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GORSS MOTELS, INC., BAIS YAAKOV OF SPRING VALLEY, ROGER H. KAYE, AND ROGER H. KAYE, MD PC v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Date: 12-31-2021
Case Number: 20-1075
Judge: DENNIS JACOBS
Court:
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
On appeal from a PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
Plaintiff's Attorney:
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Defendant's Attorney: ADAM G. CREWS, Washington D.C. (Thomas M.
Johnson, Jr., General Counsel, Jacob M. Lewis, Associate
General Counsel, on the brief), Counsel for Respondent
Federal Communications Commission, and Robert
Nicholson
New York, New York - Consumer litigation lawyer represented Petitioners with challenging a Federal Communications Commission order that removed the Solicited Fax Rule from the Code of Federal Regulations.
The TCPA, a statute designed (in another day) to help unclog the nation's
fax machines, prohibits the use of "any telephone facsimile machine . . . to send,
to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement.†See 47 U.S.C. §
227(b)(1)(C). As amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, the TCPA
excepts a narrow category of unsolicited faxes from this sweeping prohibition: an
otherwise unsolicited fax is permitted if the sender (a) has an "established
business relationship†with the recipient, (b) obtains the recipient's fax number
through certain means, and (c) includes a detailed opt-out notice on the first page
of the fax. Id. § 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(iii).
The Solicited Fax Rule, promulgated in 2006, provided that a fax "sent to a
recipient that has provided prior express invitation or permission to the sender
must include an opt-out notice†identical to the one required for faxes that were
6
unsolicited. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4) (2019) (repealed 2020) (emphasis
added). In that way, all faxed advertisements were required to contain opt-out
instructions, regardless of whether the recipient had previously consented to
receipt. See Bais Yaakov, 852 F.3d at 1080 (explaining that the Rule "mandate[d]
that senders of solicited faxes comply with a statutory requirement that applies
only to senders of unsolicited faxesâ€).
A "firestorm broke out over the new rule†as class-actions alleging
noncompliance proliferated across the country. See Brodsky v. HumanaDental
Ins. Co., 910 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2018). The stakes were high. The TCPA
authorizes statutory damages of $500 per unlawful fax (triple that amount for
willful violations) – and faxed advertisements are frequently dispatched en
masse. See, e.g., Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. ASD Specialty Healthcare,
Inc., 863 F.3d 460, 463–64 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting that the defendant in a TCPA
class action was facing $20 million in liability for sending one errant fax to
roughly 40,000 recipients); Bais Yaakov, 852 F.3d at 1081 (describing an instance
where TCPA plaintiffs claimed $150 million in damages for Solicited Fax Rule
violations); Nack v. Walburg, 715 F.3d 680, 682 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that
7
the TCPA defendant "faces a class-action complaint seeking millions of dollars
even though there is no allegation that he sent a fax to any recipient without the
recipient's prior express consentâ€).
As their exposure mounted, fax-senders turned to the FCC for relief.
Many obtained retroactive waivers that excused violations of the Solicited Fax
Rule.1 Others questioned whether the FCC had statutory authority to regulate
faxes that were solicited. In response, the FCC posted notice and invited
comment on whether the Solicited Fax Rule was lawful. Eventually, in the 2014
Order, the FCC concluded (over two dissents) that it did indeed have statutory
authority to regulate solicited faxes (but reaffirmed that the retroactive waivers
were properly granted). See Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Tel. Consumer Protec. Act of 1991, 29 FCC Rcd. 13998, 14013 (2014).
1 The FCC justified the issuance of retroactive waivers on the ground that it had
issued faulty guidance that confused regulated parties. Specifically, the FCC at
one point told regulated parties that the Solicited Fax Rule "only applies to
communications that constitute unsolicited advertisements.†In the Matter of
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protec. Act of 1991, 21
FCC Rcd. 3787, 3810 n.154 (2006). That instruction contradicted the text of the
Rule. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4) (2019) (repealed 2020).
8
When the 2014 Order was subjected to facial Hobbs Act challenges in
multiple circuits, 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1), the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation
("JPMLâ€) conducted a lottery – won by the D.C. Circuit – and consolidated the
petitions there pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3). Ruling on the consolidated
petitions, the D.C. Circuit vacated the 2014 Order on the ground that the "FCC's
2006 Solicited Fax Rule is unlawful to the extent that it requires opt-out notices
on solicited faxes.†Bais Yaakov, 852 F.3d at 1083. Then-Judge Kavanaugh
reasoned that "Congress drew a line†in the TCPA between faxes that were
solicited and those that were not, and authorized the FCC to regulate only the
latter. Id. at 1082. Challenges to the retroactive waivers were dismissed as
moot. Id. at 1083 n.2.
