Village of Freeport and Andrew Hardwick v. Christopher Barrella

Central Islip, New York civil rights lawyer represented Plaintiff, who sued Defendants on job discrimination theories.



This case asks us to resolve a vexed and recurring question:

what does it mean to be Hispanic? Specifically, it presents the

question of whether "Hispanic” describes a race for purposes of

§ 1981 and Title VII.



Defendants the Village of Freeport, NY ("Freeport” or "the

Village”) and its former mayor, Andrew Hardwick ("Hardwick”),

appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of New York (Arthur D. Spatt, Judge) following a jury

verdict for plaintiff Christopher Barrella ("Barrella”). Barrella had

sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the New York State Human Rights Law

("NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq., alleging that Hardwick

had not appointed him chief of police because Barrella was a white

Italian‐American, and that Hardwick had instead appointed a less‐

qualified Hispanic.



Based on longstanding Supreme Court and Second Circuit

precedent, we reiterate that "race” includes ethnicity for purposes of

§ 1981, so that discrimination based on Hispanic ancestry or lack

thereof constitutes racial discrimination under that statute. We also

hold that "race” should be defined the same way for purposes of

Title VII.

To summarize, we hold as follows:



(1) The meaning of “race” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and

Title VII is, like other questions of statutory interpretation, a

matter of law.



(2) As a matter of law, “Hispanic” is a race for purposes of

§ 1981 and Title VII.



a. Longstanding Supreme Court and Second Circuit

precedent defines “race,” for purposes of § 1981, as

encompassing ethnicity. Accordingly, it has been

clear at least since our decision in Albert v. Carovano,

851 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc), that § 1981

protects against discrimination based on ethnicity,

including Hispanic ethnicity or lack thereof.



b. Because it has been clearly established at least since

1988 that “Hispanic” describes a race for purposes of

§ 1981, we reject Hardwick’s assertion of qualified

immunity based on his claim that it was “objectively

reasonable” for him to believe that discrimination

based on Hispanic ethnicity did not constitute racial

discrimination under federal law.



c. Under Title VII, as with § 1981, “race” encompasses

ethnicity. Accordingly, a plaintiff who alleges

employment discrimination based on Hispanic

ethnicity or lack thereof may be able to state a claim

of racial discrimination within the meaning of Title



VII.



We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court

insofar as it denied defendants’ motions for judgment as a

matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.



(3) The District Court erred in admitting lay opinion testimony

that impermissibly speculated as to Hardwick’s reasons for

promoting Bermudez, in violation of Rule 701(b) of the

Federal Rules of Evidence.



a. Reviewing the District Court’s evidentiary rulings

under the so‐called “abuse of discretion” standard,

we conclude that the District Court erroneously

allowed lay witnesses to speculate that racial

considerations may have influenced Hardwick’s

appointment of Bermudez.



b. Because this was a factually close case, we conclude

that the District Court’s error prejudiced defendants,

and that a new trial is necessary. Accordingly, we

VACATE the District Court’s judgment and

REMAND to the District Court for a new trial

consistent with this opinion.