Please E-mail suggested additions, comments and/or corrections to Kent@MoreLaw.Com.

Help support the publication of case reports on MoreLaw

GORSS MOTELS, INC., BAIS YAAKOV OF SPRING VALLEY, ROGER H. KAYE, AND ROGER H. KAYE, MD PC v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Date: 12-31-2021

Case Number: 20-1075

Judge: DENNIS JACOBS

Court:

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
On appeal from a PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Plaintiff's Attorney:



New York, New York - Best consumer litigation Lawyer Directory



Tell MoreLaw About Your Litigation Successes and MoreLaw Will Tell the World.



Re: MoreLaw National Jury Verdict and Settlement



Counselor:

MoreLaw collects and publishes civil and criminal litigation information from the state and federal courts nationwide. Publication is free and access to the information is free to the public.




MoreLaw will publish litigation reports submitted by you free of charge




Info@MoreLaw.com - 855-853-4800


Defendant's Attorney: ADAM G. CREWS, Washington D.C. (Thomas M.

Johnson, Jr., General Counsel, Jacob M. Lewis, Associate

General Counsel, on the brief), Counsel for Respondent

Federal Communications Commission, and Robert

Nicholson

Description:

New York, New York - Consumer litigation lawyer represented Petitioners with challenging a Federal Communications Commission order that removed the Solicited Fax Rule from the Code of Federal Regulations.



The TCPA, a statute designed (in another day) to help unclog the nation's

fax machines, prohibits the use of "any telephone facsimile machine . . . to send,

to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement.” See 47 U.S.C. §

227(b)(1)(C). As amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, the TCPA

excepts a narrow category of unsolicited faxes from this sweeping prohibition: an

otherwise unsolicited fax is permitted if the sender (a) has an "established

business relationship” with the recipient, (b) obtains the recipient's fax number

through certain means, and (c) includes a detailed opt-out notice on the first page

of the fax. Id. § 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(iii).

The Solicited Fax Rule, promulgated in 2006, provided that a fax "sent to a

recipient that has provided prior express invitation or permission to the sender

must include an opt-out notice” identical to the one required for faxes that were

6

unsolicited. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4) (2019) (repealed 2020) (emphasis

added). In that way, all faxed advertisements were required to contain opt-out

instructions, regardless of whether the recipient had previously consented to

receipt. See Bais Yaakov, 852 F.3d at 1080 (explaining that the Rule "mandate[d]

that senders of solicited faxes comply with a statutory requirement that applies

only to senders of unsolicited faxes”).

A "firestorm broke out over the new rule” as class-actions alleging

noncompliance proliferated across the country. See Brodsky v. HumanaDental

Ins. Co., 910 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2018). The stakes were high. The TCPA

authorizes statutory damages of $500 per unlawful fax (triple that amount for

willful violations) – and faxed advertisements are frequently dispatched en

masse. See, e.g., Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. ASD Specialty Healthcare,

Inc., 863 F.3d 460, 463–64 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting that the defendant in a TCPA

class action was facing $20 million in liability for sending one errant fax to

roughly 40,000 recipients); Bais Yaakov, 852 F.3d at 1081 (describing an instance

where TCPA plaintiffs claimed $150 million in damages for Solicited Fax Rule

violations); Nack v. Walburg, 715 F.3d 680, 682 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that

7

the TCPA defendant "faces a class-action complaint seeking millions of dollars

even though there is no allegation that he sent a fax to any recipient without the

recipient's prior express consent”).

As their exposure mounted, fax-senders turned to the FCC for relief.

Many obtained retroactive waivers that excused violations of the Solicited Fax

Rule.1 Others questioned whether the FCC had statutory authority to regulate

faxes that were solicited. In response, the FCC posted notice and invited

comment on whether the Solicited Fax Rule was lawful. Eventually, in the 2014

Order, the FCC concluded (over two dissents) that it did indeed have statutory

authority to regulate solicited faxes (but reaffirmed that the retroactive waivers

were properly granted). See Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the

Tel. Consumer Protec. Act of 1991, 29 FCC Rcd. 13998, 14013 (2014).

1 The FCC justified the issuance of retroactive waivers on the ground that it had

issued faulty guidance that confused regulated parties. Specifically, the FCC at

one point told regulated parties that the Solicited Fax Rule "only applies to

communications that constitute unsolicited advertisements.” In the Matter of

Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protec. Act of 1991, 21

FCC Rcd. 3787, 3810 n.154 (2006). That instruction contradicted the text of the

Rule. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4) (2019) (repealed 2020).

