United States of America v. Heath Solutions, P.C., et al.

Nita K. Patel and her husband, Kirtish N. Patel, were

convicted of defrauding Medicare in a prior criminal

proceeding. The United States then brought this civil action

for the same fraudulent schemes against Ms. Patel, Ms.

Patel’s healthcare company (Heart Solution P.C.), Mr. Patel,

and Mr. Patel’s healthcare company (Biosound Medical

Services). The United States prevailed in the District Court

and only Ms. Patel and Heart Solution appealed.

In granting summary judgment to the United States,

the District Court relied on the Patels’ convictions and plea

colloquies in the criminal case, essentially concluding that

Ms. Patel had already admitted to all elements and issues

relevant to her civil liability. However, the District Court

failed to dissect the issues that were determined in the

criminal case from those that were not. It lumped together

Ms. Patel and Heart Solution, even though Heart Solution was

4

not involved in the criminal case. It also failed to

disaggregate claims Medicare paid to Ms. Patel and Heart

Solution from those paid to Mr. Patel and Biosound. As such,

it erred in finding that Ms. Patel and Heart Solution conceded

all of the essential elements to every claim in this appeal.

Thus, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in part

and vacate in part and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

I.

In November 2015, the Patels pled guilty to separate,

but nearly identical, criminal information charges under 18

U.S.C. § 1347 for defrauding Medicare.1 They conducted this

fraud through two separate schemes. First, the Patels

submitted diagnostic reports to Medicare that should have

been written by a specialist physician—but were not—and

contained forged physician signatures. Ms. Patel and Heart

Solution do not dispute liability with respect to the claims

involving this scheme. The second scheme involved

diagnostic neurological testing. Medicare regulations require

all diagnostic testing to be “reasonable and necessary,” as

defined under Medicare Part B.2 In order for diagnostic

neurological testing to be “reasonable and necessary,” it must

be performed under the proper level of physician

supervision.3 The Patels did not comply with these

regulations. Instead of employing a supervising neurologist

for these tests, the Patels falsely represented to Medicare that

1 Ms. Patel was sentenced to 78 months in prison and is

currently serving her sentence.

2 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A).

3 42 C.F.R. § 410.32(b)(1); 42 C.F.R. § 411.15(k).

5

the neurological testing was being supervised by a licensed

neurologist.

Much of this appeal centers on Ms. Patel’s plea

colloquy for her criminal conviction. The relevant parts of

the colloquy follow. First, the sentencing judge asked Ms.

Patel whether she and her husband “own and operate mobile

diagnostic companies known as Biosound Medical Services

and Heart Solution PC,” and she responded, “yes.”4 Neither

the court, the government, nor Ms. Patel clarified whether she

had ownership interests in both companies or just Heart

Solution.5 Next, the judge asked whether between 2006 and

2014, Ms. Patel and her husband “falsely represent[ed] to

Medicare that the neurological testing being performed at

Biosound Medical Services was being supervised by a

licensed neurologist, when, in fact, it was not.”6 Again, she

responded “yes.”7 Neither the court nor the parties addressed

whether Heart Solution—as opposed to the Patels or

Biosound—made any such misrepresentations. Finally, the

judge asked whether, “Biosound Medical Services and Heart

Solution, PC, [were] paid at least [$1.18 million] by Medicare

. . . for diagnostic neurological testing that was never

supervised by a licensed neurologist.” Ms. Patel answered,

4 A41.

5 Ms. Patel does not contest that she owns Heart Solution.

The parties disagree on whether Ms. Patel had any ownership

interest in Biosound. But as discussed in III.A, whether Ms.

Patel had an ownership interest in Biosound is irrelevant;

thus, we do not make any determinations as to this issue.

6 A43.

7 A43.

6

“yes.”8 Neither the parties nor the court sought to clarify

whether one company was paid the entire amount or whether

the payments were divided between the companies.

In June 2014, relator Jane Doe brought a qui tam suit

under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Ms. Patel, Mr.

