STATE OF OHIO v. DEMETRIUS WILLIAMS

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In the early hours of September 4, 2017, 20-year-old Pierre Jackson was

shot and killed in the parking lot of the Plush Gentlemen’s Club (“Plush”) in Harrison

Township. Jackson’s cousin, Rino Lattimore, was shot multiple times during the same

incident. Josh Newsome and Alex Hernandez, two security guards present at Plush that

morning, detained Williams until law enforcement officers arrived and arrested him.

{¶ 3} Williams was indicted on seven charges: Counts One and Three, murder

(proximate result) in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), unclassified felonies (both related to

Jackson’s death); Counts Two and Five, felonious assault (deadly weapon) in violation of

R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), second-degree felonies (Count Two related to Jackson’s shooting,

Count Five to Lattimore’s); Counts Four and Six, felonious assault (serious physical harm)

in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), second-degree felonies (Count Three related to





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Jackson’s shooting, Count Six to Lattimore’s); and Count Seven, having weapons under

disability (prior drug conviction) in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), a third-degree felony.

Counts One through Six also carried firearm specifications. Williams pled not guilty to all

charges.

{¶ 4} At Williams’s jury trial, shooting victim Lattimore testified that on the night of

September 3, 2017, he and Jackson arranged to meet at a bar in Cincinnati, where both

lived. Inside the bar, Lattimore encountered Williams, who was with his (Williams’s)

girlfriend, “Q” (Shaquina Ray), and “Self” (Eric Jones), 1 another acquaintance of

Lattimore’s. According to Lattimore, he and Williams had been friends for over 25 years,

and Lattimore had lived with Williams’s family when he and Williams were young. The five

(Lattimore, Jackson, Williams, “Q,” and “Self”) had drinks together at the Cincinnati bar.

When Lattimore informed Williams that he (Lattimore) and Jackson were headed to a rap

concert in Dayton, Williams said that his group would go there as well.

{¶ 5} Lattimore and Jackson then walked to Lattimore’s Toyota Camry, while

Williams, “Q,” and “Self” went to Williams’s Mercedes Benz. Lattimore testified he pulled

alongside Williams’s car, where Williams “showed me his pistol,” saying “I’m strapped;”

Lattimore explained that “strapped” meant Williams had a gun. Lattimore described the

pistol as “a little red gun.” He said he told Williams that was a “girl gun,” and Williams “just

laughed and then he showed me another gun” he pulled from the back of his car.

Lattimore described the second gun as “a 22” that resembled “[a] little machine gun.”

Lattimore said he had seen Williams with both guns before, and that Williams regularly

1 Defense counsel and a law enforcement witness later provided the real names of “Q” and “Self.” (See Tr. p. 420, 705).





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carried the red pistol. Lattimore identified State’s Exhibits 16 and 70 as Williams’s red

pistol and .22 caliber rifle, respectively.

{¶ 6} Both groups then drove to Dayton. Lattimore testified that all five stopped at

an unspecified bar and shared drinks together before heading in the same two cars to

Cognacs, the club where the concert was to occur. At Cognacs, Lattimore saw Kenneth

Vaughn, another acquaintance, seated with “his guys” in the “VIP” section. He said

Williams, “Q,” and “Self” joined Vaughn in the VIP area, while Lattimore and Jackson

remained in the area for the general public, where a female friend of Lattimore’s later

joined them. Lattimore said Jackson had been drinking Patrón all night, but by this time,

Lattimore had switched to smoking marijuana. At one point, Jackson interrupted the

rapper on stage by yelling over the music, but the concert resumed with little disruption.

Sometime later, the group all agreed to continue on to Plush, with Lattimore’s female

friend leaving in her own car, Lattimore and Jackson going in Lattimore’s Toyota, and

Williams, “Q,” and “Self” following in Williams’s Mercedes. Lattimore testified that

Jackson, who was “drunk” by this time, reclined his car seat and said “he was going to go

to sleep.”