8

When the 2014 Order was subjected to facial Hobbs Act challenges in

multiple circuits, 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1), the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation

("JPML”) conducted a lottery – won by the D.C. Circuit – and consolidated the

petitions there pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3). Ruling on the consolidated

petitions, the D.C. Circuit vacated the 2014 Order on the ground that the "FCC's

2006 Solicited Fax Rule is unlawful to the extent that it requires opt-out notices

on solicited faxes.” Bais Yaakov, 852 F.3d at 1083. Then-Judge Kavanaugh

reasoned that "Congress drew a line” in the TCPA between faxes that were

solicited and those that were not, and authorized the FCC to regulate only the

latter. Id. at 1082. Challenges to the retroactive waivers were dismissed as

moot. Id. at 1083 n.2.

Once the Bais Yaakov decision became final (the petition for certiorari was

denied in 2018), the FCC, by its Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau,

removed the Solicited Fax Rule from the CFR "in light of the [Bais Yaakov]

court's decision that the rule is unlawful.” In the Matter of Rules and

Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protect. Act of 1991, 33 FCC Rcd.

11179, 11183 (2018). Entities whose class-action claims depended on the Rule

9

(including Gorss) then asked the full Commission to review that decision.

According to the challengers, Bais Yaakov did not require the elimination of the

Rule because: (a) Bais Yaakov addressed only the 2014 Order, not the underlying

2006 Rule, and (b) the D.C. Circuit's mandate was discretionary and did not

compel acquiescence.

The Repeal Order, issued by the full Commission, rejected the challenge.

That rejection is the subject of this petition for review. The FCC reasoned that

keeping the Solicited Fax Rule in the CFR would "create unnecessary confusion

and consternation” because interested parties "could not use the CFR to know

what the law is without also being aware of and understanding the significance

of the Bais Yaakov decision.” Repeal Order at 3082.

The Commission then rejected both arguments posited by the challengers.

It first explained that Bais Yaakov ruled on the validity of the Solicited Fax Rule

itself notwithstanding that it was technically reviewing the 2014 Order, rather

than the original rule. The Commission next rejected the argument that Bais

Yaakov's mandate did not require vacatur of the Solicited Fax Rule. It reasoned

that the Commission had no choice but to repeal the Solicited Fax Rule, which

10

"could no longer be viewed as lawful after [Bais Yaakov's] pronouncement.”

Repeal Order at 3083. Because "the D.C. Circuit's decision is binding on all

other circuits,” the Commission considered that it was "bound to comply with

the D.C. Circuit's mandate.” Id. at 3084. The Repeal Order dismissed

challenges to the FCC's retroactive waivers as moot. Id. The rationale of the

Repeal Order was thus limited to the impact of Bais Yaakov. It did not itself

consider whether the Solicited Fax Rule comports with the TCPA, or state that

the Rule was removed as a matter of policy, either to enforce regulations

consistently across the circuits or for any other reason.2

Gorss filed a timely petition for review of the Repeal Order. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2342(1).

2 The FCC's brief asserts that it repealed the Solicited Fax Rule "as a matter of

policy because of the Rule's widespread invalidation.” FCC Br. at 30. But a

reviewing court "must judge the propriety of [agency] action solely by the

grounds invoked by the agency.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196

(1947). The FCC's Repeal Order does not purport to do away with the Solicited

Fax Rule as a matter of policy. Rather, it accepted the holding of Bais Yaakov,

determining that it had no option but to comply with the D.C. Circuit's mandate.

Repeal Order at 3083. Accordingly, we ignore additional justifications

proffered for the first time on appeal.

11

II

Gorss steps back from the threshold issue of whether Bais Yaakov is

binding on this Court and the FCC, and urges us to reconsider the question

posed in Bais Yaakov: whether the FCC has statutory authority to regulate

solicited faxes.

Other courts have taken the approach advanced by Gorss (albeit without

much success for plaintiffs). Earlier this year, the First Circuit opted to

"sidestep” the question of whether Bais Yaakov binds other circuits because it

concluded that the decision was correct in any event. See Bais Yaakov of Spring

Valley v. ACT, Inc., 12 F.4th 81, 86 (1st Cir. 2021); see also Physicians

Healthsource, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 954 F.3d 615, 624 n.11 (3d Cir. 2020)

(concluding that it did not need to decide whether Bais Yaakov was binding as it

reached the "same conclusion . . . independently”). But this approach is not

available to us here. Unlike the First Circuit, which reviewed a district court's

ruling that the Solicited Fax Rule was invalid, the issue before us is the validity of

the Repeal Order. The Repeal Order was expressly based on the FCC's view

that the "D.C. Circuit's decision is binding on all other circuits.” Repeal Order

12

at 3084. Accordingly, we must consider the binding effect of Bais Yaakov.

