D & D Tire v. Jack R. Ouellette

In Nevada, employers and coemployees of a person injured in

the course of employment are immune from liability for the injury under

the exclusive remedy provision of the workers' compensation statutes.

Additionally, some subcontractors and independent contractors are

accorded the same status as employers or coemployees of the injured

employee and are thus immune from liability. However, a subcontractor

or independent contractor is not considered to be a statutory employee

when it is performing a major or specialized repair that the injured

worker's employer is not equipped to handle with its own work force. This

opinion addresses when an independent contractor's actions are within the

scope of a major or specialized repair so as to prevent it from claiming

immunity as a statutory employer or coemployee.

We hold that when evaluating whether an independent

contractor's actions are within the scope of a major or specialized repair, a

district court must consider the act giving rise to the injury within the

entire context of the overall specialized repair and not in isolation. Thus,

factors such as whether the presence of the contractor at the job site was

for the purpose of the specialized repair or whether the activity was in

furtherance of the specialized repair can help guide the court's analysis.

We further hold that where, as in this case, the jury is instructed on

negligence, proximate cause, and the essentiality of a finding of the

defendant's negligence, an incomplete "mere happening" jury instruction

may be duplicative and/or confusing, and thus, the district court's failure

to give such an instruction was not an abuse of discretion.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent Jack R. Ouellette was employed by Allied Nevada

Gold Corporation (Allied) to perform tire service work, including the

installation, removal, repair, and replacement of tires on various pieces of

mining equipment. Appellant Purcell Tire & Rubber Company is a

commercial tire retailer. 1 Among other things, it provides tire changing

and repair services to mining companies

As part of his job, Ouellette drove and operated a tire

changing boom truck owned by Purcell and leased to Allied. When a

problem developed with the boom truck's power take off unit (PTO),

Purcell contacted an independent repair company, Dakota Diesel, who

sent repairman Scott Durick to make specialized repairs to the PTO.

Purcell, as owner of the truck, also sent Ryan Wintle, a tire technician for

Purcell with responsibilities similar to those of Ouellette, to assist with

the repairs.

After the initial repairs were completed, Wintle and Durick

filled the truck with hydraulic oil. Wintle then got into the truck to move

it to another area before testing the PTO. While backing up the truck,

Wintle struck and pinned Ouellette against a dumpster, causing Ouellette

to suffer a shoulder injury.

Ouellette filed a personal injury claim against Purcell. At

trial, Purcell moved for a judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that

it was a statutory employee of Allied and was thus immune from liability

under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NIIA). The district court

lAppellants D & D Tire, Inc., and Purcell Tire Company, Inc., are subsidiaries of Purcell Tire & Rubber Company (collectively, Purcell).

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denied Purcell's motion. Purcell also requested a mere happening jury

instruction, which the district court declined to give.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ouellette. Purcell then

renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that it

was a statutory employee of Allied. Alternatively, it moved for a new trial,

arguing that the district court's error in refusing to give Purcell's mere

happening jury instruction materially affected its substantial rights. The

district court denied Purcell's motion. Purcell now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Purcell argues that the district court erred in denying its

motion for judgment as a matter of law because Purcell was a statutory

employee of Allied at the time of Ouellette's injury and would thus be

immune from liability for the injury under the NIIA. Purcell also argues

that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to give a mere

happening jury instruction.

Ouellette argues that the district court did not err in denying

Purcell's motion for judgment as a matter of law because Purcell was

performing a specialized repair at the time of Ouellette's injury and thus

was not a statutory employee of Allied Ouellette also argues that the

district court did not err in refusing to give Purcell's proffered jury

instruction because it misstated Nevada law and was adequately covered

by other instructions given to the jury.

The district court did not err by denying Purcell's motion for judgment as a matter of law

NRCP 50(a)(1) provides that a district court may grant

judgment as a matter of law "with respect to a claim or defense that

cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated." In deciding

a motion for judgment as a matter of law, "[t]he [district] court must view

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all evidence and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." FGA, Inc. v.

