Good News Club v. Milford Central School

Under New York law, respondent Milford Central School (Milford) en-acted
a policy authorizing district residents to use its building after
school for, among other things, (1) instruction in education, learning,
or the arts and (2) social, civic, recreational, and entertainment uses
pertaining to the community welfare. Stephen and Darleen Fournier,
district residents eligible to use the school’ s facilities upon approval
of their proposed use, are sponsors of the Good News Club, a private
Christian organization for children ages 6 to 12. Pursuant to Milford’
s policy, they submitted a request to hold the Club’ s weekly afterschool
meetings in the school. Milford denied the request on the
ground that the proposed use—to sing songs, hear Bible lessons,
memorize scripture, and pray—was the equivalent of religious worship
prohibited by the community use policy. Petitioners (collectively,
the Club), filed suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging, inter
alia, that the denial of the Club’ s application violated its free speech
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District
Court ultimately granted Milford summary judgment, finding the
Club’ s subject matter to be religious in nature, not merely a discussion
of secular matters from a religious perspective that Milford otherwise
permits. Because the school had not allowed other groups
providing religious instruction to use its limited public forum, the
court held that it could deny the Club access without engaging in unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination. In affirming, the Second
Circuit rejected the Club’ s contention that Milford’ s restriction was
unreasonable, and held that, because the Club’ s subject matter was
quintessentially religious and its activities fell outside the bounds of
pure moral and character development, Milford’ s policy was constitutional subject discrimination, not unconstitutional viewpoint dis-crimination.

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Click the case caption above for the full text of the Court's decision.

1. Milford violated the Club’ s free speech rights when it excluded
the Club from meeting after hours at the school. Pp. 5–11.

(a) Because the parties so agree, this Court assumes that Milford
operates a limited public forum. A State establishing such a forum is
not required to and does not allow persons to engage in every type of
speech. It may be justified in reserving its forum for certain groups
or the discussion of certain topics. E.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 829. The power to so restrict
speech, however, is not without limits. The restriction must not discriminate
against speech based on viewpoint, ibid., and must be reasonable
in light of the forum’ s purpose, Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 806. Pp. 5–6.

(b) By denying the Club access to the school’ s limited public forum
on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, Milford discriminated
against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation
of the Free Speech Clause. That exclusion is indistinguishable
from the exclusions held violative of the Clause in Lamb’ s Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384, where a school
district precluded a private group from presenting films at the school
based solely on the religious perspective of the films, and in Rosenberger,
where a university refused to fund a student publication because
it addressed issues from a religious perspective. The only apparent
difference between the activities of Lamb’ s Chapel and the
Club is the inconsequential distinction that the Club teaches moral
lessons from a Christian perspective through live storytelling and
prayer, whereas Lamb’ s Chapel taught lessons through films. Rosenberger
also is dispositive: Given the obvious religious content of
the publication there at issue, it cannot be said that the Club’ s activities
are any more “religious” or deserve any less Free Speech Clause
protection. This Court disagrees with the Second Circuit’ s view that
something that is quintessentially religious or decidedly religious in
nature cannot also be characterized properly as the teaching of morals
and character development from a particular viewpoint. What
matters for Free Speech Clause purposes is that there is no logical
difference in kind between the invocation of Christianity by the Club
and the invocation of teamwork, loyalty, or patriotism by other associations
to provide a foundation for their lessons. Because Milford’ s
restriction is viewpoint discriminatory, the Court need not decide
whether it is unreasonable in light of the forum’ s purposes. Pp. 6–11.

2. Permitting the Club to meet on the school’ s premises would not
have violated the Establishment Clause. Establishment Clause defenses similar to Milford’ s were rejected in Lamb’ s Chapel, supra, at
395—where the Court found that, because the films would not have
been shown during school hours, would not have been sponsored by
the school, and would have been open to the public, not just to church
members, there was no realistic danger that the community would
think that the district was endorsing religion—and in Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U. S. 263, 272–273, and n. 13—where a university’ s forum
was already available to other groups. Because the Club’ s activities
are materially indistinguishable from those in Lamb’ s Chapel and
Widmar, Milford’ s reliance on the Establishment Clause is unavailing.
As in Lamb’ s Chapel, the Club’ s meetings were to be held after
school hours, not sponsored by the school, and open to any student
who obtained parental consent, not just to Club members. As in
Widmar, Milford made its forum available to other organizations.
The Court rejects Milford’ s attempt to distinguish those cases by emphasizing
that its policy involves elementary school children who will
perceive that the school is endorsing the Club and will feel coerced to
participate because the Club’ s activities take place on school grounds,
even though they occur during nonschool hours. That argument is
unpersuasive for a number of reasons. (1) Allowing the Club to speak
on school grounds would ensure, not threaten, neutrality toward religion.
Accordingly, Milford faces an uphill battle in arguing that the
Establishment Clause compels it to exclude the Club. See, e.g., Ro-senberger,
supra, at 839. (2) To the extent the Court considers
whether the community would feel coercive pressure to engage in the
Club’ s activities, cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 592–593, the relevant
community is the parents who choose whether their children will
attend Club meetings, not the children themselves. (3) Whatever significance
it may have assigned in the Establishment Clause context to
the suggestion that elementary school children are more impressionable
than adults, cf., e.g., id., at 592, the Court has never foreclosed private
religious conduct during nonschool hours merely because it takes place
on school premises where elementary school children may be present.
Lee, supra, at 592, and Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578, 584, distinguished.
(4) Even if the Court were to consider the possible mis-perceptions
by schoolchildren in deciding whether there is an Estab-lishment
Clause violation, the facts of this case simply do not support
Milford’ s conclusion. Finally, it cannot be said that the danger that
children would misperceive the endorsement of religion is any greater
than the danger that they would perceive a hostility toward the religious
viewpoint if the Club were excluded from the public forum.
Because it is not convinced that there is any significance to the possibility
that elementary school children may witness the Club’ s activities
on school premises, the Court can find no reason to depart from Lamb’ s Chapel and Widmar. Pp. 12–20.

Because Milford has not raised a valid Establishment Clause
claim, this Court does not address whether such a claim could excuse
Milford’ s viewpoint discrimination. Pp. 12, 20.
202 F. 3d 502, reversed and remanded.

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