In re Interest of Adrian C. et al., children under 18 years of age, State of Nebraska v. Robin C.

Robin C. appeals from the decision of the county court for Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska, sitting as a juvenile court, which terminated her parental rights to her three children under the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Robin C. and Terrence V. had three children together: Brendon C., born February 1, 1997; Mercedes C., born July 30, 1998; and Adrian C., born June 24, 1999. On April 28, 2001, Robin left the children with Terrence's parents, saying she could not care for the children any longer. Juvenile court petitions were filed on April 30, alleging that the children were persons within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 1998). The petitions stated that Terrence's parents could no longer care for the children "due to medical conditions." On June 21, the children were adjudicated to be within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2002). The court found that "continuation of the juvenile(s) in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the juvenile(s), and that placement outside the home is in the juvenile(s)' best interests." The court further ordered that "temporary custody of the juvenile[s] shall be placed with the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services for placement in foster care pending further hearing."

The matter came on for hearing on August 23, 2001, and the court approved and adopted the case plan and court report of the Department of Health and Human Services (hereinafter DHHS) and continued the case until further order of the court. The case was reviewed on November 1, 2001, and on May 2, 2002. Each time, the court found that "reasonable efforts were made, prior to placement, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal and to make it possible for the juvenile(s) to return home based upon the facts in the case plan and court report."

On August 21, 2002, the children's guardian ad litem filed a supplemental petition to terminate the parental rights of Robin and Terrence, which petition was ultimately consented to by the Scotts Bluff County Attorney on April 4, 2003. In the supplemental petition, it was alleged that "[t]ermination is appropriate because the parents of the juveniles have effectively abandoned the juveniles for six months or more immediately prior" to the filing of the supplemental petition; that "[t]he parents have substantially and continuously or repeatedly neglected and refused to give the juveniles necessary parental care and protection"; that "[o]ne or both of the parents are unfit by reason of debauchery, habitual use of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, or repeated lewd and lascivious behavior, which conduct is seriously detrimental to the health, morals, or well-being of the juveniles"; and that "[t]ermination is in the best interests of the juveniles." The supplemental petition also recognized that the termination proceeding would be subject to the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act (hereinafter ICWA), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1501 et seq. (Reissue 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2002), which deals with the termination of the parental rights to Indian children in Nebraska.

On March 3, 2003, a hearing was held on the supplemental petition to terminate the parental rights of Robin and Terrence. The children's guardian ad litem first called Dr. Mark Hald to the stand. On direct examination, Dr. Hald explained his qualifications, which include a doctorate in school psychology (which emphasizes child and adolescent psychology), along with other degrees and licenses. Dr. Hald testified that he had specialized in child psychology for 4 years and that he had 20 years of experience altogether. He explained that he was the treating psychologist for Brendon, Mercedes, and Adrian. Dr. Hald indicated that he had primarily diagnosed all three children as having "adjustment disorder" with "mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct" and that the medical cause of these disorders was that "[the children have] had to be removed from their parents and have been in a number of different foster homes."

Regarding Robin and Terrence, Dr. Hald said that he had no information about their parenting abilities "other than that they haven't been available to the children." Dr. Hald next testified that in his expert opinion, continued custody of Brendon by Robin or Terrence would be "likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to [Brendon]." Dr. Hald based this opinion on his "knowledge of the need for children to have a stable consistent environment with loving parents who are there available to them." With respect to Mercedes and Adrian, Dr. Hald testified that they "would have further difficulties, not knowing if [they have] a stable environment or not," and that this would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage. He indicated that in similar situations with absentee parents, "typically the children are more anxious, they are confused about who[m] they belong to, for parents. They sometimes have nightmares; they become angry and don't know why they're angry." Dr. Hald testified that in his professional opinion, the children needed "a consistent home where they can be raised for the long term" and that a stable environment was necessary for all children, regardless of heritage or culture.