Giglio, 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 26, 278 P.3d 490, 500 (2012). Thus, a

nonmoving party can defeat a motion for judgment as a matter of law if it

"present Es] sufficient evidence such that the jury could grant relief to that

party." Bielar v. Washoe Health Sys., Inc., 129 Nev., Adv, Op. 49, 306 P.3d

360, 368 (2013) (internal quotations omitted).

We review a district court's order granting or denying

judgment as a matter of law and its interpretation of a statute de novo.

Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 460, 244 P.3d 765, 775 (2010) (reviewing

judgment as a matter of law de novo); Intl Game Tech., Inc. v. Second

Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 198, 179 P.3d 556, 559 (2008)

(reviewing statutory interpretation de novo).

An independent contractor is not immune from liability when performing specialized repairs

In Nevada, employers and coemployees of a person injured in

the course of employment are immune from liability under the NIIA. NRS

616B.612; Lipps v. S. Nev. Paving, 116 Nev. 497, 501, 998 P.2d 1183, 1186

(2000) (noting that coemployees are immune from liability for injuries

incurred by other employees during the course of employment under NIBS

6161B.612(3), NRS 616A.020(1), and NRS 616C.215(2)(a)). Additionally,

the NIIA is "uniquely different from industrial insurance acts of some

states in that sub-contractors and independent contractors are accorded

the same status as employees" and are immune from liability. Meers v.

Haughton Elevator, 101 Nev. 283, 285, 701 P.2d 1006, 1007 (1985)

(internal quotations omitted) (interpreting a prior version of NRS

616C.215); see also NRS 616A.210(1) ("[S]ubcontractors, independent

contractors and the employees of either [are] deemed to be employees of

the principal contractor for the purposes of [the NIIA].").

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However, not all types of subcontractors and independent

contractors are considered to be statutory employees under NRS

616A.210. Id. A subcontractor or independent contractor is not a

statutory employee if it "is not in the same trade, business, profession or

occupation as the [employer of the injured worker]." See NRS

616B.603(1)(b); Hays Home Delivery, Inc. v. Emp'rs Ins. Co. of Nev., 117

Nev. 678, 682, 31 P.3d 367, 369-70 (2001) (noting that NRS 616B.603

codifies the Meers test, discussed below, which is used to "determine [ ]

whether independent contractors are 'employees' under the NIIA").

The "normal work" test, first articulated in Meers, guides

courts as to whether a subcontractor or independent contractor is

considered to be in the same trade, business, profession, or occupation as

the employer of an injured worker. See Hays Home Delivery, Inc., 117

Nev. at 682-83, 31 P.3d at 369-70 (2001). The Meers normal work test is

not one of whether the subcontractor's activity is useful, necessary, or even absolutely indispensable to the statutory employer's business, since, after all, this could be said of practically any repair, construction or transportation service. The test (except in cases where the work is obviously a subcontracted fraction of a main contract) is whether that indispensable activity is, in that business, normally carried on through employees rather than independent contractors.

101 Nev. at 286, 701 P.2d at 1007 (internal quotations omitted); see also

Oliver v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, 111 Nev. 1338, 1349, 905 P.2d 168, 175

(1995) (holding that the "same trade" language in NRS 616.262, replaced

by NRS 616B.603, refers to the Meers test). With regard to subcontracted

maintenance activities, "[t]he general rule is that major repairs, or

specialized repairs of the sort which the employer is not equipped to

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handle with his own force, are held to be outside his regular business."

Meers, 101 Nev. at 286, 701 P.2d at 1007-08 (internal quotations omitted).

