Richard Carraher v. Target Corp.

Richard "Tom" Carraher appeals from the entry of summary judgment on his
age discrimination claim against Target Corporation. Carraher alleges that Target
terminated his employment in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01-.41. On appeal, Carraher contends that the district court1
erred in its pretext analysis and did not view the evidence in the light most favorable
to him. We affirm.

I.

Target hired Carraher, then 56 years old, as a recruiter in June 2003. In
September 2003, Carraher became an executive recruiter for Target's southern region,
which stretches from Texas to Florida. Carraher, however, worked in Minneapolis,
Minnesota.

In August 2004, Dan Caspersen became Target's Vice President for Stores
Human Resources. Caspersen sought to "decentralize" Target's executive recruiting
by moving recruiters to the regions for which they were recruiting. As a result of the
decentralization, Carraher's position was relocated to Texas, the region for which he
primarily recruited. When Carraher's supervisor, Kim Strong, asked Carraher if he
would be willing to relocate, Carraher informed her that he preferred to remain in
Minneapolis and would seek another position with Target there.

After unsuccessfully seeking four different recruiting positions at Target's
Minneapolis headquarters, Carraher e-mailed Strong on January 24, 2005, and
informed her that he was interested in the possibility of relocating to Texas. On
January 27, 2005, Carraher met with Strong to discuss the issue. According to
Carraher, Strong presented him with only one option at that meeting: termination with
severance. Strong asserts that they discussed three options: severance, the prospect
of Carraher relocating to Texas, and a different recruiting position, located in
Minneapolis, that Carraher had originally proposed.

On February 2, 2005, Carraher sent a letter to Todd Blackwell, Target's
Executive Vice President for Human Resources, alleging that his impending
termination was motivated by age bias. Carraher failed to return to work after
February 4, 2005. On March 4, 2005, Target terminated his employment.

On October 11, 2005, Carraher filed suit alleging age discrimination in
violation of the ADEA and the MHRA, and retaliation.2 The district court granted
summary judgment to Target on all Carraher's claims. Carraher appeals.

* * *

The ADEA and the MHRA both forbid an employer from taking adverse
employment actions against an employee because of his age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1);
Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 2; see Chambers v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 351 F.3d
848, 855 (8th Cir. 2003) (age discrimination claims under the MHRA are analyzed in
the same fashion as claims under the ADEA). To establish a claim of intentional age
discrimination, a plaintiff may present direct evidence of such discrimination or may
prove his claim through circumstantial evidence. See Mayer v. Nextel W. Corp., 318
F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 2003). "[D]irect evidence is evidence ‘showing a specific link
between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to
support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually
motivated' the adverse employment action." Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d
733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64,
66 (8th Cir. 1997)). Where the plaintiff presents only circumstantial evidence of
discrimination, as Carraher does in the instant case, we apply the familiar burdenshifting
analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. See 411 U.S. 792,
800-04 (1973).3

* * *