On cross-examination, Dr. Hald testified that when children lack a stable environment, "it affects their ability to form relationships with other people, if a parent, a mother or a father, are not consistent," and that the children often fail to grow and develop properly. Dr. Hald admitted that a stable environment can be provided by extended family, besides the mother and father, and that most of the work he had done had been with Brendon. Further, Dr. Hald admitted that he had never "been involved in any kind of meeting or interview with Terrence or Robin." On redirect examination, Dr. Hald testified that the children's "primary years" were critical in their development and that "the next several years [were] critical as far as getting [the children] a stable home environment."

The children's guardian ad litem next called John Zach, a DHHS employee. Zach testified that he was a protection and safety worker and that he became involved with Brendon, Mercedes, and Adrian on March 30, 2000, as a result of "a couple of child abuse neglect reports." On that date, Robin had been arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) and the children needed assistance. Zach testified that the police took custody of the children at that time and that the children were released to Robin's mother. Zach testified that upon Robin's release, he set up some "voluntary services" for her, but that Robin did not participate in them. He further testified that the children later moved in with Terrence's parents. Zach testified that Robin had indicated to him she would like to get some inpatient treatment for substance abuse, but that when the court did not order it, Robin no longer felt the need to get treatment.

Zach testified that he did not have contact with Robin again until April 28, 2001, when the children were taken from the home of Terrence's mother and father and placed into foster care due to Terrence's mother's health issues. Zach testified that at that point, Robin was homeless and that "she didn't have a place for the kids." Zach also testified that neither Robin nor Terrence visited the children with regularity when the children were in foster care. With respect to reunification, Zach testified that "[DHHS'] plan was reunification of the kids with [Robin] when she, you know, got her life more stable with a place to live and such." Finally, Zach testified that he transferred the case to a permanent caseworker in August 2001.

On cross-examination, Zach testified that any contact he had with Robin prior to April 28, 2001, was voluntary on her behalf and that he did not have any part of creating the case plans or court reports for Brendon, Mercedes, or Adrian. On redirect examination, Zach testified that Brendon, Mercedes, and Adrian were not registered members of an Indian tribe and that Robin was not taking steps to get them registered. Finally, Zach testified that any official involvement he had with Robin ended sometime in August 2001 and that he did not have any contact with her after that date.

The children's guardian ad litem next called Twila Thompson to the stand. Thompson, also employed by DHHS as a protection and safety worker, testified that Zach transferred Brendon, Mercedes, and Adrian's case to her in August 2001, which was right after the children were adjudicated. Thompson testified that she discussed the case plan, dated August 14, 2001, and its goals with Robin at that time, including the need for Robin to secure a place to live and a job, to work with a family support worker to improve her parenting skills, to attend visits with the children on a regular basis, and to address her problems with alcohol. Thompson said that she prepared another case plan and court report on October 29, at which time Robin had failed to comply with any of the goals set forth in the first plan and report. Thompson testified that Robin's visits with the children were sporadic, that Robin had not found a job or a place to live, that she had not attempted to deal with her problems relating to alcohol, and that she was not working with the family support worker.

Thompson testified that the goals she incorporated into the October 29, 2001, case plan "pretty much stayed the same" as the goals from the previous plan. She testified that Robin knew she had to comply with the goals "in order for [her children] to be reunified with her." Thompson further testified that as with the previous plan, Robin failed to comply with the goals of the October 29 case plan and court report. Thompson said that Robin never visited the children between October 29, 2001, and April 30, 2002, and that Robin had not provided DHHS with a current address or telephone number with which to contact her.

Thompson next testified that she put together another case plan and court report on April 30, 2002, and that once again, the goals remained the same. Robin had again failed to comply with the goals of the previous case plan and court report: She had not visited the children at all, she failed to obtain employment or a residence, and she had not worked with the family support worker. Thompson testified that Robin also failed to visit the children between April 30 and October 2002, when Thompson transferred the case to another DHHS employee, and that Robin had failed to provide DHHS with any contact information during that time period. Finally, Thompson indicated that during her involvement with the case, Robin had failed to get any alcohol treatment, to provide any financial support or parental care or support for her children, or to comply with any of the goals of the case plans or court reports. On cross-examination, Thompson admitted that she had no involvement with the children after October 2002.

