Ronell Williams v. Lindenwood University

Ronell Williams (“plaintiff”) is a black male who attended Lindenwood
University before being expelled for disciplinary violations arising out of a party held
in student housing. Plaintiff appeals from a final order entered in the United States
District Court1 for the Eastern District of Missouri granting summary judgment in
favor of Lindenwood University on plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and racial
discrimination. See Williams v. Lindenwood University, No. 4:00CV00010 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2001) (hereinafter “slip op.”). For reversal, plaintiff argues that the
district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the university because
(1) he raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether his expulsion and denial of
readmission was based on his race and (2) he produced evidence that the university’s
proffered explanations for the expulsion and denial of readmission were pretexts for
racial discrimination. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the grant of
summary judgment and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.

* * *

While plaintiff was a student at Lindenwood University, he lived with Chad
Moore, who is also black, in a mobile home used by the university for student
housing (“the trailer”). Lindenwood University students who live in student housing
agree to abide by certain rules, including that alcohol is not allowed on campus (“the
alcohol policy”), visitation by members of the opposite sex is prohibited (“the
visitation rule”), and that students are responsible for the actions of their guests while
on campus.

On February 16, 1999, plaintiff, Moore, two white female students named
Kristen Bruening and Stephanie Denbrow (together, “the students”), and three
unidentified black males who were not students (together, “the nonstudents”)
participated in a party in the trailer. There was alcohol at the party in violation of the
alcohol policy. Denbrow’s and Bruening’s presence in the trailer was a violation of the visitation rule.2 Williams was responsible for the actions of the nonstudents while
they were on campus.

Denbow testified in her deposition that she initially went to the trailer that
night on her own accord to do laundry, and that Moore and plaintiff were both present
when she arrived. Bruening testified in her deposition that she accompanied Denbow
to the trailer, and that at approximately 9:00 p.m., both Moore and plaintiff
announced to them that other guests would be coming over. Denbrow and Bruening
decided to wait in the trailer to socialize with Moore, plaintiff, and others who would
be arriving later that evening. More than an hour later, the nonstudents arrived at the
trailer. Bruening testified that there was already alcohol present before the
nonstudents arrived. The uncontroverted testimony of the students at the party was
that plaintiff did not ever drink any of the alcohol, while Moore, Denbrow,3 Bruening,
and the nonstudents did drink it. The students all testified that the nonstudents did
not misbehave or act inappropriately during the party or ever cause anyone to feel
unsafe. Moore testified that he did not see anyone in danger at the party and that no
one made any sexual or inappropriate remarks. Similarly, Bruening testified that she
never felt threatened during the party. Bruening testified that, at different times, both
Moore and plaintiff left the party for a little while and returned later. Moore testified
that when he returned to the party, he turned on the stereo in his room.

At approximately 2:00 a.m., campus security officer Byron Steele, who is
black, and another campus security officer heard noise from the trailer, determined that its occupants were in violation of Lindenwood University’s “quiet hours policy,”
and approached the trailer to confront them. Steele testified in his deposition that
when he arrived at the trailer, neither of the women appeared to be in any trouble and
no one asked for any help; rather, everyone was “just partying and running around.”
Steele described the nonstudents’ appearance as “pretty nice.”

Steele testified that when he and the other campus security officer entered the
front of the trailer, he saw Moore and Bruening trying to run out the back door.
Breuning admitted that she and Moore went out the back door of the trailer when she
saw security coming, and that Steele had to call her at home at 3:00 a.m. to let her
know that he was aware she had been present at the party. Moore, too, testified that
he left with Bruening when the campus security officers arrived, and said that he
found out what happened from plaintiff when he returned to the trailer later, after the
campus security officers had left. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he was
cooperative with the campus security officers, answered all of their questions, and
told them who the nonstudents were. Steele confirmed that it was plaintiff who spoke
with him and that only plaintiff took responsibility for living in the trailer.

At approximately 2:20 a.m., Steele wrote out a three-page behavioral incident
report detailing his observations. In the report, Steele did not mention that the
nonstudents acted belligerently or violently, or that they did anything to make Steele
feel unsafe.

Steele also reported the incident to Joseph Steenbergen, the Lindenwood
University Dean of Students. Dean Steenbergen claimed that he learned from Steele
that the nonstudents were members of a gang, that they said that they were going to
“go through” the campus security officers, and that they were criminals with
outstanding arrest warrants. Dean Steenbergen testified that Steele seemed “pretty
scared” by the incident, that the nonstudents cursed at Steele, that Steele thought they were going to fight, and that this was the first time Steele had ever told him anything
like that.

After speaking with Steele, Dean Steenbergen expelled the students from the
university. Each of the students appealed their expulsion to the Lindenwood
University Dean of Admissions, David Williams. Dean Williams heard all of the
appeals and met individually with each of the four students while the university
investigated the incident. Moore, Bruening, and Denbrow were readmitted within
days. Plaintiff was denied readmission ostensibly because he created a dangerous
situation by bringing criminals and gang members to campus and because he
instigated all of the violations of Lindenwood University policy.

Throughout Lindenwood University’s investigation of the incident, there arose
several instances where (1) university administrators drew conclusions about the
incident which were not corroborated by the students, Steele, or the behavioral
incident report, and (2) university administrators made remarks about plaintiff and the
nonstudents which the students interpreted as racially discriminatory.

* * *

On January 4, 2000, plaintiff filed this action against Lindenwood University
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri alleging
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. On February 13, 2001, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Lindenwood University, holding that there were no
genuine issues of material fact and that Lindenwood University was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff failed to set forth a prima facie case of
racial discrimination. See slip op. at 9 (stating that plaintiff offered no evidence of
intentional discrimination and no evidence that Lindenwood University’s actions
were pretext for discrimination). This appeal followed.

* * *

The purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is to prohibit discrimination in the
"performance, modification and termination of contracts" and to protect "the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual
relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). Because plaintiff’s discrimination claim is
“based on inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence, it is governed by the
familiar burden-shifting analysis.” Carter v. St. Louis Univ., 167 F.3d 398, 401 (8th
Cir. 1999) (Carter). To establish a prima facie claim of racial discrimination under
42 U.S.C. § 1981, the plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a racial minority,
(2) the defendant intended to discriminate against him on the basis of race, and (3) the
discrimination concerned an area enumerated by the statute. See Mian v. Donaldson,
Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993). Once the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the burden shifts to
the defendant to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions to rebut
the presumption of discrimination. See Carter, 167 F.3d at 401. Then, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason was a pretext for unlawful
discrimination. See id. The “ultimate question of law [is] whether the evidence is
sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff.” Id., citing Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers,
Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1336-37 (8th Cir. 1996). We hold that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment because the evidence is sufficient to create genuine
issues of material fact with respect to plaintiff’s prima facie case and the issue of
pretext.

* * *

Click the case caption above for the full text of the Court's opinion.

For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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