State Of New Mexico v. Stanfield

On October 23, 2009, Sonny Jim and Fernando Begay were on Wayne14

Johnson’s property in San Rafael, New Mexico. They were putting away tools after15

taking down a barbed-wire fence when they were confronted by Defendant, who was16

a tenant on Johnson’s property. Defendant began shouting at Jim, and then got back17

in his truck and drove toward his trailer. When he returned shortly, a gun holster1

containing a single-action revolver was attached to his waist.2

{3} With the gun out, Defendant attempted to handcuff Jim. Jim called 911 and told3

the dispatcher, “‘He’s got a gun on me.’” Defendant grabbed the phone and threw it,4

disconnecting the call, and tried again to place Jim in handcuffs. When Jim resisted,5

Defendant began shooting. {4} Defendant shot at Jim eight times. Six of the bullets entered Jim’s body, two7

through his back. Because Defendant used a single-action revolver, he had to pull8

back the hammer, repoint the gun, and pull the trigger with each shot. Jim was9

unarmed. Upon shooting all six of the revolver’s rounds, Defendant would have10

needed to physically push each shell out of its chamber one by one and reload.11

Although Jim had a gun in his truck, it was buried under a pile of his belongings and12

was not visible.13

{5} After shooting Jim, Defendant turned to Johnson. Johnson reached for his gun,14

but Defendant shot him four times. Johnson was found holding a Derringer gun that15

contained one intact bullet and one spent casing, but all ten projectiles and eleven shell16

casings found at the scene or recovered by the Office of the Medical Investigator were17

from Defendant’s gun. Johnson’s body was found in a fetal position.18

{6} Defendant pointed his gun at Begay after he shot Jim and Johnson. Begay19

4

started running, and Defendant began firing at him. Begay called 911 and watched as1

deputies came up the road. Officer Lister, the first to arrive on the scene, asked2

Defendant if he was the shooter. Defendant at first denied shooting Jim and Johnson,3

but when asked again stated, “‘You’re damn right I did.’” Defendant said, “‘They4

were stealing my property. Damn right. I shot him in self-defense.’”5

{7} Defendant was arrested and indicted on two counts of first-degree murder and6

one count of attempt to commit first-degree murder. After finding in February 20117

that Defendant was not competent to stand trial and was dangerous, the district court8

entered an order of commitment for treatment to attain competency.9

{8} Three years later, in February 2014, the district court found that Defendant10

remained dangerous, that he was not making substantial progress towards11

competency, and that there was not a substantial probability that Defendant would12

become competent to stand trial within nine months. Based on those findings and in13

accordance with the New Mexico Mental Illness and Competency Code, NMSA 1978,14

Sections 31-9-1 to -2 (1988, as amended through 1999), the district court then held an15

evidentiary hearing in May 2014 to determine the sufficiency of the evidence against16

Defendant. See § 31-9-1.4 (providing that “any time the district court determines that17

there is not a substantial probability that the defendant will become competent to18

proceed in a criminal case within a reasonable period of time not to exceed nine19

5

months from the date of the original finding of incompetency, the district court may1

. . . hear the matter pursuant to Section 31-9-1.5 within three months if the defendant2

is charged with a felony that involves the infliction of great bodily harm on another3

person [or] the use of a firearm . . . .”); § 31-9-1.5 (providing that a hearing to4

determine the sufficiency of the evidence relevant to the defendant’s guilt shall be5

held and that “[i]f the district court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the6

defendant committed a felony that involves the infliction of great bodily harm on7

another person [or] the use of a firearm . . . and enters a finding that the defendant8

remains incompetent to proceed and remains dangerous[,] . . . the defendant shall be9

detained by the department of health in a secure, locked facility [and] shall not be10

released from that secure facility except pursuant to an order of the district court11

which committed him or upon expiration of the period of time equal to the maximum12

sentence to which the defendant would have been subject had the defendant been13

convicted in a criminal proceeding . . . .”).14

{9} After finding by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant had, with15

deliberate intention, taken the lives of Jim and Johnson and attempted to take the life16

of Begay, the district court committed Defendant to the custody of the New Mexico17

