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STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. WILLIAM MEYER
Date: 05-08-2016
Case Number: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
Judge: Marianne Espinosa
Court: SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
Plaintiff's Attorney: Carolyn A. Murray, LeeAnn Cunningham
Defendant's Attorney: Joseph E. Krakora, Abby P. Schwartz
Description:
Defendant pled guilty in 2009 to one count of third-degree
endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). The
May 6, 2016
A-5643-13T2 2
court sentenced defendant in accordance with his plea agreement
to four years in prison, which it suspended, and imposed Megan's
Law conditions, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11, parole supervision for
life, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4, a requirement that he not contact his
victim, and mandatory outpatient treatment.
Defendant did not file a direct appeal from his conviction
and sentence. In 2013, defendant filed a petition for PCR, in
which he initially argued his trial counsel did not review or
discuss his case with him and failed to explain the conditions
of his parole supervision for life. He also contended that when
he was offered his plea deal he was under the influence of
medications that affected his judgment, preventing him from
making any decisions and interfering with his ability to
understand what was happening or to "fight for [a] chance[] to
be acquitted." According to defendant's certification, "[i]t
was no[t] until [he] received a copy of the discovery from [his]
PCR attorney that [he saw] what had been said about [him] and
[he] knew that there were many factual discrepancies and things
that were not true that and [had] been said about [him]." In a
supplemental filing submitted by assigned counsel, defendant
also argued his PCR claims were not procedurally barred, his
trial counsel was ineffective, and "the court was in error when
A-5643-13T2 3
it did not question the defendant as to whether or not he was
under the influence of any medications."
The PCR court denied defendant's petition by order dated
March 10, 2014, which was supported by a written statement of
reasons. In its decision, the PCR court first reviewed the
charges brought against defendant, his plea, and his sentence.
It then reviewed defendant's presentence report and noted
defendant did not make any statement about his offense, but
"indicate[d] that he drank daily and took daily seizure
medication[, and] had been treated at different facilities on
four different occasions, presumably for alcohol addiction."
The court noted that, when defendant was evaluated for
sentencing as a sex offender, he admitted to having a "co
dependency on drugs and alcohol" and reported that he took an
"antidepressant" and an "antipsychotic medication."
According to the court, it was the latter medication,
identified as "Thorazine," that defendant "refer[red] to . . .
as being responsible for his inability to understand the plea
agreement." The PCR court observed, however, "[t]here was no
notation by either the defendant or the psychologist of an
inability to understand or communicate contained in the report.
There was no complaint by defendant of the same, or indeed any
complaints of any side effects of his medications."
A-5643-13T2 4
The PCR court proceeded to state the controlling principles
of law applicable to defendant's petition and apply those
principles to his various claims. The court first determined
that his allegations regarding counsel's failure to review his
case with him and provide him with discovery materials were
totally unsupported, and that defendant had failed to make any
"showing [that] the discovery would have changed the outcome of
the case." The court found defendant "generally complain[ed]
his attorney did not talk to him and only discussed one plea
offer with him," but that he did "not assert innocence or give
any specifics about what was missing from the attorney-client
discussions." Based on those findings, the judge rejected
defendant's claim.
The PCR court turned next to defendant's claims about being
under the influence of medication that interfered with his
ability to understand what he was doing at the time he pled
guilty. The court noted there was no medical proof that he was
taking the medication at the time and found that, based on the
plea court's "exhaustive questioning" about defendant's ability
to understand and not being under the influence of any drugs
that would affect his judgment, there was no support for
defendant's contentions. The matter was put to rest, according
to the PCR judge, when at sentencing defendant confirmed his
A-5643-13T2 5
understanding of his obligations under the plea agreement's
recommended sentencing. As a result, the PCR court concluded
that "[i]n the absence of any specifics, supporting evidence,
[or] expert opinion, and in the face of an extremely thorough
record to the contrary, [defendant's] allegation[s did] not rise
to a prima facie showing [and did] not merit an evidentiary
hearing."
The PCR court entered its order denying relief. This
appeal followed.
Defendant presents the following issues for our
consideration in his appeal.
POINT I
BY FAILING TO INVESTIGATE PETITIONER'S MENTAL HEALTH HISTORY, IN PARTICULAR THE MEDICATIONS HE WAS GIVEN IN THE JAIL, COUNSEL HAD NO IDEA IF PETITIONER ENTERED HIS PLEA KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.
POINT II
THE STATE ERRED IN ARGUING THAT THE PETITION FOR PCR WAS BARRED PURSUANT TO RULE 3:22-5.
A-5643-13T2 6
POINT III
THE PCR COURT'S DENIAL OF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
We are not persuaded by any of these arguments and affirm.
The standard for determining whether counsel's performance
was ineffective for purposes of the Sixth Amendment was
formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court
in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (l987). In order to prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must
establish both that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient and
he or she made errors that were so egregious that counsel was
not functioning effectively as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution; and (2) the defect in
performance prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial such
that there exists a "reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687,
694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 698.
A defendant's entitlement to relief must be established by
competent evidence. "[I]n order to establish a prima facie
claim, a petitioner must do more than make bald assertions that
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel." State v.
A-5643-13T2 7
Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
162 N.J. 199 (1999).
endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). The
May 6, 2016
A-5643-13T2 2
court sentenced defendant in accordance with his plea agreement
to four years in prison, which it suspended, and imposed Megan's
Law conditions, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11, parole supervision for
life, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4, a requirement that he not contact his
victim, and mandatory outpatient treatment.
