United States of America v. JAMES MICHAEL BARTLEY

St. Louis, MO - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant with a unlawful possession of a firearm charge.

In 2011, Bartley was stopped for driving under the

influence (DUI). After Bartley's defense counsel questioned

his competence to stand trial, the state court ordered a mental

evaluation under Idaho Code § 18-211. The psychologist

who performed the evaluation found that Bartley "appeared

genuine and consistent in his presentation and belief, stating

that he is the son of God, experiencing persecution by those

who do not believe him. This appears to be a fixed delusional

belief with prominent religious features with possible

auditory hallucinations.” The psychologist believed that

Bartley's delusional disorder would prevent him from

assisting in his defense.

Based on its review of the mental evaluation, the court

found that Bartley lacked fitness to stand trial and lacked the

capacity to make informed decisions about his treatment. On

UNITED STATES V. BARTLEY 5

August 8, 2011, the court ordered Bartley committed to the

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare for evaluation and

treatment pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-212. There, Bartley

was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and chronic

mental illness. Six weeks after his commitment, the state

hospital determined that Bartley's competency was restored

and discharged him. On October 20, 2011, the court entered

an order terminating the commitment pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 18-212 and sentenced Bartley to probation on the DUI

charge.

II. The 2018 Offense

In July 2018, someone called the police because Bartley

was in the parking lot of a business, yelling obscenities at a

vehicle. A witness and Bartley argued, and the witness

recorded the interaction on his telephone. Bartley pointed a

gun at the witness and then left. Officers executed a search

warrant at Bartley's home and found firearms and

ammunition.

III. Procedural History

In denyingBartley's motion to dismiss the indictment, the

district court, applying intermediate scrutiny, concluded that

the firearm ban in § 922(g)(4) is not overburdensome

"because those to whom the statute applies can participate in

a petition process to restore their right to firearm possession.”

Bartley, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 1071. The court also rejected

Bartley's as-applied challenge to the statute. Id. The court

concluded that the 2011 state proceeding in which Bartley

was found incompetent to stand trial and committed to the

state hospital brought Bartley within the meaning of

6 UNITED STATES V. BARTLEY

§ 922(g)(4). Id. at 1073. Finally, the court rejected Bartley's

due process claim. Id.

Bartley entered a plea of guilty pursuant to a plea

agreement, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his

motion to dismiss the indictment. The court sentenced

Bartley to a twenty-month term of imprisonment. Bartley

timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo.

United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir.

2013). The district court's denial of a motion to dismiss the

indictment also is reviewed de novo. United States v.

Sineneng-Smith, 982 F.3d 766, 773 (9th Cir. 2020), pet. for

cert. filed, No. 20-1803 (U.S. Jun. 25, 2021). Although our

court has not addressed the issue, we agree with the district

court that the issue of whether a defendant's adjudication or

commitment comes within the meaning of § 922(g)(4) "is a

question of law to be determined by the court rather than a

question of fact to be reserved for the jury.” Bartley, 400 F.

Supp. 3d at 1072 (quoting United States v. McLinn, 896 F.3d

1152, 1156 (10th Cir. 2018)). The facts of Bartley's

circumstances are undisputed – the only question is whether

those facts come within the meaning of the statute, which is

a question of law. See McLinn, 896 F.3d at 1156 (stating that

"every court of appeals to have addressed the issue has held

that whether a defendant's adjudication or commitment

qualifies under the current version of § 922(g)(4) is a question

of law to be determined by a judge rather than a question of

fact reserved for the jury,” and concluding likewise).

UNITED STATES V. BARTLEY 7

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Bartley raises three arguments. First, he

contends that the 2011 competency proceedings did not

include sufficient due process protections to bring him within

the purview of § 922(g)(4). Second, he argues that the 2011

proceedings did not constitute an adjudication or commitment

within the meaning of the statute. Third, he argues that the

statute as applied to him violates his Second Amendment

rights.

I. Due Process

Contrary to Bartley's contention, the 2011 state

proceedings to determine his competency to face criminal

charges did not lack due process. He relies on the

observation in Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th

Cir. 2020), cert. denied, No. 20-819, 2021 WL 1602649 (Apr.

26, 2021), that "commitments under state-lawprocedures that

lack robust judicial involvement do not qualify as

commitments for purposes of § 922(g)(4).” Id. Mai relied

for this principle on United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45

(1st Cir. 2012), which addressed Maine's emergency

procedure for involuntary admission to psychiatric hospitals.