We have jurisdiction to review the Repeal Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2342(1) and "will overturn [the FCC's] decision only if it was arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”

Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 570 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation marks omitted). When an agency decides a question of law,

our review is de novo. See Aleutian Cap. Partners, LLC v. Scalia, 975 F.3d 220,

229 (2d Cir. 2020).

When, as here, a court invalidates an agency rule pursuant to Hobbs Act

review, that ruling is binding on subsequent courts tasked with determining the

regulation's validity. Accordingly, consistent with the holding in Bais Yaakov,

we conclude that the FCC did not err by repealing the Solicited Fax Rule.

This opinion should not be over-read to suggest that if a Hobbs Act court

upholds a challenged order, the order is immune from challenge in subsequent

enforcement proceedings. Such a result would raise due process concerns, and

it does not appear that Congress contemplated such a sweeping effect when it

enacted the Hobbs Act. See PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris

13

Chiropractic, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2051, 2062-63 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in

the judgment). We decide only the effect of a Hobbs Act court's decision that

invalidates a rule on a facial challenge – when subsequent courts have nothing left

to enforce.

A

The Hobbs Act (or Administrative Orders Review Act) is a jurisdictionchanneling statute that "provides for facial, pre-enforcement review of FCC

orders.”3 PDR Network, 139 S. Ct. at 2058 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the

judgment). It gives the federal courts of appeals "exclusive jurisdiction to

enjoin, set aside, suspend . . . or to determine the validity of” certain FCC orders.

28 U.S.C. § 2342(1). After issuance of an order subject to the Hobbs Act, an

aggrieved party has 60 days to file a petition for review in a circuit court with

3 The Hobbs Act also provides for review of certain actions of the Department of

Agriculture, the Department of Transportation, the Federal Maritime

Commission, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Surface Transportation Board,

and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. See 28 U.S.C. §§

2342(2)–(6).

14

venue.4 Id. § 2344.

Because the types of FCC orders subject to Hobbs Act review tend to apply

nationwide, petitions for review are sometimes filed in multiple circuits. When

that happens within the first ten days after the order is issued, 28 U.S.C. § 2112 is

triggered, which directs the JPML to randomly "designate one court of appeals

. . . in which the record is to be filed, and [to] issue an order consolidating the

petitions for review in that court of appeals.” 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3). Any and

all other petitions filed more than ten days after issuance but within § 2344's 60-

day window are also transferred to the randomly-selected consolidating court.

28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(5). Because the 60-day time limit is jurisdictional, a facial

challenge commenced outside that window cannot be maintained. See New

York v. United States, 568 F.2d 887, 892 (2d Cir. 1977). The transferee court thus

"has exclusive jurisdiction to make and enter . . . a judgment determining the

4 Venue for Hobbs Act petitions lies "in the judicial circuit in which the

petitioner resides or has its principal office, or in the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.” 28 U.S.C. § 2343.

15

validity of . . . the order of the agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 2349(a).

Together, the Hobbs Act and § 2112(a) channel all facial challenges into a

single circuit court in order to "ensure[] uniformity nationwide.” Sandusky, 863

F.3d at 467. Post-consolidation, the designated court becomes "the sole forum

for addressing the validity of the FCC's order.” King, 894 F.3d at 476 n.3

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). So when Bais Yaakov

wound up in the D.C. Circuit via this channeling device, that court's adverse

decision was a ruling on all of the facial challenges that could ever arise. This

mechanism alleviates the confusion that would ensue from conflicting rulings,

dueling stays, and incongruent appeals.

B

The precise holding of Bais Yaakov is disputed: did Bais Yaakov invalidate

only the 2014 Order, or the 2006 Solicited Fax Rule as well? See Brodsky, 910

F.3d at 289-90 (recognizing ambiguity in Bais Yaakov). The petition at issue in

Bais Yaakov directly challenged the 2014 Order, and was filed well after the

deadline for challenging the 2006 Solicited Fax Rule; but as the Repeal Order

16

recites, the 2014 Order essentially "reopened the question of whether the

Solicited Fax Rule was authorized by . . . statute,” Repeal Order at 3083, so that

"the validity of the 2014 [O]rder depended on the validity of the 2006 Solicited

Fax Rule,” True Health Chiropractic, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 896 F.3d 923, 930

(9th Cir. 2018).