Once the Bais Yaakov decision became final (the petition for certiorari was
denied in 2018), the FCC, by its Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau,
removed the Solicited Fax Rule from the CFR "in light of the [Bais Yaakov]
court's decision that the rule is unlawful.†In the Matter of Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protect. Act of 1991, 33 FCC Rcd.
11179, 11183 (2018). Entities whose class-action claims depended on the Rule
9
(including Gorss) then asked the full Commission to review that decision.
According to the challengers, Bais Yaakov did not require the elimination of the
Rule because: (a) Bais Yaakov addressed only the 2014 Order, not the underlying
2006 Rule, and (b) the D.C. Circuit's mandate was discretionary and did not
compel acquiescence.
The Repeal Order, issued by the full Commission, rejected the challenge.
That rejection is the subject of this petition for review. The FCC reasoned that
keeping the Solicited Fax Rule in the CFR would "create unnecessary confusion
and consternation†because interested parties "could not use the CFR to know
what the law is without also being aware of and understanding the significance
of the Bais Yaakov decision.†Repeal Order at 3082.
The Commission then rejected both arguments posited by the challengers.
It first explained that Bais Yaakov ruled on the validity of the Solicited Fax Rule
itself notwithstanding that it was technically reviewing the 2014 Order, rather
than the original rule. The Commission next rejected the argument that Bais
Yaakov's mandate did not require vacatur of the Solicited Fax Rule. It reasoned
that the Commission had no choice but to repeal the Solicited Fax Rule, which
10
"could no longer be viewed as lawful after [Bais Yaakov's] pronouncement.â€
Repeal Order at 3083. Because "the D.C. Circuit's decision is binding on all
other circuits,†the Commission considered that it was "bound to comply with
the D.C. Circuit's mandate.†Id. at 3084. The Repeal Order dismissed
challenges to the FCC's retroactive waivers as moot. Id. The rationale of the
Repeal Order was thus limited to the impact of Bais Yaakov. It did not itself
consider whether the Solicited Fax Rule comports with the TCPA, or state that
the Rule was removed as a matter of policy, either to enforce regulations
consistently across the circuits or for any other reason.2
Gorss filed a timely petition for review of the Repeal Order. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2342(1).
2 The FCC's brief asserts that it repealed the Solicited Fax Rule "as a matter of
policy because of the Rule's widespread invalidation.†FCC Br. at 30. But a
reviewing court "must judge the propriety of [agency] action solely by the
grounds invoked by the agency.†SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196
(1947). The FCC's Repeal Order does not purport to do away with the Solicited
Fax Rule as a matter of policy. Rather, it accepted the holding of Bais Yaakov,
determining that it had no option but to comply with the D.C. Circuit's mandate.
Repeal Order at 3083. Accordingly, we ignore additional justifications
proffered for the first time on appeal.
11
II
Gorss steps back from the threshold issue of whether Bais Yaakov is
binding on this Court and the FCC, and urges us to reconsider the question
posed in Bais Yaakov: whether the FCC has statutory authority to regulate
solicited faxes.
Other courts have taken the approach advanced by Gorss (albeit without
much success for plaintiffs). Earlier this year, the First Circuit opted to
"sidestep†the question of whether Bais Yaakov binds other circuits because it
concluded that the decision was correct in any event. See Bais Yaakov of Spring
Valley v. ACT, Inc., 12 F.4th 81, 86 (1st Cir. 2021); see also Physicians
Healthsource, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 954 F.3d 615, 624 n.11 (3d Cir. 2020)
(concluding that it did not need to decide whether Bais Yaakov was binding as it
reached the "same conclusion . . . independentlyâ€). But this approach is not
available to us here. Unlike the First Circuit, which reviewed a district court's
ruling that the Solicited Fax Rule was invalid, the issue before us is the validity of
the Repeal Order. The Repeal Order was expressly based on the FCC's view
that the "D.C. Circuit's decision is binding on all other circuits.†Repeal Order
12
at 3084. Accordingly, we must consider the binding effect of Bais Yaakov.
