted to arrest and handcuff Ford, Ford forcefully pulled

away and began to flee from the officer on foot. As the officer was chasing Ford, a

vehicle driven by the mother of one of Ford’s children, Kamila Portis, approached them

and drove directly at the officer in an aggressive manner. Portis then slammed on her

vehicle’s brakes and Ford entered the vehicle. The officer then approached the vehicle

and ordered Portis to stop, but she instead sped away as the officer opened the driver’sside door. For safety purposes, the officer did not pursue the vehicle containing Ford

and Portis. The officer, however, went back to search the vehicle that he had previously

stopped and found a backpack containing a firearm and a loaded magazine. Ford was

later placed in custody after a warrant was issued for his arrest.

{¶ 5} On November 5, 2019, Ford entered into a plea agreement with the State

whereby he pled guilty to possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and

obstructing official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A), both fifth-degree felonies.

Ford also agreed to the forfeiture of $2,230 that was found on his person during the

offenses in question. In exchange for Ford’s guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the

remaining charges and firearm specifications, including the firearm specification attached

to the charge for possession of heroin. After conducting the necessary plea colloquy,

the trial court accepted Ford’s guilty plea and ordered a presentence investigation report

(“PSI”).

{¶ 6} At Ford’s sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Ford to 12 months in

prison for each of his two offenses. The trial court then ordered the sentences to be

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served consecutively for a total prison term of two years. The trial court also ordered

Ford to forfeit the $2,230 found on his person. Ford now appeals, challenging his

sentence and raising a single assignment of error for review.

Assignment of Error

{¶ 7} Under his assignment of error, Ford raises several arguments concerning the

aggregate two-year prison sentence imposed by the trial court. Ford’s primary argument

is that his sentence violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Ford also claims that the trial court erred by

imposing consecutive sentences and by failing to consider the purposes and principles of

felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11. For the reasons outlined below, we find that Ford’s

claims lack merit.

{¶ 8} When reviewing felony sentences, this court must apply the standard of

review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-

Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1 and 7. Under that statute, an appellate court may

increase, reduce, or modify a sentence, or it may vacate the sentence and remand for

resentencing, only if it clearly and convincingly finds either: (1) the record does not support

the sentencing court’s findings under certain statutes (including R.C. 2929.14(C)(4),

which concerns the imposition of consecutive sentences); or (2) the sentence is otherwise

contrary to law. Id. at ¶ 9, citing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

{¶ 9} As part of his argument, Ford is challenging the trial court’s imposition of

consecutive sentences. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a trial court may impose

consecutive sentences if it finds that: (1) consecutive service is necessary to protect the

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public from future crime or to punish the offender; (2) consecutive sentences are not

disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the

offender poses to the public; and (3) one or more of the following three findings are

satisfied:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while

the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction

imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the

Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one

or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of

the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no

single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any

of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the

offender’s conduct.

(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from

future crime by the offender.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c).

{¶ 10} “[A] trial court is required to make the findings mandated by R.C.

2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing

entry, but it has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings.” State v. Bonnell,

140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, syllabus. “[W]here a trial court

properly makes the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), an appellate court may not

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reverse the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences unless it first clearly and

convincingly finds that the record does not support the trial court’s findings.” State v.

Withrow, 2016-Ohio-2884, 64 N.E.3d 553, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.). The consecutive nature of

the trial court’s sentencing decision should therefore stand “unless the record

overwhelmingly supports a contrary result.” (Citation omitted.) Id. at ¶ 39.

{¶ 11} In this case, the record establishes that the trial court made all the required

consecutive-sentence findings at the sentencing hearing. The record also establishes

that the trial court included those findings in the sentencing entry. Specifically, the trial

court found that:

[C]onsecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future

crime by the defendant * * * and to punish the defendant. Consecutive

sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct and

the danger he poses to the public. The Court also finds the defendant

committed one or more multiple offenses while he was awaiting trial or

sentencing, and the defendant’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime

by the defendant[.]

Sentencing Tr. p. 12. See also Judgment Entry of Conviction p. 2.

{¶ 12} Upon review, we do not clearly and convincingly find that the record fails to

support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings. The PSI indicated that Ford had

a lengthy criminal history that included several juvenile adjudications and adult

convictions. For instance, as a juvenile, Ford was adjudicated for arson, disorderly

conduct, aggravated assault, criminal damaging, criminal trespass, and several probation

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violations. As an adult, Ford had been convicted of receiving stolen property,

aggravated robbery, vandalism, and several traffic violations, including driving under

suspension and driving without a valid license. More recently, in 2015, Ford was

convicted of fleeing and eluding and having a weapon while under disability. Then, in

2018, Ford was charged with driving under suspension in Madison County, where he

failed to appear at court. This resulted in Madison County issuing a warrant for Ford’s

arrest in February 2019. Ford then committed the instant offenses while the Madison

County warrant was active.

{¶ 13} The PSI also established that when Ford committed the instant offenses,

he engaged in conduct that could have caused serious physical harm to a police officer.