Patel, Biosound, and Heart Solution. The United States filed

a complaint in intervention on November 18, 2015. The

plaintiffs sought to hold the Patels and the two companies

civilly liable for defrauding Medicare through the two

schemes described above. Specifically, they claimed the

defendants violated two provisions of the FCA by (1)

“knowingly present[ing] or caus[ing] to be presented a false

or fraudulent claim,”9 and (2) “knowingly mak[ing], us[ing],

or caus[ing] to be made or used a false record or statement

material to a false or fraudulent claim.”10 They also brought

common law claims including fraud, unjust enrichment,

disgorgement of profits, and payment by mistake of fact.

In March 2016, the plaintiffs moved for partial

summary judgment on the two FCA counts, arguing that Ms.

Patel’s admissions during her plea colloquy established all the

elements of the FCA claims and that therefore Heart Solution

and Ms. Patel were collaterally estopped from contesting

FCA liability. In their opposition brief, the defendants relied

on a statement submitted by Mr. Patel in a pleading entitled

“Certification of Kirtish N. Patel.” In it, Mr. Patel claimed

8 A44. Medicare paid a total of $1,668,954.95. $1.18 million

was for the neurological testing, and the remainder was for

the scheme not at issue here.

9 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A).

10 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B).

7

that Biosound employed a supervising neurologist from 2006

to 2007 and from 2012 to 2014. The defendants argued that

the statement raised an issue of fact as to the time frame

during which Biosound lacked a supervising neurologist. The

statement was not sworn and was not made under the penalty

of perjury.

The District Court granted summary judgment to

plaintiffs on July 8, 2016, finding that the guilty pleas and

accompanying colloquies established all elements of the FCA

claims and collaterally estopped the defendants from

contesting liability. It also struck the section of Mr. Patel’s

statement regarding the time frame during which Biosound

had a supervising neurologist because it was “self-serving”

and conflicted with testimony from the plea colloquy

regarding the time frame without any “reasonable

explanation.” On December 23, 2016, the government moved

for summary judgment on the remaining common law claims

under the same theory—that the defendants had admitted to

all the elements of the claims. The District Court agreed and

granted the motion on April 3, 2017.

On May 3, 2017, Ms. Patel and Heart Solution

appealed both summary judgment orders.11 They submit two

primary arguments. First, they contend that Ms. Patel cannot

be liable for any unsupervised neurological testing at

Biosound because she did not own or operate Biosound, and

thus had no legal duty to ensure Biosound employed a

neurological testing supervisor. Second, they argue that even

if we find them liable for the neurological testing issues at

Biosound, Mr. Patel’s statement created an issue of material

11 Kirtish Patel and Biosound did not appeal.

8

fact as to the time frame during which the unsupervised

testing occurred. We reject both of these arguments.

Moreover, we will affirm the District Court with

regard to Ms. Patel’s liability on the FCA and common law

fraud claims. However, we will vacate the District Court’s

findings that (1) Heart Solution is estopped from contesting

liability and damages for all claims, and (2) Ms. Patel is

estopped from contesting liability and damages for the

remaining common law claims.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 31 U.S.C. §

3732(a) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. We have jurisdiction

of this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary

review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment,

applying the same standard as the district court.12 Under this

standard, a court will “grant summary judgment if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”13

III.

We first address Ms. Patel’s and Heart Solution’s two

main arguments on why the District Court erred in granting

summary judgment. First, they contend that Ms. Patel cannot

be liable for Biosound’s unsupervised testing because she did

not possess an ownership interest in Biosound and merely

12 Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d

Cir. 2014).

13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

9

worked as an employee. We reject this argument and hold

that ownership interest is irrelevant to FCA liability. Second,

they argue that even if Ms. Patel is liable for Biosound’s

fraud, Mr. Patel’s statement created a triable issue of fact as

to the years during which Biosound lacked a supervising

neurologist. We conclude that Mr. Patel’s statement cannot

create a disputed issue of fact on summary judgment because

it was not sworn or made under penalty of perjury.

A.

We address the issue of ownership first. Ms. Patel

argues that because she did not have any ownership interest in

Biosound, she had no duty to ensure that Biosound employed

a supervising neurologist and was not in charge of ensuring

Biosound’s compliance with Medicare regulations. However,

whether Ms. Patel had an ownership interest in Biosound is

irrelevant to her liability under the FCA.14 There are four

elements to the two FCA claims brought here: “falsity,

causation, knowledge, and materiality.”15 Ownership is not

one of them. Although corporations and individuals with

ownership interests—such as board members and

14 Ms. Patel also makes this argument in her brief with respect

to common law fraud, stating that “there is no evidence that

Nita Patel made material misrepresentations to Medicare

regarding supervision of the neurological testing that was

performed at Biosound,” supposedly because she did not own

Biosound. This argument fails on its face because she plainly

admitted in her plea colloquy that she made such

misrepresentations.