Bais Yaakov is clear on this point. The D.C. Circuit concluded that the

"Solicited Fax Rule is . . . unlawful,” and in turn invalidated the 2014 Order,

which "interpreted and applied” the Solicited Fax Rule. Bais Yaakov, 852 F.3d

at 1079. As the Solicited Fax Rule and the 2014 Order are inextricable, we

conclude (along with our sister courts) that Bais Yaakov invalidated the Solicited

Fax Rule as well as vacated the 2014 Order. See Sandusky, 863 F.3d at 467-68;

True Health, 896 F.3d at 930.5 The dissent posits that our holding amounts to "a

new rule of intercircuit stare decisis,” where "not only the judgment in the case

but also the reasoning of its opinion was universally binding.” We do not

5 This is consistent with the FCC's view, explained in the Repeal Order. See

Repeal Order at 3082 ("[T]he Solicited Fax Rule was struck down by the D.C.

Circuit in Bais Yaakov even though the 2006 order adopting that rule was not

technically before the Court.”).

17

announce such a sweeping new rule. The D.C. Circuit expressly held that the

Solicited Fax Rule was unlawful and thus invalidated the 2014 Order; it is that

precise ruling only that binds us today.

The case before us adds yet another layer to the analysis: Gorss challenges

the Repeal Order, which removed the 2014 Order and the Solicited Fax Rule from

the CFR following Bais Yaakov. According to Gorss, the holding of Bais Yaakov

is limited to the validity of the 2014 Order, so even if Bais Yaakov is binding in

the Second Circuit, we can nevertheless address the validity of the Solicited Fax

Rule in the context of the Repeal Order. This argument chases its tail. We

conclude that, if we are bound by Bais Yaakov, then its holding decides the

instant challenge to the Repeal Order.

C

Gorss advances a closely related argument that the FCC was not required

to remove the Solicited Fax Rule from the Code of Federal Regulations in

response to the ruling of a single circuit. According to Gorss, the FCC could

18

have maintained a policy of nonacquiescence. We disagree. The handwriting

on the wall does not admit of a second opinion.

1

In general, agencies may maintain a policy of nonacquiescence, which is

"[a]n agency's policy of declining to be bound by lower-court precedent that is

contrary to the agency's interpretation of its organic statute, but only until the

Supreme Court has ruled on the issue.” NONACQUIESCENCE, Black's Law

Dictionary 1073 (11th ed. 2019). Nonacquiescence allows an agency to adhere to

an interpretation of its statute notwithstanding that it has been rejected by a

court, or even by more than one.

Inter-circuit nonacquiescence ensures that a single court cannot undo years

of administrative work. Promulgating a regulation is purposefully burdensome

and assumes prolonged scrutiny and input by the agency, the stakeholders, and

the public; so it is problematic if an agency's work could be erased by a single

court (or by the happy acquiescence of a re-staffed agency). Nonacquiescence

also promotes inter-circuit dialogue. When tricky legal questions percolate,

judges and courts can build upon and critique each other's reasoning, which

19

often "yield[s] a better informed and more enduring final pronouncement.”

Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). And close

questions that split circuits can provoke Supreme Court review. Finally,

refusing to succumb to the view of the first court that disagrees with it allows an

agency to pursue a uniform regulatory agenda nationwide.

For the reasons set out below, however, invalidation of an order by a

Hobbs Act court forecloses the doctrine of nonacquiescence.

2

After Hobbs Act petitions are consolidated under § 2112(a)(3), a ruling by

the consolidating court that grants a facial challenge is binding nationwide. This

holding is consistent with holdings in our sister circuits. See True Health, 896

F.3d at 930; Sandusky, 863 F.3d at 467. Though the federal system does not

generally permit decisions of the circuit courts to have nationwide effect, the

Hobbs Act mechanism produces that effect. As described above, the Hobbs Act

establishes a "special statutory review proceeding” that channels all of the preenforcement facial challenges to an FCC order that could ever arise to a single

20

court tasked with deciding the validity of the order. See 5 U.S.C. § 703; 28

U.S.C. §§ 2342(1), 2349. The designated circuit then becomes the "the sole

forum for addressing the validity of” the challenged order. See King, 894 F.3d

at 476 n.3 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). If the designated

court invalidates the order, it cannot be enforced by another circuit, whether or

not it is removed from the books.