Unlike Maine's procedure for "full-scale commitments (as

opposed to temporary hospitalization),” the statute governing

the emergency procedure provided for temporary

hospitalization following ex parte procedures and thus did not

require a traditional adversary proceeding. Id. at 46. The

First Circuit concluded that "temporary hospitalizations

supported only by ex parte procedures” did not constitute a

commitment under § 922(g)(4). Id. at 50.

8 UNITED STATES V. BARTLEY

Bartley's commitment proceedings were unlike the

emergency procedure found insufficient in Rehlander. To the

contrary, Bartley was examined by a qualified psychologist

and represented by counsel, and the determination that he was

not fit to proceed was made by the court based on the

examiner's findings. See Idaho Code §§ 18-211, 18-212. In

addition, Idaho law requires an adversarial proceeding if

either the prosecutor or defense counsel contests the finding

of the report, and the party contesting the finding has the right

to cross-examine the examiner and offer evidence. Idaho

Code § 18-212(1). Bartley's commitment did not "lack

robust judicial involvement.” Mai, 952 F.3d at 1110.

Bartley also relies on the statement in Mai that

"[i]nvoluntary commitments comport with due process only

when the individual is found to be both mentally ill and

dangerous.” Id. (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80

(1992)). But Foucha, on which Mai relied, does not support

Bartley's due process argument. Foucha addressed the

constitutionality of a Louisiana statute that permitted the

continued civil commitment of the petitioner, who had been

found not guilty by reason of insanity. Foucha, 504 U.S. at

73–74. The statute required the petitioner to prove that he

was not dangerous in order to be released from a psychiatric

hospital, even though he no longer suffered from mental

illness. Id. The Court explained that, "even if [the

petitioner's] continued confinement were constitutionally

permissible, keeping [him] against his will in a mental

institution is improper absent a determination in civil

commitment proceedings of current mental illness and

dangerousness.” Id. at 78.

Unlike in Foucha, Bartley is not currently confined, and

his confinement after he was found not competent to stand

UNITED STATES V. BARTLEY 9

trial was for a constitutionally valid reason. Jackson v.

Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 733 (1972), held that a person's civil

commitment passes constitutional scrutiny even "[w]ithout a

finding of dangerousness” when the commitment is "for a

'reasonable period of time' necessary to determine whether

there is a substantial chance of his attaining the capacity to

stand trial in the foreseeable future.” And, as Justice

O'Connor pointed out, the opinion in Foucha "addresses only

the specific statutory scheme before us, which broadly

permits indefinite confinement of sane insanity acquittees in

psychiatric facilities.” Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86–87

(O'Connor, J., concurring). The statute governing Bartley's

confinement is nothing like the broad statute at issue in

Foucha, and he was found mentally ill, which was the

componenet missing during the extended confinement period

in Foucha. Mai accordingly does not support the contention

that the proceedings to determine Bartley's competency to

face criminal charges lacked due process.

II. Adjudication or Commitment

A. Finding of Dangerousness

Bartley contends that the 2011 proceedings did not

constitute an adjudication or commitment within the meaning

of § 922(g)(4) because the state court did not find that he was

both mentally ill and dangerous. This argument is not

supported by the plain language of the statute and its

implementing regulation, 27 C.F.R. § 478.11.

Section 922(g)(4) prohibits the possession of a firearm by

any person "who has been adjudicated as a mental defective

10 UNITED STATES V. BARTLEY

or who has been committed to a mental institution.”1 The

regulation defines the phrase "committed to a mental

institution” simply as "[a] formal commitment of a person to

a mental institution by a court, board, commission, or other

lawful authority.” 27 C.F.R. § 478.11. It includes "a

commitment to a mental institution involuntarily,”

"commitment for mental defectiveness or mental illness,” and

"commitments for other reasons, such as for drug use.” Id.

Nowhere does the statute or regulation require a finding that

the committed person was both mentally ill and dangerous.

Bartley relies on Mai's statement that "§ 922(g)(4)'s

prohibition as to those who were committed involuntarily . . .

applies only to those who were found, through procedures

satisfying due process, actually dangerous in the past.” Mai,

952 F.3d at 1121. This statement must be read in light of

Mai's holding. The plaintiff in Mai had been committed

involuntarily after a state court determined he was both

mentally ill and dangerous. Id. at 1110. He successfully

petitioned for relief from state law prohibiting him from

possessing a firearm, but he was forbidden by § 922(g)(4)

from purchasing a handgun, and there was no state

mechanism for relief from the federal prohibition. Id. He

1 We focus our discussion on the "committed” prong and conclude

that Bartley's commitment to the state hospital qualifies. In light of our

conclusion, we need not address whether the finding that Bartley was not

competent to stand trial was an adjudication "as a mental defective”

within the meaning of § 922(g)(4), although the definition of the phrase

in 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 indicates that it qualifies. We do note, as has the

Department of Justice, that the statutory phrase "mental defective” is an

unfortunate relic in the United States Code and does not comport with

current usage. See Amended Definition of "Adjudicated as a Mental

Defective” and "Committed to a Mental Institution” Summary, 79 Fed.