15 United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d

481, 487 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).

10

executives—are typically the parties investigated and sued for

FCA violations, individuals at all levels of a company have

been found liable under the FCA.16 We conclude that

individual employees with no ownership interest in a

company can be liable under Sections 3729(a)(1)(A) and

3729(a)(1)(B) of the FCA.

This conclusion, that an ownership interest is not

required for FCA liability, is consistent with the language of

the FCA. Section 3729 establishes civil penalties for “[a]ny

person” in violation of its provisions.17 The FCA does not

define the term “person,” but the Supreme Court has found

that the meaning of the word has not changed since 1863,

when Congress passed the original FCA.18 There is no doubt

that Congress intended the term “person” to include natural

16 See, e.g., United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 942 (D.C.

Cir. 1997) (wife of psychiatrist who worked as an employee

in his practice was liable under FCA); United States v.

Menominee Tribal Enterprises, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1071

(E.D. Wis. 2009) (employees of a tribe are “persons” under

the FCA); U.S. ex rel. Burlbaw v. Regents of N.M. State

Univ., 324 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1215 (D.N.M. 2004) (“[U]nder

the FCA, state employees are ‘persons’ who may be sued if

they are sufficiently involved in the submission of a false

claim to the United States.”).

17 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).

18 See Cook County, Ill. v. U.S. ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S.

119, 125 (2003).

11

persons. There is no suggestion in the FCA that an ownership

interest is necessary to the definition of “person.”19

Recent Department of Justice (DOJ) guidance

regarding the FCA is consistent with our holding that

ownership is not required for FCA liability. In 2015, then–

Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates issued a memo

regarding corporate fraud and wrongdoing, including FCA

enforcement.20 The memo explicitly states that the DOJ

should focus on “seeking accountability from the individuals

who perpetrated the wrongdoing.”21 The memo states that the

DOJ should “fully leverage its resources to identify culpable

individuals at all levels in corporate cases”22 and that DOJ

“lawyers should not agree to a corporate resolution that

19 Id. at 125 (“[T]he Court . . . recognized the presumption

that the statutory term ‘person’ ‘extends as well to persons

politic and incorporate, as to natural persons whatsoever.’”)

(quoting United States v. Amedy, 412, 6 L.Ed. 502 (1826)).

Even if the term’s meaning was not clear, the Dictionary Act

resolves the question. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,

Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2793 (2014) (“The Dictionary Act’s

definition [of the term person], however, controls only where

context does not indicate otherwise.”) (citations omitted).

The Dictionary Act’s definition of the term “person” includes

“individuals” and does not indicate any necessity for

ownership interests. See 1 U.S.C. § 1.

20 See Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates on Individual

Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing to the DOJ, at 4

(Sept. 9, 2015) (mentioning liability under 31 U.S.C. § 3729

explicitly).

21 Id. at 1.

22 Id. at 2 (emphasis added).

12

includes an agreement to dismiss charges against, or provide

immunity for, individual officers or employees.”23 It is clear

from the language of the memo that, in the eyes of the DOJ,

liability does not depend on ownership and employees are

subject to suit.

Because ownership is irrelevant to FCA liability, the

first argument fails.

B.

Ms. Patel and Heart Solution also argue that there

remains a triable issue of fact regarding the years during

which Biosound employed a supervising neurologist. In

support of this argument, they rely on Mr. Patel’s statement,

which claims that Biosound employed a supervising

neurologist during 2006-2007 and 2012-2014. We conclude

that because Mr. Patel’s statement was both unsworn and not

given under the penalty of perjury, it was insufficient to

create an issue of fact on summary judgment.

This holding is consistent with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, authority from our sister circuits, and our

own precedent. A 2010 amendment to the Advisory

Committee Notes on Federal Rule 56(c)(4), which governs

evidence submitted on summary judgment, states “that while

‘a formal affidavit is no longer required’ on summary

judgment, a certification submitted as a substitute for an

affidavit must be subscribed in proper form as true under

penalty of perjury.” This amendment incorporates a statutory

exception to the general rule that affidavits must be sworn to

23 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).