As previously noted, Ford jumped into a vehicle that drove directly at the officer who was

chasing Ford. The vehicle then sped away as the officer attempted to open the driver’sside door. The PSI also indicated that a firearm was discovered in the vehicle Ford was

initially traveling in. Although the State mentioned the firearm at the sentencing hearing,

the trial court stated that because the firearm specifications were dismissed, it did not

consider the firearm when sentencing Ford.

{¶ 14} The PSI further established that Ford scored high on the Ohio Risk

Assessment Survey, which indicates a high risk of recidivism. The PSI also indicated

that over the previous 12 years, Ford had served several jail terms, paid several fines,

and performed several hours of community service, and yet had not responded favorably

to these sanctions. Ford was also found to have shown no genuine remorse for his

conduct in this case. Based on all the foregoing information, we cannot say that the

record fails to support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings. Therefore, we find

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no error with regard to the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences.

{¶ 15} We also do not clearly and convincingly find that Ford’s sentence was

otherwise contrary to law. “A sentence is contrary to law when it does not fall within the

statutory range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes and

principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors set

forth in R.C. 2929.12.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-8416, 99 N.E.3d

1135, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.). “ ‘The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within

the authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give

its reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.’ ” State v. Fyffe,

2018-Ohio-112, 109 N.E.3d 51, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. King, 2013-Ohio-2021,

992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 16} Contrary to Ford’s claim otherwise, the record of the sentencing hearing and

the sentencing entry indicate that the trial court considered the purposes and principles

of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11, as well as the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.

See Sentencing Tr. p. 11; Judgment Entry of Conviction p. 1. In addition, the 12-month

prison sentence imposed for each of Ford’s offenses was within the authorized statutory

range for fifth-degree felonies. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(5). Therefore, we do not clearly

and convincingly find that Ford’s individual prison sentences were contrary to law.

{¶ 17} “[A]n appellate court may vacate or modify any sentence that is not clearly

and convincingly contrary to law only if the appellate court finds by clear and convincing

evidence that the record does not support the sentence.” Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516,

2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, at ¶ 23. “If the record does not contain evidence from

which we can determine that the sentence was clearly and convincingly improper, then

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we are without authority to vacate it.” State v. Pack, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2018-CA-52,

2018-Ohio-4632, ¶ 12. Therefore, “the record must contain substantial affirmative

factual information in support of the defendant to conclude that the trial court’s sentencing

decision was in error.” Id., citing Withrow, 2016-Ohio-2884, 64 N.E.3d 553, at ¶ 40.

{¶ 18} After a thorough review of the record, we do not find by clear and convincing

evidence that the record fails to support the trial court’s decision to impose maximum,

consecutive sentences. As we previously discussed, Ford had a lengthy criminal

history, engaged in conduct that put a police officer in harm’s way, had not responded

favorably to previously imposed sanctions, received a high risk-of-recidivism score, and

showed no genuine remorse for his conduct. Therefore, when considering all of the

above, we cannot say that Ford’s aggregate two-year prison sentence was unsupported

by the record.

{¶ 19} We also find that Ford’s allegation of cruel and unusual punishment is

unpersuasive. “In addition to protecting individuals from punishment such as torture, the

Eighth Amendment has been invoked to prohibit punishment that is disproportionate to

the crime committed.” State v. Harding, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20801, 2006-Ohio481, ¶ 77, citing State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 370, 715 N.E.2d 167 (1999).

“Eighth Amendment violations are rare, and instances of cruel and unusual punishment

are limited to those punishments, which, under the circumstances, would be considered

shocking to any reasonable person.” Id., citing Weitbrecht at 370. (Other citation

omitted.) “The punishment must be so greatly disproportionate to the offense that it

shocks the sense of justice of the community.” Id. Because “we are bound to give

substantial deference to the General Assembly, which has established a specific range

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of punishment for every offense,” as a general rule, a sentence “ ‘that falls within the terms

of a valid statute cannot amount to a cruel and unusual punishment.’ ” State v. Hairston,

118 Ohio St.3d 289, 2008-Ohio-2338, 888 N.E.2d 1073, ¶ 21 and 24, quoting McDougle

v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 69, 203 N.E.2d 334 (1964). Accord State v. Mayberry,

2014-Ohio-4706, 22 N.E.3d 222, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 20} In this case, each of Ford’s individual prison sentences fell within the

authorized statutory range for fifth-degree felonies. Consecutive service of those

sentences was also authorized under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Ford’s aggregate two-year

prison sentence was also not so greatly disproportionate to his offenses that it would

shock a reasonable person or the community’s sense of justice. Therefore, because

Ford’s sentence was statutorily sanctioned and would not shock a reasonable person or

the community’s sense of justice, we cannot say that Ford’s sentence amounted to cruel

and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See Mayberry at ¶ 38.

{¶ 21} For all the foregoing reasons, Ford’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion

Having overruled Ford’s assignment of error, the judgment of the trial court

is affirmed.