We have jurisdiction to review the Repeal Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2342(1) and "will overturn [the FCC's] decision only if it was arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.â€
Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 570 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). When an agency decides a question of law,
our review is de novo. See Aleutian Cap. Partners, LLC v. Scalia, 975 F.3d 220,
229 (2d Cir. 2020).
When, as here, a court invalidates an agency rule pursuant to Hobbs Act
review, that ruling is binding on subsequent courts tasked with determining the
regulation's validity. Accordingly, consistent with the holding in Bais Yaakov,
we conclude that the FCC did not err by repealing the Solicited Fax Rule.
This opinion should not be over-read to suggest that if a Hobbs Act court
upholds a challenged order, the order is immune from challenge in subsequent
enforcement proceedings. Such a result would raise due process concerns, and
it does not appear that Congress contemplated such a sweeping effect when it
enacted the Hobbs Act. See PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris
13
Chiropractic, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2051, 2062-63 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in
the judgment). We decide only the effect of a Hobbs Act court's decision that
invalidates a rule on a facial challenge – when subsequent courts have nothing left
to enforce.
A
The Hobbs Act (or Administrative Orders Review Act) is a jurisdictionchanneling statute that "provides for facial, pre-enforcement review of FCC
orders.â€3 PDR Network, 139 S. Ct. at 2058 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the
judgment). It gives the federal courts of appeals "exclusive jurisdiction to
enjoin, set aside, suspend . . . or to determine the validity of†certain FCC orders.
28 U.S.C. § 2342(1). After issuance of an order subject to the Hobbs Act, an
aggrieved party has 60 days to file a petition for review in a circuit court with
3 The Hobbs Act also provides for review of certain actions of the Department of
Agriculture, the Department of Transportation, the Federal Maritime
Commission, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Surface Transportation Board,
and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. See 28 U.S.C. §§
2342(2)–(6).
14
venue.4 Id. § 2344.
Because the types of FCC orders subject to Hobbs Act review tend to apply
nationwide, petitions for review are sometimes filed in multiple circuits. When
that happens within the first ten days after the order is issued, 28 U.S.C. § 2112 is
triggered, which directs the JPML to randomly "designate one court of appeals
. . . in which the record is to be filed, and [to] issue an order consolidating the
petitions for review in that court of appeals.†28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3). Any and
all other petitions filed more than ten days after issuance but within § 2344's 60-
day window are also transferred to the randomly-selected consolidating court.
28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(5). Because the 60-day time limit is jurisdictional, a facial
challenge commenced outside that window cannot be maintained. See New
York v. United States, 568 F.2d 887, 892 (2d Cir. 1977). The transferee court thus
"has exclusive jurisdiction to make and enter . . . a judgment determining the
4 Venue for Hobbs Act petitions lies "in the judicial circuit in which the
petitioner resides or has its principal office, or in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.†28 U.S.C. § 2343.
15
validity of . . . the order of the agency.†28 U.S.C. § 2349(a).
Together, the Hobbs Act and § 2112(a) channel all facial challenges into a
single circuit court in order to "ensure[] uniformity nationwide.†Sandusky, 863
F.3d at 467. Post-consolidation, the designated court becomes "the sole forum
for addressing the validity of the FCC's order.†King, 894 F.3d at 476 n.3
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). So when Bais Yaakov
wound up in the D.C. Circuit via this channeling device, that court's adverse
decision was a ruling on all of the facial challenges that could ever arise. This
mechanism alleviates the confusion that would ensue from conflicting rulings,
dueling stays, and incongruent appeals.
B
The precise holding of Bais Yaakov is disputed: did Bais Yaakov invalidate
only the 2014 Order, or the 2006 Solicited Fax Rule as well? See Brodsky, 910
F.3d at 289-90 (recognizing ambiguity in Bais Yaakov). The petition at issue in
Bais Yaakov directly challenged the 2014 Order, and was filed well after the
deadline for challenging the 2006 Solicited Fax Rule; but as the Repeal Order
16
recites, the 2014 Order essentially "reopened the question of whether the
Solicited Fax Rule was authorized by . . . statute,†Repeal Order at 3083, so that
"the validity of the 2014 [O]rder depended on the validity of the 2006 Solicited
Fax Rule,†True Health Chiropractic, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 896 F.3d 923, 930
(9th Cir. 2018).