13

be considered on summary judgment. The statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1746, provides that when a matter is required to be

supported by a sworn affidavit, the matter can instead be

supported by an unsworn “declaration, certificate,

verification, or statement,” as long as the statement is made

under penalty of perjury and dated. Thus, while an unsworn

statement may be considered on summary judgment, an

unsworn statement that has not been made under penalty of

perjury cannot.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same

conclusion when presented with this issue. In Nissho-Iwai

American Corp. v. Kline,24 the only evidence the nonmoving

party submitted on summary judgment was an statement that

was “neither sworn nor its contents stated to be true and

correct nor stated under penalty of perjury.”25 The court held

that unsworn statements, on their own, generally cannot raise

an issue of fact as to preclude summary judgment unless the

statement falls within the statutory exception to this rule

24 845 F.2d 1300 (1988).

25 Id. at 1305-06.

14

under Section 1746.26 The Second and Seventh Circuit

Courts of Appeals have come to similar conclusions.27

Although we have not directly addressed this issue in a

precedential opinion, today’s holding is in line with our prior

rulings. In Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence,28 we held that a

district court did not err in refusing to consider an unsworn

statement on summary judgment because it did not comply

with Rule 56.29

Accordingly, Mr. Patel’s statement is incompetent

summary judgment evidence. His statement is the only

evidence Ms. Patel and Heart Solution submitted on the issue

of the whether Biosound had a supervising neurologist at any

26 Id. at 1306-07; see also Ion v. Chevron USA, Inc., 731 F.3d

379, 382 n.2 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Although unsworn documents

usually cannot raise fact issues precluding summary

judgment, [the] declaration can be considered pursuant to the

statutory exception found in 28 U.S.C. § 1746.”).

27 See In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litig., 722 F.3d

483, 488 (2d Cir. 2013) (unsworn statements can be

considered on summary judgment as long as they comply

with 28 U.S.C. § 1746); Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 859

(7th Cir. 1985) (“Affidavits are admissible in summary

judgment proceedings if they are made under penalties of

perjury; only unsworn documents purporting to be affidavits

may be rejected”).

28 396 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2005).

29 Id. at 322-23. Woloszyn was decided before the 2010

amendments to the Advisory Notes, and thus, did not consider

whether the statement complied with the 28 U.S.C. § 1746

exception.

15

point between 2006 and 2014.30 Therefore, there is no

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Biosound had a

supervising neurologist.

IV.

We now turn to collateral estoppel as applied to Heart

Solution and conclude that Heart Solution is not collaterally

estopped from contesting liability or damages for the claims

against it. Under federal common law, collateral estoppel

applies when “(1) the issue sought to be precluded is the same

as that involved in the prior action; (2) that issue was actually

litigated; (3) it was determined by a final and valid judgment;

and (4) the determination was essential to the prior

judgment.”31 Moreover, “collateral estoppel cannot apply

when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted

did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in

the earlier case.”32 In situations involving the collateral

30 Ms. Patel and Heart Solution also argue that the words

“supervision” and “the” in the sentencing judge’s questioning

are ambiguous and create an issue of material fact as to the

time frame during which Biosound employed a supervising

neurologist. This argument fails. Even if these words were

ambiguous in the context of the plea colloquy, the Appellants

have put forth no evidence supporting Ms. Patel’s

understanding of such terms. Thus, these arguments are

insufficient to create an issue of fact at the summary

judgment stage.

31 In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089, 1097 (3d Cir. 1992)

(citations omitted).

32 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980) (citations

omitted).

16

estoppel effects of a prior criminal judgment, “the court must

examine the record of the criminal proceeding,” including the

plea colloquy, “to determine specifically what issues were

decided.”33 “[R]easonable doubt as to which issues were

decided by a prior judgment should be resolved against using

such judgment as an estoppel.”34

Heart Solution cannot be estopped based on Ms.