Reg. 774 (proposed Jan. 7, 2014).

UNITED STATES V. BARTLEY 11

brought an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(4), "arguing that

its continued application to him despite his alleged return to

mental health and peaceableness violates the Second

Amendment.” Id. at 1109. Mai held that "the prohibition on

the possession of firearms by persons, like Plaintiff, whom a

state court has found to be both mentally ill and dangerous is

a reasonable fit with the government's indisputably important

interest in preventing gun violence.” Id. Mai thus concluded

that the prohibition properly applied to the plaintiff. It did

not hold that findings of both mental illness and

dangerousness are always necessary in order for a state

commitment to come within the meaning of § 922(g)(4).

Such a requirement would be inconsistent with the plain

language of the statute.2

See Rehlander, 666 F.3d at 50

("[S]ection 922(g)(4) does not bar firearms possession for

those who are or were mentally ill and dangerous, but . . .

only for any person 'who has been adjudicated as a mental

defective' or 'has been committed to a mental institution.'”).

B. Idaho Code § 66-356

Bartley further argues that the 2011 competency

proceedings do not come within the meaning of § 922(g)(4)

because the state court did not make a finding under Idaho

Code § 66-356 that he is a person to whom § 922(g)(4)

applies.3

This argument is precluded by the language of the

2 Bartley's argument that his commitment does not qualify under

§ 922(g)(4) because he was not found dangerously mentally ill under

Idaho Code § 18-212(2) must be rejected for the same reason.

3 Section 66-356 is entitled "Relief from firearms disabilities” and

provides in part that a court that "[f]inds a defendant incompetent to stand

trial pursuant to section 18-212, Idaho Code, shall make a finding as to

12 UNITED STATES V. BARTLEY

statute and regulation, which do not require a separate

finding. The only question is whether he was "adjudicated as

a mental defective” or "committed to a mental institution.”

§ 922(g)(4); cf. NLRB v. Nat. Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600,

603 (1971) ("'In the absence of a plain indication to the

contrary, . . . it is to be assumed when Congress enacts a

statute that it does not intend to make its application

dependent on state law.'” (quoting NLRB v. Randolph Elec.

Membership Corp., 343 F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir. 1965))).

The state court order committing Bartley to the state

hospital falls within the meaning of "committed to a mental

institution” for purposes of § 922(g)(4). The phrase means a

"formal commitment of a person to a mental institution by a

court, board, commission, or other lawful authority,” and it

"includes a commitment to a mental institution

involuntarily.” 27 C.F.R. § 478.11. This is precisely what

occurred here. The state court ordered a mental evaluation of

Bartley after his defense counsel questioned his competence.

Based on the psychologist's evaluation, the court found

Bartley lacked fitness to stand trial and lacked the capacity to

make informed decisions about his treatment, and ordered

him committed to the state hospital for evaluation and

treatment under Idaho Code § 18-212. Bartley was

"committed to a mental institution” within the meaning of

§ 922(g)(4). See, e.g., United States v. McIlwain, 772 F.3d

688, 689, 697 (11th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the

appellant's commitment by an Alabama probate court

constituted a commitment under § 922(g)(4) where he

"received a formal hearing, was represented by an attorney,

and the state probate court heard sworn testimony and made

whether the subject of the proceeding is a person to whom the provisions

of 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(4) and (g)(4) apply.” Idaho Code § 66-356(1)(f).

UNITED STATES V. BARTLEY 13

substantive findings of fact that it included in its formal order

of commitment”); United States v. Dorsch, 363 F.3d 784,

786–87 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that the appellant "was

committed to a mental institution as contemplated by

§ 922(g)(4) and 27 C.F.R. § 478.11,” where a county board

found that he was mentally ill and ordered his involuntary

commitment to a mental facility following "a hearing during

which [he] was represented by counsel, was given the

opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses,

and during which a physician testified that [he] was mentally

ill”); United States v. Midgett, 198 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir.