Purcell's interpretation of the Meers normal work test is incorrect

Purcell concedes that the job of repairing the truck's PTO

would be considered a specialized repair under Meers. However, it argues

that Dakota Diesel performed the specialized repair, while Wintle was

merely there to "monitor the repair process." Purcell further argues that

even if Wintle was performing a specialized repair on the day of

Ouellette's injury, Wintle was not performing a specialized repair at the

time Ouellette was actually injured.

In making its argument, Purcell contends that the focus of the

normal work test is on the work being performed at the time the injury

occurred. Therefore, because Wintle was moving the tire changing boom

truck at the time of Ouellette's injury, which was work normally

performed by employees of Allied, Purcell argues that Wintle was not

performing a specialized repair at the time of Ouellette's injury. In

support of its argument, Purcell relies on State Industrial Insurance

System v. Ortega Concrete Pumping, Inc., which held that under the

normal work test, "the relevant factual inquiry. . . is whether [the

contractor who caused the accident] was in the 'same trade, business,

profession or occupation' as [the injured employee] at the time of the

accident." 113 Nev. 1359, 1363-64, 951 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1997) (emphasis

added). Purcell also relies on Employers Insurance Company of Nevada v.

United States, which held that a principal contractor was immune under

the NIIA as the statutory employee of the subcontractor because the work

that the subcontractor "was performing at the time of his injury" was

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normally carried out by the principal contractor. 322 F. Supp. 2d 1116,

1118 (D. Nev. 2004) (emphasis added).

We reject Purcell's narrow interpretation of the Meers normal

work test. Purcell effectively argues that the relevant inquiry under

Meers is whether, at the exact moment of an employee's injury, the activity

being performed by the subcontractor or independent contractor was

normally performed by the injured worker's employer. Purcell misstates

the holdings of Ortega and Employers Insurance Company. In Ortega, this

court foundS the district court's failure to apply the Meers test was error,

and we reversed and remanded so that it could apply the proper analysis.

113 Nev. at 1364, 951 P.2d at 1036. Because the Ortega court did not

actually apply the Meers normal work test, its holding is inapposite to the

current case. Id. And in Employers Insurance Company, the district court

examined whether the defendant was the statutory employer "at the time

of the accident" by examining the circumstances surrounding the

employment, not the acts at the exact moment of the injury. 322 F. Supp.

2d at 1118. Thus, nothing in the reasoning of either case supports

Purcell's contention.

Furthermore, Purcell's narrow interpretation could readily

create absurd results. Under Purcell's reasoning, the status of a worker

performing specialized repairs would change from moment-to-moment

depending on whether that particular task is normally performed by

employees of the primary contractor. For instance, repairing an engine

valve on a vehicle might be considered a specialized repair, but checking

the oil level afterwards would not be if the primary contractor's employees

normally check the oil level of the vehicles they are driving. Thus, the

status of the work that an independent contractor is performing could

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repeatedly alternate between a specialized repair and something else

during the same overall repair.

Winne was performing a specialized repair at the time of Ouellette's injury

In rejecting Purcell's narrow interpretation of Meers, we hold

that in order to determine whether a subcontractor or independent

contractor was engaged in a specialized repair under the Meers test, and

therefore whether that subcontractor or independent contractor is liable

for any injuries caused to workers during the course of that specialized

repair, the court must consider the subcontractor or independent

contractor's activity leading to a worker's injury within the context of their

other actions, both before and after the injury, and not in isolation. In this

case, we hold that Wintle's presence at the mine for the purpose of a

specialized repair was sufficient to establish that he was not acting as an

employee of Allied at the time of the injury.

Wintle was at the mine on the day of Ouellette's injury

because the truck's PTO required specialized repair. Purcell sent Wintle

to the site specifically to accompany Durick, who was hired to make those

specialized repairs. 2 Even if Wintle's only purpose at the mine that day

was to "monitor the repair process" of the truck, as Purcell claims, Wintle

was nonetheless there for the sole purpose of the specialized repair. To

put it another way, Wintle would not have been at the mine that day but

for the specialized repair. Because Wintle was at the mine on the day of

Ouellette's injury for the purpose of a specialized repair, we hold that

2VVhen asked why he was at the mine on the day of the accident, Wintle testified that he went there "to assist and facilitate Mr. Durick in repairs to the 508 boom truck."