{¶ 7} When the group arrived at Plush, Lattimore parked his Toyota in a grassy

area of the parking lot, and Williams parked his Mercedes directly next to Lattimore’s

Toyota. Lattimore exited his car and leaned against the driver’s side of the Mercedes

while talking on his cell phone; Jackson remained in Lattimore’s car. Lattimore testified

that he then heard a shot, felt his “whole body just * * * rock[ ],” and turned to see Williams

shooting at him while standing in front of the Mercedes with the red gun in his hand.

Lattimore said he was hit three times before he “took off running.”





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{¶ 8} Lattimore testified that he was hit two more times while running toward a tree,

with Williams “limping”2 after him and continuing to shoot. Once Lattimore reached the

tree and fell to the grass behind it, police had arrived and surrounded him with flashlights

and guns drawn. When he told them that he had been shot by Williams, an officer rolled

Lattimore over and confirmed that he had “multiple” wounds. Lattimore said he briefly lost

consciousness, but came to and asked his friend to call Williams’s mother, because

“[t]hat’s like my mother” and he wanted her to know that Williams had shot him. He then

tried to call his own mother before reaching Beverly Turner, the mother of his child.

{¶ 9} Lattimore denied that he had a gun that night. He said he was transported to

the hospital with five gunshot wounds, including two to the opposite sides of his ribs, one

in his thigh, and two in his shoulder. Lattimore said the bullets to his shoulder broke bones

and “messed up” his deltoid muscle, leaving him unable to lift his arm or to work. He said

he also now walks with a slight limp. Lattimore identified Williams as the man who shot

him. On cross-examination, Lattimore admitted that he did not see who shot Jackson;

only later did he learn that Jackson had been killed. He also admitted that he initially

believed that “Self” must have shot Jackson.

{¶ 10} Deputy Joseph Schwieterman of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office

testified that he was dispatched to Plush at about 3:15 a.m. on September 4, 2017, in

response to a reported shooting. Other officers in other vehicles arrived at the scene at

about the same time. Deputy Schwieterman ran to an individual lying face up on the

ground in front of a Toyota Camry at the south side of the parking lot. That man (Jackson)

“appeared to be lifeless,” and Deputy Schwieterman was unable to detect a pulse. When

2 Lattimore explained that Williams walks with a limp.





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medics arrived to tend to that man, a security guard3 approached Deputy Schwieterman

and handed him a Springfield Armory pistol that the guard said had been taken from a

man who tried to enter a Chevrolet Traverse4 parked at Plush. Alex Hernandez, a Plush

security guard, then handed Deputy Schwieterman a second pistol, “silver on top and red

on bottom.” Deputy Schwieterman said he secured both guns in the trunk of a police

cruiser at the scene.

{¶ 11} Hernandez and Josh Newsome, another Plush security guard, had Williams

on the ground between the Toyota Camry and a Mercedes Benz. A female whose last

name was Ray (i.e., “Q”) also was being detained by the security guards, and Deputy

Schwieterman transported her to the Sheriff’s office headquarters to be interviewed by

Detective Kellar. Deputy Schwieterman then returned to the scene to drop off two other

female witnesses who already had been interviewed.

{¶ 12} Deputy Craig Stone of the sheriff’s office testified that he was dispatched to

Plush later on the morning of September 4 to act as an evidence technician. Deputy Stone

said he took photographs and collected three firearms that had been secured by other

deputies before he arrived. He identified those guns as a red 9 millimeter (State’s Exhibit

16), a black Springfield .40 caliber (State’s Exhibit 66), and a Beretta 9 millimeter (State’s

Exhibit 64). He also identified a fragmented bullet that he collected from beneath a car in

the Plush parking lot (State’s Exhibit 24). Deputy Stone said he found an additional 9

millimeter Smith and Wesson (State’s Exhibit 68) in the glove box of a Mercedes at the

scene and a Beretta .22 caliber “submachine gun[-]style” weapon (State’s Exhibit 70) on

3 The record indicates that this security guard was named “Locker” [sic]. (Tr. p. 208).



4 Deputy Schwieterman later identified that individual as Kenneth Vaughn. (Tr. p. 222).





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the floor of that car’s back seat. Deputy Stone testified that he lifted fingerprints from

various locations on the Mercedes, and identified State’s Exhibit 30 as a copy of the

fingerprint card he prepared from those prints. He also said he collected DNA swabs from

the guns and the interior and exterior of the Mercedes, and collected ammunition from

each of the guns. Finally, Deputy Stone testified that he collected a DNA swab from

Vaughn at the scene.