It follows that the FCC correctly concluded that the Repeal Order was

required once the Bais Yaakov decision became final: "Because Bais Yaakov

struck down the Solicited Fax Rule, the [Commission] acted properly in

eliminating that rule and, indeed, had no discretion but to do so.” Repeal Order

at 3083. See also Repeal Order at 3084 ("[T]he D.C. Circuit's decision is binding

on all other circuits,” and therefore, "[t]he Commission is . . . bound to comply

with the D.C. Circuit's mandate.”). Without the Repeal Order, the Solicited Fax

Rule and the 2014 Order would have remained on the books as vestiges. The

Repeal Order was therefore a ministerial act.

The purpose of the Hobbs Act is to "avoid[] the delays and uncertainty”

that transpire when "multiple pre-enforcement proceedings [are] filed and

21

decided over time in multiple district courts and courts of appeals.” PDR

Network, 139 S. Ct. at 2059 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment). The

Hobbs Act's specialized statutory scheme would fail of its purpose if, after the

designated circuit court invalidates a challenged order, the agency could enforce

it nonetheless. That is because "in much the same way that our disposition of

an appeal operates on the judgment of the district court, a disposition of a Hobbs

Act petition operates on the order under review” and "the agency that made it.”

Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Safemark Sys., LP, 931 F.3d 1094, 1108 (11th Cir. 2019)

(Pryor, J., concurring); see also PDR Network, 139 S. Ct. at 2063 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring in the judgment) (if the reviewing court "determines that the order is

invalid and enjoins it, the agency can no longer enforce the order.”). It is

unsurprising that the Hobbs Act and other "channeling statutes have long been

interpreted as authorizing the reviewing court to universally vacate invalid

regulations.” Mila Sohoni, The Power to Vacate a Rule, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV.

1121, 1176–77 (2020).

22

3

Gorss fails to identify any example of an agency responding to a Hobbs

Act invalidation with nonacquiescence. Repeal normally follows vacatur by a

circuit court acting pursuant to a special statutory review proceeding like Hobbs

Act consolidation. For example, in Zen Magnets, LLC v. Consumer Product

Safety Commission, a company petitioned pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2060 for

review of a Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC”) regulation. See

841 F.3d 1141, 1147 (10th Cir. 2016). That statute is a Hobbs Act analog: it

provides a 60-day window for facial challenges to certain CPSC actions to be

brought and consolidates all such challenges in a single court of appeals via 28

U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3). 15 U.S.C. § 2060(a). In Zen Magnets, the Tenth Circuit

vacated the challenged regulation and remanded to the CPSC, 841 F.3d at 1155,

which promptly removed the rule from the CFR, explaining that the removal

"responds to a decision of the . . . Tenth Circuit that vacated the rule.” 82 FR

12716–01, 2017 WL 878371 (Mar. 7, 2017). We therefore reject Gorss's contention

that the Repeal Order here was anomalous.

* * *

23

In sum, when a consolidating court becomes the "sole forum” that can

address the facial validity of a challenged order, and invalidates it, the final

ruling of that court binds subsequent courts tasked with considering the facial

validity of the order, and the agency therefore lacks the option of

nonacquiescence. See King, 894 F.3d at 476 n.3. Accordingly, we detect no

error in the FCC's Repeal Order.
Outcome:
For the reasons stated above, the petition for review is DENIED.

Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments:

About This Case

What was the outcome of GORSS MOTELS, INC., BAIS YAAKOV OF SPRING VALLEY, ROGER H...?

The outcome was: For the reasons stated above, the petition for review is DENIED.

Which court heard GORSS MOTELS, INC., BAIS YAAKOV OF SPRING VALLEY, ROGER H...?

This case was heard in <center><h4><b> United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit </b> <br> <font color="green"><i>On appeal from a PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION </i></font></center></h4>, NY. The presiding judge was DENNIS JACOBS.

Who were the attorneys in GORSS MOTELS, INC., BAIS YAAKOV OF SPRING VALLEY, ROGER H...?

Plaintiff's attorney: New York, New York - Best consumer litigation Lawyer Directory Tell MoreLaw About Your Litigation Successes and MoreLaw Will Tell the World. Re: MoreLaw National Jury Verdict and Settlement Counselor: MoreLaw collects and publishes civil and criminal litigation information from the state and federal courts nationwide. Publication is free and access to the information is free to the public. MoreLaw will publish litigation reports submitted by you free of charge Info@MoreLaw.com - 855-853-4800. Defendant's attorney: ADAM G. CREWS, Washington D.C. (Thomas M. Johnson, Jr., General Counsel, Jacob M. Lewis, Associate General Counsel, on the brief), Counsel for Respondent Federal Communications Commission, and Robert Nicholson.

When was GORSS MOTELS, INC., BAIS YAAKOV OF SPRING VALLEY, ROGER H... decided?

This case was decided on December 31, 2021.