Department of Health, pursuant to Section 31-9-1.5(D), until further order of the18

court, not to exceed two consecutive terms of life imprisonment plus an additional19

6

nine years, the period of time equal to the maximum sentence to which Defendant1

would have been subject had he been convicted at trial. Defendant appeals the2

commitment order, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to rebut his claim of3

self-defense or to establish that he acted with deliberate intent to kill.4

II. DISCUSSION5

{10} Criminal commitment requires the State to prove by clear and convincing6

evidence that Defendant committed the acts charged. Section 31-9-1.5(D). When7

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support an order of commitment, we8

determine whether substantial evidence exists so that “a rational fact finder could find9

that the State’s evidence ‘instantly tilt[ed] the scales in the affirmative when weighed10

against the evidence in opposition.’” State v. Adonis, 2008-NMSC-059, ¶ 26, 14511

N.M. 102, 194 P.3d 717 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Evidence is12

substantial when it is “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as13

adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 126 N.M.14

438, 971 P.2d 829. To prove first-degree deliberate murder, the State was required to15

demonstrate that Defendant killed Jim and Johnson and attempted to kill Begay16

without lawful justification or excuse and with the deliberate intention to take away17

their lives. See NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A)(1) (1994) (“Murder in the first degree is the18

killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse . . . by19

7

any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.”).1

{11} Defendant argues first that the shootings were justified because he was acting2

in self-defense and that the State must disprove this theory by clear and convincing3

evidence. Self-defense requires that “(1) the defendant was put in fear by an apparent4

danger of immediate death or great bodily harm, (2) the killing resulted from that fear,5

and (3) the defendant acted reasonably when he or she killed.” State v. Rudolfo, 2008-6

NMSC-036, ¶ 17, 144 N.M. 305, 187 P.3d 170 (internal quotation marks and citation7

omitted). The State must prove the absence of self-defense when a defendant has8

presented sufficient evidence of each element to support the theory that a killing was9

justified. State v. Parish, 1994-NMSC-073, ¶ 16, 118 N.M. 39, 878 P.2d 988 (“The10

defendant’s only obligation is to introduce evidence that will raise in the minds of the11

jurors a reasonable doubt about the matter.”).12

{12} Defendant confronted Jim and Begay, left to retrieve his weapon, and returned13

to reinitiate the confrontation. As the instigator of the conflict, he cannot justify his14

actions by claiming self-defense unless he was using nondeadly force or unless he15

tried to stop the fight at which point the victim became the aggressor. UJI 14-519116

NMRA; State v. Lucero, 1998-NMSC-044, ¶ 7, 126 N.M. 552, 972 P.2d 1143. The17

evidence demonstrates that Jim was unarmed. Johnson reached for his gun only after18

Defendant had already killed Jim and then turned to begin firing at Johnson. Begay19

8

was running away as Defendant shot at him.1

{13} Self-defense is unavailable here, where Defendant initiated the confrontation,2

no evidence suggests that he then tried to stop the fight or that the victims became the3

aggressors, and Defendant has not demonstrated that he acted reasonably out of fear4

for his personal safety. See State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 64-65, 279 P.3d 7475

(holding that an instruction on self-defense was not required when there was no6

evidence that the defendant had been motivated by fear or, assuming such fear, had7

acted reasonably); Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036, ¶ 17 (stating that while the presence of8

danger and actual fear are measured subjectively, the killing in reaction to the9

perceived danger must be objectively reasonable). Where the evidence does not put10

self-defense at issue, its absence is not an essential element that the State must prove.11

State v. Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045, ¶¶ 21-22, 142 N.M. 191, 164 P.3d 72.12

{14} Defendant’s attempt to handcuff Jim and his statements immediately following13

the shooting suggest that he was reacting to a perceived threat to his property, not to14

his person. It is well-settled that deadly force may not be used in the defense of15

property other than to prevent the commission of a felony in the home. See State v.16

Boyett, 2008-NMSC-030, ¶ 15, 144 N.M. 184, 185 P.3d 355 (“Defense of habitation17

has long been recognized in New Mexico. It gives a person the right to use lethal force18

against an intruder when such force is necessary to prevent the commission of a felony19