{¶ 13} Deputy Eric Bryan, another evidence technician with the sheriff’s office,

testified that he, too, was dispatched to the crime scene at Plush, arriving shortly after

3:15 a.m. on September 4. Deputy Bryan took a series of photographs, including some

depicting a ball cap on the ground near some blood.5 He collected the cap, three shell

casings, and a fragment of a spent bullet found on the roof of car parked near the

deceased victim (Jackson). Deputy Bryan identified photographs depicting where each of

those items was found.

{¶ 14} Both Newsome and Hernandez testified as to what they observed at Plush

on the morning of the shooting. Newsome said he had worked security at a different club

the previous night, but headed to Plush after the other club closed in order to pay the

security staff there. He arrived shortly before 3 a.m., and almost immediately noticed a

car pull into the parking lot, “driving erratically.”6 As Newsome and other security guards

began to approach that vehicle, Newsome heard gunshots behind him, and turned to see

a man with a gun in his hands, shooting. Only then did Newsome notice another man on

5 Lattimore testified he was wearing a San Diego Chargers hat that fell from his head when he hit the ground; he identified State’s Exhibit 35 as a photograph of that hat and Exhibit 39 as the hat itself.



6 The “erratic” vehicle apparently was unrelated to the shooting. (See Tr. p. 749).





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the ground. With the shooter headed in a different direction and continuing to fire,

Newsome drew his own gun and ordered the shooter to drop his weapon. When the

shooter’s weapon “either jammed or ran out of ammunition,” he (the shooter) ran toward

Newsome and “tossed the firearm at me and it hit me in the leg.” Newsome said he picked

up the shooter’s gun and holstered his own.

{¶ 15} Newsome testified that the shooter then headed toward a parked Mercedes

and attempted to enter it. Newsome followed and “t[ook] him to the ground with my right

arm.” Newsome handed the shooter’s gun to Hernandez and handcuffed the shooter,

then stood over him until police arrived. Newsome directed officers to the body in front of

the car and to the weapon taken from the shooter, which he described as “red or maroon

with a silver slide.” He identified State’s Exhibit 16 as that gun, and Williams as the

shooter.

{¶ 16} Hernandez testified that he began the night of September 3, 2017 working

outside security at Cognacs. While there, he was summoned inside to help with a pending

“altercation.” Once inside, he observed Jackson in a verbal exchange with the performer,

but no intervention was necessary. Hernandez watched Jackson walk to a car and leave

shortly before Cognacs’ 2:30 a.m. closing time. After closing, Hernandez headed to Plush,

arriving for his shift there at about 3 a.m.

{¶ 17} About five minutes after Hernandez arrived, and before he entered the club,

he saw a Mercedes pull into the parking lot, “driving recklessly.”7 As he, Newsome, and

some other security guards started toward that vehicle, Hernandez “began hearing shots

fired from * * * the side lot.” After about three shots, he reached a corner of the building

7 This was a different Mercedes than the one Williams drove. (See fn.6, above).





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and “saw one male fall to the ground.” Hernandez ran toward that man and checked for

a pulse. Using his light, he noticed that the man’s pupils did not dilate. Hernandez then

saw “that he (Jackson) was bleeding out of his face and there was brain matter on his

face.” He recognized the man as the patron who confronted the performer at Cognacs

earlier.