Linda Hassler, the DHHS protection and safety worker who received Brendon, Mercedes, and Adrian's case from Thompson, testified next. Hassler's involvement with the children commenced in October 2002. Hassler testified that she was familiar with the children's history, because she reviewed their files and was briefed by Thompson. Hassler said that her first occasion to meet Robin was on November 14, 2002, at the first stage of the termination hearing. Hassler testified that Robin was incarcerated at the time. Hassler asked Robin to contact her when Robin was released from jail, and Robin did finally contact Hassler in January 2003. Hassler testified that Robin set up visits with the children at that time and that Robin had been to all of the scheduled visits. Further, Robin told Hassler that she was interested in having her children back again.

Hassler did testify that other than starting visitation and completing treatment, Robin had not accomplished any other goals in her case plan or court report. Hassler also testified that other than visitation, Robin had not given the children any parental care or protection. Hassler further said that in her opinion, Robin's parental rights should be terminated because of "the length of time that [Robin] has had to follow the case plan and court report and her lack of follow-through on any part of the plan and the fact that these children have been out of the home for 23 out of 23 months." Hassler further opined that "[t]he kids again need some permanence and stability." Hassler next testified that she did not believe any Native American placements were available at the present time in the area and that she was unaware of any family member who was willing to take the children. Hassler testified that in her opinion, it was in the children's best interests to terminate Robin's parental rights, because "[t]hese children need to have some stability and security in their li[ves]."

On cross-examination, Hassler admitted that she did not know why Robin was in jail at the time of their first meeting or whether her treatment was voluntary or court ordered. Hassler also said that Robin contacted her very quickly after Robin's release from inpatient treatment and that Robin "did want her kids and then wanted to start to begin setting up a plan and working to get reunified with her children." Hassler also testified that Robin had tried to contact her in February 2003 to increase her visitation.

Renee Pardue, employed by Reach Out Foster Care, testified next. She testified that she had been present during Robin's visits with Brendon and that the visits had gone well. After Pardue testified, the hearing was continued in order to "allow . . . the tribe 20 days to intervene" if it so desired, pursuant to the ICWA.

The termination proceeding continued on April 7, 2003. At that point, Hassler again testified, indicating that the Rosebud Tribe had not intervened. Further, when she was asked if reasonable efforts had been made to preserve and reunify Robin's family, Hassler testified that "active efforts have been done on this case," that neither parent had followed through with case plans or recommendations, that only recently had Robin been cooperating with DHHS, and that the best interests of the children required terminating Robin's and Terrence's parental rights.

The children's guardian ad litem next called Robin to the stand. Robin admitted that she had had very little contact with the children since April 2001 and had "little to no contact until about the last 30 days or so." When asked if she had "a plan, a home set up to take the children back to," Robin indicated that she did not. Robin admitted to two prior DUI convictions, one pending DUI charge, five convictions for driving under suspension, and previous drug and shoplifting charges. Finally, Robin admitted that in the previous 22 to 24 months, she had seen her children "four or five times."

When questioned by her attorney, Robin testified that she was following up on her inpatient treatment with aftercare and that she was attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings. Robin further testified that her recent inpatient treatment for alcoholism was "the first time [she was] actually able to be accepted into a treatment program" and that she had tried previously to get into treatment but was unsuccessful. She testified that she contacted her children as soon as she was released from the treatment center; she also said that she was unable to contact the children while in the treatment facility because their foster parents "didn't give [their telephone number] to [Robin]" and that Robin did not try to get the number from DHHS because she "didn't think they would give it to [her] anyways." Robin's testimony indicated that her recent visits with the children had gone well, and that while Adrian did not recognize her at first, "he knows who [she is] now." Robin said that Mercedes called Robin her "real mom" and frequently asked "when she's gonna come home."