1999) (concluding that the defendant's "confinement falls

squarely within any reasonable definition of 'committed' as

used in section 922(g)(4),” where he "was examined by a

competent mental health practitioner” and represented by

counsel, and a judge heard evidence, made factual findings,

concluded that he suffered from a mental illness, and issued

an order committing him to a mental institution); United

States v. Waters, 23 F.3d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding

that the defendant was committed within the meaning of

§ 922(g)(4) where he was committed to a mental health

facility pursuant to "established 'commitment' procedures

under New York State law”).

III. Second Amendment

The application of § 922(g)(4) to Bartley does not violate

his Second Amendment right to possess a firearm. He

concedes that this issue is controlled by Mai, which explained

that "[a] law does not burden Second Amendment rights 'if

it either falls within one of the "presumptively lawful

regulatory measures” identified in [District of Columbia v.

Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)] or regulates conduct that

historically has fallen outside the scope of the Second

14 UNITED STATES V. BARTLEY

Amendment.'” Mai, 952 F.3d at 1114 (quoting United States

v. Torres, 911 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 2019)). The

"presumptively lawful” measures identified by the Supreme

Court include "the 'longstanding prohibitions on the

possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.'” Id.

(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626).

Bartley contends, nonetheless, that § 922(g)(4) is

unconstitutional as applied to him, relying on his arguments

that his competency proceedings did not comport with due

process and that he was not found to be actually dangerous.

Although the "longstanding prohibition[] on the possession

of firearms by . . . the mentally ill” is presumptively lawful,

id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626), Mai explained that "the

'well-trodden and "judicious course”' taken by our court in

many recent cases” is to "assume, without deciding, that

§ 922(g)(4), as applied to [Bartley], burdens Second

Amendment rights.” Id. at 1114–15 (quoting Pena v. Lindley,

898 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Pena

v. Horan, 141 S. Ct. 1081 (2020)).

Therefore, assuming, without deciding, that the

application of § 922(g)(4) to Bartley burdens Second

Amendment rights, intermediate scrutiny applies. Id. at 1115.

This means "the government's statutory objective must be

'significant, substantial, or important,' and there must be a

'reasonable fit' between the challenged law and that

objective.” Id. (quoting Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816,

821–22 (9th Cir. 2016)). Bartley has conceded that "there is

a significant interest in protecting the community from gun

violence,” Bartley, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 1071, and he does not

argue that there is not a reasonable fit between § 922(g)(4)

and that objective. Cf. Mai, 952 F.3d at 1117 (noting that the

plaintiff did not challenge the conclusion that § 922(g)(4) is

UNITED STATES V. BARTLEY 15

"a reasonable fit for the government's laudable goal of

preventing gun violence”). Nor does he challenge the

conclusion in Mai that scientific evidence supported the

congressional judgment that those who have been

involuntarily committed to a mental institution posed an

increased risk of violence. See id. at 1116–21.

As discussed above, Bartley's due process rights were not

violated by his competency proceedings, and a finding of

actual dangerousness is not required for the statute to apply

to him. Bartley contends only that the issues he raises are

"magnified” as applied to him because he is "a twicehonorably discharged veteran” and a college graduate and has

no other felony convictions. He does not, however, offer any

evidence or explanation as to why those factors mean that

§ 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional as applied to him. Cf.Chovan,

735 F.3d at 1142 (rejecting an as-applied challenge to

§ 922(g)(9) where the defendant offered no evidence to

contradict the evidence that the rate of domestic violence

recidivism is high).

Moreover, the burden on Bartley's Second Amendment

rights is weaker than the burden in Mai, where the state

offered no relief from the firearm prohibition. By contrast,

here, Idaho law provides for the restoration of rights. See

Idaho Code § 66-356(2). There is no indication that Bartley

ever sought such restoration or whether he could have

obtained it. Mai acknowledged that the plaintiff did not have

any avenue for relief from § 922(g)(4), but nonetheless

concluded that "§ 922(g)(4)'s prohibition on those who have

been involuntarily committed to a mental institution is a

reasonable fit for the important goal of reducing gun

violence.” Mai, 952 F.3d at 1121. The prohibition on

Bartley's right to possess a firearm is "'presumptively

16 UNITED STATES V. BARTLEY

lawful,'” not an unconstitutional burden.

4

Id. at 1113

(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26); see Torres, 911 F.3d

at 1258 (stating that presumptively lawful measures such as

the ban on possession of firearms by the mentally ill

"comport with the Second Amendment because they affect

individuals or conduct unprotected by the right to keep and

bear arms” (quoting Binderup v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d

336, 343 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc))).

The judgment is AFFIRMED