State of Minnesota vs. Tara Renaye Molnau

In April 2015 law enforcement applied for a warrant to search the home of N.Z.

because police believed N.Z. was selling methamphetamine out of his home. The warrant

application sought permission to search the premises and N.Z. for drugs and evidence of

drug trafficking. The warrant application also indicated that police believed that a woman,

M.L.D., resided at the premises with N.Z., but the application did not provide any other

information about M.L.D. or indicate that she was involved in drug trafficking. The district

court issued a warrant authorizing the search of N.Z. and his home for methamphetamine,

drug paraphernalia, and materials associated with drug trafficking.

When police arrived at N.Z.’s home to execute the warrant, they found appellant,

Tara Molnau, sitting on a couch in the living room. Police searched the living room and

found marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia. Police also searched the kitchen, where they

found methamphetamine and “suspected hash oil.” They also found a purse on the kitchen

table. The purse contained 4.002 grams of methamphetamine and Molnau’s identification

card.

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Respondent State of Minnesota charged Molnau with third-degree controlled

substance crime, Minn. Stat. § 152.023 (2014), for possessing methamphetamine. Before

trial, Molnau moved to suppress the methamphetamine found in her purse. She argued that

the search violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches,

because as a visitor to N.Z.’s residence, the search of her purse was beyond the scope of

the warrant. The district court denied Molnau’s motion, concluding that irrespective of

whether police knew the purse belonged to Molnau, “[t]he officers executing the search

warrant could reasonably assume that the items listed in the search warrant could be

concealed in a purse,” and that because the purse was not in Molnau’s possession, police

could properly search it.

Molnau entered a plea of not guilty, waived her right to a jury trial and her other

trial rights, and stipulated to the facts under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The parties

agreed that the charge was based exclusively on the methamphetamine found in the purse.

After a bench trial, the district court found Molnau guilty, stayed imposition of sentence,

and placed Molnau on probation.

Molnau appealed the suppression issue, arguing that as a visitor not named in the

warrant, she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her belongings, including her purse,

even if they were not in her possession when the warrant was executed. The court of

appeals affirmed the denial of Molnau’s motion to suppress. State v. Molnau, No. A16

0330, 2016 WL 7337090, at *4 (Minn. App. Dec. 19, 2016). We granted Molnau’s petition

for review.

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ANALYSIS

On appeal, Molnau argues that the district court erred in refusing to suppress the

contents of her purse as the fruits of an unconstitutional search. When reviewing the denial

of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s factual findings for

clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn.

2009). The State bears the burden of proving that police obtained the challenged evidence

in accord with the Constitution. State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 141 N.W.2d 3, 13–14

(Minn. 1965).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that “[t]he

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against

unreasonable searches . . . shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.1 In general,

warrantless searches are unreasonable. Riley v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473,

2482 (2014). Here, police had a warrant to search N.Z. and his residence, but they did not

have a warrant to search Molnau. Accordingly, we must decide whether the search of

Molnau’s purse, which was not in her possession when police found and searched it, was

nevertheless reasonable because it was within the scope of the warrant.

A search that exceeds the scope of a warrant is unconstitutional. Horton v.

California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990). A warrant generally authorizes police to search all

containers they reasonably believe could contain the items sought. United States v. Ross,



1 Molnau also relies on Minn. Const. art. I, § 10, but makes no argument that we should extend broader protections under Article I, Section 10 of Minnesota Constitution than those provided under the Fourth Amendment.

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456 U.S. 798, 820–21 (1982). A warrant, however, does not authorize the police to search

the body and outer clothing of persons who are not named in the warrant.2 See Ybarra v.

Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (holding that a search warrant authorizing the search of a

tavern and a bartender did not authorize police to search customers at the tavern when the

warrant was executed); see also State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Minn. 1996)

(recognizing that a purse carried by a person is protected from search under a premises

warrant because it is an extension of the person).

In this case, the purse was not in Molnau’s possession when police searched it, so

the search did not involve a search of Molnau herself. See Wynne, 552 N.W.2d at 220. But

the search of her purse could still violate the Fourth Amendment if it was beyond the scope

of the warrant. The State argues that the search of Molnau’s purse was within the scope of

the warrant because the purse was not in her possession and it was capable of hiding the

narcotics for which police were authorized to search. For her part, Molnau argues that the

warrant did not authorize the search of her purse because she was a mere guest at N.Z.’s

home and her relationship with the home was too attenuated for her belongings to be

searched under the warrant.

We have examined whether a search exceeds the scope of a warrant using a totality

of-the-circumstances analysis. See State v. Thisius, 281 N.W.2d 645, 645–46 (Minn.

1978). The parties ask us to depart from that method of analysis in favor of tests that give



2 The State does not argue that the warrant was an “all persons” warrant, which would authorize police to search all people found at the premises subject to the warrant. See State v. Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Minn. 1985) (discussing “all persons” warrants).

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dispositive weight to single factors.3 We decline this invitation because “the touchstone of

the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” In re Welfare of M.L.M., 813 N.W.2d 26, 31

(2012) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The determination of what is

reasonable in a given situation is necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry best evaluated by

considering all of the circumstances. Accordingly, we conclude that the totality-of-the

circumstances analysis remains the appropriate framework for assessing whether the search

of a guest’s belongings is unreasonable because it is beyond the scope of a premises

warrant.

Examining all of the circumstances here, we conclude that the search of Molnau’s

purse was reasonable. Several facts are important to our analysis. First, the warrant

application suggests that police believed that a woman, M.L.D., lived at the home with

N.Z., and the parties acknowledge that a purse is an item typically associated with women.



3 The parties have identified three tests that courts have used to determine when a search of a guest’s belongings exceeds the scope of a premises search warrant: (1) the physical possession test, see State v. Reid, 77 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (applying the physical possession test); (2) the relationship test, see United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429, 431-32 (1st Cir. 1973) (applying the relationship test); and (3) the actual notice test, see State v. Nabarro, 525 P.2d 573, 576-77 (Haw. 1974) (applying the actual notice test). They ask us to adopt one of these tests. For the reasons stated above, we decline to do so.



The State further argues that the Supreme Court effectively rejected any test except the physical possession test in Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999). Houghton examined the scope of a warrantless automobile search. Id. at 300–03. In a car, both drivers and passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. Id. This case does not involve the automobile exception, and we therefore conclude that Houghton does not require us to abandon the totality-of-the-circumstances approach.



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Second, at the time of the search, the police did not know to whom the purse belonged.

Third, police did not find the purse in anyone’s possession; it was found unattended in a

different room than where police found Molnau. Finally, it was reasonable for police to

believe that they could find the drugs and contraband for which they were searching in the

purse.

We emphasize that all of the facts and circumstances should be considered in

determining whether the search of a guest’s belongings falls within the scope of a premises

warrant. Taken together, the facts here show that the search of Molnau’s purse was

reasonable, and therefore the search did not violate Molnau’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Because the search was reasonable, we hold that the district court did not err in denying

Molnau’s motion to suppress.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Affirmed.