Robin said that she was not seeking employment at the present time, because she was waiting to be sentenced on her most recent DUI charge and because she wanted to move to Grand Island, Nebraska, in order to seek employment. She further testified that she would be willing to return to Scotts Bluff County for visits, that she presently was living with her mother in a stable environment, and that because she had been sober since completing her treatment, she would have a greater ability to complete goals set out in the case plans and court reports. On redirect examination, Robin did admit that she had failed to give DHHS current address and telephone number information at certain times during the previous 2 years. On recross-examination, Robin testified that her pending DUI sentencing stemmed from a 2001 arrest.

After closing arguments were heard, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both Robin and Terrence. The court found that "[Robin] made efforts, but it -- it has come too late. The children have been neglected too long. . . . Children are entitled to a stable environment." The court further found that "Dr. Hald is qualified [as an expert witness] by being a professional person having substantial education and experience in the area of child psychology." The court noted that Robin and Terrence "have given the juveniles no support, care or comfort or otherwise acted as responsible parents." The court held that "[t]ermination [of parental rights] is appropriate because the parents of the juveniles have effectively abandoned the juveniles for six months or more," that Robin and Terrence had "substantially and continuously or repeatedly neglected and refused to give the juveniles necessary parental care and protection," and that "reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family under the direction of the court have failed to correct the conditions leading to the determination." The court further found that the "juveniles have been in an out-of-home placement for more than 15 of the last, most recent 22 months."

Robin has timely appealed to this court.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Robin asserts, restated for purposes of discussion, that the juvenile court erred when it found that there was sufficient evidence supporting the termination of her parental rights and when it failed to properly apply § 43-1505(4).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"An order terminating parental rights pursuant to the Nebraska ICWA is reviewed de novo on the record, and an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion independent of the juvenile court's findings." In re Interest of Phoebe S. & Rebekah S., 11 Neb. App. 919, 932, 664 N.W.2d 470, 480 (2003). "However, when the evidence is in conflict, an appellate court may give weight to the fact that the juvenile court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of facts over another." Id.

ANALYSIS

§ 43-1505(4).

Robin first asserts that the juvenile court did not properly apply § 43-1505(4), which specifically provides:

.

Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under state law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.

.

Therefore, § 43-1505(4) requires proof of "active efforts" before the rights of an Indian parent can be terminated.

The juvenile court specifically found:

.

Following the determination that the juveniles were ones described in § 43-247(3)(a), reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family under the direction of the court have failed to correct the conditions leading to the determination. The parents have failed to comply in whole or in part with reasonable provisions material to the rehabilitative objectives of the plan.

.

This language appears to be culled specifically from Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(6) (Reissue 1998), the statute governing the termination of parental rights in non-ICWA situations. No other specific findings were made regarding the reunification of Robin and the children. Robin alleges that the juvenile court's failure to apply § 43-1505(4) was error and that therefore her parental rights should not have been terminated.

In support of her proposition that it was error for the juvenile court not to apply the correct statute, Robin cites In re Interest of Sabrienia B., 9 Neb. App. 888, 621 N.W.2d 836 (2001). In that case, we addressed the question of whether the "active efforts" discussed in § 43-1505(4) are different from the "reasonable efforts" discussed in § 43-292(6), which requires that courts, prior to terminating parental rights in certain situations, must find that "reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family . . . have failed to correct the conditions leading to the determination." In In re Interest of Sabrienia B., we held that "the ICWA requirement of 'active efforts' is separate and distinct from the 'reasonable efforts' provision of § 43-292(6)." 9 Neb. App. at 895, 621 N.W.2d at 842. We further held that "[t]he ICWA . . . mandates active efforts in every case involving an Indian child." Id.

Because the ICWA does specifically require a finding of "active efforts," it was error for the juvenile court to terminate Robin's parental rights without such a finding. However, our inquiry does not end here. "An order terminating parental rights pursuant to the Nebraska ICWA is reviewed de novo on the record, and an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion independent of the juvenile court's findings." In re Interest of Phoebe S. & Rebekah S., 11 Neb. App. 919, 932, 664 N.W.2d 470, 480 (2003). Therefore, we must determine whether "active efforts [were] made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup" of Robin's family and whether "these efforts have proved unsuccessful."

Insufficient Evidence.

