Stacy Lane VanHorn v. Dennis Oelschlager, et al.

Dennis Oelschlager, the Executive Secretary for the Nebraska State Racing
Commission ("the Commission"), and its three appointed Commissioners, Chairman
Dennis P. Lee, Janell Beveridge, and Bob Volk ("the Commissioners") seek an
interlocutory appeal. Oelschlager and the Commissioners request reversal of the
district court's1 denial of their motion to reconsider its order directing that lawsuits
filed by Dr. Stacy Lane VanHorn and Dr. Douglas L. Brunk shall proceed against
Oelschlager and the Commissioners in their official capacities. We now dismiss the
interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I. Background

The background facts underlying this dispute are fully set forth in our prior
opinion, VanHorn v. Oelschlager, 457 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 2006) ("VanHorn I"). We
repeat the underlying facts here only as necessary to the instant appeal.

Dr. VanHorn and his employer, Dr. Brunk, licensed veterinarians in the State
of Nebraska, brought suit against Oelschlager and the Commissioners, alleging that
they were denied due process and equal protection. They contended that the
Commission violated these constitutional rights when it disciplined and banned them
from treating race horses. The district court denied Oelschlager and the
Commissioners' motion for summary judgment based on qualified or quasi-judicial
immunity. On appeal, we reversed the district court, holding that "[u]pon careful
review, we find that the appellants are entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity."
VanHorn I, 457 F.3d at 847. We concluded that "the holding in Dunham [v. Wadley,
195 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 1999),] [was] controlling in the instant case." Id. at 848. We
therefore reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment to Oelschlager and
the Commissioners and "remanded for further proceedings consistent with th[at]
opinion." Id. at 848.

On remand, the district court denied in part Oelschlager and the Commissioners'
motion for summary judgment, finding that the claims against them in their official
capacities for declaratory and injunctive relief should proceed. Oelschlager and the
Commissioners filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the district court
should have dismissed the case in its entirety based on our holding in VanHorn I.

The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, explaining that
absolute, quasi-judicial immunity "only applies to individual capacity suits" and that
the only immunities that apply in an official-capacity action "'are forms of sovereign
immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment.'"
(Citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985)).

Additionally, the district court rejected Oelschlager and the Commissioners'
argument that they were absolutely immune from suit for injunctive or declaratory
relief. The district court noted that the 1996 amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provided
that "in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." According to
the district court, no authority existed for the proposition that Oelschlager and the
Commissioners qualified as "judicial officers" merely because this court concluded
that their actions "were functionally comparable to those of judges and prosecutors."
VanHorn I, 457 F.3d at 848. Furthermore, the district court noted that this court
previously held in Heartland Academy Community Church v. Waddle, 427 F.3d 525,
530–31 (8th Cir. 2005), that prosecutors are not immune from suit for injunctive relief
under § 1983.

Finally, the district court found no support for Oelschlager and the
Commissioners' claim that judicial officers cannot be sued for declaratory relief under
§ 1983. Thus, the district court ordered the actions against Oelschlager and the
Commissioners in their official capacities for declaratory and injunctive relief to
proceed.

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