State of North Dakota v. Raymond Gunn

Fargo, North Dakota criminal defense lawyers represented Defendant charged with second-degree murder.



Christopher Gunn, age 40, was charged with with murder for shooting and killing 41-year-old Eric Woodrow Hayes around 11 p.m. July 24 in the Loaf 'N Jug parking lot at 1201 N. University Drive in Fargo, across the street from North Dakota State University.



Defendant claimed self defense and stand your ground.



12.1-05-03. Self-defense.

A person is justified in using force upon another person to defend himself against danger of

imminent unlawful bodily injury, sexual assault, or detention by such other person, except that:

1. A person is not justified in using force for the purpose of resisting arrest, execution of

process, or other performance of duty by a public servant under color of law, but

excessive force may be resisted.

2. A person is not justified in using force if:

a. He intentionally provokes unlawful action by another person to cause bodily injury

or death to such other person; or

b. He has entered into a mutual combat with another person or is the initial

aggressor unless he is resisting force which is clearly excessive in the

circumstances. A person's use of defensive force after he withdraws from an

encounter and indicates to the other person that he has done so is justified if the

latter nevertheless continues or menaces unlawful action.



12.1-05-07.1. Use of deadly force - Presumption of fear of death or serious bodily

injury.

1. An individual is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or

serious bodily injury to that individual or another when using deadly force if:

a. The individual against whom the deadly force was used was in the process of

unlawfully and forcibly entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered and

remains within a dwelling, place of work, or occupied motor home or travel trailer

as defined in section 39-01-01, or if the individual had removed or was attempting

to remove another against that individual's will from the dwelling, place of work, or

occupied motor home or travel trailer as defined in section 39-01-01; and

b. The individual who uses deadly force knew or had reason to believe that an

unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had

occurred.

2. The presumption in subsection 1 may be rebutted by proof beyond a reasonable doubt

that the individual who used the deadly force did not have a reasonable fear of

imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury to that individual or another.

3. The presumption in subsection 1 does not apply if the court finds that any of the

following have occurred:

a. The individual against whom the deadly force is used has the right to be in or is a

lawful resident of the dwelling, place of work, or occupied motor home or travel

trailer as defined in section 39-01-01, including an owner, lessee, or titleholder,

and there is not a temporary or permanent domestic violence protection order or

any other order of no contact against that individual;

b. The individual removed or sought to be removed is a child or grandchild, or is

otherwise in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of, the individual

against whom the deadly force is used;

c. The individual who uses deadly force is engaged in the commission of a crime or

is using the dwelling, place of work, or occupied motor home or travel trailer as

defined in section 39-01-01 to further the commission of a crime; or

d. The individual against whom the deadly force is used is a law enforcement officer

who enters or attempts to enter a dwelling, place of work, or occupied motor

home or travel trailer as defined in section 39-01-01 in the performance of official

duties and the officer provided identification, if required, in accordance with any

applicable law or warrant from a court, or if the individual using force knew or

reasonably should have known that the individual entering or attempting to enter

was a law enforcement officer.

Not guilty.