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there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Wintle and Purcell

were performing a specialized repair under Meers at the time of

Ouellette's injury, and were therefore not statutory employees of Allied

under NRS 616B.603 and NRS 616A.210.

Even under Purcell's narrow interpretation of Meers, we hold

that, when looked at in context, Wintle would still have been acting in

furtherance of the specialized repair at the time of Ouellette's injury and

thus be considered to be performing a specialized repair under Meers.

Wintle arrived at the mine with Durick, the Dakota Diesel repairman

Purcell had engaged to perform the specialized repair work. Both Durick

and Wintle testified that Wintle actively assisted Durick in the specialized

repair. Wintle testified that "[he] was going out to assist and

facilitate. . . Durick in repairs to the 508 boom truck." Durick testified

that Wintle assisted him in his work on the truck, stating that

[Wintle and I] had to drain all of the hydraulic oil. We drained the transmission fluid out, removed the hydraulic pump, and the power takeoff unit, mounted the new one on, had to do some setup procedure on it, got that all mounted, filled the tranny back full of oil, and remounted the hydraulic pump

After Durick and Wintle performed the initial repairs, they "got to a point

where [they] needed hydraulic oil" and drove the truck from the tire pad to

the shop where the hydraulic oil was kept. After filling the truck with

hydraulic oil, Durick testified that he and Wintle were next going to "take

pressure checks and. . . were going to operate the crane to make sure it

was operating and functioning properly." Ouellette testified that this was

to see if the repairs were successful. Wintle then asked Durick if he

"wanted to do the pressure checks and the function checks right there,"

but Durick wanted to first move the truck to the tire pad because the shop

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area was congested. Wintle then got into the truck to move it to the tire

pad, a move that led to Ouellette's injury.

Thus, while employees of Allied may usually drive the truck

and fill it with hydraulic oil, in the context of Wintle's other actions, it is

clear that in this case he was acting in furtherance of the overall

specialized repair at the time of Ouellette's injury. Therefore, even had

evidence not been presented that Wintle was at the mine solely for the

purpose of the specialized repair, there was sufficient evidence

demonstrating that Wintle was still in the process of performing a

specialized repair at the time of Ouellette's accident. Accordingly, Purcell

was not a statutory employee of Allied under NRS 616B.603 and NRS

616A.210, and we hold that the district court did not err in denying

Purcell's motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding NRS

616B.612's application.

The district court did not improperly reject Purcell's jury instruction

We review a decision to admit or refuse jury instructions for

an abuse of discretion or judicial error. Ins. Co. of the W. v. Gibson Tile

Co., 122 Nev. 455, 463, 134 P.3d 698, 702-03 (2006). We review de novo

whether a jury instruction accurately states Nevada law. Cook v. Sunrise

Hosp. & Med. Ctr., LLC, 124 Nev. 997, 1003, 194 P.3d 1214, 1217 (2008).

Although "a party is entitled to jury instructions on every theory of fits]

case that is supported by the evidence," Johnson v. Egtedar, 112 Nev. 428,

432, 915 P.2d 271, 273 (1996), the offering party must demonstrate that

the proffered jury instruction is warranted by Nevada law. NRCP

51(a)(1).

At trial, the district court rejected the following jury

instruction offered by Purcell:

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The mere fact that there was an accident or other event where someone was injured is not in and of itself a sufficient basis for negligence.