Patel’s criminal conviction and plea colloquy. The United

States charged and convicted only Mr. and Ms. Patel of

healthcare fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1347—not Heart

Solution.35 As such, Heart Solution did not have any

opportunity, much less a “full and fair opportunity,”36 to

litigate any issue involved in this appeal. Moreover, whether

Heart Solution defrauded Medicare by submitting false

reports about neurological testing was not actually litigated or

determined by a final judgment in the criminal proceeding.

Ms. Patel’s plea testimony and conviction certainly speak to

her role in Biosound’s schemes to defraud Medicare, but they

do not establish that Heart Solution had any role in this

scheme.

Thus, we will vacate the District Court’s holding that

Heart Solution is estopped.

33 Chisholm v. Def. Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 48 (3d Cir.

1981).

34 Id. at 50 (citing Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274

(3d Cir. 1970)).

35 See Criminal Complaint, United States v. Patel, No. 15-cr-

592 (D.N.J. June 9, 2014), ECF No. 1.

36 Allen, 449 U.S. at 95.

17

V.

Next, we address Ms. Patel’s liability for FCA

violations and common law fraud and conclude that (1) the

District Court properly found that she was estopped from

contesting the falsity and knowledge elements of these

claims; and (2) the Government met its burden to show

materiality and causation.

An FCA violation has four elements: “falsity,

causation, knowledge, and materiality.”37 Ms. Patel admitted

that: (1) she “falsely represented to Medicare that the

neurological testing being performed at Biosound Medical

Services was being supervised by a licensed neurologist

when, in fact, it was not;” and (2) she “knowingly made these

false representations to Medicare.” As a result, she is

collaterally estopped from denying the falsity and knowledge

elements of the FCA claims.

We also conclude that the materiality element has been

satisfied38 even though the District Court did not apply

Supreme Court precedent. In June 2016, the Supreme Court

decided Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex

37 United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d

481, 487 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).

38 Because we find that the materiality element of the FCA

claims has been satisfied, we need not reach the question of

whether Ms. Patel is collaterally estopped from contesting

materiality. Therefore, we make no determinations as to

whether materiality under 18 U.S.C. § 1347—the criminal

statute under which Ms. Patel was convicted—and materiality

under the FCA are the same “essential element.”

18

rel. Escobar,39 where it held that materiality is an element of

all FCA claims, regardless of whether the specific statutory

provision lists materiality as an element.40 The Court then

provided guidance on how the materiality requirement should

be applied. It explained that a misrepresentation is not

material merely because the government designates

compliance with a particular regulatory requirement as a

condition of payment or because “the Government would

have the option to decline to pay if it knew of the defendant’s

noncompliance [with the regulation].”41 In fact, it is “very

strong evidence” that a requirement is not material “if the

Government pays a particular claim in full despite its actual

knowledge that certain requirements were violated.”42 Thus,

materiality “cannot be found where noncompliance is minor

or insubstantial.”43 On the other hand, materiality may be

found where “the Government consistently refuses to pay

claims in the mine run of cases based on noncompliance with

the particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual

requirement.”44

The District Court did not apply Escobar in its

analysis. It relied exclusively on the provision labeling

39 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016).

40 Id. at 2002-03; see also United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS

Caremark Corp., 875 F.3d 746, 763 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Despite

the lack of a materiality requirement, the Supreme Court had

no trouble finding that the FCA’s materiality requirement also

applied to this section.”).

41 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003.

42 Id.

43 Id.

44 Id.

19

supervision of diagnostic testing a condition of payment

rather than looking to the record for other factors, as provided

in Escobar, bearing on the materiality analysis.45 However,

when we examine the record, we conclude that there is no

issue of fact as to materiality under Escobar.

The initial burden was on the government to show

materiality, and it met its burden when it submitted that,

pursuant to the regulation, Medicare would not pay the claims

in the absence of a certification from a supervising

neurologist. Neither Ms. Patel nor any other defendant put

forth any evidence indicating otherwise. She made no

showing that noncompliance with the supervision

requirement was “minor or insubstantial”46 or that Medicare

generally pays this type of claim “in full despite its actual

knowledge that certain requirements were violated.”47

Because the Government met its burden to show materiality

and Ms. Patel put forth no evidence in rebuttal, the element of

materiality was properly established, and there is no need to

remand this case to the District Court to determine materiality

under Escobar.