{¶ 18} As Hernandez was checking that victim, he saw in the middle of the road a

bearded man “in a white shirt with red lettering” who appeared to be “clearing a jam out

of his gun.” Soon thereafter, Newsome handed Hernandez a gun. Hernandez placed that

gun in his front pocket, then moved to a second shooting victim (Lattimore). Hernandez

began to apply pressure to that man’s wounds, and used his belt to place a tourniquet on

the man’s leg. Describing the man as “panicked” and “frantic,” Hernandez testified that

the man said, “Demetrius shot me, Demetrius shot me, call my mother.” When police

arrived, Hernandez handed the weapon he received from Newsome to an officer. He

identified State’s Exhibit 16 as that “small-framed pistol with a red handle.”

{¶ 19} Kenneth Vaughn testified that he had known Lattimore since 2008 from

having served time together in the Butler County jail; he said he had known Williams about

the same length of time from “see[ing] him at clubs.” Vaughn said that he was at a rap

concert at Cognacs with his brothers and cousin on the night of September 3, 2017, and

saw Lattimore, Jackson, Williams, and “Self” there. Vaughn said he assumed that they

were together because he knew that they all were from Cincinnati. Vaughn said that

Jackson “was getting drunk and [Lattimore] took the bottle from him.”8 Vaughn described

Jackson as “hyped, like he was jumping up and down, like with the artist whoever [sic]

8 Vaughn confirmed that Jackson was drinking alcohol directly from a bottle.





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was rapping.” Vaughn said Jackson also was “throwing the middle finger up to the dude

who [was] rapping,” causing Lattimore to try to “calm[ ] [Jackson] down” by pulling him

aside. He said he did not witness any fighting at Cognacs. Lattimore, Jackson, and the

rest of their group all left before Vaughn did.

{¶ 20} Vaughn said that when Cognacs closed that night, he, his girlfriend

Keishawn Tims, and Tims’s sister all proceeded to Plush in Tims’s Chevy truck. Vaughn

was driving, and he parked next to a Mercedes, then exited the truck and began talking

to “Self,” who was standing nearby. According to Vaughn, as the two women were getting

out of Tims’s truck, he “heard a bang” and turned his head to see “a gun * * * turned

towards” Lattimore, firing in his direction. The shooter’s back was toward Vaughn. Vaughn

saw that Jackson had fallen to the ground in front of a car, then saw the shooter “shift” in

Lattimore’s direction, “chasing [Lattimore], shooting [Lattimore].” Vaughn said he and the

two women ran behind the Chevy toward the highway, then ran back to the truck to try to

drive away. As Vaughn attempted to get in the back seat, a security guard approached

and had all three of them lie in the grass. Vaughn said there were two guns in the backseat

of the Chevy, but he did not use either of them that night. He also said he did not see

either Lattimore or Jackson with a gun that night. Vaughn identified Williams as the only

person he saw fire a gun in the parking lot at Plush.

{¶ 21} Beverly Turner, Lattimore’s girlfriend and the mother of his child, testified

that Lattimore called her at about 3 a.m. on September 4, 2017, sounding “out of breath,”

“yelling,” and “excited.” According to Turner, Lattimore kept repeating, “baby, Demetrius

just shot me four times.” She said that when Lattimore stopped speaking, she continued

to listen to what was going on, then picked up Lattimore’s mother and drove to the hospital





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in Dayton.

{¶ 22} The State also presented a series of expert witnesses. First, a latent print

examiner from the Miami Valley Regional Crime Laboratory (“MVRCL”) testified that

fingerprints taken from the crime scene and labeled as State’s Exhibit 30 matched