The instruction was based on Gunlock v. New Frontier Hotel Corporation,

which held, in relevant part, that "Whe mere fact that there was an

accident or other event and someone was injured is not of itself sufficient

to predicate liability. Negligence is never presumed but must be

established by substantial evidence." 78 Nev. 182, 185, 370 P.2d 682, 684

(1962), abrogated on other grounds by Foster v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,

128 Nev., Adv. Op. 71, 291 P.3d 150, 156 (2012).

The omitted portions of Purcell's jury instruction were adequately covered by other instructions

While Purcell's proffered jury instruction accurately reflects

the first part of the Gunlock mere happening instruction, it omits the

second part, stating that "[n]egligence is never presumed but must be

established by substantial evidence." 78 Nev. at 185, 370 P.2d at 684.

Therefore, Purcell's proffered jury instruction, by itself, is an inaccurate

statement of Nevada law. However, in civil cases, "if an instruction is not

technically correct, the instruction should be examined in the context of all

instructions given to the jury" in deciding whether "the jury was•

sufficiently and fairly instructed." Gordon v. Hurtado, 96 Nev. 375, 380,

609 P.2d 327, 330 (1980).

Here, the statement that "[n]egligence is never presumed" is

merely a restatement of the first part of the Gunlock reasoning presented

above, 78 Nev. at 185, 370 P.2d at 684 ("The mere fact that there was an

accident . .. is not of itself sufficient to predicate liability."), and the

concept that negligence "must be established by substantial evidence" was

adequately covered by other jury instructions stating the burden of proof

for a claim of negligence; see, e.g., Jury Instruction No. 20 (stating the

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elements that Ouellette must prove to prevail on a negligence theory and

that those elements must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence).

Thus, when taken as a whole with the other jury instructions given by the

court, we find that Purcell's proposed jury instruction would have

sufficiently and fairly instructed the jury on Gunlock's holding. See

Gordon, 96 Nev. at 380, 609 P.2d at 330.

Purcell's proposed jury instruction was adequately covered by other instructions

"[T]he number of instructions to be given is discretionary with

the court." Duran v. Mueller, 79 Nev. 453, 460, 386 P.2d 733, 737 (1963).

"If one instruction adequately covers a given theory of liability or defense,

it is preferable that the court refuse additional instructions relating to the

same theory, though couched in different language." Id.

Where other jury instructions "adequately cover[ ] negligence,

proximate cause, and the essentiality of a finding of defendants'

negligence to permit a verdict for [the] plaintiff," a mere happening

instruction is duplicative or confusing. Gagosian v. Burdick's Television &

Appliances, 62 Cal. Rptr. 70, 73 (Ct. App. 1967); see also Kennelly v.

Burgess, 654 A.2d 1335, 1341 (Md. 1995) ("Even the use of a proper 'mere

happening' instruction can lead to confusion in the minds of jurors .

Simmons v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 596 N.E.2d 318, 324 (Mass. 1992)

(holding that a mere happening instruction was redundant to an

instruction which stated that "if the defendant acted with reasonable care

under the circumstances, then it is not negligent and not liable to the

plaintiff even though the plaintiff might have been injured"), abrogated on

other grounds by Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 910

(Mass. 1998).

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We con

Gibboffs

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and/or confusing.

J.

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Here, the district court's jury instructions covered the issues of

negligence, proximate cause, and the essentiality of a finding of Purcell's

negligence. See Jury Instruction No. 18 (stating that Ouellette had the

burden to prove that his injury was caused by Purcell's negligence); Jury

Instruction No. 20 (stating the elements that Ouellette must prove to

prevail on a negligence theory and that those elements must be proven by

a preponderance of the evidence); Jury Instructions Nos. 21-26 (defining

negligence, contributory negligence, proximate cause, and duty of care).

Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give

Purcell's incomplete mere happening jury instruction. See Gagosian, 62

Cal. Rptr. at 73.

Because there was sufficient evidence demonstrating that

Wintle was present at the mine for the purpose of a specialized repair and

acting in furtherance of the specialized repair when he caused Ouellette's

injury, Purcell was not immune from liability for Ouellette's injury under

NRS 616B.612.