Bais Yaakov is clear on this point. The D.C. Circuit concluded that the
"Solicited Fax Rule is . . . unlawful,†and in turn invalidated the 2014 Order,
which "interpreted and applied†the Solicited Fax Rule. Bais Yaakov, 852 F.3d
at 1079. As the Solicited Fax Rule and the 2014 Order are inextricable, we
conclude (along with our sister courts) that Bais Yaakov invalidated the Solicited
Fax Rule as well as vacated the 2014 Order. See Sandusky, 863 F.3d at 467-68;
True Health, 896 F.3d at 930.5 The dissent posits that our holding amounts to "a
new rule of intercircuit stare decisis,†where "not only the judgment in the case
but also the reasoning of its opinion was universally binding.†We do not
5 This is consistent with the FCC's view, explained in the Repeal Order. See
Repeal Order at 3082 ("[T]he Solicited Fax Rule was struck down by the D.C.
Circuit in Bais Yaakov even though the 2006 order adopting that rule was not
technically before the Court.â€).
17
announce such a sweeping new rule. The D.C. Circuit expressly held that the
Solicited Fax Rule was unlawful and thus invalidated the 2014 Order; it is that
precise ruling only that binds us today.
The case before us adds yet another layer to the analysis: Gorss challenges
the Repeal Order, which removed the 2014 Order and the Solicited Fax Rule from
the CFR following Bais Yaakov. According to Gorss, the holding of Bais Yaakov
is limited to the validity of the 2014 Order, so even if Bais Yaakov is binding in
the Second Circuit, we can nevertheless address the validity of the Solicited Fax
Rule in the context of the Repeal Order. This argument chases its tail. We
conclude that, if we are bound by Bais Yaakov, then its holding decides the
instant challenge to the Repeal Order.
C
Gorss advances a closely related argument that the FCC was not required
to remove the Solicited Fax Rule from the Code of Federal Regulations in
response to the ruling of a single circuit. According to Gorss, the FCC could
18
have maintained a policy of nonacquiescence. We disagree. The handwriting
on the wall does not admit of a second opinion.
1
In general, agencies may maintain a policy of nonacquiescence, which is
"[a]n agency's policy of declining to be bound by lower-court precedent that is
contrary to the agency's interpretation of its organic statute, but only until the
Supreme Court has ruled on the issue.†NONACQUIESCENCE, Black's Law
Dictionary 1073 (11th ed. 2019). Nonacquiescence allows an agency to adhere to
an interpretation of its statute notwithstanding that it has been rejected by a
court, or even by more than one.
Inter-circuit nonacquiescence ensures that a single court cannot undo years
of administrative work. Promulgating a regulation is purposefully burdensome
and assumes prolonged scrutiny and input by the agency, the stakeholders, and
the public; so it is problematic if an agency's work could be erased by a single
court (or by the happy acquiescence of a re-staffed agency). Nonacquiescence
also promotes inter-circuit dialogue. When tricky legal questions percolate,
judges and courts can build upon and critique each other's reasoning, which
19
often "yield[s] a better informed and more enduring final pronouncement.â€
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). And close
questions that split circuits can provoke Supreme Court review. Finally,
refusing to succumb to the view of the first court that disagrees with it allows an
agency to pursue a uniform regulatory agenda nationwide.
For the reasons set out below, however, invalidation of an order by a
Hobbs Act court forecloses the doctrine of nonacquiescence.
2
After Hobbs Act petitions are consolidated under § 2112(a)(3), a ruling by
the consolidating court that grants a facial challenge is binding nationwide. This
holding is consistent with holdings in our sister circuits. See True Health, 896
F.3d at 930; Sandusky, 863 F.3d at 467. Though the federal system does not
generally permit decisions of the circuit courts to have nationwide effect, the
Hobbs Act mechanism produces that effect. As described above, the Hobbs Act
establishes a "special statutory review proceeding†that channels all of the preenforcement facial challenges to an FCC order that could ever arise to a single
20
court tasked with deciding the validity of the order. See 5 U.S.C. § 703; 28
U.S.C. §§ 2342(1), 2349. The designated circuit then becomes the "the sole
forum for addressing the validity of†the challenged order. See King, 894 F.3d
at 476 n.3 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). If the designated
court invalidates the order, it cannot be enforced by another circuit, whether or
not it is removed from the books.
It follows that the FCC correctly concluded that the Repeal Order was
required once the Bais Yaakov decision became final: "Because Bais Yaakov
struck down the Solicited Fax Rule, the [Commission] acted properly in
eliminating that rule and, indeed, had no discretion but to do so.†Repeal Order
at 3083. See also Repeal Order at 3084 ("[T]he D.C. Circuit's decision is binding
on all other circuits,†and therefore, "[t]he Commission is . . . bound to comply
with the D.C. Circuit's mandate.â€). Without the Repeal Order, the Solicited Fax
Rule and the 2014 Order would have remained on the books as vestiges. The
Repeal Order was therefore a ministerial act.