This conclusion as to materiality also means that there

was causation—the final FCA element. Because these

misrepresentations were material, they caused damage to

45 Escobar specifically states that whether a “provision is

labeled a condition of payment is relevant to but not

dispositive of the materiality inquiry.” Id. at 2001 (emphasis

added).

46 Id. at 2003.

47 Id.

20

Medicare. In other words, but for the misrepresentations,

Medicare would never have paid the claims.

Next, we address the District Court’s holding that Ms.

Patel’s conviction also estops her from contesting liability as

to common law fraud. The elements of fraud under New

Jersey law are (1) knowingly making a material

misrepresentation; (2) an intention that the other person rely

on the misrepresentation; (3) reasonable reliance by the other

person; and (4) resulting damages.48 We agree with the

District Court that Ms. Patel is estopped from denying that

she knowingly made misrepresentations to Medicare

regarding the neurological testing being performed at

Biosound. Moreover, for the same reasons as in the FCA

claim, we find that the materiality and causation/reliance

elements of common law fraud have been met. Therefore, we

will affirm the District Court’s determination as to common

law fraud.

VI.

Turning to the remaining common law claims—unjust

enrichment, disgorgement of profits, and payment by mistake

of fact—we hold that Ms. Patel is not collaterally estopped

from denying liability or damages as to these claims.

An essential element of all three of these claims is that

the defendant retained funds—payments from Medicare in

this case. Unjust enrichment requires a showing “that

defendant received a benefit and that retention of that benefit

48 Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 172-73

(2005).

21

without payment would be unjust.”49 A disgorgement of

profits claim requires that the defendant have profit or

revenue to disgorge.50 And payment by mistake of fact

allows the United States to recover money from a defendant

that “its agents have wrongfully, erroneously, or illegally

paid.”51

Whether Ms. Patel or Heart Solution specifically—as

opposed to Mr. Patel and Biosound—retained any from funds

from Medicare was not determined in the criminal case so as

to estop Ms. Patel from contesting liability for these claims.

In order to find that Ms. Patel is collaterally estopped, we

must find that the issue of whether she retained funds was (1)

involved and litigated in the prior action, (2) actually

determined by a final judgment, and (3) essential to the

conviction.52 Ms. Patel’s conviction and plea colloquy do not

permit such findings. First, 18 U.S.C. § 1347 criminalizes

knowingly “defraud[ing] any health care benefit program” or

“obtain[ing] . . . money . . . owned by . . . any health care

benefit program.” Thus, Ms. Patel need not have obtained

money from Medicare to be liable under Section 1347; she

could have just defrauded Medicare.

Her plea colloquy does not establish that she obtained

funds from Medicare. Ms. Patel admitted that she submitted

false claims to Medicare about the neurological testing at her

49 VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994)

(emphasis added).

50 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. Metals

Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 76 (3d Cir. 1993).

51 United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 415 (1938).

52 See In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089, 1097 (3d Cir. 1992).

22

husband’s company, Biosound. She also admitted that

Biosound and Heart Solution were paid approximately $1.18

million from Medicare for unsupervised neurological testing.

These admissions may suggest that Ms. Patel and/or Heart

Solution retained at least part of the $1.18 million, but they

are not sufficient to estop Ms. Patel from arguing and

submitting evidence to show otherwise. It is possible that Mr.

Patel and Biosound retained the entire benefit and Ms. Patel

and Heart Solution retained nothing. The criminal

proceedings do not speak to this question, much less resolve

it. Where there is “reasonable doubt as to which issues were

decided by a prior judgment” we cannot conclude that

collateral estoppel applies.53

This same reasoning applies to the question of

damages. Ms. Patel is not estopped from contesting damages

because neither her conviction nor colloquy conclusively

establish she was ever paid by Medicare for unsupervised

neurological testing.

As such, we will reverse the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment on the unjust enrichment, disgorgement

of profits, and payment by mistake of fact claims. We will

also reverse the District Court’s finding as to damages

assessed against Ms. Patel.



* * *



53 Chisholm v. Def. Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 50 (3d Cir.

1981).

23

the FCA for false claims submitted to Medicare for

unsupervised neurological tests and on the issue of Ms.

Patel’s common law fraud. We will reverse the remaining

portions of the District Court’s summary judgment orders and

remand this case to the District Court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District

Court’s judgment on the issue of Ms. Patel’s liability under