Robin asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding that sufficient evidence was presented in the instant case to support terminating her parental rights. Specifically, Robin alleges that there was insufficient evidence presented to show that "active efforts [had] been made to provide services designed to prevent the breakup of Robin's Indian family and that those efforts had failed."

Numerous witnesses testified at Robin's parental rights termination hearing, detailing the various efforts that were made to reunify Robin with her children. Zach, the DHHS protection and safety worker who dealt with Robin and her children from March 2000 until he transferred the case in August 2001, testified that Robin had numerous opportunities to visit her children when they were first placed into foster care in 2001 and that she failed to visit the children on a regular basis.

Thompson, the DHHS protection and safety worker involved with Robin and the children from August 2001 until October 2002, testified that she had discussed case plans and court reports with Robin on numerous occasions and had explained what Robin needed to do in order to achieve reunification with her children. Thompson testified that Robin did nothing to comply with the case plans or court reports and that Robin rarely, if ever, visited her children. Thompson testified that the case plans included working with social workers and family support workers, among other services and programs, in order to help Robin reunify with the children, but that Robin had not complied with any of these goals. Thompson also indicated that Robin would often fail to provide her with a current address or telephone number and that there were many times DHHS did not have any way to contact Robin.

Hassler, the protection and safety worker dealing with Robin and the children from November 2002 until the time of the hearing, testified that Robin had taken an interest in visiting the children in late January 2003 and that Robin had completed treatment for her problems with alcohol. However, Hassler testified that Robin had failed to complete any of the other goals in the case plans, such as securing employment, finding a residence, or working with family support workers. Hassler further testified that Robin had taken an active interest in being with her children only within the 3 or 4 weeks preceding the hearing and that prior to that time, Robin had failed to give her children any parental care, protection, or financial support. Hassler also testified that "active efforts have even been done on this case" in attempts to prevent the breakup of Robin's family.

Robin herself admitted that between April 2001 and the time of the hearing, she had had "little or no contact" with her children, and that she had seen the children only four or five times in the previous 22 to 24 months. Robin admitted that she did not "have a plan, a home set up to take the children back to." When asked if she was willing to comply with the goals and recommendations of DHHS, Robin answered, "I'll try." She did testify that she had completed alcohol treatment and was participating in AA meetings, but she admitted that she had made no attempt to get in contact with her children via telephone during the preceding 2 years and that she had provided them with no support during that time. She further testified that she had not given DHHS current addresses or telephone numbers during portions of the preceding 2 years.

Based on our de novo review of the record, we find that "active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup" of Robin's family. We further find that "these efforts have proved unsuccessful." Numerous services and programs were in place to prevent the breakup of Robin's family, but Robin did not take advantage of any of these services. She failed to comply with any goals of the case plans designed by DHHS, and she did not visit her children when provided with the opportunity. Further, in her reply brief, Robin admits that "the efforts made to unify her family" were "factually significant." Reply brief for appellant at 3. In examining the instant case, it is evident that "active efforts" were made to prevent the breakup of Robin and her children. Thus, while the district court erred by applying § 43-292(6) instead of § 43-1505(4), that error is harmless, because our de novo review reveals that "active efforts" were made and that those efforts have "proved unsuccessful."

We will next address the other two allegations individually.

Expert Testimony.

Robin next alleges that there was insufficient expert testimony to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "continued custody of the children by Robin was likely to result in serious emotional and physical damage to the children." Section 43-1505(6) provides:

.

No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.

.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Dr. Hald testified that Brendon, Mercedes, and Adrian all suffer from adjustment disorder, with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct. Dr. Hald testified that Brendon had difficulty expressing his emotions and that he was at risk for numerous other psychological disorders. Dr. Hald indicated that Mercedes had characteristics of attachment disorder, and that the children needed to be raised "in a consistent manner and a manner that's very predictable, so that they can grow to reach the potential that they have as a -- as a human being." When asked if continued custody of Brendon by Robin and Terrence would be "likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to [Brendon]," Dr. Hald replied that "if they continue to parent as they have continued that that would be true, yes." Asked if Robin and Terrence's continued custody of Mercedes and Adrian would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage, Dr. Hald testified that "if [Robin and Terrance] remain absent, I can speak with a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that [Mercedes and Adrian] would have further difficulties, not knowing if [they have] a stable environment or not." Finally, Dr. Hald testified that all three children needed "a consistent home where they can be raised for the long term. . . . They need ongoing counseling to just help continue to be able to adjust to a new setting, be able to learn how to talk about their feelings, problem-solve, and feel safe and secure with their new family."