Williams’s fingerprints. None of those prints came from a firearm. Later, a forensic

scientist from the serology/DNA section of the MVRCL testified that swabs for touch DNA

taken from various guns seized at the scene of the Plush shooting yielded inconclusive

results; neither the red pistol nor any other gun could be tied to Williams by DNA

evidence.9

{¶ 23} The State also presented by DVD the deposition testimony of Russell

Uptegrove, the forensic pathologist who conducted Jackson’s autopsy. Uptegrove

testified that Jackson died of homicide resulting from a single gunshot wound to the back

of his head, with the bullet passing through and nearly severing his brain stem before

lodging in his nasal cavity. Uptegrove said that although the bullet fragmented when it

struck bone, he was able to remove the jacket and three small pieces of lead, which he

identified as State’s Exhibit 9. A forensic firearms examiner from the MVRCL then opined,

based on her testing and examination, that three cartridge casings recovered from the

crime scene outside Plush and the bullet fragments extracted from Jackson’s body all

had been fired from the red and silver SCCY 9 millimeter handgun marked as State’s

Exhibit 16.

9 According to this expert witness, the only known individual who “could not be excluded” as having contributed to the mixed DNA profile found on the red pistol was Hernandez, the security guard who last handled that weapon before it was turned over to the police. (Tr. p. 473). No definitive conclusion was reached regarding who handled any other weapon.





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{¶ 24} The final witness was Detective Isaiah Kellar of the sheriff’s office. Det.

Kellar testified that when he responded to Plush sometime after 3:30 a.m. on September

4, 2017, Lattimore already had been transported to the hospital, but Jackson’s body

remained in place. He said that after gathering information at the scene, he interviewed

Williams at police headquarters later that morning. He identified a copy of a form initialed

by Williams, indicating that Williams had waived his Miranda rights for purposes of that

interview (State’s Exhibit 79). A DVD of the interview then was played for the jury (State’s

Exhibit 80).

{¶ 25} During that interview, Williams (bearded and wearing a white t-shirt with red

lettering) said he had not met up with anyone in Cincinnati prior to driving to Dayton. He

also initially denied knowing the people who came to Plush in a Toyota Camry. Later,

however, Williams said “Suave” was in the Camry, but he did not know the person with

“Suave.” Williams confirmed that “Suave” was Lattimore, whom he’d known for many

years. He denied having shot Lattimore, having a gun, or throwing a gun at a security

guard. When asked to provide a DNA sample, Williams invoked his right to counsel.

{¶ 26} Det. Kellar interviewed Lattimore at the hospital two days later, on

September 6. He also interviewed Vaughn on September 4, and later interviewed Eric

Jones (“Self”). Det. Kellar stated that both Lattimore and Vaughn identified the shooter

when he first interviewed them.10

{¶ 27} The defense presented no witnesses. The jury returned a verdict finding

10 Det. Kellar did not repeat Lattimore’s or Vaughn’s hearsay statements regarding the name of that shooter, but merely confirmed that their ability to identify the shooter was not a recent development, as had been suggested by defense counsel during his crossexamination of Lattimore and Vaughn.





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Williams guilty of all six counts and the related firearm specifications. Subsequently, the

trial court found Williams guilty of the seventh count of having weapons under disability.

At sentencing, the court merged four other counts with the Count Three murder and Count

Six felonious assault, made the sentences on those two counts and the related firearm

specifications consecutive, added a concurrent sentence for having weapons under

disability, and imposed an aggregate prison term of 29 years to life.

{¶ 28} Williams’s appeal from that judgment sets forth these four assignments of

error:

1) The [t]rial court [e]rred in [o]verruling Mr. Williams’ Motion to Exclude

Photographs and [f]ailing to grant an order prohibiting the State from

introducing into evidence a multitude of photographs of the victim, both from

the autopsy and from the crime scene.

2) The [t]rial [c]court [e]rred when it [o]verruled Mr. Williams’ Motion to

suppress any and all evidence, including statements, obtained as a result

of the violation of [Williams’s] constitutional rights, and the procedural

safeguards established by Miranda.

3) The [t]rial [c]ourt [e]rred in [o]verruling Mr. Williams’ [m]otion to suppress

as evidence at trial any and all identification testimony that the prosecuting

attorney [m]ight attempt to introduce into evidence at trial, including but not

limited to any prior out[-]of[-]court identification evidence of [Williams] and

any in[-]court identification of [Williams] * * *.