The purpose of the Hobbs Act is to "avoid[] the delays and uncertaintyâ€
that transpire when "multiple pre-enforcement proceedings [are] filed and
21
decided over time in multiple district courts and courts of appeals.†PDR
Network, 139 S. Ct. at 2059 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment). The
Hobbs Act's specialized statutory scheme would fail of its purpose if, after the
designated circuit court invalidates a challenged order, the agency could enforce
it nonetheless. That is because "in much the same way that our disposition of
an appeal operates on the judgment of the district court, a disposition of a Hobbs
Act petition operates on the order under review†and "the agency that made it.â€
Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Safemark Sys., LP, 931 F.3d 1094, 1108 (11th Cir. 2019)
(Pryor, J., concurring); see also PDR Network, 139 S. Ct. at 2063 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (if the reviewing court "determines that the order is
invalid and enjoins it, the agency can no longer enforce the order.â€). It is
unsurprising that the Hobbs Act and other "channeling statutes have long been
interpreted as authorizing the reviewing court to universally vacate invalid
regulations.†Mila Sohoni, The Power to Vacate a Rule, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1121, 1176–77 (2020).
22
3
Gorss fails to identify any example of an agency responding to a Hobbs
Act invalidation with nonacquiescence. Repeal normally follows vacatur by a
circuit court acting pursuant to a special statutory review proceeding like Hobbs
Act consolidation. For example, in Zen Magnets, LLC v. Consumer Product
Safety Commission, a company petitioned pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2060 for
review of a Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSCâ€) regulation. See
841 F.3d 1141, 1147 (10th Cir. 2016). That statute is a Hobbs Act analog: it
provides a 60-day window for facial challenges to certain CPSC actions to be
brought and consolidates all such challenges in a single court of appeals via 28
U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3). 15 U.S.C. § 2060(a). In Zen Magnets, the Tenth Circuit
vacated the challenged regulation and remanded to the CPSC, 841 F.3d at 1155,
which promptly removed the rule from the CFR, explaining that the removal
"responds to a decision of the . . . Tenth Circuit that vacated the rule.†82 FR
12716–01, 2017 WL 878371 (Mar. 7, 2017). We therefore reject Gorss's contention
that the Repeal Order here was anomalous.
* * *
23
In sum, when a consolidating court becomes the "sole forum†that can
address the facial validity of a challenged order, and invalidates it, the final
ruling of that court binds subsequent courts tasked with considering the facial
validity of the order, and the agency therefore lacks the option of
nonacquiescence. See King, 894 F.3d at 476 n.3. Accordingly, we detect no
error in the FCC's Repeal Order.
About This Case
What was the outcome of GORSS MOTELS, INC., BAIS YAAKOV OF SPRING VALLEY, ROGER H...?
The outcome was: For the reasons stated above, the petition for review is DENIED.
Which court heard GORSS MOTELS, INC., BAIS YAAKOV OF SPRING VALLEY, ROGER H...?
This case was heard in <center><h4><b> United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit </b> <br> <font color="green"><i>On appeal from a PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION </i></font></center></h4>, NY. The presiding judge was DENNIS JACOBS.
Who were the attorneys in GORSS MOTELS, INC., BAIS YAAKOV OF SPRING VALLEY, ROGER H...?
Plaintiff's attorney: New York, New York - Best consumer litigation Lawyer Directory Tell MoreLaw About Your Litigation Successes and MoreLaw Will Tell the World. Re: MoreLaw National Jury Verdict and Settlement Counselor: MoreLaw collects and publishes civil and criminal litigation information from the state and federal courts nationwide. Publication is free and access to the information is free to the public. MoreLaw will publish litigation reports submitted by you free of charge Info@MoreLaw.com - 855-853-4800. Defendant's attorney: ADAM G. CREWS, Washington D.C. (Thomas M. Johnson, Jr., General Counsel, Jacob M. Lewis, Associate General Counsel, on the brief), Counsel for Respondent Federal Communications Commission, and Robert Nicholson.
When was GORSS MOTELS, INC., BAIS YAAKOV OF SPRING VALLEY, ROGER H... decided?
This case was decided on December 31, 2021.