Dr. Hald did testify that he did not have contact with Robin at any point during his treatment of the children, that he had no information about Robin "other than that [she has not] been available to the children," and that he could not "speak to [Robin's] parenting skills." Robin argues that Dr. Hald's testimony was largely hypothetical and not case-specific to the instant case and that Dr. Hald's testimony therefore could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the continued custody" of the children by Robin would be "likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage" to the children. Robin asserts that "Dr. Hald was quite familiar with the children, but not with either parent. For this reason, there was insufficient proof presented at trial to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the children would suffer serious emotional or physical harm" if Robin's parental rights were not terminated. Brief for appellant at 15.

Robin's arguments indicate an incorrect reading of the operative statute, § 43-1505(6). While the statute does require proof beyond a reasonable doubt and also requires "testimony of qualified expert witnesses," it does not require that the testimony of an expert witness alone provide evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the children would likely suffer "serious emotional or physical damage" if custody was continued. Rather, the statute requires that the totality of the evidence presented at a termination hearing must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that termination of parental rights is appropriate. The fact that expert testimony is a required part of the evidence to be presented does not mean that the expert's testimony alone must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the children would be likely to suffer serious emotional or physical damage if custody was continued.

Prior to the 1 to 2 months immediately preceding the parental rights termination hearing, Robin had shown little inclination to comply with any of the recommendations or goals developed by DHHS, even though she knew that compliance with these goals and recommendations would likely mean reunification with her children. Our de novo review of the evidence, taking into account not only Dr. Hald's testimony but that of the other witnesses presented, indicates that the juvenile court did not err in finding sufficient evidence that the continued custody of the children by Robin would likely result in serious emotional or physical harm to the children.

Best Interests.

Finally, Robin asserts that there was insufficient evidence presented at the termination hearing to prove that terminating her parental rights to Brendon, Mercedes, and Adrian would be in their best interests. Her main argument to support this contention is that the juvenile court should not have reached a "best interests" analysis, because it should have found that the evidence presented did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "the continued custody of the child[ren] by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child[ren]," as required by § 43-1505(6). However, as previously discussed, we believe that the juvenile court did not err in finding that the requirements of § 43-1505(6) were met. Therefore, it was proper for the juvenile court to then consider whether terminating Robin's parental rights was in the children's best interests.

"[W]e will not ask the children to wait and see whether their mother grows up in the future." In re Interest of C.W. et al., 239 Neb. 817, 831, 479 N.W.2d 105, 115 (1992). Robin's children deserve and require a stable environment in their lives, and Robin has been unable to provide them with any modicum of stability. Unfortunately, her recent interest in reuniting with her children is a case of "too little, too late." Our de novo review of the evidence presented at the hearing indicates that the juvenile court did not err when it found that terminating Robin's parental rights was "in the juveniles' best interest."

* * *

Click the case caption above for the full text
of the Court's opinion.

We find that while the juvenile court did err by failing to properly apply § 43-1505(4), that error was harmless because there was sufficient evidence presented to show that "active efforts" were taken to prevent the breakup of Robin's family. Further, we find that sufficient evidence was presented to terminate Robin's parental rights, and we affirm the decision of the juvenile court.

Affirmed in favor of Defendent.

Unavailable

Dr. Mark Hald, a child and adolescent psychologist
.
John Zach, a DHHS a protection and safety worker
.
Twila Thompson, a DHHS a protection and safety worker
.
Linda Hassler, a DHHS protection and safety worker
.
Renee Pardue, employed by Reach Out Foster Care.

Reported by L. Hargraves.