4) Mr. Williams received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel

failed to properly advise him throughout the course of the proceedings in





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violation of Mr. Williams’ Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under

both the United States and Ohio Constitution.

{¶ 29} We will address those assignments of error in the order most conducive to

our analysis.

Assignment #3 – Motion to Suppress Identification Evidence

{¶ 30} Williams’s third assignment of error argues that the trial court erred when it

overruled his motion to suppress “any and all identification testimony.” However, the

record reveals that the trial court did not overrule Williams’s motion to suppress such

evidence. Rather, during a pre-trial conference regarding Williams’s then-pending

motions, Williams’s attorney explicitly withdrew that motion to suppress. The record

reflects the following exchange on that topic:

[Trial court]: All right. Now, there’s been a motion filed to suppress

identification. Where do we stand on that?

* * *

[Trial court]: My understanding [is] that there were no photospread

identifications or show up identifications. Is that correct?

[Prosecutor]: That’s correct, Your Honor.

[Trial court]: So[,] a lot of times the motion is made to flush [sic] out whether

there are any identifications that we don’t know about. There having been

no identifications, this is withdrawn * * *?

[Defense counsel]: Yes, Your Honor, for the aforementioned reasons.

(Tr. p. 7).

{¶ 31} Because Williams withdrew his motion to suppress identification evidence,





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there can be no error pertaining to the court’s action on that issue, and Williams’s third

assignment of error is overruled.

Assignment #2- Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained in Violation of Miranda

{¶ 32} In his second assignment of error, Williams urges that the trial court erred

by overruling his motion to suppress “any and all evidence, including statements, obtained

as a result of the violation of” his constitutional rights as recognized in Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Once again, no factual basis exists

for that argument.

{¶ 33} During the same pre-trial conference referenced above, the following

occurred:

[Defense counsel]: There was a general one-page motion to suppress

seeking to suppress statements and anything taken from Mr. Williams[,]

which would include any personal effects, DNA, and so forth.

After becoming acquainted with the discovery, there’s no DNA or

fingerprints attributed to Mr. Williams in this case to this point. Number two,

there was nothing taken – no property taken from Mr. Williams or any

personal effects. And then thirdly, his statement I’m acquainted with and I

listened to it time and time again, I don’t want to suppress that, so I’m going

to withdraw the motion.

[Trial court]: Okay. So the supplemental motion to suppress statement is

withdrawn.

(Tr. p. 6).

{¶ 34} As the trial court did not overrule a motion by Williams to suppress his





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statements or other evidence allegedly obtained in derogation of Miranda, his second

assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled.

Assignment #1 – Motion to Exclude Inflammatory Photographs

{¶ 35} Williams’s first assignment of error argues that the trial court erred by

denying his motion to exclude photographs taken of Jackson, the deceased shooting

victim, at the crime scene and during his autopsy.11 On this issue, the trial court did

overrule Williams’s motion, permitting the prosecution to introduce into evidence two

photographs of Jackson’s bloodied body on the ground outside Plush, including one

close-up of the entry wound to the back of his head. (See State’s Exhibits13, 14).12 The

court also allowed the admission of six photographs of Jackson during his autopsy: one

head shot and one clothed full-body shot of Jackson lying on the autopsy table; two close

ups of the entry wound to the back of Jackson’s head after hair had been shaven from

the immediate area; and two photographs of Jackson’s brain after it was removed from

his skull.13 Williams contends that those photographs “inflamed the Jury’s passion,

resulting in a verdict based on tainted evidence,” and thus denied him a fair trial.

11 Although Williams refers generally to “multiple photographs of the deceased from the autopsy and crime scene,” he does not identify by exhibit number the specific photographs he deems objectionable.



12 The State’s appellate memorandum notes that the admitted exhibits also included three crime scene photographs that capture a sheet covering Jackson’s body (see State’s Exhibits 11, 12, 20). Those photographs do not appear to be gruesome or inflammatory in the same manner as the other photographs we will discuss and do not bolster Williams’s assignment of error.