Defendant did not file a direct appeal from his conviction
and sentence. In 2013, defendant filed a petition for PCR, in
which he initially argued his trial counsel did not review or
discuss his case with him and failed to explain the conditions
of his parole supervision for life. He also contended that when
he was offered his plea deal he was under the influence of
medications that affected his judgment, preventing him from
making any decisions and interfering with his ability to
understand what was happening or to "fight for [a] chance[] to
be acquitted." According to defendant's certification, "[i]t
was no[t] until [he] received a copy of the discovery from [his]
PCR attorney that [he saw] what had been said about [him] and
[he] knew that there were many factual discrepancies and things
that were not true that and [had] been said about [him]." In a
supplemental filing submitted by assigned counsel, defendant
also argued his PCR claims were not procedurally barred, his
trial counsel was ineffective, and "the court was in error when
A-5643-13T2 3
it did not question the defendant as to whether or not he was
under the influence of any medications."
The PCR court denied defendant's petition by order dated
March 10, 2014, which was supported by a written statement of
reasons. In its decision, the PCR court first reviewed the
charges brought against defendant, his plea, and his sentence.
It then reviewed defendant's presentence report and noted
defendant did not make any statement about his offense, but
"indicate[d] that he drank daily and took daily seizure
medication[, and] had been treated at different facilities on
four different occasions, presumably for alcohol addiction."
The court noted that, when defendant was evaluated for
sentencing as a sex offender, he admitted to having a "co
dependency on drugs and alcohol" and reported that he took an
"antidepressant" and an "antipsychotic medication."
According to the court, it was the latter medication,
identified as "Thorazine," that defendant "refer[red] to . . .
as being responsible for his inability to understand the plea
agreement." The PCR court observed, however, "[t]here was no
notation by either the defendant or the psychologist of an
inability to understand or communicate contained in the report.
There was no complaint by defendant of the same, or indeed any
complaints of any side effects of his medications."
A-5643-13T2 4
The PCR court proceeded to state the controlling principles
of law applicable to defendant's petition and apply those
principles to his various claims. The court first determined
that his allegations regarding counsel's failure to review his
case with him and provide him with discovery materials were
totally unsupported, and that defendant had failed to make any
"showing [that] the discovery would have changed the outcome of
the case." The court found defendant "generally complain[ed]
his attorney did not talk to him and only discussed one plea
offer with him," but that he did "not assert innocence or give
any specifics about what was missing from the attorney-client
discussions." Based on those findings, the judge rejected
defendant's claim.
The PCR court turned next to defendant's claims about being
under the influence of medication that interfered with his
ability to understand what he was doing at the time he pled
guilty. The court noted there was no medical proof that he was
taking the medication at the time and found that, based on the
plea court's "exhaustive questioning" about defendant's ability
to understand and not being under the influence of any drugs
that would affect his judgment, there was no support for
defendant's contentions. The matter was put to rest, according
to the PCR judge, when at sentencing defendant confirmed his
A-5643-13T2 5
understanding of his obligations under the plea agreement's
recommended sentencing. As a result, the PCR court concluded
that "[i]n the absence of any specifics, supporting evidence,
[or] expert opinion, and in the face of an extremely thorough
record to the contrary, [defendant's] allegation[s did] not rise
to a prima facie showing [and did] not merit an evidentiary
hearing."
The PCR court entered its order denying relief. This
appeal followed.
Defendant presents the following issues for our
consideration in his appeal.
POINT I
BY FAILING TO INVESTIGATE PETITIONER'S MENTAL HEALTH HISTORY, IN PARTICULAR THE MEDICATIONS HE WAS GIVEN IN THE JAIL, COUNSEL HAD NO IDEA IF PETITIONER ENTERED HIS PLEA KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.
POINT II
THE STATE ERRED IN ARGUING THAT THE PETITION FOR PCR WAS BARRED PURSUANT TO RULE 3:22-5.
A-5643-13T2 6
POINT III
THE PCR COURT'S DENIAL OF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
We are not persuaded by any of these arguments and affirm.
The standard for determining whether counsel's performance
was ineffective for purposes of the Sixth Amendment was
formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court
in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (l987). In order to prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must
establish both that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient and
he or she made errors that were so egregious that counsel was
not functioning effectively as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution; and (2) the defect in
performance prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial such
that there exists a "reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687,
694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 698.
A defendant's entitlement to relief must be established by
competent evidence. "[I]n order to establish a prima facie
claim, a petitioner must do more than make bald assertions that
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel." State v.
A-5643-13T2 7
Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
162 N.J. 199 (1999).
Outcome:
We conclude from our review of the record that defendant
failed to make a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel under the Strickland-Fritz test. All of his
allegations were unsupported by any competent evidence and
belied by the record. Accordingly, the PCR court correctly
determined that an evidentiary hearing was not warranted, see
State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992), and denied
defendant's petition.1
Affirmed.
failed to make a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel under the Strickland-Fritz test. All of his
allegations were unsupported by any competent evidence and
belied by the record. Accordingly, the PCR court correctly
determined that an evidentiary hearing was not warranted, see
State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992), and denied
defendant's petition.1
Affirmed.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments:
About This Case
What was the outcome of STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. WILLIAM MEYER?
The outcome was: We conclude from our review of the record that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under the Strickland-Fritz test. All of his allegations were unsupported by any competent evidence and belied by the record. Accordingly, the PCR court correctly determined that an evidentiary hearing was not warranted, see State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992), and denied defendant's petition.1 Affirmed.
Which court heard STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. WILLIAM MEYER?
This case was heard in SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION, NJ. The presiding judge was Marianne Espinosa.
Who were the attorneys in STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. WILLIAM MEYER?
Plaintiff's attorney: Carolyn A. Murray, LeeAnn Cunningham. Defendant's attorney: Joseph E. Krakora, Abby P. Schwartz.
When was STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. WILLIAM MEYER decided?
This case was decided on May 8, 2016.