9

in his or her home.” (citation omitted)); State v. McCracken, 1917-NMSC-029, ¶¶ 8-1

10, 22 N.M. 588, 166 P. 1174 (“‘While the law justifies the taking of life when2

necessary to prevent the commission of a felony, one cannot defend his property, other3

than his habitation, to the extent of killing the aggressor for the mere purpose of4

preventing a trespass.’” (citation omitted)). A citizen’s arrest, although allowed under5

certain circumstances, must be objectively reasonable and use no more force than is6

necessary. See State v. Johnson, 1996-NMSC-075, ¶ 18, 122 N.M. 696, 930 P.2d7

1148.8

{15} No evidence supports Defendant’s argument that he was in fear for his life, and9

accordingly the district court did not err in rejecting his claim of self-defense.10

{16} Defendant argues next that, even if the killings and attempted killing were not11

justified, the State failed to prove first-degree murder because it presented no evidence12

that Defendant deliberated before shooting. Deliberate intention is not a rash impulse,13

and, although it may be arrived at quickly, it must involve careful thought and the14

weighing of considerations for and against an action. UJI 14-201 NMRA. “A15

deliberate intention is rarely subject to proof by direct evidence and often must be16

inferred from the circumstances.” State v. Astorga, 2015-NMSC-007, ¶ 60, 343 P.3d17

1245.18

{17} In Adonis, we reversed an order of commitment for first-degree murder because19

10

there was insufficient evidence of deliberation. 2008-NMSC-059, ¶ 26. The defendant1

came out of an apartment and rapidly fired several shots, killing the victim who had2

parked in his space. Id. ¶ 4. The defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia but3

kept to himself and rarely bothered his neighbors. Id. ¶ 2. The victim and others4

regularly parked in his parking spot without incident. Id. ¶ 3. After the shooting, he5

said, “‘[T]hat will teach this guy a lesson not to park in my place no more.’” Id. ¶ 4.6

We concluded that while this evidence demonstrated an intentional killing, it did not7

prove premeditation or deliberation. Id. ¶¶ 20-26.8

{18} In contrast, Defendant did not shoot Jim on rash impulse when first confronting9

him. He initiated the confrontation, left to retrieve his weapon, and returned with the10

gun. Evidence that a defendant has taken steps to arm himself supports an inference11

of deliberation. See State v. Begay, 1998-NMSC-029, ¶¶ 45-46, 125 N.M. 541, 96412

P.2d 102 (recognizing the fact that the defendant had a knife as evidence to uphold a13

finding of deliberation). This evidence alone may not be enough to infer that14

Defendant deliberated, see State v. Taylor, 2000-NMCA-072, ¶ 22, 129 N.M. 376, 815

P.3d 863 (concluding that although the retrieval of a weapon provided an opportunity16

to deliberate, alone it did not prove that the defendant “actually did so”), but the facts17

of this case provide additional support.18

{19} Defendant started shooting after Jim resisted the handcuffs, and he shot Jim six19

11

times, including twice in the back, with a single-action revolver that required him to1

aim and pull the trigger each time. He individually ejected each shell, reloaded, and2

shot Johnson four times, killing him, before shooting at Begay who was running away.3

When asked if he had shot the victims, he said, “You’re damn right I did.” Deliberate4

intent can be inferred from multiple injuries, prolonged attacks, unarmed victims, and5

a defendant’s own statements. See State v. Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 8-11, 1406

N.M. 94, 140 P.3d 515 (holding that a prolonged struggle, a large number of wounds,7

and the defendant’s statement after the killing that he had “‘straight up murdered some8

bitch’” supported a rational inference of deliberation); State v. Sosa, 2000-NMSC-9

036. ¶ 13, 129 N.M. 767, 14 P.3d 32 (holding that pursuit of and repeated shooting at10

an unarmed victim who was trying to flee provided evidence of deliberate intent).11

These facts provide substantial evidence to support the district court’s determination12

that Defendant made the deliberate decision to kill

Because sufficient evidence supports Defendant’s criminal commitment for the

period of time prescribed by Section 31-9-1.5, we affirm the commitment order of the district court.