13 Two additional exhibits from the autopsy – one picturing an x-ray of Jackson’s skull that shows the location of the bullet, and the other a photograph depicting the bullet jacket and fragments after removal (State’s Exhibits 7, 8) – likewise are dissimilar from the others and do not lend support to Williams’s position.





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a. Standard of Review

{¶ 36} A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and its

exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.

State v. Easterling, 2019-Ohio-2470, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 54 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Norris,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26147, 2015-Ohio-624, ¶ 14. “A trial court abuses its discretion

when it makes a decision that is unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.” Id., quoting

State v. Darmond, 135 Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 34. That

standard applies to the admission or exclusion of photographic evidence. State v.

Whitfield, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22432, 2009-Ohio-293, ¶ 122.

{¶ 37} Under Evid.R. 403(A), “a trial court may reject an otherwise admissible

photograph which, because of its inflammatory nature, creates a danger of prejudicial

impact that substantially outweighs the probative value of the photograph as evidence.”

State v. Jones, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27354, 2018-Ohio-2332, ¶ 44, quoting State v.

Morales, 32 Ohio St.3d 242, 257, 513 N.E.2d 276 (1987). However, “ ‘[i]t is to be expected

that most photographs of a murder victim will depict blood and will be gruesome by their

very nature.’ ” State v. Winbush, 2017-Ohio-696, 85 N.E.3d 501, ¶ 46 (2d Dist.), quoting

State v. Moss, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22496, 2008-Ohio-6969, ¶ 28. Therefore, “ ‘the

mere fact that a photograph is gruesome or horrendous is not sufficient to render it per

se inadmissible.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Jones at ¶ 44, quoting Morales at 260.

b. Analysis

{¶ 38} In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that

the probative value of the photographs admitted was not substantially outweighed by their

potential for unfair prejudice. The two photographs of Jackson’s body taken at the crime





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scene gave context to the witnesses’ testimony about the circumstances of the shooting

and the manner in which Jackson died. Similarly, the contested photographs from

Jackson’s autopsy illustrated the forensic pathologist’s testimony, and they were not

overly repetitive. The pathologist testified that Jackson’s face had been cleaned prior to

the one close-up photograph of his head while on the autopsy table (Tr. p. 494; see

State’s Exhibit 2), reducing the goriness of that picture. Additionally, the two photographs

of Jackson’s brain, while admittedly gruesome, depicted the extent of the internal damage

done by the bullet despite the seemingly small entry wound, giving visual evidence of

Jackson’s cause of death. Further, the record contains “thumbnail” renditions of multiple

other photographs from Jackson’s autopsy that the State submitted to the trial court for

comparison but opted not to submit to the jury. (See Court’s Exhibit I). Many of those

photographs, including some of Jackson’s nude body on the autopsy table and some of

his brain within his opened skull, are objectively more disturbing or potentially prejudicial

than those the State chose for display to the jury. The photographs admitted by the trial

court were not unduly inflammatory.

{¶ 39} Williams’s first assignment of error is overruled.

Assignment of Error #4 – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

{¶ 40} Finally, Williams argues in his fourth assignment of error that he was denied

his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney

“failed to properly advise him throughout the course of the proceedings.” Specifically, but

without further elaboration, Williams contends that his trial counsel performed deficiently

by failing to “provide discovery to Mr. Williams; obtain ballistic expertise and a detective

to investigate the case; seek suppression of evidence at trial; and * * * investigate and





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properly prepare for trial and sentencing.”14

a. Standard of Review

{¶ 41} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

demonstrate both that trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness and that the errors were serious enough to create a reasonable

probability that, but for the errors, the outcome of the case would have been different.

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984);

State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-142, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). Hindsight is not

permitted to distort the assessment of what was reasonable in light of counsel’s

perspective at the time, and a debatable decision concerning trial strategy cannot form

the basis of a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d

516, 524-525, 605 N.E.2d 70 (1992); State v. Fields, 2017-Ohio-400, 84 N.E.3d 193,

¶ 38 (2d Dist.). Trial counsel is also entitled to a strong presumption that his or her conduct

falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance. Strickland at 689.

b. Analysis

{¶ 42} Williams has failed to demonstrate that his trial attorney provided deficient

representation. Although he faults his counsel for allegedly failing to provide him with

“discovery,” he does not explain what particular materials he believes his attorney should

have shared but did not, nor does he explain how the purported failure to share discovery

materials in any way impacted the defense of his case. The record demonstrates that

Williams’s trial attorney requested and received from the prosecution all materials

14 To the extent that any of these broad, unelaborated assertions may rely upon evidence outside the trial record, they are not properly raised on this direct appeal, but might be appropriate subjects for a petition for postconviction relief.





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normally obtained through discovery in criminal matters, and used that discovery in

extensively cross-examining prosecution witnesses. We have no basis for concluding that

trial counsel performed deficiently in that regard.

{¶ 43} As to his criticism of trial counsel’s failure to retain a ballistics expert or

engage an independent investigator, Williams again fails to demonstrate how those

alleged omissions affected the outcome of his trial. Defense counsel vigorously cross

examined the State’s forensic firearms examiner about her conclusion that the bullet that

killed Jackson came from the red and silver handgun that the prosecution sought to

connect to Williams. Nothing in the record suggests that a different ballistics expert would

have reached a different conclusion. Additionally, especially given Williams’s denial

during his police interview that the red handgun belonged to him, trial counsel cannot be

second guessed for pursuing a defense strategy focused on the lack of physical (i.e.,

DNA or fingerprint) evidence tying Williams to that gun rather than on disproving that such

gun was the murder weapon. Furthermore, even if conflicting expert opinions had been

presented regarding the lethal bullet’s source, multiple eyewitnesses identified Williams

as the only active shooter on the premises at Plush at the time of the shootings. We are

unable to conclude that the retention of either a ballistics expert or an investigator for the

defense would have created a reasonable probability that Williams would have been

acquitted.

{¶ 44} With respect to efforts to suppress evidence, Williams again does not

identify what evidence he believes his attorney should have tried to exclude but did not.

As discussed above, defense counsel did attempt, albeit unsuccessfully, to prevent the

admission of certain photographs of Jackson’s body. Although Williams’s trial attorney





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voluntarily withdrew other motions to suppress, the record confirms that challenging

Williams’s identification was not a viable defense in this case, where Williams was well

known to the surviving shooting victim (Lattimore) and at least one other eyewitness

(Vaughn), both of whom identified him as the shooter. His trial attorney also reasonably

assessed the statements Williams made during his police interview to be not significantly

probative of guilt. Williams has not demonstrated that the outcome of his trial would have

been changed by further efforts to exclude evidence presented by the State.

{¶ 45} Finally, the record does not substantiate Williams’s bald suggestion that his

trial attorney failed to investigate his case or to properly prepare for his trial and

sentencing. To the contrary, the record shows that defense counsel filed numerous

pretrial motions, questioned potential jurors extensively during voir dire, displayed in

depth knowledge about and understanding of Williams’s case throughout his opening

statement and closing argument, and vigorously cross-examined prosecution witnesses

about their prior written statements to the police, their prior criminal convictions, and other

matters reflecting on the reliability or credibility of their testimony. Indeed, the trial court

specifically remarked on the thoroughness of defense counsel’s cross-examination of

witnesses by using their prior written statements. (Tr. p. 728).15

{¶ 46} Because Williams has shown neither that his trial attorney’s performance

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness nor that any omission by his attorney

was serious enough to create a reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would

have been different but for those omissions, his fourth and final assignment of error is

15 There, the trial court stated, “I don’t think this Court * * * has seen a more thorough cross examination of * * * witnesses about” their statements made to the police.





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overruled.

The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.